Is libertarian free will coherent?

[themuzicman]

How can agent P "choose" B or ~B? That's the thing you have to explain. Explain to me how you can choose your next thought.

That's what the faculty of free will in human beings does. It's like asking how water can be wet. We were created with the ability to choose.

Then you're basically saying our thoughts would be totally random fluctuations and it would be a mere coincidence that they had any connection to the physical world or reality.

No, that's you building a straw man. I've already said that our free will has the ability to CAUSE thoughts. You've removed the ability to cause from free will, and then asked me a question. The ability to cause implies the ability to have intent, to direct our thoughts.

How is it possible for something to influence something else to influence it differently in the same exact situation?

You pour water on sugar, it melts. You pour water on hot Lithium, it explodes. It all depends on what you decide to pour water on.

This is the nature of free will. It has the ability to cause thoughts, to form intent. An influence may be attempting to make the will choose B, but the will chooses ~B. Again, that the nature of the faculty of free will. That's why I said influence doesn't determine an outcome.

You need this to be possible if LFW is to have any leg to stand on. But since you cannot choose your thoughts or the way something influences your thoughts, how can even that rescue LFW?

Never stated either of those things. Indeed, I said the opposite: We CAN choose our thoughts, and we CAN choose the way something influences our thoughts. I've even provided you with a circumstance that demonstrates this.

What the hell is this free will? You make no sense. What causes the free will?

And there's your fundamental flaw. The free will is uncaused, but has the ability to form its own intent. That's why we call it "free."

You see, your engage in a false dichotomy that either the will must be caused or random. You're ignoring the possibility that the will can form a coherent intent.

Let me ask you this:

Does God have free will?

I made no assumption. The first premise of the kalam argument is a metaphysical claim, not a physical claim.

But it is an explanation of the physical world.

That makes no sense at all.

That's because it defeats your argument. You speak of thoughts as physical things and not as events.

The choice to look at the menu was caused by antecedent physical processes in your brain. Your decision to order food was caused by antecedent physical processes in your brain. The choice to recall the taste of the Big Mac was caused by antecedent physical processes in your brain. The choice to recall the taste of pickles was caused by antecedent physical processes in your brain. And your ultimate choice on what to eat was caused by antecedent physical processes in your brain. This is what all the evidence shows. On a more logical, and not evidential level, you still have yet to logically demonstrate how one can "choose" their next thought. You've just asserted it.

LOL... Seeing as psychology isn't a hard science, and neuroscience can't explain what happens, I'd say your evidence is, AT BEST, flimsy.

Again, your assumption that all this is purely a product of the physical world means you've put yourself in a box and think that I'm somehow bound by it.

The faculty of free will is the very thing here that needs to be explained logically.

What more do you want? I've given a definition, shown how it works, explained why it is not confined to the bounds of the physical universe. What remains is for you to stop imposing your assumptions on me.

Then logically explain how LFW is coherent.

Objections answered. Done.

[The Thinker]

Nonsense Thinker,



And you are only pushing the problem back one step Thinker. Who gets to define what a properly basis belief is? Without being arbitrary? So do you agree that the trilemma makes proving any logical truth impossible? Yet you still BELIEVE.

Nonsense how? It's hard for me to make sense of your incoherent responses. Properly basic beliefs are always debatable. My view is to assume the fewest amount of things using something like Occam's razor. The more you assume, the less likely that the beliefs that flow from yous assumptions will be true.

The dilemma does not make proving any logical truth impossible. Some axioms are so basic that the possibility of their falsity is incoherent.

I did not claim that my view resolved anything, only that we all live by faith - including you, i.e. we all accept things as true without logical justification.

[The Thinker]

It doesn't. Purpose is not cause. They are different things.
As I said before, "Your claim was that if the agent was not moved by an external efficient cause, then the agent acts randomly/arbitrarily."

Acting with purpose and/or order is not the same thing as being caused to so act. If an agent acts as an uncaused causer, that doesn't imply that the agent's acts are without order or purpose (thus does not imply that the agent acts randomly/arbitrarily).

Purpose (or reason for doing something) doesn't cause anything to happen. But it does make something be not arbitrary/random.

What is the ontological status of purpose, and how does it affect someone?

As far as I can tell, this is bare assertion, and not a counter-argument. (And I don't see how what I said is not LFW.)

It doesn't meet either of my (1),(2), or (3).

Perhaps I should have said (4)? But no, the selecting is not something that pops into the mind at all. The options (e.g. (2)) were already in the mind. As was the potentiality of making a selection. The selecting of (2) does not cause (1) or (2) to pop into your head, because they already were in your head. And (4) does not represent anything popping into your head either, because X was already in your head. No new thought popped into your head. That is exactly the point of my presenting this example.

