Free Will and Determinism

[Jim B.]

Shuny was asking for citations to the effect that compatibilism is deterministic.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/god-necessary-being/

Compatibilism does not maintain that humans are free. Compatabilism does not hold that humans have free will.

Compatibilism holds that:

1) the thesis of determinism is true, and that accordingly all human behavior, voluntary or involuntary, like the behavior of all other things, arises from antecedent conditions, given which no other behavior is possible: all human behavior is caused and determined ...
...Compatibilism is NOT a position that holds that humans are "a little bit" free....
...Compatibilism is NOT a position that holds that humans have "limited free will"...
Compatibilism is NOT a position that holds that humans have some free will.
Compatibilism is determinism with a slight modification for the sake of appearances and for our language use. It is a position taken because of the perceived need to have some idea of accountability or responsibility for human behavior.

And this:

Sometimes compatibilism is called soft determinism. However, do not interpret this lable to mean that the compatibilist is "soft" on determinism. The compatibilist agrees with the hard determinist that the thesis of universal causation applies to all human actions. In other words,the compatibilist believes human actions are 100 per cent determined just as much as the hard determinist does. The difference between the two positions is that the compatibilist believes that the implications of determinism are not as hard and severe as the hard determinist believes. (Hence, the label softdeterminism.)

(my emphasis)
The Philosophical Journey, pg. 383, William F. Lawhead, Mayfield Publishing, 2000

[Jim B.]

I think that any conception of libertarian free will depends upon some indeterminism in the brain/nervous system, although just establishing such indeterminism would still not establish libertarian free will. Free will would have to also establish that some indetrminsitc events contribute to a decision/action that is not random but is mine, ie in line with my conscioulsy held purposes and intentions. Libertarian free will has nothing to do with the presence or absence of constraints, whether cultural, evolutionary or nomological. No one argues that human actions are not highly constrained in many ways or that most human actions are not causally determined. It's the thesis that some human actions are not causally necessitated, even though they are heavily constrained. It's the thesis that same past=same future does not universally hold in all human actions.

[Crackerjack]

Shuny was asking for citations to the effect that compatibilism is deterministic.

Your source is misleading about compatibilism. Compatibilism doesn't entail commitment to determinism. The position is a conditional statement: If determinism is true, agents have free will. One can be a compatibilist and not a determinist. There are compatibilists who are determinists, and they're called soft determinists. This distinction is important because contemporary compatibilists are open to the idea of indeterministic causation.

[HumbleThinker]

Like the ability to make choices based on fine-grained discriminations? That would argue against epiphenomenalism.

This sounds acceptable, yes. I just looked up epiphenomenalism and I definitely do not agree with it, particularly since it rests on a foundation of dualism. If physical processes themselves are in some manner indeterminate, as some neural processes arguably are, then there is no reason to require a dualistic approach to thinking about mental vs. physical processes in order to argue for a form of free will, even if it is not the radical freedom that some libertarians may argue for.

[Crackerjack]

This sounds acceptable, yes. I just looked up epiphenomenalism and I definitely do not agree with it, particularly since it rests on a foundation of dualism. If physical processes themselves are in some manner indeterminate, as some neural processes arguably are, then there is no reason to require a dualistic approach to thinking about mental vs. physical processes in order to argue for a form of free will, even if it is not the radical freedom that some libertarians may argue for.

Positing substance dualism doesn't guarantee a libertarian free will. An agent's will, while insulated from physical determinism, could be determined by prior mental events.

[shunyadragon]

It doesn't say one way or the other, but the sources I have quoted several times now DO STATE DEFINITIVELY THAT CHAOTIC SYSTEMS ARE DETERMINISTIC. Chaos theory is the attempt to understand chaotic systems. Chaos theory makes no sense independently of the thing it's intended to understand.

