Determinism And Rationality.

[seer]

No, Compatibilists do not "redefine" free will. That would imply that there was some single, well-defined, widely accepted definition for free will which we arbitrarily overturned. That is simply not the case. Even within Libertarian philosophy, the notion of free will has been notoriously difficult to define in a cogent manner.

If we don't have the ability to do otherwise then everything we do, say, believe or think is determined. No matter how you define free will.

What does it mean to say one "has the ability to do otherwise?" I'm assuming you don't simply mean this epistemically, since it applies equally well on Determinism in that case. You also don't mean that the choice is completely unrestrained by outside influence, presumably. You also can't mean simply that the result of the choice in question is due to the actor performing the action, since that is the same as on Compatibilism.

What I'm saying that if we don't have the ability to do otherwise (no matter what we think that entails) it is turtles all the way down. We are the play things of antecedent conditions - we have no choice in what we do, think or say. We don't believe A primarily because it is true, we believe A it because we were determined to by the non-rational forces of nature. Our reasoning plays no causal role.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

If we don't have the ability to do otherwise then everything we do, say, believe or think is determined. No matter how you define free will.

I honestly don't know what you are trying to illustrate here. I've already agreed that on Determinism everything proceeds deterministically. How is simply repeating that fact meant to further this discussion in any way?

What I'm saying that if we don't have the ability to do otherwise (no matter what we think that entails)

Before we can reasonably say we know the consequences of X or Not-X, we need to know what X entails. Presumably, you are not saying it is possible to evaluate the consequences of a proposition without actually knowing what that proposition is.

So, again, what is it that you mean by "the ability to do otherwise? "

[seer]

I honestly don't know what you are trying to illustrate here. I've already agreed that on Determinism everything proceeds deterministically. How is simply repeating that fact meant to further this discussion in any way?

Then you agree that everything that we believe or think is determined. Which begs the question - determined by what? Non-reasoning forces?

Before we can reasonably say we know the consequences of X or Not-X, we need to know what X entails. Presumably, you are not saying it is possible to evaluate the consequences of a proposition without actually knowing what that proposition is.

So, again, what is it that you mean by "the ability to do otherwise? "

I have the ability to touch my nose at this moment or not touch my nose. Either option is open for me, and past antecedents do not determine that. I do. Now some people think that is an incoherent idea, but is that belief of theirs determined, if so, why should I believe it?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Then you agree that everything that we believe or think is determined. Which begs the question - determined by what? Non-reasoning forces?

Let's try to be careful with our language. Determinism does not suggest that there exists some actor or group of actors which perform an action to force a particular choice. Rather, Determinism simply suggests that the world consists of intelligible, non-random patterns which perfectly describe its behavior.

I have the ability to touch my nose at this moment or not touch my nose.

This is not an answer to the question. You still haven't actually told me what X is supposed to mean. You're simply giving me a scenario in which you think X applies.

What do you mean by "the ability to do otherwise?"

[seer]

Let's try to be careful with our language. Determinism does not suggest that there exists some actor or group of actors which perform an action to force a particular choice. Rather, Determinism simply suggests that the world consists of intelligible, non-random patterns which perfectly describe its behavior.

BP, that doesn't make sense to me, either your beliefs and choices are determined or they are not. And determined by antecedent conditions or not.

This is not an answer to the question. You still haven't actually told me what X is supposed to mean. You're simply giving me a scenario in which you think X applies.

What do you mean by "the ability to do otherwise?"

I told you, I'm not determined to choose A, I can choose B, both options are open to me. It is kind of a classic definition...


Libertarianism holds onto a concept of free will that requires the agent to be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances, interactionist dualists believe that some non-physical mind, will, or soul overrides physical causality.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

BP, that doesn't make sense to me, either your beliefs and choices are determined or they are not. And determined by antecedent conditions or not.

When you say "determined" do you mean it in the sense of an action? That is to say, do you think that Determinism entails that some actor or group of actors is forcing a particular decision onto what would otherwise be a free choice?