(And remember that (4) doesn't follow logically necessarily from 1-3 because we could replace (4) with (4b) "You don't think more about X, and instead go make a sandwich." and it would still be logically consistent.)

4b or 4 would both be thoughts that pop into your mind. It doesn't matter whether they popped into your mind before in (1) or (2). If you were thinking about X, that was a thought that popped into your mind that you couldn't have possibly chosen beforehand. When you continue to think about X, it is the same situation, and when you continue thinking about X that is also a thought that popped into your mind that you couldn't have possibly chosen beforehand. That you were once in state (2) ("You think about continuing to think about X") does not make a difference, because if your mind goes to state (3) which is deliberating whether or not to think about X (state (1)) then back to state (1), which is thinking about X, you couldn't have chosen that before your mind continued to think about X.

No it doesn't. The very conclusion of the kalam argument is that there must be an uncaused causer.
As I've pointed out before, the agent, by choosing, does not cause anything to come to be except the actualization of one of the potentialities. And that is caused by the agent. Thus the only thing that comes to be does have a cause: the agent. The fact that there is no antecedent efficient cause is not a problem, rather it is a solution to a problem (it prevents infinite regress). The buck has to stop somewhere. Why not at the agent?

Yes it does violate it. On the kalam view god is uncaused, he has no potentiality, humans are caused, they do have potentiality. If a thought begins to exist it must have a cause. If it is caused by an agent, the agent's cause of the thought must have a cause, and on and on until you get to the big bang. Anything else is special pleading. A potentiality that is actualized is something that begins to exist, and the kalam states that everything that begins to exist has a cause. There are no exceptions.

No, I'm not. If the agent selects one of his thoughts to actualize, that implies the agent has thoughts, and is not thought-less.

Then your view makes no sense just like your views on morality a few months ago.

Irrelevant. Recall that we aren't talking about evidence for whether LFW is true or false, but whether LFW is possible. If what I said is compatible with both determinism and LFW, then it is evidence that LFW is possible.

We are talking about whether it is possible, but what you described is compatible with determinism because in determinism we have a causal chain of cause and effect. On LFW you must reject that, and in doing so it makes LFW incoherent. IF selection is not a thought, and "the agent has thoughts, and is not thought-less" as you said, I just can't make sense of your view. That is why I asked you to outline a chronological order of events when a "free will" decision happens. Your 1-4 doesn't do that. It doesn't say what makes the choice. Does the agent, the soul, the mind, the will come first? I have no idea what you're talking about.

It is consistent with your 1-3.

No it is not because you still haven't shown how the will can be free and how we are in control of our will. Your whole scenario describes thoughts popping into one's consciousness uncontrollably.

You keep sliding back into whether LFW is true. We are talking about whether it is possible. If we can't tell whether our choices are LFW or determinism, then, to the extent of our ability to know, each is possible. If each is possible, then LFW is possible.

No I'm not, I'm saying that your experience is indistinguishable from you having no control of your thoughts from the perspective of your subjective experience, and therefore it cannot be used as evidence for my (1) "We are in control of our will."

I have given multiple scenarios. E.g. my (1)-(4) example above.

Which doesn't work. Interestingly on your view, you have already acknowledged that some thoughts we have we are totally out of control over.

This was regarding your request "You need to differentiate between the soul, the agent, the will, and the mind."
What I said before was that for our purposes I don't need to distinguish between soul, mind, and agent. Consider them synonymous. And I said I considered the will to be one of the many faculties/capacities of an agent (along with memory, reason, contemplation, capacity for feeling, etc.)

That doesn't make things any less confusing for me, and perhaps makes them even more confusing. If the soul/will/agent/mind are the same thing, I thought you said that the soul causes the mind? If "the agent selects...thoughts to actualize, that implies the agent has thoughts," but thoughts are the mind, and you're saying the agent has its own thoughts, and its thoughts select what a person does using the thoughts that are in the mind, that implies the agent has thoughts that are different from the mind's thoughts, but you say they are all the same. See how it's confusing?

[seer]

Nonsense how? It's hard for me to make sense of your incoherent responses. Properly basic beliefs are always debatable. My view is to assume the fewest amount of things using something like Occam's razor. The more you assume, the less likely that the beliefs that flow from yous assumptions will be true.

The dilemma does not make proving any logical truth impossible. Some axioms are so basic that the possibility of their falsity is incoherent.

Thinker, that is the whole point of trilemma, no option is good, let me quote again: The trilemma, then, is the decision among the three equally unsatisfying options.the problem - all THREE options. And I would also add that your choice of the axiomatic argument over infinite regression or circular reasoning is also arbitrary. And no less problematic.

