Free Will and Determinism

[shunyadragon]

I wonder if libertarianism is as 'extreme' as you seem to assume. It is not the idea that our will is entirely indeterministic or that we are not heavily constrained by various factors such as genetics, natural laws, causality. It's not the idea that we can do whatever our whims suggest. It's the idea that in some cases, our decisions are not absolutely necessitated by the past and the laws even though those decisions are based on our conscious intentions and purposes.




Yes, our decision tree is highly constrained. This alone does not count against libertarianism.



I agree that our will is not necessarily free. This question has more to do with coming up with coherent possibilities aided by science, and then those possibilities might gain or lose plausibility based on further empirical and philosophical work, etc...

It depends on what definition of libertarian free will we use. Without further qualification the strict definition of libertarian is what was described above.

[Jim B.]

There are coherent accounts written by causal indeterminists such as Kane. His is one that doesn't introduce anything outside the purview pf physics, and so operates within the framework of the world as normally understood. It all depends on what your criteria for coherent account are. Kane et al cannot give contrastive explanations, but it's never been established why such an explanation is needed to give a coherent account of libertarianism. A thorough contrastive account may be the incoherency that this author and others, like Strawson, object to.

Libet's findings are highly controversial and ambiguous. Writers have cited them to support determinism and others have cited them to support libertarianism and several other positions. No readiness potential was detected before vetos of actions. Also no RP has been detected before acts that are not free and voluntary, such as in Tourette's Syndrome. Libet's experiments were under highly contrived, simple situations and never involved deliberation, but something more resembling reflex action, where one would expect to find determinism. No one has ever disputed that impulses arise unconsciously. These impulses, however, could be the very constraints that make free will possible, the 'menu' that the subject is offered from which to choose. Also, if you think about conversation, unless we are just automata every time we speak, then how is it that we can converse as quickly as we do? According to Libet, we couldn't act quickly enough to converse.

It depends on what definition of libertarian free will we use. Without further qualification the strict definition of libertarian is what was described above.

Source: http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/libertarianism.html

Libertarianism
Libertarianism is a school of thought that says humans are free from physical determinism and all the other diverse forms of determinism.

© Copyright Original Source

I disagree with this. It is not the thesis that humans are "free from physical determinism" but that in some cases humans are free from physical determinism during deliberation. We are subject to physical determinism in every other way.

[cite]Libertarians believe that strict determinism and freedom are incompatible. Freedom seems to require some form of indeterminism.
"Radical" libertarians believe that one's actions are not determined by anything prior to a decision, including one's character and values, and one's feelings and desires. This extreme view, held by leading libertarians such as Robert Kane, Peter van Inwagen and their followers, denies that the will has control over actions.

Critics of libertarianism properly attack this view. If an agent's decisions are not connected in any way with character and other personal properties, they rightly claim that the agent can hardly be held responsible for them.[/cite]

There's obvious equivocation there. "Not determined by" and "not connected in any way with" are very different things.

[cite]
A more conservative or "modest" libertarianism has been proposed by Daniel Dennett and Alfred Mele. They and many other philosophers and scientists have proposed two-stage models of free will that keep indeterminism in the early stages of deliberation, limiting it to creating alternative possibilities for action.[/cite]

Perhaps. This would fulfill most of the requirements , but the idea that the final decision is still necessitated by its past is counter-intuitive to most accounts.

[/cite]

Causal indeterminism does not require substance dualism. I'm not convinced that substance dualism is wrong.

[cite]
In recent free will debates, these dualist explanations are called "agent-causal libertarianism." The idea is that humans have a kind of agency (an ability to act) that cannot be explained in terms of physical events. [/cite]

Eg O'Connor, Taylor, Chisolm and Swinburne.

[shunyadragon]

I disagree with this. It is not the thesis that humans are "free from physical determinism" but that in some cases humans are free from physical determinism during deliberation. We are subject to physical determinism in every other way.

There's obvious equivocation there. "Not determined by" and "not connected in any way with" are very different things.

The definition was, of course, too brief, but your response is not clear. I believe what those who support the 'libertarianianism' claim is our moral choices, choice of belief system, and ALL other choices of deliberation, that are not subject to direct physical determinism.

Perhaps. This would fulfill most of the requirements , but the idea that the final decision is still necessitated by its past is counter-intuitive to most accounts.