I told you, I'm not determined to choose A, I can choose B, both options are open to me. It is kind of a classic definition...

That's not a definition, at all. All this tells me is that the choice is not deterministic. Of course, a completely stochastic scenario in which the decision between A and B is entirely random is certainly non-deterministic, but I presume that is not what you mean by "the ability to do otherwise." So I still don't know what it is that you actually mean by "the ability to do otherwise."

You might say that, modally speaking, there exists a possible world in which you choose A and another possible world with completely identical antecedent conditions in which you choose B. However, if that is the case, I do not see how this is at all different from simply being random.

[seer]

When you say "determined" do you mean it in the sense of an action? That is to say, do you think that Determinism entails that some actor or group of actors is forcing a particular decision onto what would otherwise be a free choice?

I'm saying that you are forced to believe or do by forces beyond your control. By the forces of nature that created you.

That's not a definition, at all. All this tells me is that the choice is not deterministic. Of course, a completely stochastic scenario in which the decision between A and B is entirely random is certainly non-deterministic, but I presume that is not what you mean by "the ability to do otherwise." So I still don't know what it is that you actually mean by "the ability to do otherwise."

You might say that, modally speaking, there exists a possible world in which you choose A and another possible world with completely identical antecedent conditions in which you choose B. However, if that is the case, I do not see how this is at all different from simply being random.

It actually was a definition BP, and it was clear. And of course free will could include randomness. Whether I touch my nose in this moment or not is random. The shirt I picked this morning was a random choice. I do the choosing, I'm not compelled by antecedent conditions. And reason also enters in, so my reasoning powers play a role in various choices. Reason plays no role in determinism - how could it since it is not really you who is doing the reasoning, you are just follow the pre-determined path that the non-rational forces of nature caused you to follow.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

I'm saying that you are forced to believe or do by forces beyond your control. By the forces of nature that created you.

So you do think that Determinism means that something is acting upon a person to restrict an otherwise free choice, then?

It actually was a definition BP, and it was clear.

It's really not. If it had been clear, I wouldn't be asking questions asking for clarification. I'm not trying to be obtuse, here-- I sincerely don't understand what you mean.

And of course free will could include randomness. Whether I touch my nose in this moment or not is random. The shirt I picked this morning was a random choice. I do the choosing, I'm not compelled by antecedent conditions. And reason also enters in, so my reasoning powers play a role in various choices.

I didn't ask whether it includes randomness. I'm asking what differentiates it from pure randomness.

Reason plays no role in determinism - how could it since it is not really you who is doing the reasoning, you are just follow the pre-determined path that the non-rational forces of nature caused you to follow.

Once again, you have offered no justification for asserting that rational cognition cannot arise from deterministic principles. The fact that a person's cognition, on Determinism, results from deterministic principles does not imply that it is not actually that person performing cognitive acts. You've offered no justification for thinking that a person's actions are suddenly not their actions given Determinism.

[shunyadragon]

So? There may be a range of possibilities but they all are still determined...

Careful with the word determined, but yes the possible outcomes are limited by Natural Laws, environment, and the chain of prior cause and effect outcomes.

[Jim B.]

Yep. I'm a Compatibilist. I don't believe that Determinism and Free Will are incompatible.

That's not my understanding of compatibilism. Compatibilism is the kind of determinism that allows you to believe that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

That's not my understanding of compatibilism. Compatibilism is the kind of determinism that allows you to believe that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility.

While Compatibilism certainly can be leveled as an answer to questions of moral responsibility, specifically, the label can be and certainly has been applied to the notion of compatibility between determinism and free will in philosophy.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

[Jim B.]

So what reason should I have to think that consciousness cannot supervene on its basal physical constituents?

Because of the lack of logical implication from physical to phenomenal truths. Because the essential property of experience is lost when analyzed physically. Because Mary learns something new. Because of the contingent relation between the two kinds of property unlike the necessary relation between all other a posteriori identity relations in science, eg H2O and water.