Your conflating the systems that Chaos Theory describe the nature of the variability, and not that Chaos Theory itself is deterministic. You caped the problem with your view. Chaos Theory can describe the variability in systems that are indeterministic.

Virtually all possible systems are deterministic, because of the constraints of natural law and the environment, but this degree of determinism is not absolute.

We are not talking about the mathematics but the phenomena that the math is trying to formalize. Chaos, or a periodicity and non-linearity, are intrinsic features of some systems. If some properties of the brain are chaotic, that alone would not indicate indeterminism.

In a way correct either way. I did not propose that the properties of the brain being chaotic determined that the processes were indeterministic. I proposed that the variability of chaotic processes were setting up many possible decisions for the observed decision making process that is to some degree indetrministic, in other words human decisions reflect a degree of free will, but most definitely not libertarian free will.

This states that because we can never know the initial conditions, that we can never predict the outcomes. This means that the unpredictability is not inherent in the systems but in our lack of knowledge. A super-intelligent race of aliens who could know all of the initial conditions could predict the outcomes (in principle). This is an example of the distinction I was trying to draw above between epistemic and ontological issues, which you dismissed as "splitting frog hairs." Indeterminism is a feature that is intrinsic to a system. Unpredictability is observer-relative. The aliens could not predict quantum indeterministic systems.

Your over reaching, the source did not make this claim.

No one can predict the weather beyond a given level of approximation, but this doesn't mean that the weather is indeterministic.

Yes, computer models for predicting weather use fractal modeling to increase the reliability of weather prediction, and this breaks down with time, because of the large number of variables involved, but the above is not a conclusion of the reference.

[HumbleThinker]

Positing substance dualism doesn't guarantee a libertarian free will. An agent's will, while insulated from physical determinism, could be determined by prior mental events.

Ah, thanks for the clarification.

[Jim B.]

Your source is misleading about compatibilism. Compatibilism doesn't entail commitment to determinism. The position is a conditional statement: If determinism is true, agents have free will. One can be a compatibilist and not a determinist. There are compatibilists who are determinists, and they're called soft determinists. This distinction is important because contemporary compatibilists are open to the idea of indeterministic causation.

Who is not "open to indeterministic causation"? There's nothing at all incompatible about a compatibilist who is a determinist also being open to indeterministic causation.

Compatibilism entails a compatibility between "free will" (ie moral responsibility) and determinism. Obviously if there's no determinism at all, then there'd be no compatibilist free will. But if there is determinism at the macro-scale, then compatibilists are determinists. You can believe that there is micro-indeterminism but that this does not scale up to be relevant to action theory. BTW, as you probably know, indeterminism is usually combined with libertarianism, as in causal indeterminism.

[Jim B.]

Your conflating the systems that Chaos Theory describe the nature of the variability, and not that Chaos Theory itself is deterministic. You caped the problem with your view. Chaos Theory can describe the variability in systems that are indeterministic.

I wasn't conflating them. I took special care to point out that they were distinct. How can a theory be deterministic or indeterministic? These properties are usually reserved for events. I was referring to the things that the theory describes.

Virtually all possible systems are deterministic, because of the constraints of natural law and the environment, but this degree of determinism is not absolute.

Where or how does this indeterminism arise? Quantum indeterminacy? How would this indeterminacy scale up to macro-level events?

In a way correct either way. I did not propose that the properties of the brain being chaotic determined that the processes were indeterministic. I proposed that the variability of chaotic processes were setting up many possible decisions for the observed decision making process that is to some degree indetrministic, in other words human decisions reflect a degree of free will, but most definitely not libertarian free will.

How is it indeterministic? If chaotic systems aren't, then is it from the quantum level?

Your over reaching, the source did not make this claim.

The source said that because all initial conditions can not be known, therefore the outcomes are unpredictable. It didn't say that it's indeterministic.

Yes, computer models for predicting weather use fractal modeling to increase the reliability of weather prediction, and this breaks down with time, because of the large number of variables involved, but the above is not a conclusion of the reference.

