Mind is not reduceable to brain

[metacrock]

So, you are saying that reason and awareness are a part of mind/spirit, but reason and awareness only describe what the mind does, not what it is. The physical brain can be described as embodying those same properties,

no it can't/ you are confusing cvonsciousne4ss with brain function. In any case we can't answer the hard problem so we can't say

so what I'm asking you is to describe the mind as a thing in itself. Does it take up space, does it have legnth, width, volume, etc etc, by what mechanism does it reason, in what sense is it conscious and of what is it conscious of?

It's immaterial. Like light doesn't take up space it's not an organ. It may be im another dimension. we don't know.

But light doesn't do anything, so I don't think it a good analogy for describing the mind. You know what a better analogy for mind would be? The brain.

It's good analogy. all analogies have a breaking poi t where they don't apply. analogies are not proof, their only function is to illustrate concepts. they bridge the gap between known and unknown.

[metacrock]

When you are sleeping, you also lose the faculty of consciousness, yet you are aware of an alternate reality and live in it as though in a waking life. And you can believe that EvoUK and the science he is relating to you to be quite wrong, but the science, the empirical evidence, contradicts your belief.

no it doesn't. no scientific evidence says there is not a faculty of consciousness that transcends brain function,. there is no disproof of that., there is only the fact that you can't produce a positive proof and you are taking that to be positive proof there is not.,

in the OP I gave six reasons why mind can't be reduced to brain. you have no answer for them. since mind is not brain it must be something, you fill in the blank with ideology and your ideology says there can't be immaterial things, I do not fill in the bank because I don't know. I am willing to consider. I am willing to consider the immaterial.

the positive reasons why mind is not reducible:


*problem of binding * Projective activity in perceptual processB] *[/B] Semantic or intentional content; word meaning and other form of representation. * problem of Intentionality *The Humunculus Problem

[EvoUK]

when I was in the coma I lost the faculty of being conscious. yet I was aware of a reality and lived in it as though in a waking life.

... You were dreaming? Without knowing the details of your coma it is hard to comment - usually coma patients show no signs of the normal sleep-wakefulness cycle, which means they are unlikely to be dreaming. However some have claimed to dream or experience nightmares, so this probably depends on the cause & severity of the coma.

I also think you are quite wrong about corresponding a bran function to a physical part as Talis says this is not something we can do.

Noting correlations between physical alterations to the brain and corresponding brain function is very well documented, so I am unsure what basis you have for claiming this to be incorrect? Or do you have alternate explanations for each and every one of these documented cases? As mentioned, the documentation & evidence is wide ranging and relatively straightforward, so I'm interested as to why you think a whole section of science to be factually incorrect?

[EvoUK]

This is currently relatively accurate - at least in so much as we don't know

[metacrock]

... You were dreaming? Without knowing the details of your coma it is hard to comment - usually coma patients show no signs of the normal sleep-wakefulness cycle, which means they are unlikely to be dreaming. However some have claimed to dream or experience nightmares, so this probably depends on the cause & severity of the coma.

I don't I was dreaming I know I was. people fr4om the hospital were in the dreams even though I had not met them in waking moments. you can doubt this all you want to I know it was real.

Noting correlations between physical alterations to the brain and corresponding brain function is very well documented, so I am unsure what basis you have for claiming this to be incorrect? Or do you have alternate explanations for each and every one of these documented cases? As mentioned, the documentation & evidence is wide ranging and relatively straightforward, so I'm interested as to why you think a whole section of science to be factually incorrect?

your position suffers from an inescapable epistemological failing you cannot resolve., it's just of getting you to understand the concept., the Ray Tallis quotes on OP back me up. just damaging some part of the brain \does not prove the behavior is caused by that part of the brain rather than just being accessible by it. All you have to claim that you know is an ideological answer that says this has to be. it's not proof.

If brain function is access to mind then damaging brain function cuts off access that does not prove the mind goes away. even if it was that does not mean that mind and brain are the same, mind can still live on beyond brain even if it is caused by it.