It's not just an abstraction for what all individual truths have in common. Individual truths are all propositions, but "truth" as a concept is not the idea of "proposition," despite this commonality. The concept of "truth" is the standard by which we attempt to evaluate a given proposition. The phrase "a truth," as you have been using it, is a proposition which has been evaluated. Again, these are two entirely different things.

You're talking about a norm. The norm of truth. I wouldn't say they are two entirely different or unrelated things. I think there's a dialectical relation between them. Otherwise you're committing to some form of idealism, which I don't think you want to do.

You are responding to my saying "I am not convinced." I didn't actually mention anything, in that sentence, of which I am convinced. So which of my convictions were you expecting me to support? If you would like me to explain why I am convinced of Determinism, in general, that's all well and good. However, the original question of this thread didn't ask Determinists to support Determinism. It asked Determinists if they agreed with a particular statement. That's what I've been responding to, throughout.

You're convinced of determinism regarding human cognition, asaict, because you've been ascribing to the statement in the OP. But then you also said you believe in determinism generally. We can restrict ourselves just to human cognition and consciousness if you want.

Yes, if you believe that consciousness cannot arise from underlying deterministic processes then you may have reason to believe that intent and purpose cannot arise from underlying deterministic processes. I thought that I had made it fairly clear that I do not see any reason to believe either of these statements.

I think that conscious experience, reasons and purposes are difficult to reconcile with a purely physical, deterministic world picture.

Certainly not! Even if one ascribes to a stochastic interpretation of quantum mechanics-- which I most certainly do not-- the overwhelmingly vast majority of the physical models which we utilize are still completely deterministic. And since I actually subscribe to a completely deterministic interpretation of QM, even that would not be an abandonment of determinism.

This is definitely above my pay grade. From what I can gather, no one really knows for sure. Maybe even the question is ill-posed.

So, if we agree that it is not incompatible to discuss single events at different levels of description, all I am lacking is an argument which shows that it is impossible for consciousness to be described at any of these other levels of description.

Because the conscious experience itself, the essential quality, the sine qua non of the experience is lost when analyzed in terms of its structure and function. The conscious experience can be described in terms of its causes or in terms of its effects at other levels of description, which is what neuroscience is currently doing.

[Jim B.]

While Compatibilism certainly can be leveled as an answer to questions of moral responsibility, specifically, the label can be and certainly has been applied to the notion of compatibility between determinism and free will in philosophy.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

I should have specified 'free will' as meaning "one's actions not being determined by the past.' Compatibilist free will is understood as "doing what you will or desire even if what you will or desire is determined by the past." The members of "Walden 2" would be 'free' in a compatibilist sense because they would still be morally responsible actors even though all of their actions are determined. Understood in a metaphysical sense, compatibilism is a species of determinism.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Because of the lack of logical implication from physical to phenomenal truths. Because the essential property of experience is lost when analyzed physically. Because Mary learns something new. Because of the contingent relation between the two kinds of property unlike the necessary relation between all other a posteriori identity relations in science, eg H2O and water.

So are you saying that I should think consciousness cannot supervene on its basal physical constituents because we do not have a satisfactory theory describing how consciousness can supervene on its basal constituents? Or are you saying that you can demonstrate that it is impossible for consciousness to supervene on its basal constituents?

You're talking about a norm. The norm of truth. I wouldn't say they are two entirely different or unrelated things. I think there's a dialectical relation between them. Otherwise you're committing to some form of idealism, which I don't think you want to do.

I certainly never claimed that they are unrelated. I think it is fairly obvious that I would agree that "propositions which are true" are related to "truth as a concept." I simply fail to see how this relation implies that because propositions are linguistic we can thereby conclude that capital-T Truth is linguistic.

You're convinced of determinism regarding human cognition, asaict, because you've been ascribing to the statement in the OP. But then you also said you believe in determinism generally. We can restrict ourselves just to human cognition and consciousness if you want.

The reason I am convinced of Determinism in regard to cognition and consciousness, specifically, is because I am convinced of Determinism more generally. As I mentioned in an earlier post responding to Seer, I am convinced of Determinism because I am a B-Theorist with regards to Time. Now, I am absolutely willing to discuss that in more detail, if you would like, but we might want to move such a discussion to another thread in order to keep this one more focused on the original topic.