You're referring to unpredictability again. Libertarian free will is not a matter of unpredictability.

[shunyadragon]

I wasn't conflating them. I took special care to point out that they were distinct. How can a theory be deterministic or indeterministic? These properties are usually reserved for events. I was referring to the things that the theory describes.

I was referring to events in the human decision making process. Chaos theory does not refer to things. It in and of itself only describes the patterns of events, and not things. It is neither deterministic nor indeterministic.

Where or how does this indeterminism arise? Quantum indeterminacy? How would this indeterminacy scale up to macro-level events?

My source below explains this. I did not say determinism arises at any particular point. I said indeterminism is apparent at the human decision level.

How is it indeterministic? If chaotic systems aren't, then is it from the quantum level?

The source said that because all initial conditions can not be known, therefore the outcomes are unpredictable. It didn't say that it's indeterministic.

Again, I never said it did. It is neither deterministic nor indeterministic. Your misrepresenting me and not citing me correctly

You're referring to unpredictability again. Libertarian free will is not a matter of unpredictability.

No I did not.
Of course not. I never claimed it was.

I find it helpful to cite another reference that may clarify my view better. this section os Stanford's Encyclopedia of Philosophy best describes my view in terms of chaos and determinism. I do not agree with everything here, but it is written by those more qualified than I. It has a good section on Metaphysics and natural law.

[Jim B.]

I was referring to events in the human decision making process. Chaos theory does not refer to things. It in and of itself only describes the patterns of events, and not things. It is neither deterministic nor indeterministic.

Patterns of events are things. Things are not restricted to physical objects. It is the explanatory target systems that chaos theory may describe that are relevant here. If chaos theory is nothing more than the study of mathematical models with no close correspondence with physical or biological systems, how can it have any bearing on free will or determinism in human decisions/actions?

My source below explains this. I did not say determinism arises at any particular point. I said indeterminism is apparent at the human decision level.

I didn't say you said that determinism arises at any point but that indeterminism does.

Again, I never said it did. It is neither deterministic nor indeterministic. Your misrepresenting me and not citing me correctly

You're confusing the map with the thing purportedly to be mapped. A theory is neither deterministic nor indeterministic. It's the theory's explanatory target that can have these properties. If chaos theory applies to formal systems only with no correspondence to physical, behavioral, biological systems, how can it apply to free will?

[cite=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/#DetCha]

From what I can find, this interpretation is largely the result of Suppes' work which has been called into question by Werndl, Winnie and others. From my readings, the non-stochastic assumption is the consensus view.

From "Chaos", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

In addition to exhibiting sensitive dependence, chaotic systems possess two other properties: they are deterministic Nevertheless, the mathematical properties of dynamical systems (e.g., their deterministic character) present a serious problem with this line of reasoning. Determinism as unique evolution appears to be preserved in our mathematical models of chaos, which serve as our ontic descriptions of chaotic systems.[14]

Nearly all of the references I've read about indeterminism and chaos have to do with quantum indeterminacy and its (possible) influences on chaotic systems. These systems, it is speculated, could act as amplifiers for genuine indeterminacy, if it exists at the quantum level, to be able to influence macro-level events such as human thoughts and actions.

Let's assume that something like this is the case. How does indeterminism alone account for free will? It cannot be compatibilist free will since that version has no need of indeterminism. It would have to be some version of libertarian free will, but the question remains: how can indeterminate events occurring in my brain result in a free decision/action of mine? Causal indeterminists like Kane have a possible explanation, but is it plausible?

[shunyadragon]

Patterns of events are things. Things are not restricted to physical objects.

Not in this context.I do not consider events things. Too mechanistic

It is the explanatory target systems that chaos theory may describe that are relevant here.

No

If chaos theory is nothing more than the study of mathematical models with no close correspondence with physical or biological systems, how can it have any bearing on free will or determinism in human decisions/actions?

