Mind is not reduceable to brain

[shunyadragon]

But you haven't put forward any actual arguments yet, but keep repeating the same phrases again and again. How is one to interpret that? Actually your position, as far as any argument can be teased out, is an argument from ignorance:
1. Any limits to empirical knowledge would be in principle empirically verifiable.
2. No limits to empirically knowledge have so far been empirically verified.
3. therefore, there are no limits to empirical knowledge in principle.

Actually as long as the empirical knowledge is based on objectively verifiable evidence and falsifiable hypothesis I see no limits to science. My primary argument is against your vague, undefined, foggy claim of the 'mystery of consciousness' that you describe as a vague, undefined limit on science, which you continually avoid by misrepresenting my views. As long as the scientific research is on hypothesis concerning the physical relationship between the brain, and the mind and consciousness is objectively verifiable I see no specific definable limit for science in this research. I have never asserted that science is in any way unlimited beyond the accepted criteria of MN.

Theist religions is a strawman. I never brought up theist religions.

I brought up religions, and I will when I feel it is appropriate. It is not a strawman.

You did bring up the question of religion as to why Jim B choose the ontological Naturalist path, and I responded with a very viable reason why people choose the Ontological Naturalist Philosophy.

You still haven't addressed how it is you think that MN justifies you in saying what consciousness (ontologically) is or that there are no limits to what empirical science can understand and reduce. At best, it provides a method for understanding a certain range of phenomena, physical phenomena. To reach beyond those procedural limits is to make philosophical decisions that are not justified within the self-described limits of that method.

Your insertion of ontologically is severely problematic. I have been very clear that ontological assumptions cannot be falsified by the scientific methods of MN. You continue to misrepresent my posts and view of MN.

[shunyadragon]

I cited Block firstas an example of a reductionist.

I never cited Dennett as a "skeptic of science." Dennett is very pro-science. His commitment to physical science as being all-explanatory is the reason why he resorts to eliminativism. I cited Strawson because I happen to agree with a number of his points, especially that Dennett's whole book is an elaborate exercise in question-begging and bait and switch. And I know that Strawson is a physicalist; that was one of the points, that even physicalists can see that Dennett is deeply confused.

Concerning your reference, please read your own words again . . .

The empirical evidence here, as with countless other topics, is not and cannot be decisive. Even reductionists when it comes to consciousness (Block, Dennett, Strawson, etc)don't believe that this issue can be resolved primarily through empirical findings. Those findings can and must inform one's position but they can't determine it.

It is misleading and Block was brought up not primarily because he was a reductionist. He was brought as highlighted above. The other misrepresentation above is the claim that Dennett does not 'believe that this issue can be resolved primarily through empirical findings.' Your reference above needs to include citations where they indeed believe as you claim.

It is best that you stop arguing from authority, i.e. hiding behind the prestige of science and actually mount an argument of your own.

Rhetorical nonsense that does not reflect what I have posted.

Scientists do not and cannot speak on the limits of science. If they do, they are no longer speaking as scientists but as philosophers. That's perfectly legitimate.

You may consider it legitimate, it does not make sense, and it does not reflect what I posted. First, scientist do not speak of the limits of science as long as the criteria of MN are involved. You, my friend are the one trying to 'speak of the limits of science' as an undefined, vague and nebulous 'mystery of consciousness.' Also, yes, scientists do address philosophical issues by not trying to falsify hypothesis and theories that are not based on objective empirical evidence.

Einstein did it often but he would not have thought he was doing physics when he was doing so. It's like asking MN to prove that it supports ON, but by using just the tools and concepts of MN. That's not what it does. Science is not magic. It has a definition, a structure, a method and supporting concepts. It cannot magically answer every conceivable question, not even in principle. Perhaps it will change one day, expanding its assumptions and/or its definition of the physical, but then it would be something else. It wouldn't be what we define now as "science."

When Einstein, Jim L, and myself speak of philosophical assumptions beyond MN, than the sky is blue on a clear day on the 4th of July, that is not science, but nonetheless you asked Jim L to justify his Ontological Naturalism in this thread, therefore you brought the religion issue. which I addressed. Also the vague, nebulous and undefined limitation on science you describe as the 'mystery of consciousness,' smells of philosophical and theological presuppositions that should have no place in defining the limits of MN.

