Determinism And Rationality.

[Tassman]

Well since I'm a Christian I don't have to accept a purely mechanical explanation.

Well, 'god did it' is always an option as a response. Whether or not it is a rational one or one based upon subjective delusions is another question.

I don't think computers care about truth and rationality, they only act rationally because we programmed them that way. The forces that programmed us are non-rational and care nothing for truth or rationality. It would be like saying a tornado plowed through a junk yard and created a functioning calculator. Why would you trust the reasoning abilities created by non-rational forces.

AI computers act rationally because we as their rational creators make them that way. But humans (and other intelligent self-aware creatures) learn from experience and factor this into our actions and behavior. So, increasingly AI computers will be able to do the same and learn to write their own software programs without any further input from us.

[JonathanL]

You think that humans have a choice in some way that the computer doesn't. But I don't see how that could be demonstrated.

On the face of it, humans seem to have the ability to choose contrary to their inclinations and nature. Computers, at least not yet, do not seem to be able to "choose" contrary to their own programming. Barring strong evidence to the contrary I would suggest belief in free will is justified solely based on the firsthand experience of it that nearly every human being atleast seems to have.

[seer]

Clearly, this is only true if there is no randomness built in. And even without the randomness, there is no way to test whether a human being could choose differently if the conditions were the same, so this doesn't prove that human beings have any more free will than the computer.

Except by our experience, I know that I can choose to eat that second piece of cake or not. I have no reason to doubt that ability. But if we are determined then as I said truth does not really enter the picture. You believe A because you were determined to, not because of the truth value. A may be true, but that is not why you believe.

Of course he was a theist. Back then, it would have been a serious mistake not to be.

Everything I read about him, he wasn't a theist in name only, he was quite devout.

The way I see it, rationality existing from the start is a whole lot harder to believe than rationality coming about bit by bit through the ratcheting effect of natural selection and the survival value of being able to anticipate future events.

Why? I think a rational Creator being the source of our rationality is much simpler than millions of happy accidents by a process that does not aim at rationality, truth or survival.

[seer]

On the face of it, humans seem to have the ability to choose contrary to their inclinations and nature. Computers, at least not yet, do not seem to be able to "choose" contrary to their own programming. Barring strong evidence to the contrary I would suggest belief in free will is justified solely based on the firsthand experience of it that nearly every human being atleast seems to have.

What have you done with Chrawnus? Are an evil doppelganger?

[Tassman]

Except by our experience, I know that I can choose to eat that second piece of cake or not. I have no reason to doubt that ability. But if we are determined then as I said truth does not really enter the picture. You believe A because you were determined to, not because of the truth value. A may be true, but that is not why you believe.

No. You choose to eat "that second piece of cake" based upon a variety of subconsciousness factors which have been programmed by genes and environmental pressures and childhood memories etc. - but not completely freely.

[Stoic]

Except by our experience, I know that I can choose to eat that second piece of cake or not. I have no reason to doubt that ability.

What I doubt is that you can provide a cogent explanation of just how you can tell whether your choice is determined or not.

But if we are determined then as I said truth does not really enter the picture. You believe A because you were determined to, not because of the truth value. A may be true, but that is not why you believe.

The truth value may be a major factor in determining what you believe, at least in areas other than religion. (In religion, the largest factor appears to be the religion of your parents.)

Everything I read about him, he wasn't a theist in name only, he was quite devout.

Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing what he would have been like if he had lived in an era where being devout didn't make as much of a difference to one's self-interest.

Why? I think a rational Creator being the source of our rationality is much simpler than millions of happy accidents by a process that does not aim at rationality, truth or survival.

A rational creator may make it simple to explain our rationality, but it leaves you with the incredibly larger puzzle of explaining said creator's rationality.

[Tassman]

I think a rational Creator being the source of our rationality is much simpler than millions of happy accidents by a process that does not aim at rationality, truth or survival.

[Stoic]

On the face of it, humans seem to have the ability to choose contrary to their inclinations and nature.

Do they? It seems to me that we just choose between conflicting inclinations. I can't eat as many sweets as I want, and be as lazy as I want, and be as healthy as I want. So one way or the other, I'm going to choose contrary to at least one of my inclinations.

Computers, at least not yet, do not seem to be able to "choose" contrary to their own programming.

Through their programming, computers can be given conflicting inclinations also.

Barring strong evidence to the contrary I would suggest belief in free will is justified solely based on the firsthand experience of it that nearly every human being atleast seems to have.

Yes, sometimes the argument goes from "Do we have free will?" to "Of course we have free will. But what exactly does that mean?"

