Is libertarian free will coherent?

[The Thinker]

I prefer:

An agent P has free will if, given a circumstance A with contingent option B, P is able to choose B, AND P is able to choose ~B, although not both.

How can agent P "choose" B or ~B? That's the thing you have to explain. Explain to me how you can choose your next thought.

The faculty of the human being to make choices is uncaused. You can call it the "mind" or the "soul" or the "will" or whatever you want, but our free will is not caused to act by external force.

Then you're basically saying our thoughts would be totally random fluctuations and it would be a mere coincidence that they had any connection to the physical world or reality.

This does not eliminate "influence." But influence does not cause.

How is it possible for something to influence something else to influence it differently in the same exact situation? You need this to be possible if LFW is to have any leg to stand on. But since you cannot choose your thoughts or the way something influences your thoughts, how can even that rescue LFW?

False. Free will can cause thoughts.

What the hell is this free will? You make no sense. What causes the free will?

1) You've made the assumption that the faculty of free will is a part of the physical world. Christianity embraces the idea of a spiritual realm, which is not necessarily subject to all the laws of the physical universe.

I made no assumption. The first premise of the kalam argument is a metaphysical claim, not a physical claim.

2) The Kalam argument is not affected, because your argument is conflating between "caused to exist" and "caused to occur." Just because my free will comes about because of my parent's choices doesn't mean that everything my free will does is caused by how it came about.

That makes no sense at all.

Some of my thoughts have a cause, which is my free will. Consider:

I arrive at McDonalds, and look at the menu. This is circumstance B, as it defines my options. I choose (freely) to look at the menu. Did anything CAUSE me to choose to look at the menu? No. I decided I want to order food, so I looked at it. I see the Big Mac and the QPC. These are input to my next thought about which to choose. I (freely) choose to recall the taste of the Big Mac special sauce. I (freely) choose to recall the taste of pickles on a QPC. I then (freely) choose to weigh those options, and I (freely) make a choice.

My will has made several uncaused choices, which, in turn, caused thoughts and ultimately actions.

The choice to look at the menu was caused by antecedent physical processes in your brain. Your decision to order food was caused by antecedent physical processes in your brain. The choice to recall the taste of the Big Mac was caused by antecedent physical processes in your brain. The choice to recall the taste of pickles was caused by antecedent physical processes in your brain. And your ultimate choice on what to eat was caused by antecedent physical processes in your brain. This is what all the evidence shows. On a more logical, and not evidential level, you still have yet to logically demonstrate how one can "choose" their next thought. You've just asserted it.

You error is assuming that only thoughts can cause other thoughts. You've ignored the faculty of free will.

The faculty of free will is the very thing here that needs to be explained logically.

Done.

Please. Your response didn't even come close.

Reject bad logic.

Then logically explain how LFW is coherent.

Let's deal with your non-starter logic before dealing with conjured emotional responses.

So deal with it.

[seer]

Two points.

1) I made that argument. I showed how in principle it would work. You have not logically shown LFW is coherent, even in principle. No comparison.

Nonsense Thinker, I asked one specific question from the get go in that discussion which you failed to answer, and just hand waved i.e. deductively go from your brain dictating that A is true, to A being actually being true.

2) Even if I didn't show that argument, since you believe LFW without being able to show how it is coherent, you could not accuse me of being self-refuting or illogical without being a hypocrite, since you do the same thing.

Remember in that debate you first asked me to make a "logical" argument for free will. And my only point was that we all accept and live with beliefs that can not be logically demonstrated, including you.

[The Thinker]

Nonsense Thinker, I asked one specific question from the get go in that discussion which you failed to answer, and just hand waved i.e. deductively go from your brain dictating that A is true, to A being actually being true.

I did answer it, you just kept moving the goal posts to try and claim that I must deductively show how any specific belief relates to reality. I gave you the example of how that was possible by showing you how seeing a rock being added to another rock could cause me to believe 1+1=2, which is logically and deductively irrefutable. Then you made a bunch of noise because you didn't want to admit that I had met your challenge.

