Is libertarian free will coherent?

[The Thinker]

I have not said that.
I'll try explaining in a different way. Suppose you are pushing a cart toward a goal. The cause of the cart's movement is you pushing it. The goal is the thing aimed at (the purpose). The goal is not the thing that causes the cart's movement. The cause and the purpose are two different things. And the existence of a goal is not sufficient to cause the movement.

That example makes no sense. The person's purpose to push the cart is caused by a physical brain process which they could not have had libertarian free will over.

Sure, in the excluded-middle sense. But a thing (that is caused or uncaused) can also have other properties besides, say being green or blue. Thus leading to many combinations of possible properties.

But those other properties may not have any influence on the cause of the thing. Once again you are stuck with two options: either a thing is caused or uncaused.

That 'claim' is just part of the definition of my model. And the model is consistent with your (1). That's all I need. The burden would be on you to prove that my model is self-contradictory.

That model is not in any way consistent with my (1) because once again all you've done is assert that at t2 the agent chooses their will. That doesn't in any way show my (1) is logically possible. This has basically all been an utter waste of my time, just like our debate over morality a few months back.

First, the only thing the agent need control is the action, and, in my view, the action is caused.

Secondly, I never suggested that purpose is part of the control of the action; I said it implies the action is non-arbitrary.

My (1) is that we are in control of our will, it doesn't say anything about action. So in order to show LFW is logically possible you need to show my (1). If the agent cannot control its will and its will results in the action, then you have not at all shown LFW.

Purpose would be a cause, and a something caused would not be LFW. And how would purpose limit the uncaused will? It's uncaused! To limit its possibilities would put a causal constraint on it.

This makes no sense. There is no Y in my question.

You're question was a little confusing. I agree that just because we cannot determine whether something is true, that does not imply it is false. It could be true or false. But that does not apply to LFW. On LFW there is a logical problem it faces that other things (which might look identical to LFW according to you) do not have. And so that does not allow LFW to be possibly true.

1) If there is no difference between LFW and determinism, then what are we debating about?
2) You yourself stated the difference in your OP.
3) That there is a difference does not imply that we will be able to observationally tell the difference.

My view of course is that there is a difference, and one that is experimentally testable, but you keep claiming that LFW would not be able to be distinguished from determinism (or maybe randomness too). If you were not claiming this, then I asked you to show me the difference. Now you're back to telling me we cannot tell the difference. So be clear on what you believe. Just spell it out concisely. Is your view that LFW is true but we cannot tell by any test or observation? Yes or no? Stop wasting my time.

Yes, the problem I describe makes no sense--in exactly the same way the problem you describe about LFW makes no sense. In the case of LFW, the agent is X and the action is Y, and the "will" is just another word for the causation Z.

It doesn't match the actual problems of LFW at all.

To say a person made a LFW choice is just to say that the person was an uncaused causer. And your position is that that is logically impossible. If it's not logically impossible, then the debate is settled.

No, the debate would not be settled, because an uncaused causer would not be able to control their will - because it's uncaused - and this would negate LFW.

But you are asking for something that is not necessary. The only uncaused thing is the agent. So you are complaining that the agent doesn't control the agent (in the situation where the agent does control the agent's action (which is caused)). If the agent controls the action, what more control could we want?

It is absolutely necessary that the agent be able to control its will/mind/thoughts in order to have LFW. That was the whole thing behind my (1).

As I said before, your "will" is just another word for your control (of your actions). So your insistence that you control your control, is like insisting that X cause its causation of Y. That doesn't add anything meaningful to the concept.

Bingo! That's exactly why LFW is incoherent. We cannot control the things we're caused to do. They either have prior causes which we can't control, or they are uncaused which we can't control either. The debate is settled. LFW is incoherent.

Perhaps because that is the extent of the agent's faculty/ability. Perhaps the agent has the power to select within that confines but lacks the power to select outside of it. A person's abilities are limited.

None of this makes any sense. Something uncaused would not have any limitations on it. It should even be able to violate the laws of physics in principle.

