Is libertarian free will coherent?

[The Thinker]

So one can know that something happens without knowing how it happens.
And thus one can know that something is possible without knowing how it happens.
So it's conceivable that one could know that LFW is possible, without knowing how LFW happens.

Really, your requests for proof are like saying that you doubt that human memory exists or is even possible, and thus you demand that someone must explain how human memory works in order for you to believe that human memory is possible. How would you answer someone who demanded that of you? I'm curious to see an example of the kind of answer you are asking for.

No comparison, because there is nothing internally incoherent about the brain causing consciousness, there is something internally incoherent about LFW. Internally incoherent ideas have to be shown to be coherent in order to even get off the ground to be acceptable.

[Joel]

I don't know if I'm understanding what you are asking. If you are hungry and eat a sandwich in order to not be hungry, then that (to not be hungry) is your purpose in eating. It is the end toward, and rationale according to, which your action is directed/ordered. That order doesn't cause your action; it is a description of the action's order/rationale. And an action with order/rationale is not random/arbitrary, regardless whether the actor/causer was, in turn, caused to act in that way.

Hunger is a physical process of the body, and all physical processes are determined by the laws of physics and it can indeed cause actions. I need you to give me an example of a purpose that cannot be reduced to physical processes because any time you do it will be determined and that cannot be free.

A person can choose to delay or refrain from eating. People sometimes intentionally go on fasts. So no, hunger does not necessarily cause you to eat. (But of course this was just an example, and not the main point of my comment. People have a wide variety of purposes for actions beyond bodily pains and pleasures. I'm sure you can think of some.)

The important point is that randomness/arbitrariness has to do with lack of order/rationale, not with lack of efficient cause.

No!!! I doesn't show any of those things at all.

That's not the question. The scenario only needs to be compatible with those things, not to show those things. (We are talking about logical possibility, not actuality.)

It causes them to pop into your head again, as all thoughts are judged as unique in their existence.

It can't pop into your head again if it never left your head. You were thinking about it continuously.

If on the other hand you want to classify (a) thinking of X at time t and (b) thinking of X at time t+dt (with no gap of not thinking of X in between) as always being distinct thoughts, then your argument still completely collapses, because your argument depends on a supposed contradiction in freely deciding (at time t) whether to think X at time t+dt.

It's not [a counter-example to Thinker's argument]. You can't have the same thought about a thought, before you have the thought. If I think of Pepsi right now, it is not somehow my "free choice" or a demonstration of an ability to choose my thoughts -- just because I've thought about Pepsi before. This is not in anyway an example of my (1).

The question before us is not whether it is a free choice. It is not to demonstrate free choice. Rather your argument was trying to argue that it's impossible. Thus the counter-example only needs to evade your supposed impossibility. It doesn't need to demonstrate any actual free thought.

Neither of those are thoughts you could have chosen beforehand. The decision to continue thinking about X popped into your head without your control. There is no way around this.

You still aren't understanding what I'm saying. You were thinking all the thoughts involved prior to making the choice. Selecting which idea to actualize is not, itself a thought. No new thought arises in the selecting/acting, because the thought about the idea of the action was already in your mind prior to the selecting.

You even conceded that a device implanted into your head that controls your thoughts would be indistinguishable from what you claim is "free will" from your subjective experience

No I didn't. I said that if it is indistinguishable, then as far as we know either is possible, and so LFW is possible.

Interestingly, on another point, you've already conceded that the initial thought is not something you could've chosen.

Not at all. I argued that: even if the initial ideas were in your head involuntarily, that doesn't preclude freely choosing from among them.

And if subsequent thoughts were only possible because of that initial unchosen thought, that itself puts free will in a hamper.

Necessary condition is not cause.

The buck has to stop somewhere. Why not at the agent?

Because that violates the kalam. (I personally don't care, but theists like you do.) Why not stop at the big bang?

The fact that it stops somewhere does not violate kalam. It must stop somewhere. Kalam says nothing about where that stopping point is. Making use of only kalam, the stopping point could be anywhere, including in an agent.

The choice began to exist in the agent.

Sure, the actualization of the potential action began in the agent, because it was caused by the agent.

You said the selection itself isn't a thought. So then what is it?

The actualizing of one of the potential actions.