That's why I'm a compatibilist. I don't think it makes sense to say that we don't have free will, in the sense that most people have in mind when they think of free will. But I think the same thing would be true even if the world were completely deterministic.

[seer]

What I doubt is that you can provide a cogent explanation of just how you can tell whether your choice is determined or not.

So you choices seem determined to you?

The truth value may be a major factor in determining what you believe, at least in areas other than religion. (In religion, the largest factor appears to be the religion of your parents.)

That really doesn't make sense - if you are determined by forces that neither see or know truth how do truth values or concepts (which are immaterial) impinge on or influence that process?

A rational creator may make it simple to explain our rationality, but it leaves you with the incredibly larger puzzle of explaining said creator's rationality.

Nothing to explain, an eternal immutable Mind...Simple...

[seer]

That's why I'm a compatibilist. I don't think it makes sense to say that we don't have free will, in the sense that most people have in mind when they think of free will. But I think the same thing would be true even if the world were completely deterministic.

Compatibilism is determinism, they just change the definition of free will. The ability to do otherwise is lost. As Dennett makes clear.

[Stoic]

So you choices seem determined to you?

My choices generally seem to be based on my desires, and I don't generally choose my desires.

That really doesn't make sense - if you are determined by forces that neither see or know truth how do truth values or concepts (which are immaterial) impinge on or influence that process?

If my beliefs are determined by reality, it doesn't seem so hard to believe that my beliefs would generally be in accord with reality.

Nothing to explain, an eternal immutable Mind...Simple...

I guess it saves a lot of effort when there's nothing to explain.

[seer]

My choices generally seem to be based on my desires, and I don't generally choose my desires.

If you don't generally choose what you desire doesn't that point to a will that is not determined?

If my beliefs are determined by reality, it doesn't seem so hard to believe that my beliefs would generally be in accord with reality.

But your beliefs are not determined by reality, that is a conceptual question. They are determined by the forces of nature that are blind to reality, i.e. truth claims or conceptual realities. Now if your cognitive functions were designed by a rational force (like your computer model), well that would be a horse of a different color.

I guess it saves a lot of effort when there's nothing to explain.

I have debated atheists who believe that our universe is merely a bubble in a larger eternal multiverse - Ask where that came from - well they say - it is just there. No explanation. Unless you have an infinite regression of explanations the question must stop somewhere.

[Tassman]

Nothing to explain, an eternal immutable Mind...Simple...

"Nothing to explain" because you have said nothing. You've merely assumed your premise to be true whilst making no attempt to justify it, i.e. the 'bare assertion fallacy'.

[Stoic]

If you don't generally choose what you desire doesn't that point to a will that is not determined?

If your desires are handed to you by genetics/environment (i.e. not chosen by you), that kind of points to a will that is determined.

But your beliefs are not determined by reality, that is a conceptual question. They are determined by the forces of nature...

The forces of nature ARE reality.

I have debated atheists who believe that our universe is merely a bubble in a larger eternal multiverse - Ask where that came from - well they say - it is just there. No explanation. Unless you have an infinite regression of explanations the question must stop somewhere.

I don't see God as an explanation. It's just putting a label on "I don't know" and calling it an explanation.

[JonathanL]

Do they? It seems to me that we just choose between conflicting inclinations. I can't eat as many sweets as I want, and be as lazy as I want, and be as healthy as I want. So one way or the other, I'm going to choose contrary to at least one of my inclinations.

You're correct that we choose between different inclinations. But we seem to have the ability to choose against what is currently our strongest inclinations, in favor of a weaker one.

Of course, you could then argue that what is happening is not that we're choosing to override our strongest inclinations, but rather that we're misidentifying what our strongest inclination is, and whatever it was that made us choose against an inclination is what was our strongest inclination in the first place. Which I would have a harder time arguing against.

Through their programming, computers can be given conflicting inclinations also.

I'm not sure it's appropriate to call whatever it is that's happening when a computer evaluates an algorithm an "inclination". There's no feeling of desire towards whatever the computer is "inclined" towards, for one.

Yes, sometimes the argument goes from "Do we have free will?" to "Of course we have free will. But what exactly does that mean?"

That's why I'm a compatibilist. I don't think it makes sense to say that we don't have free will, in the sense that most people have in mind when they think of free will. But I think the same thing would be true even if the world were completely deterministic.

My personal view is that we have free will in our actions, and to some degree in our thoughts. Freely changing our desires (and inclinations) is something I have a much harder time arguing for.