One example to illustrate this (contemplating the idea of contemplating X without actually contemplating X) is the case where you are struggling to remember X. The fact that your memory has not (yet) successfully recalled X implies that you are not actually contemplating X itself. Yet the fact that you are struggling to recall X implies that you are thinking about the idea of contemplating X. You are trying to contemplate X but have not yet successfully done so. Thus the former is possible without the latter.

You aren't thinking about thinking about X because you've forgotten X. This is not a comparison. False analogy.

It's easier to grasp in examples I gave before: You can contemplate the quadratic equation in the abstract, without the particular content of the equation being in your conscious mind at the moment. We could come up with various similar examples, contemplating the idea of the Gettysburg Address in the abstract without contemplating the actual words of the Address.

That's irrelevant to my example. You don't have to be thinking about all the content of a subject all the time.

How so?

Because it could cause t2.

Now you're just wasting my time. The debate is over. You've basically conceded.

So then you must adopt a self-changing uncaused causer, in which case the objection I was addressing vanishes.

A self changing uncaused causer is also incoherent. None of your options make any logical sense.

Says you.

Says logic.

I didn't say deity.

Doesn't matter. Unless you're willing to tell me another type of being that us an uncaused causer of the universe, we all know that what you're talking about is a god.

By it not being deterministic. It seems that your problem is that you insist on thinking of it as a deterministic thing, which begs the question.

I am not at all presupposing determinism. On indeterminism the thing must change in order to cause one effect in one scenario and another effect (or no effect) in another scenario. If the thing in question is ontologically identical in each scenario, saying it causes a different effect in one make no logical sense. Go ahead and logically explain this if you disagree. Determinism/indeterminism is irrelevant. Change/unchange is.

Oh and you keep claiming that I'm begging the question. What question is that? And let me remind you that you've begged dozens of questions on this thread.

It seems you've walked yourself into a contradiction. At least one uncaused causer has existed (whether God or the Big Bang or whatever). In the event of its acting as an uncaused causer, it either was self-changing or not. You seem to be saying that each of those options is logically impossible and thus false, which is a contradiction.

I didn't make any contradiction at all. First, there is no requirement for anything uncaused. There could be an infinite regress of causes, and causality could go backwards in our past if there is another universe before our big bang with entropy increasing in what we'd consider our past direction. Second, an uncaused big bang doesn't have to self-change, especially on the B-theory of time. But a god that is an uncaused causer must self-change, unless you're willing to concede that it has no control over what it thinks, desires, or wills.

[Joel]

But the only thing being asked for in this thread is logical consistency.

No that was a brief hypothetical model that I raised for a particular purpose. It is not the model I've been arguing for generally.

You sure seem to know a lot about immaterial things. You must have evidence of their natures?

Why would you want to avoid an infinite regress?

You want to say that it's 'turtles all the way down'?

The rock was not supposed to be volitional in the example. It was the thing moved, not the mover. I intentionally chose a rock as an example of a non-volitional, deterministic thing.

[Joel]

I'll try explaining in a different way. Suppose you are pushing a cart toward a goal. The cause of the cart's movement is you pushing it. The goal is the thing aimed at (the purpose). The goal is not the thing that causes the cart's movement. The cause and the purpose are two different things. And the existence of a goal is not sufficient to cause the movement.

That example makes no sense.

I really don't know how you are confusing cause and purpose. Cause is like the thing behind, pushing. Purpose is the thing ahead, aimed at. Purpose is not cause.

And how would purpose limit the uncaused will? It's uncaused! To limit its possibilities would put a causal constraint on it.

I never said it limits the will.

Sure, in the excluded-middle sense. But a thing (that is caused or uncaused) can also have other properties besides, say being green or blue. Thus leading to many combinations of possible properties.

But those other properties may not have any influence on the cause of the thing.

I think that was my point. (that purpose is distinct from cause.)

That model is not in any way consistent with my (1) because once again all you've done is assert that at t2 the agent chooses their will.