Remember in that debate you first asked me to make a "logical" argument for free will. And my only point was that we all accept and live with beliefs that can not be logically demonstrated, including you.

Thanks for admitting you cannot demonstrate LFW is logically coherent, even in principle.

Not being able to logically demonstrate something is not the same thing is holding a belief that is logically incoherent. If a belief isn't self-refuting, unlike LFW is, it occupies a neutral ground: logically possible, yet not logically demonstrated. Whereas LFW is logically impossible, and therefore impossible to logically demonstrate.

[seer]

I did answer it, you just kept moving the goal posts to try and claim that I must deductively show how any specific belief relates to reality. I gave you the example of how that was possible by showing you how seeing a rock being added to another rock could cause me to believe 1+1=2, which is logically and deductively irrefutable. Then you made a bunch of noise because you didn't want to admit that I had met your challenge.

No Thinker, I asked that specific question from the get go, I did not move anything. And like I said then, you can not deductively argue that you are seeing a rock in the first place, that your brain is presenting your conscious mind with a truism (i.e. that you are actually viewing rock one and two).

Thanks for admitting you cannot demonstrate LFW is logically coherent, even in principle.

Not being able to logically demonstrate something is not the same thing is holding a belief that is logically incoherent. If a belief isn't self-refuting, unlike LFW is, it occupies a neutral ground: logically possible, yet not logically demonstrated. Whereas LFW is logically impossible, and therefore impossible to logically demonstrate.

Again Thinker, I doubt that you or I have all the facts about how the brain/mind interact, especially in light of Theism and the non-material. And given our woefully limited knowledge I see no need to dismiss my daily experience of free choice.

[The Thinker]

No Thinker, I asked that specific question from the get go, I did not move anything. And like I said then, you can not deductively argue that you are seeing a rock in the first place, that your brain is presenting your conscious mind with a truism (i.e. that you are actually viewing rock one and two).

Yes you did move the goal posts. You said you weren't looking for 100% certainty ("I never asked for 100% certainty"). Then you expected 100% certainty because you asked for deductive proof. That's moving the goal posts. I showed how it was logically possible to "go from being determined to believing that A is true, to A being actually being true," which is exactly what you asked for.

Again Thinker, I doubt that you or I have all the facts about how the brain/mind interact, especially in light of Theism and the non-material. And given our woefully limited knowledge I see no need to dismiss my daily experience of free choice.

That's a non-answer. We have very strong empirical evidence your substance dualism view is wrong. Now you're just avoiding the problem and hand-waving it away, as you always do. Your dualistic belief requires a certain ontology. It requires that immaterial souls drive the body like a ghost in the machine through some kind of force. But we already know all the forces that animate the body and they are found in that equation, and the "soul" is now where to be found. You need to own up to this and provide evidence for either how the soul fits into that equation, or disprove the equation. But you won't because you're a typical dishonest internet apologist who just spits out refuted apologetic talking points and never owns up to any real challenge. Your views are faith based, not evidence based.

Your daily experience is fully compatible with determinism and thus cannot be evidence in favor of LFW.

You've utterly FAILED to meet the challenge of this post.

[seer]

Yes you did move the goal posts. You said you weren't looking for 100% certainty ("I never asked for 100% certainty"). Then you expected 100% certainty because you asked for deductive proof. That's moving the goal posts. I showed how it was logically possible to "go from being determined to believing that A is true, to A being actually being true," which is exactly what you asked for.

Again Thinker, I wasn't asking for 100% certainty on every possible question. I was simply asking that you deductively go from your brain dictating that A is true, to A being actually being true. YOU DID NOT DO THAT. Just look at your rock example - you can not even argue deductively that your brain is presenting with a truism (i.e. I am seeing a rock). So how can you even suggest that you made the case when you could even get past the first step logically?