The problem is that you're falsely placing all beliefs in the same category as basic beliefs

Then give me a clear, non-arbitrary definition of a properly basic belief. And if you can't your whole argument about categories is meaningless.

[The Thinker]

That's what the faculty of free will in human beings does. It's like asking how water can be wet. We were created with the ability to choose.

That's just an assertion, not an explanation.

No, that's you building a straw man. I've already said that our free will has the ability to CAUSE thoughts. You've removed the ability to cause from free will, and then asked me a question. The ability to cause implies the ability to have intent, to direct our thoughts.

What then causes the will to cause A over B?

You pour water on sugar, it melts. You pour water on hot Lithium, it explodes. It all depends on what you decide to pour water on.

This is the nature of free will. It has the ability to cause thoughts, to form intent. An influence may be attempting to make the will choose B, but the will chooses ~B. Again, that the nature of the faculty of free will. That's why I said influence doesn't determine an outcome.

Those are all examples of things that are physically determined, which is incompatible with LFW.

Never stated either of those things. Indeed, I said the opposite: We CAN choose our thoughts, and we CAN choose the way something influences our thoughts. I've even provided you with a circumstance that demonstrates this.

Now you haven't. You've just asserted that we can choose our thoughts and your example doesn't demonstrate anything. I need a logical explanation that includes a chronological order of events of what happens when you think a person makes a freely willed decision.

And there's your fundamental flaw. The free will is uncaused, but has the ability to form its own intent. That's why we call it "free."

You see, your engage in a false dichotomy that either the will must be caused or random. You're ignoring the possibility that the will can form a coherent intent.

It is not a false dichotomy. Either something is caused or not. If it is caused it is determined, if it is not, it is random. There is no such thing as partially caused. There is such thing as many factors contributing to a cause, such that each one partially causes something, but in that scenario the thing is still caused, just by many things. I'm not ignoring anything, I'm asking you to logically demonstrate how a will can choose its own thoughts. So far you have not.

Let me ask you this:

Does God have free will?

Nope. That's one reason why the concept of god itself is incoherent.

But it is an explanation of the physical world.

Doesn't matter.

That's because it defeats your argument. You speak of thoughts as physical things and not as events.

No it doesn't, it's special pleading or a misunderstanding of the things involved. If a thought pops into your mind, it began to exist. It didn't exist, and then it did exist. It wasn't lying around, waiting to occur. And if it began to exist, it needs a cause. If it was caused by something else, like a soul, or a mind, or a will, then that thing which caused the thought, needs to have a cause because whatever decided it began to exist.

LOL... Seeing as psychology isn't a hard science, and neuroscience can't explain what happens, I'd say your evidence is, AT BEST, flimsy.

I never said it was psychology or that psychology was hard science. How you got that I don't know. The neuroscientific evidence is pretty strong. Every good test that has ever been done shows brain causes mind. So you're claim that nothing causes your thoughts or choices is not supported by any evidence. Mine is.

Again, your assumption that all this is purely a product of the physical world means you've put yourself in a box and think that I'm somehow bound by it.

I'm not assuming anything, I'm just showing you that your claim that your choice has no cause is utterly baseless. You'd need to show me empirical evidence that the brain does not cause the mind, but all the evidence we have shows this.

What more do you want? I've given a definition, shown how it works, explained why it is not confined to the bounds of the physical universe. What remains is for you to stop imposing your assumptions on me.

You've not logically explained anything, you just assert your will is free, and your choices are not caused - on no evidence or logic. Let me ask you this, can you have a thought, about a thought, before you have a thought?

Objections answered. Done.

Just asserted, not demonstrated.

[The Thinker]

Thinker, that is the whole point of trilemma, no option is good, let me quote again: The trilemma, then, is the decision among the three equally unsatisfying options.

But that does not make every circular argument logically valid. "Scientology is true, because Scientology is true," is not a valid argument, even if your fundamental logical justifications cannot be justified themselves.

And you agree that your choice of what you view as properly basic is arbitrary, and that your stopping point is arbitrary - correct?

No, I just explained to you that "The more you assume, the less likely that the beliefs that flow from your assumptions will be true." That is not arbitrary, that is a statistical truth.

the problem - all THREE options. And I would also add that your choice of the axiomatic argument over infinite regression or circular reasoning is also arbitrary. And no less problematic.

So basically you're telling me that "Scientology is true, because Scientology is true," is a valid logical argument? If not, why not?

Then give me a clear, non-arbitrary definition of a properly basic belief. And if you can't your whole argument about categories is meaningless.

