Originally posted by Jim B.
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Just as action-at-a-distance was entirely inconceivable. I agree that conceivability alone is a poor predictor, but as I said, it depends on the role that conceivability plays in the particular context in question. If the nature and scope of empirical knowledge itself is at issue rather than an empirical truth, then conceivability is a surer guide.
I'm not even clear on what you mean by your Concept of Truth, so I can't say much about it yet. I just haven't come across many naturalists who put so much emphasis on 'Concepts.' You do come across as a bit coy. Why not just tell us what these things are?
As for what I mean by the concept of Truth, I haven't been avoiding talking about it. Indeed, I've already explicitly stated it a few times throughout this thread, as well as discussing how I believe it differs from particular propositions which one might evaluate to be true. So, to reiterate again, when I am talking about Truth, I am referring to "that which corresponds to reality." Now I realize that this is a fairly quick, short, and imprecise way of phrasing it, but most of the people with whom I normally discuss the notion either also assent to the Correspondence Theory or else they are familiar with the Correspondence Theory; so I am unused to having to explicate much more on the topic. However, rather than re-invent the wheel and flood this thread with yet another side topic, I'll just point you towards this article on this subject: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/t...orrespondence/
I think action would be difficult to understand on the B-Theory. But more to come.
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