That's a non-answer. We have very strong empirical evidence your substance dualism view is wrong. Now you're just avoiding the problem and hand-waving it away, as you always do. Your dualistic belief requires a certain ontology. It requires that immaterial souls drive the body like a ghost in the machine through some kind of force. But we already know all the forces that animate the body and they are found in that equation, and the "soul" is now where to be found. You need to own up to this and provide evidence for either how the soul fits into that equation, or disprove the equation. But you won't because you're a typical dishonest internet apologist who just spits out refuted apologetic talking points and never owns up to any real challenge. Your views are faith based, not evidence based.

Your daily experience is fully compatible with determinism and thus cannot be evidence in favor of LFW.

You've utterly FAILED to meet the challenge of this post.

Yet your in your own formula consciousness can not be found. And you can not demonstrate how bouncing atoms can even give rise to self-awareness.

[Joel]

Your point is not backed up with any argument; it's just a claim and nothing more. How can an agent be acting towards an end if their thoughts are uncaused? If there is an end, then there is something that is causing it to do one thing rather than another.

You seem to be thinking that purpose is the same as efficient cause, or that they are necessarily connected? The former is untrue, and I don't see how the latter is the case. You are suddenly proposing that there is such a connection, so it's up to you to justify your claim.

Perhaps it is best if you outline a chronological order of events of what happens when you think a freely willed decision is made that allows for a coherent example of LFW.

Different than what I've already said?

That doesn't refute my argument at all, because all you're doing is just claiming that you can choose whether to think a different-but-related thought.

What I was pointing out is just that your argument that choosing thoughts is impossible does not apply to choosing whether to think a different-but-related thought.

As I said, whether (1) and (2) were involuntary is irrelevant. But then your last sentence there doesn't follow. Or is at least a claim without justification. You are saying that (1) and (2) were involuntary, therefore (4) is also involuntary. But that doesn't follow. It is possible for (1) and (2) to be involuntary but (4) to be voluntary. I see nothing contradictory about that. And at the time of (3) both X and the thought of "continuing to think about X" are both in your mind. But that doesn't imply that (4) is involuntary. And let me rephrase (3) slightly to be "You make the choice about whether to to do so or to switch to do something else." Then at (3) you might have chosen to not do (4). There would be nothing contradictory about that either. So 1 through 3 do not imply 4 follows necessarily.

The problem you face is that the thought of "continuing to think about X" is itself something that popped into your mind that you could not have chosen beforehand, and you have offered no explanation of whether (3) is a thought or choice caused by (2). If it is then it is just as involuntary as (2) and (1), and if it isn't caused by (2) then what does? It either has a cause or not. If it has no cause then it is itself something that you could not have chosen beforehand.

As a reminder, we were talking about:

The order is:
1) You think about X
2) You think about continuing to think about X.
3) You make the choice about whether to to do so or to switch to do something else.
4) You think about X some more.

Now, when you say, "The problem you face is that the thought of "continuing to think about X" is itself something that popped into your mind that you could not have chosen beforehand," you are saying,
"The problem you face is that (2) is involuntary." But, as I've said, whether (1) and (2) were involuntary is irrelevant. It is possible for (1) and (2) to be involuntary and (4) to be voluntary.

You say, "and you have offered no explanation of whether (3) is a thought or choice caused by (2)." Obviously I've been taking the position that (3) is not caused by (1) or (2). Rather, (2) is in the mind along with ideas of other alternative actions. (3) is just the selecting of (2), or one of the other alternative ideas, none of which can cause (3).

You say, "and if it isn't caused by (2) then what does?" The agent, acting (at least to some degree) as an uncaused causer. I'm seeing no logical problem.

You aren't following what I've been saying. Each idea about a possible alternative action is a thought. I'm saying that (in an LFW choice) none of them causes the action. You can think about each of them. You can consciously deliberate about them. And then you actualize one of them (without being caused to do so by any one of the thoughts or by anything external). But that lack of a further efficient cause does not rule out the possibility that you did it for a purpose, that you consciously deliberated.

