Mind is not reduceable to brain

[metacrock]

Here is an interesting take by Sam Harris...

He's partly begging the question. What he admits is basically important reason to not accept the materialist view. We know consciousness is real because we have it. There is no real reason to assert it's material origins unless one is dead set against the possibility of God. But one can't use that as a proof of materialism because that's what is under dispute and there is no reason to accept it. it has to be a pre given.

[JimL]

Evo Uk you keep putting in these qualifiers attributed to me such as Brain and mind have nothing to do wi9th each other., I did not say thyat.l two points you just don't get

(1) the epistemological problem you can't overcome--you can't turn correlation into cause--limits your ability to argue the brain damage argument as proof of reducibility. I don't have to disprove that, you do. It's a logical limit on proving cause and you must get over it to make your argument work. I don't have to disprove cause. you must prove it.

(2) IU don't have to prove there a magic entity called the soul that live on after death, I only argued that mind is not reducible to brain. I have given evince of that and it's evidence you can't answer.

Given that mind is not reducible the possibility of LAD is raised but I don't have to defend it because that's not the claim I made ion the OP.

enough of the smoke and mirrors you can't prove reducibility.

Reducibility of mind to brain needn't be proven unless and until you prove that there is such a thing as a mind, a thing separate from the brain, that is not the brain itself. Its your claim, so its yours to prove. What EvoUk and others have explained by the empirical evidence is that the mind is the brain, not that it is some other entity that is reducible to the brain.

[Tassman]

Here is an interesting take by Sam Harris...

[seer]

So what is your point? You quote footnotes to deny the content?

.
https://www.samharris.org/blog/item/...nsciousness-ii

[shunyadragon]

Reducibility of mind to brain needn't be proven unless and until you prove that there is such a thing as a mind, a thing separate from the brain, that is not the brain itself. Its your claim, so its yours to prove. What EvoUk and others have explained by the empirical evidence is that the mind is the brain, not that it is some other entity that is reducible to the brain.

Proof is being thrown about like a fish flopping around on the boat deck. As far as the scientific view of the relationship between the brain and the mind, it is subject to falsification by scientific methods that demonstrate this relationship. Yes, many years of research have demonstrated a clear relationship between the mind and consciousness is the result of the physical brain. All the research at present has not demonstrated that there are specific aspects of the mind and consciousness that cannot possibly be explained by the physical brain. Trying to prove the negative would not likely be possible. Present hypothetical dualism claims that aspects of the mind and consciousness are not yet explained by this relationship is on shacky ground, and would a logical fallacy appealing to ignorance.

The bottom line is nothing here is subject to proof.

[shunyadragon]

So what is your point? You quote footnotes to deny the content?

Sam Harris's arguments of possibilities concerning the mind and consciousness is interesting, but complete with a high fog index. It is fraught with hypothetical comments like, "reasons to believe . . .," and mystery of consciousness in full."

From Sam's hypothetical statements, one cannot appeal to a dualism unless on argues an appeal to ignorance. Nonetheless Sam Harris clearly states;

[metacrock]

Harris is unbright. everything is Like something because that's the nature of language. all meaning is metaphorical (actually that's a simile). Goes back to the basic limits of epistemology.

[seer]

Sam Harris's arguments of possibilities concerning the mind and consciousness is interesting, but complete with a high fog index. It is fraught with hypothetical comments like, "reasons to believe . . .," and mystery of consciousness in full."

From Sam's hypothetical statements, one cannot appeal to a dualism unless on argues an appeal to ignorance. Nonetheless Sam Harris clearly states;

mystery of consciousness in full."

And you forgot this: We have reasons to believe that reductions of this sort are neither possible nor conceptually coherent. Nothing about a brain, studied at any scale (spatial or temporal), even suggests that it might harbor consciousness.

[shunyadragon]

mystery of consciousness in full."

And you forgot this: We have reasons to believe that reductions of this sort are neither possible nor conceptually coherent. Nothing about a brain, studied at any scale (spatial or temporal), even suggests that it might harbor consciousness.

I already referred to this with the problem of making a statement "reasons to believe." is a hypothetical statement, and falsifying the hypothetical negative statement like this is not possible.

Not backwards at all, and I did not miss anything. You sill have the bad habit of selectively citing limited sources to justify your agenda. He nonetheless makes the statement;

By hanging on this selective citing of one source, you cannot justify a hypothetical negative of 'mystery of consciousness,' fallacy of arguing from ignorance, to justify an argument that there is scientific basis for dualism of the mind and consciousness in some way separate from the brain.

[metacrock]

I think that was covered in the original quote about binding.


In that stuff I allude to Dennett saying it marks top down causation .top down is one of the major arguments against reductionism,

Besides I think that answer would lead to recursion of the binding problem.

[stevegp49]

Given the problem for physicalism of conscious experience and clues from quantum mechanics, it may be time to consider instead an idealism model.