How is the agent choosing their will at t2 not consistent with your (1)?

First, the only thing the agent need control is the action, and, in my view, the action is caused.

My (1) is that we are in control of our will, it doesn't say anything about action.

I am increasingly thinking that your (1) is unnecessary and adds no additional meaning. Will just refers to a person's control. There is no more need to insist that an agent controls their control, any more than there is need to insist that X causes X's causation of Y. That additional step (in both cases) seems to add nothing meaningful. To say the LFW agent controls the action but not the control of the action makes no sense.

And if the agent is uncaused, yet controls the agent's action, it would seem no more is required.

As I said before, your "will" is just another word for your control (of your actions). So your insistence that you control your control, is like insisting that X cause its causation of Y. That doesn't add anything meaningful to the concept.

Bingo! That's exactly why LFW is incoherent.

Your insisting on a phrase that doesn't add anything meaninful to the concept of LFW makes LFW incoherent?

[If the things we do] are uncaused...we can't control [them]. The debate is settled. LFW is incoherent.

The things the agent does are caused: by the agent.
If you are trying to say that an uncaused agent cannot control the agent's actions, that would be begging the question.

Yes, the problem I describe makes no sense--in exactly the same way the problem you describe about LFW makes no sense. In the case of LFW, the agent is X and the action is Y, and the "will" is just another word for the causation Z.

It doesn't match the actual problems of LFW at all.

How so?

My view of course is that there is a difference, and one that is experimentally testable,

Out of curiosity, how would you experimentally test it?

but you keep claiming that LFW would not be able to be distinguished from determinism (or maybe randomness too).

I never claimed that. I only said that if we were not able, that would only help my position: It would mean we wouldn't be able to know, so to the extent of our ability to know, any of them (including LFW) would be possible.

Thus the question is not very relevant to my argument.

So be clear on what you believe. Just spell it out concisely. Is your view that LFW is true but we cannot tell by any test or observation? Yes or no? Stop wasting my time.

For the sake of this thread, I don't care one way or the other whether it's experimentally testable. We are only talking about logical possibility. And either answer to the question only seems to help me.

Perhaps because that is the extent of the agent's faculty/ability. Perhaps the agent has the power to select within that confines but lacks the power to select outside of it. A person's abilities are limited.

None of this makes any sense. Something uncaused would not have any limitations on it. It should even be able to violate the laws of physics in principle.

You yourself agreed that a person's abilities are limited.
As for your latter two sentences, I don't know how you would reach such conclusions. You seem to know something about uncaused causers that I don't.

One example to illustrate this (contemplating the idea of contemplating X without actually contemplating X) is the case where you are struggling to remember X. The fact that your memory has not (yet) successfully recalled X implies that you are not actually contemplating X itself. Yet the fact that you are struggling to recall X implies that you are thinking about the idea of contemplating X. You are trying to contemplate X but have not yet successfully done so. Thus the former is possible without the latter.

You aren't thinking about thinking about X because you've forgotten X. This is not a comparison. False analogy.

If after a moment, you succeed in recalling X, then that proves that you did not forget X. It was retained in your memory, which was just responding more slowly that you wished.

It's easier to grasp in examples I gave before: You can contemplate the quadratic equation in the abstract, without the particular content of the equation being in your conscious mind at the moment. We could come up with various similar examples, contemplating the idea of the Gettysburg Address in the abstract without contemplating the actual words of the Address.

That's irrelevant to my example. You don't have to be thinking about all the content of a subject all the time.

My point is that you don't have to be thinking about the exact content when you decide whether to think through the content. You can just be thinking about the whole in the abstract at the time that you make the decision.

Whether t1 is involuntary or not does make a difference on t2

How so?

Because it could cause t2.

But we are intentionally, by hypothesis, considering only the case in which t1 does not cause t2. (In which case, whether t1 is involuntary does not make a difference on t2.)

Now you're just wasting my time. The debate is over. You've basically conceded.