You clearly aren't following what I've been saying. Saying "You can consciously deliberate about them" must result from a process whereby thoughts enter your consciousness without choosing them. Every single thought in the chain of thoughts faces the same problem as the initial thought - you can't have a thought, about a thought, before you have the thought.

Even if true (which I've been arguing against) that's not a problem, because the actual selection of one of those thoughts is not, itself, a thought.

And when you come to the final conclusion of whether to get it or not, that itself is a thought that you could not have controlled because you can't choose whether or not to get ice cream, before you choose whether or not to get ice cream.

That selecting is not, itself, a thought. And there is no need to have selected before you select. Prior to the selecting you thought about the ideas of the alternatives, and maybe even self-consciously thought about the potentiality of selecting from among the alternatives. But those thoughts are different from the actual selecting, which is not, itself, a thought.

Having the thought in your mind about whether or not to get ice cream prior to the choice being made does not in any way make the choice libertarian

Neither does it make it unlibertarian. Which is the more relevant point (because we are only discussing whether libertarian choice is logically possible.)

If the soul effectively causes and carries out the action (that the thought was a mere idea of), then the soul was causally effective, and acted according to (not caused by) a desired end. In what other sense does the agent need to be causally effective?

If our mind is not causally effective, and if our soul causes our mind, and/or our actions, and we are not consciously aware of what the soul will do, then this is no different from a device being put in you brain that allows me to remotely control your thoughts and actions. How can you even argue your thoughts/actions are free?

This doesn't seem to answer my question.
But anyway, So what if it were the case that we cannot tell whether we are exercising LFW or we are being decieved by "a device being put in you brain that allows me to remotely control your thoughts and actions."? So what? The question isn't which of the two is true. The question is whether the former is logically possible. If we cannot tell which of those is true, then that implies that both are logically possible.

You need to differentiate between the soul, the agent, the will, and the mind.

I've already addressed that in previous posts.

[The Thinker]

Again Thinker, I wasn't asking for 100% certainty on every possible question. I was simply asking that you deductively go from your brain dictating that A is true, to A being actually being true. YOU DID NOT DO THAT. Just look at your rock example - you can not even argue deductively that your brain is presenting with a truism (i.e. I am seeing a rock). So how can you even suggest that you made the case when you could even get past the first step logically?

By asking for that you asking for 100% certainty on every possible question. In which case you're moving the goal posts once again. And not only that, you're asking for something you can't do. I showed how it was logically possible, not that in every individual case it was 100% logically certain. The question you asked was answered: it is logically possible for to "go from being determined to believing that A is true, to A being actually being true." And in my example, the rock is not important, it just represents the number 1.

Yet your in your own formula consciousness can not be found. And you can not demonstrate how bouncing atoms can even give rise to self-awareness.

That's totally irrelevant. I don't need to know how belly-button lint is formed in order to know it isn't caused by a belly-button lint fairy. You sure are really bad at logic aren't you? You have a dilemma. If you can't show me a way out of it, you cannot claim your view is true. Just keep believing on faith as you always do.

[seer]

By asking for that you asking for 100% certainty on every possible question. In which case you're moving the goal posts once again. And not only that, you're asking for something you can't do. I showed how it was logically possible, not that in every individual case it was 100% logically certain. The question you asked was answered: it is logically possible for to "go from being determined to believing that A is true, to A being actually being true." And in my example, the rock is not important, it just represents the number 1.

Yes, but you are begging the question with any example where you use sense experience. There is no situation where you will not argue in a circle. For instance, make a deductive argument that the number one is a valid token without arguing in a circle. You can not even get off the ground without first begging the question.

That's totally irrelevant. I don't need to know how belly-button lint is formed in order to know it isn't caused by a belly-button lint fairy. You sure are really bad at logic aren't you? You have a dilemma. If you can't show me a way out of it, you cannot claim your view is true. Just keep believing on faith as you always do.