[metacrock]

This is currently relatively accurate - at least in so much as we don't know how to explain the 'hard' problems of consciousness (I'm referring to Chalmers 'easy' and 'hard' problems of explaining consciousness - 1995).

this is binding not hard problem, it is a good reason why mind id not reducible to brain.

Essentially, whilst we can describe the neurophysiology of consciousness, we cannot describe why it happens to start with. Many scientists in this particular field think that consciousness can be explained given enough knowledge and understanding of the human brain. I am personally agnostic towards whether science can answer the hard problems of consciousness.

that's true and it's a bog feral you still have to deal with each of those si things independently and one of them beats reduction.

none of that is proven to be anything more than access. it does not prove that mind is brain,.

I see you also mention Baar's global workspace theory- based on the view that the brain is made up of many different processors or modules each capable of performing some task on the symbolic representations that it receives as input, and this model of the brain is fairly well-supported by evidence from anatomical studies and studies of patients with brain damage.

What global workspace theory attempts to explain is the serial stream of thought emerges from the masses of unconscious mental computations that are proceeding simultaneously in the brain.

Global workspace theory gives the most complete account to date of the relationship of conscious and unconscious processes in perception, learning, problem-solving and language, among others.




However, it is still incomplete - to go back to your original point and others you have listed below. However I am fine with that, as the neurophysiological basis for consciousness (or parts of it) is still well documented - you point seems to be there are gaps in our knowledge so we must throw it all out?

all of that is in the Kelly's book irreducible mind they site journal articles backing it up. saying it's incomplete is not a disproof all of it is incomplete your own words show your position is incomplete.

[EvoUK]

I am answering both posts here, as I do not see a need to produce several posts to one user.

just damaging some part of the brain \does not prove the behavior is caused by that part of the brain rather than just being accessible by it. All you have to claim that you know is an ideological answer that says this has to be. it's not proof.

Ok, forgive me but I do not see how your conclusions flow - or at least it seems I am missing something in your logic.

It appears that although you agree in evidence supporting the idea that physical damage to the brain causes some high brain functions to alter or be removed, you disagree that this has anything to do with those higher brain functions being a result of the brain, and instead lean towards the idea that it merely shows that it is 'accessible by it'? I do not know what evidence you are pointing to which would suggest this is the case - the points you raised earlier amount to we do not have a full picture yet, so it must therefore be impossible. No one is suggesting we have all the answers yet, nor is anyone suggesting that the subject of consciousness isn't a difficult one, scientifically.



I would contest that the correlations point to a causality, however I am afraid that I do not see your logic that this doesn't prove anything? Surely the hypothesis that correlations=causality is a simpler method than adding anything else to the mix, which it appears on the face of it that your are doing?

You also claim that I am providing an ideological answer - I am assuming by that you mean I am basing my arguments on the assumption that this is all due to natural causes (this is, after all, all science can prove or point to - the rest being more of a philosophical debate)? Or are you referring to another ideology?

If brain function is access to mind then damaging brain function cuts off access that does not prove the mind goes away. even if it was that does not mean that mind and brain are the same, mind can still live on beyond brain even if it is caused by it.

'If brain function is access to mind then damaging brain function cuts off access that does not prove the mind goes away' - well, yes - if we make the assumption that the mind is separate to the brain, then we can conclude that damage to the brain does not make the mind go away. However this is based on an assumption which I am finding it hard to find a reason for accepting to begin with - namely that the mind is separate to the brain. I would suggest that it is a direct cause of activity in the brain, rather than being a separate entity.

Other than what I can gather so far is an a-priori assumption that it is separate, I see no further reason to conclude this based on your points thus far. Is there something I am missing?

We also have no reason to think that the mind lives on without a functioning brain - brain dead states being the obvious example, as this does not relate to those in a coma.

this is binding not hard problem, it is a good reason why mind id not reducible to brain.

none of that is proven to be anything more than access. it does not prove that mind is brain,.