No, the situation is I am convinced that my possibilities are examples of how you can deliberate whether to think a thought, without a contradiction (because the two thoughts are not identical).
And you are convinced that my possibilities don't do so, and I don't know why you think they don't.
If neither of us can explain ourselves to the other better, then we may be at an impasse on this particular point of the debate, unless someone else can jump in and help us out.

To cause something requires change, because the causer has to do something. Otherwise it cannot cause anything.

Says logic.

No, it doesn't. You haven't provided any such deductive argument.

On indeterminism the thing must change in order to cause one effect in one scenario and another effect (or no effect) in another scenario. If the thing in question is ontologically identical in each scenario, saying it causes a different effect in one make no logical sense. Go ahead and logically explain this if you disagree. Determinism/indeterminism is irrelevant. Change/unchange is.

As far as I know, sodium atoms are identical to each other. And an identical sodium atom in different scenarios can result in different effects. If that's true of something deterministic like a sodium atom, a fortiori it should be true for indeterminism.

Doesn't matter. Unless you're willing to tell me another type of being that us an uncaused causer of the universe, we all know that what you're talking about is a god.

Before, you were claiming that it must be the Big Bang.

I didn't make any contradiction at all. First, there is no requirement for anything uncaused. There could be an infinite regress of causes,

!! I find that to be illogical. Turtles all the way down?
It amounts to an abandonment of determinism/causality in that there is no sufficient cause or explanation for anything.

Second, an uncaused big bang doesn't have to self-change

That contradicts what you said in post #190 that "[an unchanging Uncaused Causer of the universe] is [not] logically possible. To cause something requires change"

[The Thinker]

I really don't know how you are confusing cause and purpose. Cause is like the thing behind, pushing. Purpose is the thing ahead, aimed at. Purpose is not cause.

I'm not confusing anything. You are just trying to use these concepts in ways that does not help your view.

I never said it limits the will.

You said it makes it non-arbitrary. That is a limitation.

I think that was my point. (that purpose is distinct from cause.)

You still have yet to explain how purpose can have any effect of something uncaused.

How is the agent choosing their will at t2 not consistent with your (1)?

You haven't demonstrated that the agent chooses its will at t2. You've just asserted it. So that does not show my (1) is possible.

I am increasingly thinking that your (1) is unnecessary and adds no additional meaning. Will just refers to a person's control. There is no more need to insist that an agent controls their control, any more than there is need to insist that X causes X's causation of Y. That additional step (in both cases) seems to add nothing meaningful. To say the LFW agent controls the action but not the control of the action makes no sense.

And if the agent is uncaused, yet controls the agent's action, it would seem no more is required.

That's absurd. If the agent cannot control its will, it has no free will. It's that simple. The action is a whole other debate. This would relate to my (2) and (3) but you still haven't shown my (1).

Your insisting on a phrase that doesn't add anything meaninful to the concept of LFW makes LFW incoherent?

No no. My insistence on you being able to demonstrate how its logically possible for us to control our will (my 1) which is absolutely critical for LFW to get off the table, and for which you just conceded, shows LFW is incoherent.

The things the agent does are caused: by the agent.
If you are trying to say that an uncaused agent cannot control the agent's actions, that would be begging the question.

No, I'm saying if our will is uncaused we cannot have any control over it. What is it that makes this so hard for your brain to get?

How so?

Your problem made no sense. The problems of LFW do make sense, they are actual real problems.

Out of curiosity, how would you experimentally test it?

A test would have to show at the very least mental causation on physical matter. That could be tested.

I never claimed that. I only said that if we were not able, that would only help my position: It would mean we wouldn't be able to know, so to the extent of our ability to know, any of them (including LFW) would be possible.

Thus the question is not very relevant to my argument.

But I already answered that view and told you why it is false: But that does not apply to LFW. On LFW there is a logical problem it faces that other things (which might look identical to LFW according to you) do not have. And so that does not allow LFW to be possibly true.