No it is completely relevant, first you claimed that your formula explained EVERYTHING in our everyday experience, that was totally false. It does not explain the most important aspect of human life, consciousness. Then you assume that atoms knocking together can somehow produce self-awareness. Talk about faith.

[The Thinker]

Welcome back!

You seem to be thinking that purpose is the same as efficient cause, or that they are necessarily connected? The former is untrue, and I don't see how the latter is the case. You are suddenly proposing that there is such a connection, so it's up to you to justify your claim.

I'm asking you how purpose causes anything. You need to explain that. What is the ontological status of purpose? I can't see how it would act as anything other than an efficient cause. So please explain how purpose effects people and describe purpose's ontological status.

Different than what I've already said?

Yes because what you outlined isn't LFW.

What I was pointing out is just that your argument that choosing thoughts is impossible does not apply to choosing whether to think a different-but-related thought.

That's fine, but you didn't do that.

As a reminder, we were talking about:

The order is:
1) You think about X
2) You think about continuing to think about X.
3) You make the choice about whether to to do so or to switch to do something else.
4) You think about X some more.

Now, when you say, "The problem you face is that the thought of "continuing to think about X" is itself something that popped into your mind that you could not have chosen beforehand," you are saying,
"The problem you face is that (2) is involuntary." But, as I've said, whether (1) and (2) were involuntary is irrelevant. It is possible for (1) and (2) to be involuntary and (4) to be voluntary.

No it is not possible for 4 to be voluntary if by voluntary you mean you were able to choose the thought. You seem to be making an argument for compatiblism, not LFW.

You say, "and you have offered no explanation of whether (3) is a thought or choice caused by (2)." Obviously I've been taking the position that (3) is not caused by (1) or (2). Rather, (2) is in the mind along with ideas of other alternative actions. (3) is just the selecting of (2), or one of the other alternative ideas, none of which can cause (3).

But then you're saying that (3) just pops into the mind uncaused. You can't choose something that pops into existence uncaused. Hence no free will can exist there (3) makes better sense if it is caused by (1) and (2). But if it is caused it isn't free either.

You say, "and if it isn't caused by (2) then what does?" The agent, acting (at least to some degree) as an uncaused causer. I'm seeing no logical problem.

There is a huge problem. An uncaused agent would violate the kalam. I think the kalam is false but to believe in uncaused agents requires theists to believe it is wrong too. Second, if the agent causes (2) or (3) or any of 1-4, then what causes the agent? According to you: nothing. If the agent is uncaused then you have the random problem I mentioned in the beginning of the post. You have not resolved that.

Even if true (which I've been arguing against) that's not a problem, because the actual selection of one of those thoughts is not, itself, a thought.

So you're saying a thought-less agent, which you cannot be consciously aware of because, it's thoughtless, is responsible for "choosing" your thoughts.

That selecting is not, itself, a thought. And there is no need to have selected before you select. Prior to the selecting you thought about the ideas of the alternatives, and maybe even self-consciously thought about the potentiality of selecting from among the alternatives. But those thoughts are different from the actual selecting, which is not, itself, a thought.

That's perfectly compatible with determinism, and something compatible with determinism cannot be offered as evidence for LFW.

Neither does it make it unlibertarian. Which is the more relevant point (because we are only discussing whether libertarian choice is logically possible.)

It does because if it doesn't fit my 1-3 it is not libertarian.

This doesn't seem to answer my question.
But anyway, So what if it were the case that we cannot tell whether we are exercising LFW or we are being decieved by "a device being put in you brain that allows me to remotely control your thoughts and actions."? So what? The question isn't which of the two is true. The question is whether the former is logically possible. If we cannot tell which of those is true, then that implies that both are logically possible.

That doesn't follow. If your subjective experience of feeling like LFW is true is indistinguishable from determinism, then your subjective experience cannot be offered as evidence. I'm asking for one scenario where you can logically show a thought arising that satisfies my 1-3, or just my (1). So far you've failed.

I've already addressed that in previous posts.