Some history: Around 600 BCE there was a Carvakan school of thought in what is now known as India. These philosophers were perhaps the first materialists because one of the things they postulated was that all there is, is matter and it has "svabhava" or self-nature. In other words matter has an intrinsic nature that produces the world we see. Today this self-nature is thought of as intrinsic "properties" such as mass, spin, charge, etc. Apparently this line of thinking made its way to early Greek thought probably through the Persian trade routes because about a hundred years later materialist atomistic thought emerged most notably by Democritus. In atomism it is claimed that reality is constituted by atomos, small indestructible elements which have intrinsic properties and when combined in various ways produce the variety we see. This particular characterization of reality caught on in the West and eventually led to the predominant view in science. However, this "svabhava" view was not without its detractors. There were those both in the East and West who rejected this view. In the East the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna developed his sunyata concept or "emptiness" saying that nothing has an essential independent nature but only a conditional or relational existence. The term for this is often "dependent co-arising" in Buddhist thought. (To me this has are remarkable similarity to quantum theory concepts of entanglement and nonlocality) In early Western Greek thought the rejection of atomism was more subtle. Anaxagoras did not reject atomism, per se, but claimed that what animated atoms was not a self-nature but nous or mind. Anaxagoras is considered by some to be the first panpsychist. Perhaps the most forceful attack on the svabhavan atomism came later with the Idealism schools of thought. It maintained that what constituted reality was, in fact, mind or perception. George Berkeley was one of the most notable of idealistic proponents. He was considered by Schopenhauer as the father of Idealism. Berkeley's view was that the mind and perception are primary in his famous statement, "To be is to be perceived or to perceive". Although Berkeley and his "subjective idealism" fell under considerable criticism for being unable to account for common experience, he later became more of an absolute idealist. Another more recent idealist was Josiah Royce.

Today there aren't too many philosophers or scientists that fully embrace an idealist model of reality but there are some who, I think, show hints of idealism. First, quantum mechanics seems to dispel the "svabhava" notion of reality. Apparently there aren't enduring "things" with intrinsic properties but rather potentials that are only constituted when an "observation" is made. As physicist Henry Stapp states (and others would agree):

Then there is the observer issue in quantum mechanics. Physicists have grappled with this issue for decades. In quantum physics the conscious observer seems to play a key role in how reality is constituted. What happens in quantum experiments depends on what the conscious observer asks of it. Apparently the mind of the experimenter somehow effects outcomes.

Also there is what David Chalmers calls the "hard problem" of conscious experience ("what is it like"). In his view this problem doesn't seem amenable to physicalist explanations so he is inclined towards some form of panpsychism where consciousness is somehow fundamental to reality.

Now if instead of a physicalist model, everything is mind then these issues would seem to be more tractable, at least logically. The dichotomy mind/body or brain/mind would seem to melt away. If all is mind then conscious experience might fit in more neatly. I'm not sure how an idealist view could be verified scientifically but probably neither could a physicalist model.

[seer]

I already referred to this with the problem of making a statement "reasons to believe." is a hypothetical statement, and falsifying the hypothetical negative statement like this is not possible.

It is a position that Harris takes based on his understanding of the brain and consciousness.

Not backwards at all, and I did not miss anything. You sill have the bad habit of selectively citing limited sources to justify your agenda. He nonetheless makes the statement;

By hanging on this selective citing of one source, you cannot justify a hypothetical negative of 'mystery of consciousness,' fallacy of arguing from ignorance, to justify an argument that there is scientific basis for dualism of the mind and consciousness in some way separate from the brain,

Again you are fudging the truth Shuny. I did not cite anything selectively. And I gave links to both papers so you can read them in full. And I'm not sure what your objection to dualism is since your religion teaches exactly that - that man is both physical and spiritual, and that the spirit of man is rational and influences the physical.

http://reference.bahai.org/en/t/ab/SAQ/saq-55.html

http://reference.bahai.org/en/t/ab/SAQ/saq-60.html#fn1

[shunyadragon]

It is a position that Harris takes based on his understanding of the brain and consciousness.



Again you are fudging the truth Shuny. I did not cite anything selectively. And I gave links to both papers so you can read them in full. And I'm not sure what your objection to dualism is since your religion teaches exactly that - that man is both physical and spiritual, and that the spirit of man is rational and influences the physical.

http://reference.bahai.org/en/t/ab/SAQ/saq-55.html

http://reference.bahai.org/en/t/ab/SAQ/saq-60.html#fn1

Please do not confuse the evidence with belief. What my religion and I teach does not equate to a discussion of the nature of the evidence supporting dualism or not. You do not believe in the Baha'i Faith. It is no help citing something you do not believe in.

As far as the science it does not support either the claim of dualism, nor the Ontological Naturalism claim that only the physical exists.

The difference between you and I is that I acknowledge that many beliefs are a matter of faith and not some illusive proof, nor a selective interpretation of evidence.

In other words I do not 'cook the books' of science to justify what I believe.

[seer]

Please do not confuse the evidence with belief. What my religion and I teach does not equate to a discussion of the nature of the evidence supporting dualism or not. You do not believe in the Baha'i Faith. It is no help citing something you do not believe in.

That is nonsense, either dualism is TRUE or it is not. And I agree with the Baha'i faith when it agrees with Christianity.

[shunyadragon]

That is nonsense, either dualism is TRUE or it is not. And I agree with the Baha'i faith when it agrees with Christianity.

That is nonsense, again it is not a matter of whether dualism is true nor false, nor what you and I believe. The difference between you and I is I do not selectively 'cook the books' of science to justify what I believe.