Both have a causal chain. And both chains must have a beginning (uncaused cause, to avoid infinite regress). We just disagree about where is the beginning. Why not at the agent? I see nothing logically impossible about that.

An uncaused event that is a thought, cannot be LFW, because uncaused events cannot be controlled, as per my (1).

I never proposed that thoughts were uncaused. I only proposed that they could possibly be caused by the agent. The beginning of the chain is the agent, not the thought.

Time t1: Agent is thinking about ideas of possible actions (e.g. possible action X, possible action Y, ...), and is deliberating about them.
Time t2: Agent selects one of those ideas to actualize.
Time t3: Agent is doing action Y (or X, or Z,...)

The selecting (at time t2) is not, itself a thought, but a selection from a set of thoughts (about possible action X, possible action Y, ...).
The action at time t3 is the actualization of one of those ideas. The agent makes the selection, i.e. causes the action.
And as I've said, I'm treating agent/soul/mind as synonymous.

All three (t1,t2,t3) are instances of thoughts that popped into your mind

No. All the thoughts involved were in your mind already at t1. No new thoughts arise in t2 and t3. The selecting at t2 involves only the ideas already being thought at t1. And the idea of the action at t3 was already being thought at t1. Neither the selecting or the acting is, itself, a thought. The ideas of selecting and acting were already being contemplated at t1.

And t2 is a thought. It is a mental process.

Not all mental processes are thoughts. Thinking thoughts (i.e. ideas) is only one of our mental faculties. We also have other faculties like memory, passions, sensation, moral sense, communication, and of course, will. Clearly the thought of an action is different than the action itself, because one can think the thought of an action without doing the action. Thus acting is different from thinking. At t1 you were thinking about selecting, without yet doing the selecting. Thus the selecting at t2 is different from thinking, and is not a thought.

The truth of your (1) is not the question we are discussing (and thus evidence for or against it is not the discussion). We are only discussing whether your (1) is possible. If we can't tell whether (1) is true or false, then (as far as we know) each is possible, and thus (1) is possible.

I know. I'm not saying you must demonstrate my (1). Your examples are simply not evidence that it is even possible we are in control of our wills, since they do not demonstrate control.

Then why were you complaining that what I said "cannot be used as evidence for my (1)", when you know that that is not the question we are discussing? You realize that demonstrating control is not the question we are discussing.
And again, the relevant point is that you said that in my scenario we can't tell whether your (1) is true or false, so then (as far as we know) each is possible, and thus your (1) is possible.

This all stems from your confusing view.

What are you still confused about, regarding my view?

That's why I was a detailed chronological order of events of your view of a free will decision.

I gave one (t1, t2, t3).

For example, on your view, is the uncaused [COLOR=#333333]agent/soul/mind completely distinct from the physical body or not?

For my view, it doesn't matter. If you like you can picture the whole soul/mind/body as a single unit, a single entity: the agent. It doesn't matter to my view whether those three things are identical to each other or are distinct parts of the agent.

Does the uncaused agent/soul/mind cause the initial thought?

What initial thought? In my t1, t2, t3 chronology, all the relevant thoughts are being thought already at t1, and it is irrelevant what caused those thoughts to be in your mind. The only thing that is relevant is that the action at t3 is freely chosen.

[Joel]

So one can know that something happens without knowing how it happens.
And thus one can know that something is possible without knowing how it happens.
So it's conceivable that one could know that LFW is possible, without knowing how LFW happens.

Really, your requests for proof are like saying that you doubt that human memory exists or is even possible, and thus you demand that someone must explain how human memory works in order for you to believe that human memory is possible. How would you answer someone who demanded that of you? I'm curious to see an example of the kind of answer you are asking for.

No comparison, because there is nothing internally incoherent about the brain causing consciousness, there is something internally incoherent about LFW. Internally incoherent ideas have to be shown to be coherent in order to even get off the ground to be acceptable.

But for this exercise, suppose that someone says to you that they think the concept of human memory is internally incoherent, and says you must give a positive proof that it is coherent. How would you respond. If you like we can role play: I'll play the part of the person thinking that human memory is incoherent.

Or you can pick a different example if you like. E.g. suppose the person is claiming that the concept of the brain causing consciousness is internally incoherent and asks you for a positive proof that it is coherent.