They are the foundational, core beliefs, that are the axioms of a beliefs system. They are not higher level beliefs that derive from or sit on top of these beliefs. For example, saying "I exist" is a basic belief because it is not something you can provide evidence for. It's something you have to grant in order to even have a meaningful conversation. Saying, "We all descended from Adam and Eve 6000 years ago" is not a basic belief, because it makes empirical claims and can be totally refuted from almost every field of science.

[seer]

But that does not make every circular argument logically valid. "Scientology is true, because Scientology is true," is not a valid argument, even if your fundamental logical justifications cannot be justified themselves.

Really Thinker, this is your come back? And I would add that arbitrarily choosing to stop at a properly basic belief is just as bad. According to the trilemma, that YOU brought up.

No, I just explained to you that "The more you assume, the less likely that the beliefs that flow from your assumptions will be true." That is not arbitrary, that is a statistical truth.

It does not change the fact that what you view as properly basic is arbitrary, you are only speaking of degrees, not of kind. And who decides how many assumption it takes before you are off the reservation? More arbitrary considerations.

So basically you're telling me that "Scientology is true, because Scientology is true," is a valid logical argument? If not, why not?

Nope, my only point (from the get go) is that we all live with faith. We believe things, very fundamental things, without logical justification. And this includes you Thinker. Do what you will with it.

They are the foundational, core beliefs, that are the axioms of a beliefs system. They are not higher level beliefs that derive from or sit on top of these beliefs. For example, saying "I exist" is a basic belief because it is not something you can provide evidence for. It's something you have to grant in order to even have a meaningful conversation. Saying, "We all descended from Adam and Eve 6000 years ago" is not a basic belief, because it makes empirical claims and can be totally refuted from almost every field of science.

Thinker, this again is arbitrary. Foundational and core for whom? What if 90% of humans were theists, would theism then be a core belief? Who/what decides what core beliefs are?

[themuzicman]

That's just an assertion, not an explanation.

What is there to explain? The free will is a human faculty as much as memory and cell regeneration.

What then causes the will to cause A over B?

Absurd question. The will causes A over B. The will is a causer, it is not caused.

Why does the will cause A over B? Intent.

Those are all examples of things that are physically determined, which is incompatible with LFW.

Except the choice of which to pour water over.

Now you haven't. You've just asserted that we can choose our thoughts and your example doesn't demonstrate anything. I need a logical explanation that includes a chronological order of events of what happens when you think a person makes a freely willed decision.

These are the things the will does:

Observation.
Choice.
Action.

How these occur is as individual as the person doing them. You're trying to make human beings into robots from the same assembly line, and it doesn't work that way.

It is not a false dichotomy. Either something is caused or not. If it is caused it is determined, if it is not, it is random.

False dichotomy, as already stated and demonstrated. The will can have intent (thus not being random), and yet not be caused by something else.

There is no such thing as partially caused. There is such thing as many factors contributing to a cause, such that each one partially causes something, but in that scenario the thing is still caused, just by many things. I'm not ignoring anything, I'm asking you to logically demonstrate how a will can choose its own thoughts. So far you have not.

Actually, the problem is that you have a preconceived notion and are unable to see your own assumptions and, in this case, logical errors.

Nope. That's one reason why the concept of god itself is incoherent.

I see.

[quote]
Doesn't matter.
[/quote

But it DOES matter. You have to prove that the physical world is all that exists.

No it doesn't, it's special pleading or a misunderstanding of the things involved. If a thought pops into your mind, it began to exist. It didn't exist, and then it did exist. It wasn't lying around, waiting to occur. And if it began to exist, it needs a cause. If it was caused by something else, like a soul, or a mind, or a will, then that thing which caused the thought, needs to have a cause because whatever decided it began to exist.

That's simply untrue. Yes, there are things that occur that cause our memory to react in given ways. But the will is also able to recall memories on command, and even think new thoughts.

Ever wonder where creativity comes from? Someone does or says something completely new and creative. That requires free will.

I never said it was psychology or that psychology was hard science. How you got that I don't know.

You're making hard assertions about psychology.

The neuroscientific evidence is pretty strong. Every good test that has ever been done shows brain causes mind. So you're claim that nothing causes your thoughts or choices is not supported by any evidence. Mine is.

LOL.. you expect me to believe tripe from an atheist website?

I'm not assuming anything, I'm just showing you that your claim that your choice has no cause is utterly baseless. You'd need to show me empirical evidence that the brain does not cause the mind, but all the evidence we have shows this.

Further conflation. I said that the WILL is uncaused, not the choice. Choice is caused by an intent of the will.

You've not logically explained anything, you just assert your will is free, and your choices are not caused - on no evidence or logic. Let me ask you this, can you have a thought, about a thought, before you have a thought?

Happens all the time. I'm thinking about a particular problem or idea, and I combine that with knowledge or some creativity, which results in another thought. Intent, contemplation of a choice, observation are all things the will considers in choosing.