You yourself agreed that a person's abilities are limited.
As for your latter two sentences, I don't know how you would reach such conclusions. You seem to know something about uncaused causers that I don't.

How? Where? Quote me because the context will probably indicate why I may have said it.

If after a moment, you succeed in recalling X, then that proves that you did not forget X. It was retained in your memory, which was just responding more slowly that you wished.

Trying to remember something is not the same thing as thinking about thinking about ice cream. False analogy.

My point is that you don't have to be thinking about the exact content when you decide whether to think through the content. You can just be thinking about the whole in the abstract at the time that you make the decision.

It doesn't matter. You've already conceded that we cannot control our will. Now you're just wasting my time.

But we are intentionally, by hypothesis, considering only the case in which t1 does not cause t2. (In which case, whether t1 is involuntary does not make a difference on t2.)

Ok, then t2 is uncaused and the agent couldn't have had any control over it. Case closed.

No, the situation is I am convinced that my possibilities are examples of how you can deliberate whether to think a thought, without a contradiction (because the two thoughts are not identical).
And you are convinced that my possibilities don't do so, and I don't know why you think they don't.
If neither of us can explain ourselves to the other better, then we may be at an impasse on this particular point of the debate, unless someone else can jump in and help us out.

You are basically asserting that the agent is in control of its will/thoughts if it thinks the same thought or a similar thought prior. That doesn't in any way show LFW is logically possible.

No, it doesn't. You haven't provided any such deductive argument.

You don't need a deductive argument for this. You just need common sense. If you were frozen solid including all your thoughts, how could you make a cup of tea? Or initiate an action? It is impossible without change.

As far as I know, sodium atoms are identical to each other. And an identical sodium atom in different scenarios can result in different effects. If that's true of something deterministic like a sodium atom, a fortiori it should be true for indeterminism.

As I said before this is not an issue between determinism/indeterminism. This is an issue between change/non-change. The sodium atoms are constantly changing and moving, and bonding/unbonding. That's how they change.

Before, you were claiming that it must be the Big Bang.

What? The big bang isn't a being. You've lost your mind.

!! I find that to be illogical. Turtles all the way down?
It amounts to an abandonment of determinism/causality in that there is no sufficient cause or explanation for anything.

There is nothing illogical about that and it doesn't in any way abandon determinism/causality. If you think the principle of sufficient reason must be true then you're begging the question.

That contradicts what you said in post #190 that "[an unchanging Uncaused Causer of the universe] is [not] logically possible. To cause something requires change"

Are you kidding me? A big bang and an uncaused causer are two totally different things. For one thing, one is a being, and the other isn't. One has a mind the other doesn't. The big bang is just the beginning part of the universe after inflation.


Basically you've already conceded my (1) so I have no need to further interact with you and show you how you're almost constantly wrong again and again. It's fun but it's a waste of my time.

[Joel]

I never said [purpose] limits the will.

You said it makes it non-arbitrary. That is a limitation.

Not if it's something in addition--something independent. Like how being green or blue doesn't limit something's size.

You still have yet to explain how purpose can have any effect of something uncaused.

I have repeatedly said it doesn't. It only determines whether the action (which is caused) is arbitrary. But purpose is not a cause of the action. (Similar to how being green determines the color of a thing but does not cause a thing to come to be.)

That model is not in any way consistent with my (1)

How is the agent choosing their will at t2 not consistent with your (1)?

You haven't demonstrated that the agent chooses its will at t2. You've just asserted it. So that does not show my (1) is possible.

That's not an answer to my question. Whether my model is correct is not the same question as whether it is logically consistent with your (1).

I am increasingly thinking that your (1) is unnecessary and adds no additional meaning. Will just refers to a person's control. There is no more need to insist that an agent controls their control, any more than there is need to insist that X causes X's causation of Y. That additional step (in both cases) seems to add nothing meaningful. To say the LFW agent controls the action but not the control of the action makes no sense.

And if the agent is uncaused, yet controls the agent's action, it would seem no more is required.