This will be a useful exercise, because you will be able to give us an example of the kind of answer you are asking for.

And surely you can't just answer that you believe there is nothing internally incoherent about those concepts. And you can't answer that the request is valid only for internally incoherent concepts, because that is begging the question.

[seer]

Because my basic beliefs are not refuted by empirical evidence, the Scientology claim is.

That is nonsense Thinker, it is not about content, some circular arguments can be perfectly true, but not logically valid. That is the whole point of the trilemma, all three options are equally non-starters. Yet you will gladly impale yourself on one irrational horn while pointing a finger at others who are impaled on a different horn. Completely hypocritical. And your choice of which horn to choose is arbitrary, and your horn leads to this:

One can stop at self-evidence or common sense or fundamental principles or speaking ex cathedra or at any other evidence, but in doing so, the intention to install 'certain' justification is abandoned.

A break of searching at a certain point, which indeed appears principally feasible, but would mean a random suspension of the principle of sufficient reason.

No I'm not. Arbitrary is defined as "based on random choice or personal whim, rather than any reason or system," and I am not doing that. I have a system of reason. I don't just put ideas on a wall, close my eyes, and throw a dart at it and go with whatever idea the dart landed on. That would be arbitrary.

I did rationally justify my properly basic beliefs a few comments ago ad it is based on a system of reason and is not totally arbitrary, and I explained that you cannot just make any belief be properly basic because of the fact that some beliefs can be empirically shown to be false, or logically incoherent, like Scientology, and therefore a refuted belief cannot be properly basic. Are really this dumb that you cannot get this, or, will you never get it like the B-theory of time, which you utterly failed to grasp?

Are you this dense? Of course it is arbitrary, according to the above just about any belief could be properly basic if we don't have a defeater. And really Thinker, do you really believe you did well in that debate on B-Theory? Sad...

[The Thinker]

That is nonsense Thinker, it is not about content, some circular arguments can be perfectly true, but not logically valid. That is the whole point of the trilemma, all three options are equally non-starters. Yet you will gladly impale yourself on one irrational horn while pointing a finger at others who are impaled on a different horn. Completely hypocritical. And your choice of which horn to choose is arbitrary, and your horn leads to this:

That in no way refutes the fact that Scientology is empirically false, as are many other religions. They are not all equally non-starters. The circular logic approach is probably the worst of the three because the subject in the belief (e.g. Scientology, Christianity) can be logically incoherent internally, or empirically refuted. The axiomatic approach if you use epistemology economy (assuming the fewest axioms) like I do, prevents all of this. That's why your "Christianity is true, because Christianity is true," doesn't have a leg to stand on. And it thinking this way shows that you really don't have any good reasons to justify your religious beliefs, that's why you have to resort to such absurd logic.

Are you this dense? Of course it is arbitrary, according to the above just about any belief could be properly basic if we don't have a defeater.

Yes, we have defeaters which wildly eliminate many beliefs as candidates for being properly basic. Something that is arbitrary is done on a whim and without reason, I gave you a logical reason how I choose my basic beliefs, therefore it cannot be arbitrary.

And really Thinker, do you really believe you did well in that debate on B-Theory? Sad...

Yes, I did. You're just too ignorant to understand the science behind the B-theory.

[seer]

That in no way refutes the fact that Scientology is empirically false, as are many other religions. They are not all equally non-starters. The circular logic approach is probably the worst of the three because the subject in the belief (e.g. Scientology, Christianity) can be logically incoherent internally, or empirically refuted. The axiomatic approach if you use epistemology economy (assuming the fewest axioms) like I do, prevents all of this. That's why your "Christianity is true, because Christianity is true," doesn't have a leg to stand on. And it thinking this way shows that you really don't have any good reasons to justify your religious beliefs, that's why you have to resort to such absurd logic.

Yes, and that is your bias Thinker. Your choice of which horn you decided to be impaled on is arbitrary. Content of specific arguments are immaterial at this starting point. Like I said circular arguments can be perfectly true yet logically invalid. And according to the trilemma (which you brought up) your choice is not logically valid.

Yes, we have defeaters which wildly eliminate many beliefs as candidates for being properly basic. Something that is arbitrary is done on a whim and without reason, I gave you a logical reason how I choose my basic beliefs, therefore it cannot be arbitrary.