That's what free will can do.

[Joel]

What is the ontological status of purpose, and how does it affect someone?

I don't know if I'm understanding what you are asking. If you are hungry and eat a sandwich in order to not be hungry, then that (to not be hungry) is your purpose in eating. It is the end toward, and rationale according to, which your action is directed/ordered. That order doesn't cause your action; it is a description of the action's order/rationale. And an action with order/rationale is not random/arbitrary, regardless whether the actor/causer was, in turn, caused to act in that way.

It [someone's LFW choosing to continue thinking about X] doesn't meet either of my (1),(2), or (3).

It is an example of someone (1) controlling their thoughts, and (2) who is causally effective in causing themselves to continue to think about X (rather than doing something else), and (3) in the same situation, the person could have done otherwise (could have ceased thinking about X and instead went to make a sandwich).

4b or 4 would both be thoughts that pop into your mind.

That's irrelevant. The idea of the actions of (4) and (4b) were both in your mind prior to your selecting one of them to actualize. Your selecting one of them does not cause one of them to pop into your head (they were already in your head). But your selecting does cause what you will think about at the time of 4/4b.

This is a counter-example to your argument. Your argument was that you can never choose what to think because it would require you thinking the thought before you choose to think about it. In this example it is clear that you can think about thought X at time t when you decide whether to continue thinking it at time t+dt. There's nothing about your thinking about X at time t (of the selecting) that logically precludes the selection being that which determines whether you also think about X at time t+dt.

When you continue to think about X, it is the same situation,

Now you are just asserting that. That doesn't follow from your argument.

That you were once in state (2) ("You think about continuing to think about X") does not make a difference, because if your mind goes to state (3) which is deliberating whether or not to think about X (state (1)) then back to state (1), which is thinking about X, you couldn't have chosen that before your mind continued to think about X.

If you are (at time t) deliberating about whether to continue thinking about X, that implies that you are, at time t, also thinking about X. You didn't cease to think about X and then begin thinking about X again at time t+dt. Rather at time t+dt you either continued to think about X (not a switch and switch back), or you were no longer thinking about X at t+dt and instead are leaving to make a sandwich.

As I've pointed out before, the agent, by choosing, does not cause anything to come to be except the actualization of one of the potentialities. And that is caused by the agent. Thus the only thing that comes to be does have a cause: the agent. The fact that there is no antecedent efficient cause is not a problem, rather it is a solution to a problem (it prevents infinite regress). The buck has to stop somewhere. Why not at the agent?

Yes it does violate it. On the kalam view god is uncaused, he has no potentiality, humans are caused, they do have potentiality. If a thought begins to exist it must have a cause. If it is caused by an agent, the agent's cause of the thought must have a cause, and on and on until you get to the big bang. Anything else is special pleading.

This doesn't answer my question. The buck has to stop somewhere. Why not at the agent?

A potentiality that is actualized is something that begins to exist, and the kalam states that everything that begins to exist has a cause. There are no exceptions.

Sure. The only thing that is actualized (or 'came to be') by the agent's choice is the action. And it has a cause: the agent.

If the agent selects one of his thoughts to actualize, that implies the agent has thoughts, and is not thought-less.

Then your view makes no sense

How can an agent select one of his thoughts (i.e. ideas of possible actions) to actualize if the agent has no thoughts from which to select?

We are talking about whether it is possible, but what you described is compatible with determinism because in determinism we have a causal chain of cause and effect. On LFW you must reject that, and in doing so it makes LFW incoherent.

Both have a causal chain. And both chains must have a beginning (uncaused cause, to avoid infinite regress). We just disagree about where is the beginning. Why not at the agent? I see nothing logically impossible about that.

IF selection is not a thought, and "the agent has thoughts, and is not thought-less" as you said, I just can't make sense of your view. That is why I asked you to outline a chronological order of events when a "free will" decision happens. Your 1-4 doesn't do that. It doesn't say what makes the choice. Does the agent, the soul, the mind, the will come first? I have no idea what you're talking about.

I keep stating it repeatedly. I don't know how you are missing it. I'll try to be more explicit here:

Time t1: Agent is thinking about ideas of possible actions (e.g. possible action X, possible action Y, ...), and is deliberating about them.
Time t2: Agent selects one of those ideas to actualize.
Time t3: Agent is doing action Y (or X, or Z,...)

The selecting (at time t2) is not, itself a thought, but a selection from a set of thoughts (about possible action X, possible action Y, ...).
The action at time t3 is the actualization of one of those ideas. The agent makes the selection, i.e. causes the action.
And as I've said, I'm treating agent/soul/mind as synonymous.