I addressed this earlier, but again I would dispute that nothing other than correlations=causality is necessary. Suggesting that the mind is separate to the brain based only on information showing us that it isn't doesn't appear to be prove your point.

It only does not prove that mind is brain if you assume that it can't be - on the contrary it actually shows the opposite. Why do you feel the need to think that the mind is separate to the brain? You have not shown that it is, and can only explain all the evidence that it is as simply 'having access'. I would suggest that your point is actually a philosophical one, rather than a scientific one.

saying it's incomplete is not a disproof all of it is incomplete your own words show your position is incomplete.

Yes, it is. I actually stated that scientific knowledge on consciousness is incomplete. I do not see how this proves anything further than we have more to learn.

[Jim B.]

When you are sleeping, you also lose the faculty of consciousness, yet you are aware of an alternate reality and live in it as though in a waking life. And you can believe that EvoUK and the science he is relating to you to be quite wrong, but the science, the empirical evidence, contradicts your belief.

When my tv set is off, it no longer transmits images. By tinkering with certain components and functions of my tv set, I can alter the transmissions in specific, repeatable ways, including its ability to ever transmit images ever again. This is a possible analogy to what meta and I are suggesting, although, as he says, all analogies are severely limited.

The problem with consciousness being wholly reducible to the brain is the hard problem, as EvoUK mentions. It's a conceptual hurdle and until it's cleared, I don't see how another century of empirical data will make any difference.

[Jim B.]

I lean, as a Christian, towards the emergent dualism of William Hasker - or something there about...

I'm not familiar with Hasker. Emergent dualism has its appeal but I think you need something else there to explain how the emergence happens.

[Jim B.]

I would contest that the correlations point to a causality, however I am afraid that I do not see your logic that this doesn't prove anything? Surely the hypothesis that correlations=causality is a simpler method than adding anything else to the mix, which it appears on the face of it that your are doing?

I agree that correlations indicate causality unless we have good reasons to think otherwise. I think the arguments against reducibility are good enough reasons to suspend judgment on the nature of causality when it comes to experiences. If consciousness is a basic property, then brain function might be what enables or facilitates consciousness without being the sufficient cause. And if some kind of dual aspect theory is right, then brain function and consciousness would each be a 'projection' of something else responsible for both of them.

[seer]

Emergent dualism has its appeal but I think you need something else there to explain how the emergence happens.

Magic?

[EvoUK]

I agree that correlations indicate causality unless we have good reasons to think otherwise. I think the arguments against reducibility are good enough reasons to suspend judgment on the nature of causality when it comes to experiences. If consciousness is a basic property, then brain function might be what enables or facilitates consciousness without being the sufficient cause. And if some kind of dual aspect theory is right, then brain function and consciousness would each be a 'projection' of something else responsible for both of them.

This is one of the reasons why I personally find the subject so fascinating. Personally, from my viewpoint and from everything I think I understand about the universe and how it operates, I would see no reason why consciousness wouldn't be a result of brain activity and higher cortical function.

However

[metacrock]

Magic?

I'm pretty sure he means something esle naturalistic or at least compatible with science., I can prettymuch guaronteehe doesn't mean magic.

[metacrock]

Evo Uk you keep putting in these qualifiers attributed to me such as Brain and mind have nothing to do wi9th each other., I did not say thyat.l two points you just don't get

(1) the epistemological problem you can't overcome--you can't turn correlation into cause--limits your ability to argue the brain damage argument as proof of reducibility. I don't have to disprove that, you do. It's a logical limit on proving cause and you must get over it to make your argument work. I don't have to disprove cause. you must prove it.

(2) IU don't have to prove there a magic entity called the soul that live on after death, I only argued that mind is not reducible to brain. I have given evince of that and it's evidence you can't answer.

Given that mind is not reducible the possibility of LAD is raised but I don't have to defend it because that's not the claim I made ion the OP.

enough of the smoke and mirrors you can't prove reducibility.

[seer]

Here is an interesting take by Sam Harris...

https://www.samharris.org/blog/item/...-consciousness