[MattMurdock]

[seer]

1. In our world, there are conscious experiences.
2. There is a logically possible world physical identical to ours, in which the positive facts about consciousness in our world do not hold.
3. Therefore, facts about consciousness are further facts about our world, over and above the physical facts.
4. So materialism is false.
(Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 123)

Very good...

[MattMurdock]

You know there is something deeply flawed at the heart of materialism when even several philosophical atheists and agnostics start departing from the camp.

[shunyadragon]

First Chalmers is philosopher he does not have a degree in 'cognitive science,' and the lead singer of the Zombie Blues band. Not a qualified reference for whether science can explain the relationship between the brain, the mind and consciousness.

[shunyadragon]

You know there is something deeply flawed at the heart of materialism when even several philosophical atheists and agnostics start departing from the camp.

Several? Chalmers was never in the reality science camp.

[JimL]

I would argue that the 2nd premise in Chalmers argument is an unfounded assertion. "Logically possible" and "possible" are two different things. If such a zombie world isn't possible, then it doesn't matter if it is logically possible or not. If there is a world physically identical to ours then what is logical is that in that world, consciousness holds.

[Tassman]

thishttps://jsmf.org/meetings/2003/nov/D...ition_2001.pdf

[Truthseeker]

"Logically possible" -- is that not pleonasm? If not, what does "logically" mean in this context?

[shunyadragon]

"Logically possible" -- is that not pleonasm? If not, what does "logically" mean in this context?

Learned a new word today, 'Thank you!'

I believe "Logically possible" translates as simply "Logical"

[stevegp49]

thishttps://jsmf.org/meetings/2003/nov/D...ition_2001.pdf

From the paper you referenced (my bolding)

What is specific to consciousness, however, is that the object of
our study is an introspective phenomenon, not an objectively measurable response.
Thus, the scientifc body of consciousness calls for a specific attitude which departs
from the `objectivist' or `behaviorist' perspective often adopted in behavioral and
neural experimentation. In order to cross-correlate subjective reports of consciousness
with neuronal or information-processing states, the first crucial step is to take
seriously introspective phenomenological reports. Subjective reports are the key
phenomena that a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness purport to study. As
such, they constitute primary data that needs to be measured and recorded along
with other psychophysiological observations.

I think the reason some people, including myself, have doubts about this sort of approach, is that finding neural correlates is fine but how do you quantify and measure a subjective experience. Now, by subjective report I'm not talking about a report like "I see of a red color". The subjective report I'm concerned with is how you measure something like "I get what it's like to see a red color". For example. In principal this neuroscience approach should be able to take two people and have them listen to Mozart, and then be able to measure what it's like for each to hear that music. To be successful they would have to look at the neural correlates along with all the other complexities and come up with measured data of what it's like for each. Then they could compare the subjective experiences. How do you measure a "what it's like"? From my cursory reading of the article, although they say subjective reports are the primary data, I couldn't find anywhere they described how they would measure it.

[Tassman]

From the paper you referenced (my bolding)



I think the reason some people, including myself, have doubts about this sort of approach, is that finding neural correlates is fine but how do you quantify and measure a subjective experience. Now, by subjective report I'm not talking about a report like "I see of a red color". The subjective report I'm concerned with is how you measure something like "I get what it's like to see a red color". For example. In principal this neuroscience approach should be able to take two people and have them listen to Mozart, and then be able to measure what it's like for each to hear that music. To be successful they would have to look at the neural correlates along with all the other complexities and come up with measured data of what it's like for each. Then they could compare the subjective experiences. How do you measure a "what it's like"? From my cursory reading of the article, although they say subjective reports are the primary data, I couldn't find anywhere they described how they would measure it.

how cognitive neuroscience is going about this task. As always, science is a work in progress.

[shunyadragon]

I think the reason some people, including myself, have doubts about this sort of approach, is that finding neural correlates is fine but how do you quantify and measure a subjective experience. Now, by subjective report I'm not talking about a report like "I see of a red color". The subjective report I'm concerned with is how you measure something like "I get what it's like to see a red color". For example. In principal this neuroscience approach should be able to take two people and have them listen to Mozart, and then be able to measure what it's like for each to hear that music. To be successful they would have to look at the neural correlates along with all the other complexities and come up with measured data of what it's like for each. Then they could compare the subjective experiences. How do you measure a "what it's like"? From my cursory reading of the article, although they say subjective reports are the primary data, I couldn't find anywhere they described how they would measure it.