I think that conscious experience, reasons and purposes are difficult to reconcile with a purely physical, deterministic world picture.

I cannot claim to have a satisfactory and complete theory of consciousness on Determinism, to be sure; however, neither do I see anything in these phenomena which necessarily contradicts Determinism.

(It's a bit of an aside, but I do want to note one thing. While I do personally identify as a Naturalist, there is nothing about Determinism in and of itself which necessitates Naturalism/Physicalism/Materialism/etc. A person could be an avowed and outspoken theist while still remaining a Determinist. For example, the question in the OP might have just as easily been picked up by a Calvinist as by me.)

This is definitely above my pay grade. From what I can gather, no one really knows for sure. Maybe even the question is ill-posed.

Yeah, Foundations of Quantum Mechanics is a particularly murky field within the philosophy of science. That's one of the reasons I tend to cringe any time I see someone try to claim that QM provides support for a metaphysical argument.

Because the conscious experience itself, the essential quality, the sine qua non of the experience is lost when analyzed in terms of its structure and function. The conscious experience can be described in terms of its causes or in terms of its effects at other levels of description, which is what neuroscience is currently doing.

Is it necessarily lost? Are you claiming that there cannot possibly be any mapping of conscious experience onto physical neurology in such a way as to provide a Deterministic theory of consciousness?

[Jim B.]

So are you saying that I should think consciousness cannot supervene on its basal physical constituents because we do not have a satisfactory theory describing how consciousness can supervene on its basal constituents? Or are you saying that you can demonstrate that it is impossible for consciousness to supervene on its basal constituents?

It's difficult to imagine how such a theory could rely on current physical concepts. There's no conceptually necessary link from one kind of truth (physical) to the other (experiential). A physically identical world without consciousness is conceivable but a physically identical world without life or water is NOT conceivable. So there's something essential that's being missed, but it's almost certainly not a physical fact.

I certainly never claimed that they are unrelated. I think it is fairly obvious that I would agree that "propositions which are true" are related to "truth as a concept." I simply fail to see how this relation implies that because propositions are linguistic we can thereby conclude that capital-T Truth is linguistic.

Interesting that a naturalist would place so much importance on such a 'concept.' So I guess it exerts causal power in a way and yet it is not physical. I assume that it is mind-dependent(?). I assume that there are many other concepts with causal power, such as justice, freedom, equality,...

The reason I am convinced of Determinism in regard to cognition and consciousness, specifically, is because I am convinced of Determinism more generally. As I mentioned in an earlier post responding to Seer, I am convinced of Determinism because I am a B-Theorist with regards to Time. Now, I am absolutely willing to discuss that in more detail, if you would like, but we might want to move such a discussion to another thread in order to keep this one more focused on the original topic.

Yes, definitely! That would be an interesting thread. I'm certainly not a B-Theorist. I believe in an ontologically open universe. But we can restrict ourselves to cognition and consciousness on this thread for purposes of clarity ( although we never stick to the OP with these threads!).

I cannot claim to have a satisfactory and complete theory of consciousness on Determinism, to be sure; however, neither do I see anything in these phenomena which necessarily contradicts Determinism.

Fair enough.

(It's a bit of an aside, but I do want to note one thing. While I do personally identify as a Naturalist, there is nothing about Determinism in and of itself which necessitates Naturalism/Physicalism/Materialism/etc. A person could be an avowed and outspoken theist while still remaining a Determinist. For example, the question in the OP might have just as easily been picked up by a Calvinist as by me.)

Right. I read where you wrote that you were a determinist even when you were a Christian. Is it fair to say that determinism is more foundational to your belief system than theism/atheism?

Is it necessarily lost? Are you claiming that there cannot possibly be any mapping of conscious experience onto physical neurology in such a way as to provide a Deterministic theory of consciousness?

It doesn't seem likely given the present conceptual framework. There is no space in physical theory for intrinsicness or for purpose and intentionality.