How do you know you are not being arbitrary? Can you show, without being circular, that your brain is dictating non-arbitrary information?

[The Thinker]

Yes, and that is your bias Thinker. Your choice of which horn you decided to be impaled on is arbitrary. Content of specific arguments are immaterial at this starting point. Like I said circular arguments can be perfectly true yet logically invalid. And according to the trilemma (which you brought up) your choice is not logically valid.

The trilemma does not allow for all claims to be equally true or valid. That is one of the points. You seem to think that all claims are equally valid, or equally irrational. That is something you need to make a positive argument for. So go ahead.

How do you know you are not being arbitrary? Can you show, without being circular, that your brain is dictating non-arbitrary information?

I already showed you that. But your disabled brain just keeps asserting your point of view over and over, and information doesn't seem to be able to enter your brain. You are a perfect example of a brain on religion: factually void, emotionally driven, and faith based.

[seer]

The trilemma does not allow for all claims to be equally true or valid. That is one of the points. You seem to think that all claims are equally valid, or equally irrational. That is something you need to make a positive argument for. So go ahead.

OK, so your horn is only a little less irrational? That is your argument?

I already showed you that. But your disabled brain just keeps asserting your point of view over and over, and information doesn't seem to be able to enter your brain. You are a perfect example of a brain on religion: factually void, emotionally driven, and faith based.

No you keep appealing to my conscious understanding, with your conscious understanding. But conscious understanding plays no part in your worldview. And the only way you could know that your beliefs are non-arbitrary is by rational introspection - which is meaningless, according to you.

I did start a new thread on this in case you missed it, which you didn't: http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...ism-Irrational

[The Thinker]

But for this exercise, suppose that someone says to you that they think the concept of human memory is internally incoherent, and says you must give a positive proof that it is coherent. How would you respond. If you like we can role play: I'll play the part of the person thinking that human memory is incoherent.

Or you can pick a different example if you like. E.g. suppose the person is claiming that the concept of the brain causing consciousness is internally incoherent and asks you for a positive proof that it is coherent.

This will be a useful exercise, because you will be able to give us an example of the kind of answer you are asking for.

And surely you can't just answer that you believe there is nothing internally incoherent about those concepts. And you can't answer that the request is valid only for internally incoherent concepts, because that is begging the question.

They'd have to make an argument showing why it is incoherent, just like I did with LFW. That which is asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.

[The Thinker]

OK, so your horn is only a little less irrational? That is your argument?

No. I'm saying your claim that all claims are equally valid or invalid is false. I need you to demonstrate as best you can that this is the case.

No you keep appealing to my conscious understanding, with your conscious understanding. But conscious understanding plays no part in your worldview. And the only way you could know that your beliefs are non-arbitrary is by rational introspection - which is meaningless, according to you.

I did start a new thread on this in case you missed it, which you didn't: http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...ism-Irrational

Conscious understanding does play a role, because conscious understanding is tantamount to having a certain brain state that would be different if you didn't understand. Nothing about that makes rational introspection meaningless.

Your view is incoherent because libertarian free will is incoherent, nor is it compatible with science. Feel free to show how it is coherent anytime you want. Good luck!

[seer]

No. I'm saying your claim that all claims are equally valid or invalid is false. I need you to demonstrate as best you can that this is the case.

[The Thinker]

I need to cut this down to only the relevant points. So I will shorten my response.

A person can choose to delay or refrain from eating. People sometimes intentionally go on fasts. So no, hunger does not necessarily cause you to eat. (But of course this was just an example, and not the main point of my comment. People have a wide variety of purposes for actions beyond bodily pains and pleasures. I'm sure you can think of some.)

I never said it necessarily causes you to eat. I said it "can".

The important point is that randomness/arbitrariness has to do with lack of order/rationale, not with lack of efficient cause.

Something truly random I would think wouldn't even have an efficient cause.

That's not the question. The scenario only needs to be compatible with those things, not to show those things. (We are talking about logical possibility, not actuality.)

I agree. It doesn't show they are logically possible.

It can't pop into your head again if it never left your head. You were thinking about it continuously.