You keep sliding back into whether LFW is true. We are talking about whether it is possible. If we can't tell whether our choices are LFW or determinism, then, to the extent of our ability to know, each is possible. If each is possible, then LFW is possible.

No I'm not, I'm saying that your experience is indistinguishable from you having no control of your thoughts from the perspective of your subjective experience, and therefore it cannot be used as evidence for my (1) "We are in control of our will."

The truth of your (1) is not the question we are discussing (and thus evidence for or against it is not the discussion). We are only discussing whether your (1) is possible. If we can't tell whether (1) is true or false, then (as far as we know) each is possible, and thus (1) is possible.

That doesn't make things any less confusing for me, and perhaps makes them even more confusing. If the soul/will/agent/mind are the same thing, I thought you said that the soul causes the mind?

That doesn't sound like something I'd say.

If "the agent selects...thoughts to actualize, that implies the agent has thoughts," but thoughts are the mind

You claimed that thoughts are the mind. I explicitly denied that, saying that thoughts would be better described as being contents in the mind. The agent/mind has the ability to think thoughts. That is one of its faculties. The agent/mind is not, itself, thoughts.

, and you're saying the agent has its own thoughts, and its thoughts select what a person does

Again, I've repeatedly denied that. I'm not sure how your are not following what I've been repeatedly saying.
The agent has thoughts (of ideas of possible actions). And the agent selects among those thoughts, one of them to actualize. And that selecting is not, itself, a thought. Thus the agent (not the thoughts) selects what the agent does.

...that implies the agent has thoughts that are different from the mind's thoughts, but you say they are all the same. See how it's confusing?

This latter bit is like nothing I've said.

[The Thinker]

Really Thinker, this is your come back? And I would add that arbitrarily choosing to stop at a properly basic belief is just as bad. According to the trilemma, that YOU brought up.

This is pretty much what you think. So if your own views seem embarrassing, then don't blame me. Granting the basic beliefs that I do is not in any way just as bad as claiming "Scientology is true, because Scientology is true."

It does not change the fact that what you view as properly basic is arbitrary, you are only speaking of degrees, not of kind. And who decides how many assumption it takes before you are off the reservation? More arbitrary considerations.

There are degrees of arbitrariness, so a lower amount is obviously better. How many assumptions one makes affects their ability to be rational. Getting a perfect number is irrelevant. It still does not make the claim that "Scientology is true, because Scientology is true," any more logical.

Nope, my only point (from the get go) is that we all live with faith.

Define "faith" for me please.

We believe things, very fundamental things, without logical justification. And this includes you Thinker. Do what you will with it.

That's not a problem. The problem is when you believe non-fundamental things on faith, like that we descended from Adam & Eve, or that there is a ghost in the machine called a soul, or that there is a race of lizard people that wear suits of human skin that control our government. Are you that incapable of understanding this?

Thinker, this again is arbitrary. Foundational and core for whom? What if 90% of humans were theists, would theism then be a core belief? Who/what decides what core beliefs are?

These are all things that can be debated rationally, just like ethics, and epistemology, metaphysics, and everything else. You're stuck up on an idea that one person or thing must decide for all eternity on what is properly basic. That's not how philosophy works, and that is not needed in order to make a rational case for something. If one grants that their particular god exists or particular holy book is infallibly true as a basic belief, then they're never going to be able to know if they are wrong. And if there is a logical inconsistency in the belief, or it makes empirical claims that are refuted, then if that person believes anyway because it's "basic" they are never going to be able to realize it is false. And you wouldn't want people you disagree with to think this way.** That's why one shouldn't grant their whole worldview as a basic belief, and it's why I don't grant atheism/naturalism as a basic belief. My naturalistic worldview is falsifiable on my own basic beliefs, which is what we should all strive for. But I don't expect any of this to make sense to you because you'd rather believe on faith.


**(You even try to use reasons why atheism is wrong, which means you already presuppose that evidence and logic matters, while you deny it as soon as it's inconvenient for you.)

[Joel]

Every good test that has ever been done shows brain causes mind.

No test/experiment can ever per se show the existence of any cause whatsoever. All tests can do is show a correlation. To get to cause, the results must interpreted in light of a prior theory about cause.
(e.g. read some David Hume.)

[seer]

This is pretty much what you think. So if your own views seem embarrassing, then don't blame me. Granting the basic beliefs that I do is not in any way just as bad as claiming "Scientology is true, because Scientology is true."

OK, prove that making arbitrary stopping points is not as bad as circular reasoning?

There are degrees of arbitrariness, so a lower amount is obviously better. How many assumptions one makes affects their ability to be rational. Getting a perfect number is irrelevant. It still does not make the claim that "Scientology is true, because Scientology is true," any more logical.