Causal indeterminism does not require substance dualism. I'm not convinced that substance dualism is wrong.

Source: http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/libertarianism.html

"Religious libertarians say that God has given man a gift of freedom, but at the same time that God's foreknowledge knows everything that man will do."

© Copyright Original Source

This would be only one view of how 'substance dualism' is believed to play out in the human affairs of will. Though it is a very prevalent view of the omniscience of God by many Christians believe responding the question 'Does God really know all things?' There answer is yes, God knows all things, past, present and future even all possible free will decision. Of course, I consider this view ridiculous making humans little more than robotic automatons playing out a predetermined script of our lives making any 'gift of freedom' by God a meaningless game with God holding all the marbles.

[Crackerjack]

Who is not "open to indeterministic causation"? There's nothing at all incompatible about a compatibilist who is a determinist also being open to indeterministic causation.

In the classical Free Will debate both camps believed that the causal relation is deterministic. Since this isn't the case any longer, most compatibilists aren't comitted determinists. The famous philosopher and compatibilist David Lewis is a good example.

Compatibilism entails a compatibility between "free will" (ie moral responsibility) and determinism. Obviously if there's no determinism at all, then there'd be no compatibilist free will. But if there is determinism at the macro-scale, then compatibilists are determinists. You can believe that there is micro-indeterminism but that this does not scale up to be relevant to action theory. BTW, as you probably know, indeterminism is usually combined with libertarianism, as in causal indeterminism.

Compatibilism doesn't entail that determinism is true. It only states a conditional: "If determinism is true, at least some agents have free will" without affirming its antecedent. Hell, it doesn't even comitt one to the belief that free will exist, for free will couldn't exist for reasons unrelated to determinism e.g. the concept of free will itself is incoherent.

[Jim B.]

In the classical Free Will debate both camps believed that the causal relation is deterministic. Since this isn't the case any longer, most compatibilists aren't comitted determinists. The famous philosopher and compatibilist David Lewis is a good example.

So most compatibilists are indeterminists. I assume that's indeterminism at the macro-scale, because if not, indeterminism would have no bearing on the issue (?) Do most still believe in free will of some form, or do most think it's incoherent because of indeterminism?

Compatibilism doesn't entail that determinism is true. It only states a conditional: "If determinism is true, at least some agents have free will" without affirming its antecedent. Hell, it doesn't even comitt one to the belief that free will exist, for free will couldn't exist for reasons unrelated to determinism e.g. the concept of free will itself is incoherent.

But I thought compatibilism was the belief that free will and determinism are related, that there's nothing incoherent in the concept itself if determinism is true. What you describe sounds more like hard incompatibilism.

[Jim B.]

The definition was, of course, too brief, but your response is not clear. I believe what those who support the 'libertarianianism' claim is our moral choices, choice of belief system, and ALL other choices of deliberation, that are not subject to direct physical determinism.

Robert Kane is a libertarian who believes only that some of our choices are not necessitated by the past.

Source: http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/libertarianism.html

"Religious libertarians say that God has given man a gift of freedom, but at the same time that God's foreknowledge knows everything that man will do."

© Copyright Original Source

This would be only one view of how 'substance dualism' is believed to play out in the human affairs of will. Though it is a very prevalent view of the omniscience of God by many Christians believe responding the question 'Does God really know all things?' There answer is yes, God knows all things, past, present and future even all possible free will decision. Of course, I consider this view ridiculous making humans little more than robotic automatons playing out a predetermined script of our lives making any 'gift of freedom' by God a meaningless game with God holding all the marbles.

Foreknowledge doesn't entail pre-determinism.

[shunyadragon]

The definition was, of course, too brief, but your response is not clear. I believe what those who support the 'libertarianianism' claim is our moral choices, choice of belief system, and ALL other choices of deliberation, that are not subject to direct physical determinism.

Source: http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/libertarianism.html

"Religious libertarians say that God has given man a gift of freedom, but at the same time that God's foreknowledge knows everything that man will do."

© Copyright Original Source

This would be only one view of how 'substance dualism' is believed to play out in the human affairs of will. Though it is a very prevalent view of the omniscience of God by many Christians believe responding the question 'Does God really know all things?' There answer is yes, God knows all things, past, present and future even all possible free will decision. Of course, I consider this view ridiculous making humans little more than robotic automatons playing out a predetermined script of our lives making any 'gift of freedom' by God a meaningless game with God holding all the marbles.