If on the other hand you want to classify (a) thinking of X at time t and (b) thinking of X at time t+dt (with no gap of not thinking of X in between) as always being distinct thoughts, then your argument still completely collapses, because your argument depends on a supposed contradiction in freely deciding (at time t) whether to think X at time t+dt.

If it never left your head then it is still that thought that popped into your head that you admit you couldn't have chosen, and would therefore not be an example of my (1). If you deny this, you need to demonstrate how you could have chosen the initial thought.

You still aren't understanding what I'm saying. You were thinking all the thoughts involved prior to making the choice. Selecting which idea to actualize is not, itself a thought. No new thought arises in the selecting/acting, because the thought about the idea of the action was already in your mind prior to the selecting.

If "Selecting which idea to actualize is not, itself a thought" then I don't see how you can have any mental control over it. How would you distinguish it from a random process, or something determined by physical process that you could've had no mental control over?

No I didn't. I said that if it is indistinguishable, then as far as we know either is possible, and so LFW is possible.

But you cannot say that my (1) holds, which is that we are in control of our minds, or that it is even logically possible. You would need to show how LFW offers something different, because a device implanted into your brain would resolve the problem of not being able to choose your thoughts, because obviously the device would do that.

Not at all. I argued that: even if the initial ideas were in your head involuntarily, that doesn't preclude freely choosing from among them.

Ok, so show me how the initial thought could be mentally chosen. And you have simply not shown that preceding thoughts would be freely chosen. You even claimed it wouldn't be a thought that chooses. How can that be LFW?

The fact that it stops somewhere does not violate kalam. It must stop somewhere. Kalam says nothing about where that stopping point is. Making use of only kalam, the stopping point could be anywhere, including in an agent.


Sure, the actualization of the potential action began in the agent, because it was caused by the agent.


The actualizing of one of the potential actions.


I never proposed that thoughts were uncaused. I only proposed that they could possibly be caused by the agent. The beginning of the chain is the agent, not the thought.

It does violate it because it proposes something that begins to exist without a cause. On your view, the thought is caused by the agent. What causes the agent to cause the thought? On your view nothing does. The agent's decision to cause the thought begins to exist without a cause.

No. All the thoughts involved were in your mind already at t1. No new thoughts arise in t2 and t3. The selecting at t2 involves only the ideas already being thought at t1. And the idea of the action at t3 was already being thought at t1. Neither the selecting or the acting is, itself, a thought. The ideas of selecting and acting were already being contemplated at t1.

I'm not buying this idea that t2 when the "Agent selects one of those ideas to actualize" is not itself a thought. A selection process is a mental event (again here I'm assuming an ontology friendly to your view) and a mental event is a thought.

Not all mental processes are thoughts. Thinking thoughts (i.e. ideas) is only one of our mental faculties. We also have other faculties like memory, passions, sensation, moral sense, communication, and of course, will. Clearly the thought of an action is different than the action itself, because one can think the thought of an action without doing the action. Thus acting is different from thinking. At t1 you were thinking about selecting, without yet doing the selecting. Thus the selecting at t2 is different from thinking, and is not a thought.

You have to choose the option mentally before you take the action. So the selection is a thought. Furthermore, in your example, there are no actions taking place. Your whole example is of thinking about X and then thinking about whether to keep thinking about X or not. It's all mental and involves no physical action at all. Someone completely paralyzes can engage in this thought experiment.

Then why were you complaining that what I said "cannot be used as evidence for my (1)", when you know that that is not the question we are discussing? You realize that demonstrating control is not the question we are discussing.
And again, the relevant point is that you said that in my scenario we can't tell whether your (1) is true or false, so then (as far as we know) each is possible, and thus your (1) is possible.

You keep on getting this confused. I when I said "cannot be used as evidence for my (1)", I meant it cannot be used as evidence for my (1) to show it is possible.

What are you still confused about, regarding my view?

A chronological order of events showing what starts and causes what when a "free" decision is made.

I gave one (t1, t2, t3).

No you didn't. In your t1 an "Agent is thinking about ideas of possible actions" but you do not explain what an agent is, nor do you explain what caused this agent to think about ideas of possible actions. If an agent is both the soul and the body, then bodies are physical and are determined by physical forces, and no soul can alter that, so this right here would not explain anything, it would introduce more confusion.