Having doubts is ok, because there is indeed a great deal that science has not yet determined in the relationship between the brain, and the mind and consciousness. It depends on what you mean by quantify and measure. Scientific research has monitored brain activity during many different situations, such as listening to music, and find a direct relationship between the music and brain activity, as with many different situations. Science does not need to specifically 'quantify' relationships between brain neurological function and human experience to document the relationship. Tassman has referenced the progress of science in this relationship, and there is not reason to believe there are any specific limits that would prevent science from eventually establishing a virtually complete relationship. I consider your concerns and expectations about being able to measure and quantify the relationship as too simplistic and Newtonian.

It is also well documented that the experience of the mind and consciousness is pretty much universal in the higher animals that humans share in common, and there is a well documented relationship of the increase in the complexity of the mind and consciousness in he evolution of mammals and other animals.

The problem I have is many Christian apologists, and others like Chalmers, who try and put nebulous, vague and poorly defined limits on the capability of science, basically proposing unknowns and complexity, which is a fallacy.

[stevegp49]

Science does not need to specifically 'quantify' relationships between brain neurological function and human experience to document the relationship.

Huh? If science isn't quantifying and then measuring, then what is it doing?

Tassman has referenced the progress of science in this relationship, and there is not reason to believe there are any specific limits that would prevent science from eventually establishing a virtually complete relationship. I consider your concerns and expectations about being able to measure and quantify the relationship as too simplistic and Newtonian.

Don't know what you mean by Newtonian but I think what I'm looking for is pretty simple from a scientific standpoint. If science wants to explain subjective experience ("what it's like") then it needs to be able to quantify and measure it. Right? Otherwise it's just finding "nebulous, vague and poorly defined" correlations.

It is also well documented that the experience of the mind and consciousness is pretty much universal in the higher animals that humans share in common, and there is a well documented relationship of the increase in the complexity of the mind and consciousness in he evolution of mammals and other animals.

So? Sure, some monkeys have been shown to be self aware. That's not the issue. The issue is what it's like to be that monkey.

Sure, complexity seems to be engendering consciousness. So what's going on there? From a physicalism standpoint there is no categorical difference between what a thermostat does and the human brain does. Just a level of complexity. The thermostat senses temperature and makes a decision. The human senses temperature and flips the switch to turn on the heater. But most people would say that there is something added to the human, the "what it's like" to be cold. What made the difference? Some would say that consciousness emerges (whatever that means) from the higher level of complexity. OK, but if all physical events come about through either chance or necessity (a physicalist maxim) for both the thermostat and the human brain, what's going on differently? Science needs an empirical approach to finding "what is different" and collecting data on it.

The problem I have is many Christian apologists, and others like Chalmers, who try and put nebulous, vague and poorly defined limits on the capability of science, basically proposing unknowns and complexity, which is a fallacy.

Ok, so you have a problem with ways certain people tend to think. So do I. If their arguments aren't sound they can be dismissed. However, I think you are misreading what is going on here for many serious minded thinkers. Science often progresses from the "nebulous, vague and poorly defined". I think scientists often look at current theories, methods, data, and interpretations and vaguely think, "there is something wrong with the current theory". It's an intuitive sense engendered by years of experience that tells a scientist to look at this differently. From there they may refine that vague sense, formulate an alternative hypothesis and then get specific about ways to take measurements and test it. Major breakthroughs in science have come about this way.

I think what some thinkers are doing with the issue of phenomenal consciousness is pointing out things that may need to be addressed. They are not necessarily trying to put a limit on science. Chalmers, for instance, is exploring information approaches to explaining conscious experience which would have a scientific element. I think it is perfectly reasonable and healthy for science to raise doubts about how it's done and its definitions. It happened in quantum physics. It appears to some serious thinkers (both scientists and philosophers) that subjective experience is a challenge for the way science is approaching it now. So, unless scientists and philosophers want to ignore the issue or deny it's existence, then show how it's not really an issue or come up with some new ideas on how to approach it. Figure out a way to measure subjective experience.