OK, so you have no idea how many assumptions gets us in trouble. This is all completely subjective and arbitrary Thinker, I mean you realize that don't you?

Define "faith" for me please.

We could start with believing something with out logical justification in this case. Though it could be defined differently.

That's not a problem. The problem is when you believe non-fundamental things on faith, like that we descended from Adam & Eve, or that there is a ghost in the machine called a soul, or that there is a race of lizard people that wear suits of human skin that control our government. Are you that incapable of understanding this?

But again Thinker, you are arbitrarily deciding what is non-fundamental or fundamental.

These are all things that can be debated rationally, just like ethics, and epistemology, metaphysics, and everything else. You're stuck up on an idea that one person or thing must decide for all eternity on what is properly basic. That's not how philosophy works, and that is not needed in order to make a rational case for something. If one grants that their particular god exists or particular holy book is infallibly true as a basic belief, then they're never going to be able to know if they are wrong. And if there is a logical inconsistency in the belief, or it makes empirical claims that are refuted, then if that person believes anyway because it's "basic" they are never going to be able to realize it is false. And you wouldn't want people you disagree with to think this way.** That's why one shouldn't grant their whole worldview as a basic belief, and it's why I don't grant atheism/naturalism as a basic belief. My naturalistic worldview is falsifiable on my own basic beliefs, which is what we should all strive for. But I don't expect any of this to make sense to you because you'd rather believe on faith.

Really Thinker, you are hoisted on own petard. You can not even rational justify your properly basic beliefs, or any properly basic belief without being arbitrary. Yet that arbitrary foundation is your launching point for everything that follows.

[Joel]

I don't have to know how consciousness is explained by interacting atoms to know that it is caused by interacting atoms.

So one can know that something happens without knowing how it happens.
And thus one can know that something is possible without knowing how it happens.
So it's conceivable that one could know that LFW is possible, without knowing how LFW happens.

Really, your requests for proof are like saying that you doubt that human memory exists or is even possible, and thus you demand that someone must explain how human memory works in order for you to believe that human memory is possible. How would you answer someone who demanded that of you? I'm curious to see an example of the kind of answer you are asking for.

[The Thinker]

I don't know if I'm understanding what you are asking. If you are hungry and eat a sandwich in order to not be hungry, then that (to not be hungry) is your purpose in eating. It is the end toward, and rationale according to, which your action is directed/ordered. That order doesn't cause your action; it is a description of the action's order/rationale. And an action with order/rationale is not random/arbitrary, regardless whether the actor/causer was, in turn, caused to act in that way.

Hunger is a physical process of the body, and all physical processes are determined by the laws of physics and it can indeed cause actions. I need you to give me an example of a purpose that cannot be reduced to physical processes because any time you do it will be determined and that cannot be free.

It is an example of someone (1) controlling their thoughts, and (2) who is causally effective in causing themselves to continue to think about X (rather than doing something else), and (3) in the same situation, the person could have done otherwise (could have ceased thinking about X and instead went to make a sandwich).

No!!! I doesn't show any of those things at all. They are not in any way controlling their thoughts. Every single instance is an example of a thought popping into their head without their choice. Their thoughts are not causally effective. (For this you'd have to show how immaterial thoughts can control atoms, which would violate the laws of physics. Good luck!) Just because it is logically possible to do otherwise doesn't mean it is physically possible. If all the antecedent events in a given situation were replicated in situation X, doing otherwise in situation X is not possible unless there is randomness. but randomness is not free will.

That's irrelevant. The idea of the actions of (4) and (4b) were both in your mind prior to your selecting one of them to actualize. Your selecting one of them does not cause one of them to pop into your head (they were already in your head). But your selecting does cause what you will think about at the time of 4/4b.

It causes them to pop into your head again, as all thoughts are judged as unique in their existence.

This is a counter-example to your argument. Your argument was that you can never choose what to think because it would require you thinking the thought before you choose to think about it. In this example it is clear that you can think about thought X at time t when you decide whether to continue thinking it at time t+dt. There's nothing about your thinking about X at time t (of the selecting) that logically precludes the selection being that which determines whether you also think about X at time t+dt.

It's not. You can't have the same thought about a thought, before you have the thought. If I think of Pepsi right now, it is not somehow my "free choice" or a demonstration of an ability to choose my thoughts -- just because I've thought about Pepsi before. This is not in anyway an example of my (1).

If you are (at time t) deliberating about whether to continue thinking about X, that implies that you are, at time t, also thinking about X. You didn't cease to think about X and then begin thinking about X again at time t+dt. Rather at time t+dt you either continued to think about X (not a switch and switch back), or you were no longer thinking about X at t+dt and instead are leaving to make a sandwich.