For my view, it doesn't matter. If you like you can picture the whole soul/mind/body as a single unit, a single entity: the agent. It doesn't matter to my view whether those three things are identical to each other or are distinct parts of the agent.

Wait, then saying the agent caused the thought is the same thing as saying the body caused the thought, and on the case that would be epiphenominalism, which is my view, and that view is not compatible with LFW.

What initial thought? In my t1, t2, t3 chronology, all the relevant thoughts are being thought already at t1, and it is irrelevant what caused those thoughts to be in your mind. The only thing that is relevant is that the action at t3 is freely chosen.

It matters. If the whole this is started by something not freely willed, it impedes LFW. And I'm not talking about someone forcing you to think X. I need an explanation of how the initial thought can be freely willed by us being in control of it.

I also still don't see how t3 is a freely chosen thought. How does the agent select at t2 if it is not a mental event or thought? How can you ensure that the agent is even involved? If nothing causes the agent to cause the thought, why should I believe that we are in control of our thoughts? If the agent = the body, bodies have physical causes. Basically your explanation and view is a mess.

[The Thinker]

No. Not if they employ ontological/epistemological economy, as I do. It's the most rational view there.

[Joel]

I never said [hunger] necessarily causes you to eat.

Then that leaves open the possibility of freedom of choice. You claimed that I couldn't use hunger as an example of purpose that isn't cause, because hunger deterministically causes you to eat. But if it doesn't necessarily cause you to eat (you could do otherwise), the fact you ate doesn't imply that hunger was the cause.

Something truly random I would think wouldn't even have an efficient cause.

What you are proposing here is that "random" implies "lacks an efficient cause". But that doesn't mean "lacks an efficient cause" implies "random". And is consistent with my saying that having purpose/order/rationale is sufficient to make something not random.

E.g.,

agent has cause & has purpose => not random/arbitrary
agent has cause & lacks purpose => not random/arbitrary
agent lacks cause & has purpose => not random/arbitrary
agent lacks cause & lacks purpose => random/arbitrary

That's not the question. The scenario only needs to be compatible with those things, not to show those things. (We are talking about logical possibility, not actuality.)

I agree. It doesn't show they are logically possible.

The most one can do to show them logically possible is provide a model/scenario that is consistent with them. And my scenario is.

If it never left your head then it is still that thought that popped into your head that you admit you couldn't have chosen,

(I didn't admit any such thing. I said it's irrelevant, but I'm willing to suppose for the sake of argument that it was something you didn't choose.)
Even if we suppose that the popping into your head at t-dt was involuntary, that doesn't imply that your continuing to think it at t+dt is involuntary. They are different events. Your thinking it at t-dt doesn't imply that you must think it at t+dt. At t+dt you might keep thinking it, or you might go make a sandwich instead. So there's no contradiction with the thought at t+dt being freely chosen.

If "Selecting which idea to actualize is not, itself a thought" then I don't see how you can have any mental control over it.

That's bizarre. The mental faculty of thinking a thought is not the faculty of control. Those are different things. That they are distinct doesn't imply that you lack either of them.

How would you distinguish it from a random process, or something determined by physical process that you could've had no mental control over?

This line of questioning doesn't help you. If we can't tell whether it is LFW or not, then (as far as we know) it possibly is LFW and possible isn't, and thus LFW is possible.

It does violate it because it proposes something that begins to exist without a cause. On your view, the thought is caused by the agent. What causes the agent to cause the thought? On your view nothing does. The agent's decision to cause the thought begins to exist without a cause.

But in my view, the agent's "decision" (or "selecting from among the alternative ideas") is not a thing. Thus it is not a thing that comes to be. Rather it's just a way of speaking about the agent actualizing one of the ideas of possible actions. The only thing that comes to be is the action (such as thinking a thought). Or in other words, the only thing that comes to be is a new causal chain, and the agent causes the first effect in that new causal chain.

I'm not buying this idea that t2 when the "Agent selects one of those ideas to actualize" is not itself a thought.

A thought is just the contemplation of an idea. The agent actually selecting is not the mere contemplation of an idea, which would not be causally effective. And the thought of the agent selecting is not the same as the agent selecting, because the agent can think that thought without selecting. Thinking a thought and acting are two different things. They are different human faculties.

You have to choose the option mentally before you take the action. So the selection is a thought.