That's absurd. If the agent cannot control its [control], it has no free will. It's that simple. The action is a whole other debate. This would relate to my (2) and (3) but you still haven't shown my (1).

No no. My insistence on you being able to demonstrate how its logically possible for us to control our [control] (my 1) which is absolutely critical for LFW to get off the table, and for which you just conceded, shows LFW is incoherent.

No, I'm saying if our [control] is uncaused we cannot have any control over it. What is it that makes this so hard for your brain to get?

(I've gone ahead and substituted "control" for "will" in your above comments.)
You are increasing my belief that your (1) adds no additional meaning.
It's possible to conceive of a scenario in which there is only a LFW agent and his action (upon an object), with no intermediate thing. You are speaking as if will were a thing, rather than just a term referring to an agent freely acting upon an object. The only question in that case is whether the agent controls the action.
What would it mean for such an agent to control the agent's action, but not control the agent's control of the action?
If you think that is meaningful, then explain it.

How so?

Your problem made no sense. The problems of LFW do make sense, they are actual real problems.

That's not an answer to my question. That's just a restatement of what you said before.

A test would have to show at the very least mental causation on physical matter. That could be tested.

As far as I know, no one is disputing that humans have minds, and that humans can and do move matter. How would you test the distinctions that are being disputed?

You yourself agreed that a person's abilities are limited.

How? Where? Quote me because the context will probably indicate why I may have said it.

Post #190: "Now regarding humans living in time who are finite in their abilities,..."

Trying to remember something is not the same thing as thinking about thinking about ice cream. False analogy.

Indeed, they are different, thus showing that your insistence that you must think an idea when choosing to try to think about it is false.

But we are intentionally, by hypothesis, considering only the case in which t1 does not cause t2. (In which case, whether t1 is involuntary does not make a difference on t2.)

Ok, then t2 is uncaused and the agent couldn't have had any control over it. Case closed.

No, by hypothesis, it is caused: by the agent (not by the ideas thought at t1).

You are basically asserting that the agent is in control of its will/thoughts if it thinks the same thought or a similar thought prior. That doesn't in any way show LFW is logically possible.

No, I was showing ways in which a person doesn't need to be thinking the same thought when choosing to contemplate the idea in the future. Thus refuting one of the premises of your argument.

You don't need a deductive argument for this. You just need common sense. If you were frozen solid including all your thoughts, how could you make a cup of tea? Or initiate an action? It is impossible without change.

I'm not claiming that a human being is unchanging. That doesn't mean nothing can cause something without the thing itself changing. Just because such a thing hasn't been observed doesn't imply that it's logically possible. Your claim here is that logic proves that that's impossible.

The sodium atoms are constantly changing and moving, and bonding/unbonding. That's how they change.

As far as I know, electrons do not normally change internally. We don't measure any changes to their measurable properties (mass and charge). Position isn't an internal state, but an external relation to other things.

Before, you were claiming that the [uncaused cause] must be the Big Bang.

What? The big bang isn't a being. You've lost your mind.

I didn't say it.

!! I find that to be illogical. Turtles all the way down?
It amounts to an abandonment of determinism/causality in that there is no sufficient cause or explanation for anything.

There is nothing illogical about that and it doesn't in any way abandon determinism/causality. If you think the principle of sufficient reason must be true then you're begging the question.

Consider the hypothesis of an infinite stack of turtles supporting something (say a ham sandwich). We could just as easily conceive of the top of the stack (and the sandwich) being a foot higher or lower. (Or a mile or an infinite distance) There's nothing about an infinite stack of turtles that would determine which it is. Thus there would have to be yet something else determining that.
Likewise we could just as easily conceive of the whole stack in free-fall, and thus not supporting the sandwich at all. There's nothing about an infinite stack of turtles that would say it would support the sandwich rather than itself be in free-fall. Thus there would have to be yet something else determining that.
However you look at, it utterly fails as an explanation for how the sandwich is being supported where it is.