It's irrelevant. Neither of those are thoughts you could have chosen beforehand. The decision to continue thinking about X popped into your head without your control. There is no way around this. You even conceded that a device implanted into your head that controls your thoughts would be indistinguishable from what you claim is "free will" from your subjective experience, therefore you cannot claim that you are in control of your thoughts.

Interestingly, on another point, you've already conceded that the initial thought is not something you could've chosen. And if subsequent thoughts were only possible because of that initial unchosen thought, that itself puts free will in a hamper.

This doesn't answer my question. The buck has to stop somewhere. Why not at the agent?

Because that violates the kalam. (I personally don't care, but theists like you do.) Why not stop at the big bang?

Sure. The only thing that is actualized (or 'came to be') by the agent's choice is the action. And it has a cause: the agent.

The choice began to exist in the agent.

How can an agent select one of his thoughts (i.e. ideas of possible actions) to actualize if the agent has no thoughts from which to select?

You said the selection itself isn't a thought. So then what is it?

Both have a causal chain. And both chains must have a beginning (uncaused cause, to avoid infinite regress). We just disagree about where is the beginning. Why not at the agent? I see nothing logically impossible about that.

An uncaused event that is a thought, cannot be LFW, because uncaused events cannot be controlled, as per my (1).

I keep stating it repeatedly. I don't know how you are missing it. I'll try to be more explicit here:

Time t1: Agent is thinking about ideas of possible actions (e.g. possible action X, possible action Y, ...), and is deliberating about them.
Time t2: Agent selects one of those ideas to actualize.
Time t3: Agent is doing action Y (or X, or Z,...)

The selecting (at time t2) is not, itself a thought, but a selection from a set of thoughts (about possible action X, possible action Y, ...).
The action at time t3 is the actualization of one of those ideas. The agent makes the selection, i.e. causes the action.
And as I've said, I'm treating agent/soul/mind as synonymous.

All three (t1,t2,t3) are instances of thoughts that popped into your mind without your ability to control it. I keep stating it repeatedly. I don't know how you are missing it. And t2 is a thought. It is a mental process.

The truth of your (1) is not the question we are discussing (and thus evidence for or against it is not the discussion). We are only discussing whether your (1) is possible. If we can't tell whether (1) is true or false, then (as far as we know) each is possible, and thus (1) is possible.

I know. I'm not saying you must demonstrate my (1). Your examples are simply not evidence that it is even possible we are in control of our wills, since they do not demonstrate control.

That doesn't sound like something I'd say.


You claimed that thoughts are the mind. I explicitly denied that, saying that thoughts would be better described as being contents in the mind. The agent/mind has the ability to think thoughts. That is one of its faculties. The agent/mind is not, itself, thoughts.


Again, I've repeatedly denied that. I'm not sure how your are not following what I've been repeatedly saying.
The agent has thoughts (of ideas of possible actions). And the agent selects among those thoughts, one of them to actualize. And that selecting is not, itself, a thought. Thus the agent (not the thoughts) selects what the agent does.


This latter bit is like nothing I've said.

This all stems from your confusing view. That's why I was a detailed chronological order of events of your view of a free will decision. For example, on your view, is the uncaused agent/soul/mind completely distinct from the physical body or not? Does the uncaused agent/soul/mind cause the initial thought? I do not understand your view, sorry.

[The Thinker]

OK, prove that making arbitrary stopping points is not as bad as circular reasoning?

Because my basic beliefs are not refuted by empirical evidence, the Scientology claim is.

OK, so you have no idea how many assumptions gets us in trouble. This is all completely subjective and arbitrary Thinker, I mean you realize that don't you?

I know that the more you have the more trouble you get into. Occam's razor baby.

We could start with believing something with out logical justification in this case. Though it could be defined differently.

But not all knowledge is a priori.

But again Thinker, you are arbitrarily deciding what is non-fundamental or fundamental.

No I'm not. Arbitrary is defined as "based on random choice or personal whim, rather than any reason or system," and I am not doing that. I have a system of reason. I don't just put ideas on a wall, close my eyes, and throw a dart at it and go with whatever idea the dart landed on. That would be arbitrary.

Really Thinker, you are hoisted on own petard. You can not even rational justify your properly basic beliefs, or any properly basic belief without being arbitrary. Yet that arbitrary foundation is your launching point for everything that follows.

I did rationally justify my properly basic beliefs a few comments ago ad it is based on a system of reason and is not totally arbitrary, and I explained that you cannot just make any belief be properly basic because of the fact that some beliefs can be empirically shown to be false, or logically incoherent, like Scientology, and therefore a refuted belief cannot be properly basic. Are really this dumb that you cannot get this, or, will you never get it like the B-theory of time, which you utterly failed to grasp?