First, I'm not sure your premise here is true. I was thinking of selecting being identical to starting the new causal chain (or at least simultaneous with).

Second, even if there were some time delay between the first new step in the causal chain (caused to come to be by the agent) and the rest of the new chain that follows deterministically from that first step, that would not imply that the causing of that first step is a thought. Indeed, the faculty of doing such a thing (if we have it) seems very different from thinking a thought. Like the difference between thinking really hard about moving your hand, vs actually moving your hand. They are different faculties.

Furthermore, in your example, there are no actions taking place. Your whole example is of thinking about X and then thinking about whether to keep thinking about X or not.

No, my t1, t2, t3 sequence applies to any choice/action (whether that is kicking a ball, or continuing to contemplate X).

For your convenience I repeat it here:

Time t1: Agent is thinking about ideas of possible actions (e.g. possible action X, possible action Y, ...), and is deliberating about them.
Time t2: Agent selects one of those ideas to actualize.
Time t3: Agent is doing action Y (or X, or Z,...)

You keep on getting this confused. I when I said "cannot be used as evidence for my (1)", I meant it cannot be used as evidence for my (1) to show it is possible.

I see, the confusion comes from your saying something that means something different from what you mean to say. I encourage you to try to be more precise about this distinction, because it is the very issue of which question we are discussing, and thus is a distinction fundamental to the discussion.

A chronological order of events showing what starts and causes what when a "free" decision is made.

I gave one (t1, t2, t3).

No you didn't. In your t1 an "Agent is thinking about ideas of possible actions" but you do not explain what an agent is, nor do you explain what caused this agent to think about ideas of possible actions. If an agent is both the soul and the body, then bodies are physical and are determined by physical forces, and no soul can alter that, so this right here would not explain anything, it would introduce more confusion.

Definitions are separate from the chronological order of events.
I suppose for our discussion, an agent means a human being, since the discussion is about the possibility of human LFW.
What caused the thoughts at t1 is irrelevant. The LFW choice the sequence is describing is the action at t3.

I don't think I need to even talk about theories of soul/body, because the chronology doesn't refer to them. You can think of the human being in question as a single unit--and individual being. Theories of soul/body unity or duality or whatever are discussion for a different time.

(As I side note, your claim that no soul can affect the body would be seriously begging the question. But it's irrelevant to the model I'm presenting.)

For my view, it doesn't matter. If you like you can picture the whole soul/mind/body as a single unit, a single entity: the agent. It doesn't matter to my view whether those three things are identical to each other or are distinct parts of the agent.

Wait, then saying the agent caused the thought is the same thing as saying the body caused the thought, and on the case that would be epiphenominalism, which is my view, and that view is not compatible with LFW.

At most your statement here could refer only a particular mind/body theory (and I mentioned multiple possible theories). But because my model is agnostic to mind/body theory, the choice is not relevant. So whether the mind is part of the body is irrelevant. (And even if the mind were part of the body, your claim that that precludes LFW would be begging the question. You'd be assuming bodily, and thus mental, determinism.)

What initial thought? In my t1, t2, t3 chronology, all the relevant thoughts are being thought already at t1, and it is irrelevant what caused those thoughts to be in your mind. The only thing that is relevant is that the action at t3 is freely chosen.

It matters. If the whole this is started by something not freely willed, it impedes LFW.

Only if you assume that what happens at t2 and t3 is determined by the events of t1. But that would be assuming determinism, which would be begging the question.

I also still don't see how t3 is a freely chosen thought. How does the agent select at t2 if it is not a mental event or thought?

It is a mental event in the sense that it is the mind doing something. But it's different from a thought, as I've explained above. Those are different mental faculties.

How can you ensure that the agent is even involved?

By definition, in my model, the agent does it: "Time t2: Agent selects one of those ideas to actualize." I don't need to show that my model is true. It only needs to be consistent with your OP's 1, 2, and 3 (which it is), showing them to be possible.

If nothing causes the agent to cause the thought, why should I believe that we are in control of our thoughts?

Because that is the only sense in which the agent can be truly in control of the agent's thoughts. If something else does cause the agent to cause the thought, then we can't believe that the agent is control of the agent's thoughts.

[seer]

No. Not if they employ ontological/epistemological economy, as I do. It's the most rational view there.