Boy I messed this one up, and thought a rewrite would be meaningful.

This would be only one view of how 'substance dualism' is believed to play out in the human affairs of will. Though it is a very prevalent view of the omniscience of God held by many Christians responding to the question 'Does God really know all things?' Their answer is yes, God knows all things, past, present and future even all possible free will decision. Of course, I consider this view ridiculous making humans little more than robotic automatons playing out a predetermined script of our lives making any 'gift of freedom' by God a meaningless game with God holding all the marbles, and the strings as a puppeteer.

[shunyadragon]

I
Compatibilism doesn't entail that determinism is true. It only states a conditional: "If determinism is true, at least some agents have free will" without affirming its antecedent. Hell, it doesn't even comitt one to the belief that free will exist, for free will couldn't exist for reasons unrelated to determinism e.g. the concept of free will itself is incoherent.

What argument would you present that the concept of free will is incoherent.

[Jim B.]

Boy I messed this one up, and thought a rewrite would be meaningful.

This would be only one view of how 'substance dualism' is believed to play out in the human affairs of will. Though it is a very prevalent view of the omniscience of God held by many Christians responding to the question 'Does God really know all things?' Their answer is yes, God knows all things, past, present and future even all possible free will decision. Of course, I consider this view ridiculous making humans little more than robotic automatons playing out a predetermined script of our lives making any 'gift of freedom' by God a meaningless game with God holding all the marbles, and the strings as a puppeteer.

How does omniscience entail pre-determinism or God being a puppeteer? Boethius already dealt with this over a millennia and a half ago!

[Jim B.]

What argument would you present that the concept of free will is incoherent.

Galen Strawson's 'Basic Argument':

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galen_Strawson

Peter Inwagen has come up with another similar argument:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_van_Inwagen

[shunyadragon]

Galen Strawson's 'Basic Argument':

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galen_Strawson

Peter Inwagen has come up with another similar argument:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_van_Inwagen

These arguments propose that humans are some sort of mechanical automatons. I do not consider them remotely convincing based on what read now nor in the past.

[shunyadragon]

How does omniscience entail pre-determinism or God being a puppeteer? Boethius already dealt with this over a millennia and a half ago!

It have been been dealt with by Boethus over a millennia and half ago, but this belief s a many headed mythical creature, actually believed by some here on Tweb.

Versions of the omniscience determinism beliefs vary, but many believe that on the surface we appear to have free-will, but in reality the course of all of existence is pre-determined.

I believe Sparko for one believes this, and others.

[Jim B.]

These arguments propose that humans are some sort of mechanical automatons. I do not consider them remotely convincing based on what read now nor in the past.

I think you mis-read them. They don't propose that humans are mechanical automata. They only propose the idea of a self-caused cause as incoherent. I can see their point but am not entirely convinced. This is a framing problem. I think a lot of it has been mis-framed up til now.

[Jim B.]

It have been been dealt with by Boethus over a millennia and half ago, but this belief s a many headed mythical creature, actually believed by some here on Tweb.

But here's what you wrote:

This would be only one view of how 'substance dualism' is believed to play out in the human affairs of will. Though it is a very prevalent view of the omniscience of God by many Christians believe responding the question 'Does God really know all things?' There answer is yes, God knows all things, past, present and future even all possible free will decision. Of course, I consider this view ridiculous making humans little more than robotic automatons playing out a predetermined script of our lives making any 'gift of freedom' by God a meaningless game with God holding all the marbles.

Sounds like you're saying that omniscience entails pre-determinism, even though you seem to reject the idea of omnisicience.

[shunyadragon]

But here's what you wrote:


Sounds like you're saying that omniscience entails pre-determinism, even though you seem to reject the idea of omnisicience.

I was referring to the traditional view of omniscience believed by many Christians that God's knowledge is universal and all things past present and future, which I reject depicting God as a puppet master. There are potentially other views of omniscience I am willing to discuss.

Your view that this belief in omniscience was obsolete, because it was 'dealt with by Boethus over a millennia and half ago,' is an illusion, because it remains a prevalent belief among many Christians today.

If you wish to discuss my view of the nature of God and the knowledge of God, that is a different story, and I would discuss that separately.