Are you kidding me? A big bang and an uncaused causer are two totally different things. For one thing, one is a being, and the other isn't. One has a mind the other doesn't. The big bang is just the beginning part of the universe after inflation.

Who said an uncaused cause must have a mind? It's just a first cause. But surely it must have some existence, or else it can't cause anything. You were proposing an uncaused, non-self-changing, big bang as the beginning of the universe, implying that there is a first cause. Whatever that cause is, it must have had some kind of being/existence.

Basically you've already conceded my (1) so I have no need to further interact with you and show you how you're almost constantly wrong again and again.

[Tassman]

But the only thing being asked for in this thread is logical consistency.

The Pinocchio story is logically consistent...so?

No that was a brief hypothetical model that I raised for a particular purpose. It is not the model I've been arguing for generally.

You sure seem to know a lot about immaterial things. You must have evidence of their natures?

There is no coherent alternative to materialism.

You want to say that it's 'turtles all the way down'?

No, it's you who wants to invoke the notion of a "first cause" without proposing a solution to the immediate question "who or what caused the "first cause"?

The rock was not supposed to be volitional in the example. It was the thing moved, not the mover. I intentionally chose a rock as an example of a non-volitional, deterministic thing.

A rock is in no way analogous to even the most simple living creature with a brain.

[The Thinker]

Basically Joel you're wasting my time, as you always do. There is no reason for me to respond to your every point because you've already conceded the argument, the rest is just trivial detail, or just your misunderstanding, and which I can easily refute.

I'll give you one last chance to make a positive argument logically demonstrating my (1): We are in control of our will.

Make it good.

[seer]

Basically Joel you're wasting my time, as you always do. There is no reason for me to respond to your every point because you've already conceded the argument, the rest is just trivial detail, or just your misunderstanding, and which I can easily refute.

I'll give you one last chance to make a positive argument logically demonstrating my (1): We are in control of our will.

Make it good.

So that is what your brain chemicals made you say? Really?

Just for you Thinker: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=liKhLNY5GYI

[The Thinker]

So that is what your brain chemicals made you say? Really?

Just for you Thinker: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=liKhLNY5GYI

Yes and you know why? Because Joel can't make a logical argument.

Hey why you try making a positive argument showing LFW is logically possible. If you're so sure it is you should easily be able to show this.

[seer]

Yes and you know why? Because Joel can't make a logical argument.

Maybe his brain chemicals are on strike, maybe your brain chemicals have no idea what is or is not logical. Who knows?

[The Thinker]

Maybe his brain chemicals are on strike, maybe your brain chemicals have no idea what is or is not logical. Who knows?

How many times are you going to make the fallacy of division? Are we up to 40 now?

I'm definitely a lot more logical than you, as is evident from every interaction we've had.

[seer]

How many times are you going to make the fallacy of division? Are we up to 40 now?

I get it, so a lot of chemicals care about logic!

I'm definitely a lot more logical than you, as is evident from every interaction we've had.

Is that what your brain chemicals are telling you? How precious...

[The Thinker]

I get it, so a lot of chemicals care about logic!

No you don't get it. You don't get much. Now you're just resorting to nonsense. Looks like your brain has been fried from years of religion.

Is that what your brain chemicals are telling you? How precious...

Still waiting for that logical argument showing LFW is coherent. Anytime you want seer, anytime.

[seer]

No you don't get it. You don't get much. Now you're just resorting to nonsense. Looks like your brain has been fried from years of religion.

Oh, OK, so more chemicals don't care about logic. I wish your chemicals would make up your mind for you.

Still waiting for that logical argument showing LFW is coherent. Anytime you want seer, anytime.

Still waiting for you to show that brain chemicals even care about logic.

[The Thinker]

Oh, OK, so more chemicals don't care about logic. I wish your chemicals would make up your mind for you.

What's wrong seer? Is it too hard to admit you can't show LFW is coherent. It's OK.

Still waiting for you to show that brain chemicals even care about logic.

Still waiting for you to understand the fallacy of division. Can you try explaining it for me?