Then I missed it. Care to reiterate it?

[The Thinker]

Yes, but you are begging the question with any example where you use sense experience. There is no situation where you will not argue in a circle. For instance, make a deductive argument that the number one is a valid token without arguing in a circle. You can not even get off the ground without first begging the question.

I'm using the axiomatic approach from the munchausen trilemma, not the circular logic approach. I've already told you that I grant my senses as as a basic belief. Please don't reveal your ignorance in response to this. Saying "but those are just assumed" will do the jobl quite well.

I still need you to tell me this specific complaint about my view that is somehow resolved by your view. I don't see it. Why should I agree with your view on consciousness and not mine? Give me a reason to. I need to make sure you're not holding me to a standard that you yourself cannot meet.

No it is completely relevant, first you claimed that your formula explained EVERYTHING in our everyday experience, that was totally false. It does not explain the most important aspect of human life, consciousness. Then you assume that atoms knocking together can somehow produce self-awareness. Talk about faith.

No, it is not relevant. That equation rules out substance dualism as an explanation of consciousness. If you disagree, then refute the dilemma. The equation explains every force and particle that has any effect on you and the soul is not there. It doesn't need to explain consciousness in order to rule out souls, just as I don't need to know how belly-button lint is formed in order to know it isn't caused by a belly-button lint fairy.

I don't assume atoms bumping around can produce self-awareness. I've already provided massive amounts of evidence for that. Besides, your view that atoms bumping around cannot produce self-awareness is already self-refuting because you've already admitted to me that animals are self aware and they have no soul. So my cat literally refutes your position. Ha!

Keeping digging the hole seer. I need it for entertainment.

[Joel]

First of all, this equation doesn't describe everything, not even within the domain of physical terms, this equation merely describes the behavior of some physical observables, and how these will behave. It would not describe how such circumstances would come to be, why physical stuff would exist to begin with, the ratios of elements, compositions, large scale structures of space, etc... also its incomplete in as much as you can't boil the Standard Model down to this equation.

It seems it also cannot be complete with regards to spacetime/gravitation either. I see the Ricci scalar and the determinant of the metric, but where is the rest of the metric tensor? Where is the Ricci curvature tensor? Where is the stress-energy tensor? In short, how would you get the Einstein field equations from this?

[Joel]

You seem to be thinking that purpose is the same as efficient cause

I'm asking you how purpose causes anything.

It doesn't. Purpose is not cause. They are different things.
As I said before, "Your claim was that if the agent was not moved by an external efficient cause, then the agent acts randomly/arbitrarily."

Acting with purpose and/or order is not the same thing as being caused to so act. If an agent acts as an uncaused causer, that doesn't imply that the agent's acts are without order or purpose (thus does not imply that the agent acts randomly/arbitrarily).

Purpose (or reason for doing something) doesn't cause anything to happen. But it does make something be not arbitrary/random.

Yes because what you outlined isn't LFW.

That's fine, but you didn't do that.

No it is not possible for 4 to be voluntary if by voluntary you mean you were able to choose the thought. You seem to be making an argument for compatiblism, not LFW.

As far as I can tell, this is bare assertion, and not a counter-argument. (And I don't see how what I said is not LFW.)

But then you're saying that (3) just pops into the mind uncaused. You can't choose something that pops into existence uncaused.

Perhaps I should have said (4)? But no, the selecting is not something that pops into the mind at all. The options (e.g. (2)) were already in the mind. As was the potentiality of making a selection. The selecting of (2) does not cause (1) or (2) to pop into your head, because they already were in your head. And (4) does not represent anything popping into your head either, because X was already in your head. No new thought popped into your head. That is exactly the point of my presenting this example.

(And remember that (4) doesn't follow logically necessarily from 1-3 because we could replace (4) with (4b) "You don't think more about X, and instead go make a sandwich." and it would still be logically consistent.)

There is a huge problem. An uncaused agent would violate the kalam.

No it doesn't. The very conclusion of the kalam argument is that there must be an uncaused causer.
As I've pointed out before, the agent, by choosing, does not cause anything to come to be except the actualization of one of the potentialities. And that is caused by the agent. Thus the only thing that comes to be does have a cause: the agent. The fact that there is no antecedent efficient cause is not a problem, rather it is a solution to a problem (it prevents infinite regress). The buck has to stop somewhere. Why not at the agent?

Even if true (which I've been arguing against) that's not a problem, because the actual selection of one of those thoughts is not, itself, a thought.

So you're saying a thought-less agent, which you cannot be consciously aware of because, it's thoughtless, is responsible for "choosing" your thoughts.

No, I'm not. If the agent selects one of his thoughts to actualize, that implies the agent has thoughts, and is not thought-less.

That selecting is not, itself, a thought. And there is no need to have selected before you select. Prior to the selecting you thought about the ideas of the alternatives, and maybe even self-consciously thought about the potentiality of selecting from among the alternatives. But those thoughts are different from the actual selecting, which is not, itself, a thought.

That's perfectly compatible with determinism, and something compatible with determinism cannot be offered as evidence for LFW.

Irrelevant. Recall that we aren't talking about evidence for whether LFW is true or false, but whether LFW is possible. If what I said is compatible with both determinism and LFW, then it is evidence that LFW is possible.

It does because if it doesn't fit my 1-3 it is not libertarian.

It is consistent with your 1-3.

This doesn't seem to answer my question.
But anyway, So what if it were the case that we cannot tell whether we are exercising LFW or we are being decieved by "a device being put in you brain that allows me to remotely control your thoughts and actions."? So what? The question isn't which of the two is true. The question is whether the former is logically possible. If we cannot tell which of those is true, then that implies that both are logically possible.

That doesn't follow. If your subjective experience of feeling like LFW is true is indistinguishable from determinism, then your subjective experience cannot be offered as evidence.

You keep sliding back into whether LFW is true. We are talking about whether it is possible. If we can't tell whether our choices are LFW or determinism, then, to the extent of our ability to know, each is possible. If each is possible, then LFW is possible.

I'm asking for one scenario where you can logically show a thought arising that satisfies my 1-3, or just my (1).

I have given multiple scenarios. E.g. my (1)-(4) example above.

Then I missed it. Care to reiterate it?

This was regarding your request "You need to differentiate between the soul, the agent, the will, and the mind."
What I said before was that for our purposes I don't need to distinguish between soul, mind, and agent. Consider them synonymous. And I said I considered the will to be one of the many faculties/capacities of an agent (along with memory, reason, contemplation, capacity for feeling, etc.)

[Truthseeker]

Assume libertarianism is true.
Assume free will is true.
Then libertarian free will exists in at least one case.

I think you will reject the argument, above, as trivial. I'd be inclined to agree, but it does look like it is logically sound (consistent at least). But I do wonder that you will show that the idea of free will and libertarianism contradict each other. Anyway, could anyone suggest a way to make the argument more convincing?

[seer]

I'm using the axiomatic approach from the munchausen trilemma, not the circular logic approach. I've already told you that I grant my senses as as a basic belief. Please don't reveal your ignorance in response to this. Saying "but those are just assumed" will do the jobl quite well.

Nonsense Thinker,

impossibility to prove any truth even in the fields of logic and mathematicsThe trilemma, then, is the decision among the three equally unsatisfying options.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%BCnchhausen_trilemma

And you are only pushing the problem back one step Thinker. Who gets to define what a properly basis belief is? Without being arbitrary? So do you agree that the trilemma makes proving any logical truth impossible? Yet you still BELIEVE.

I still need you to tell me this specific complaint about my view that is somehow resolved by your view. I don't see it. Why should I agree with your view on consciousness and not mine? Give me a reason to. I need to make sure you're not holding me to a standard that you yourself cannot meet.

I did not claim that my view resolved anything, only that we all live by faith - including you, i.e. we all accept things as true without logical justification.