I already explained this. I do not consider the human decision making process necessarily a deterministic system.

The source source I gave goes more into the problem of the assumption that considers all systems deterministic.

I didn't say you said that determinism arises at any point but that indeterminism does.

I believe it cannot be determined this specifically as what is deterministic at one point nor another, as per the sources I gave.

You're confusing the map with the thing purportedly to be mapped. A theory is neither deterministic nor indeterministic. It's the theory's explanatory target that can have these properties. If chaos theory applies to formal systems only with no correspondence to physical, behavioral, biological systems, how can it apply to free will?

I already gave this explanation. The source I gave more fully explains the problem of assuming systems as deterministic. Again, I do not believe that human decision making systems are necessarily deterministic. Your view is too mechanistic.

From what I can find, this interpretation is largely the result of Suppes' work which has been called into question by Werndl, Winnie and others. From my readings, the non-stochastic assumption is the consensus view.

Being called into question does not falsify it. I consider it an option.

Nearly all of the references I've read about indeterminism and chaos have to do with quantum indeterminacy and its (possible) influences on chaotic systems. These systems, it is speculated, could act as amplifiers for genuine indeterminacy, if it exists at the quantum level, to be able to influence macro-level events such as human thoughts and actions.

It sounds like your only reading Physics Cosmology references on chaos theory. My source used the concept of chaos theory in other contexts.

Let's assume that something like this is the case. How does indeterminism alone account for free will?

It does not alone account for it, it allows for the possibility of free will.

It cannot be compatibilist free will since that version has no need of indeterminism.

I believe it allows for some free will decisions.

It would have to be some version of libertarian free will,

I do not believe 'it has to be.'

but the question remains: how can indeterminate events occurring in my brain result in a free decision/action of mine? Causal indeterminists like Kane have a possible explanation, but is it plausible?

I believe other explanations are possible, and you are taking to rigid a mechanistic approach.

. . .

[Jim B.]

Not in this context.I do not consider events things. Too mechanistic

How is it mechanistic to have a broader conception of 'thing' than 'physical object?' Yours seems mechanistic. You're forcing the word into one arbitrary conceptual niche.

I already explained this. I do not consider the human decision making process necessarily a deterministic system.

The source source I gave goes more into the problem of the assumption that considers all systems deterministic.

I agree. I don't think the human decision making process is necessarily deterministic. I am just trying to understand how it could be indeterministic. Is it, or could it be, because all events have some degree of intrinsic indeterminacy? Is there an inherent looseness in the causal joints of the world? Or does it arise through chaotic behavior alone or chaotic behavior in concert with quantum effects? You're confusing seeking clarity and an actual coherent candidate for an explanation with being mechanistic.

There are philosophers and scientists who are known as 'hard incompatibilists' who think that free will is impossible even if determinism is false. I am just speculating about how to answer that objection. How does indeterminism help us in arguing for free will? How do we answer the charge that free will, in the libertarian sense, is an incoherent idea?

Do you hold out the possibility of libertarian free will? It sounds as if you do since you're using the possibility of indeterminism as a support for it.

I think that causal indeterminism ala Robert Kane, and agent causation, ala Reid, Taylor, Swinburne and others are both live possibilities.

[shunyadragon]

How is it mechanistic to have a broader conception of 'thing' than 'physical object?' Yours seems mechanistic. You're forcing the word into one arbitrary conceptual niche.

I do not believe this is the case. I just limit the use of 'things' to more objective specific objects. when we discuss things like choices, decisions, and events, I consider there to be a degree of abstraction here that negates the description they being things.

I agree. I don't think the human decision making process is necessarily deterministic. I am just trying to understand how it could be indeterministic.

I never proposed that our will was entirely indeterministic, or libertarian free will, just that the evidence cannot justify the extremes.

Is it, or could it be, because all events have some degree of intrinsic indeterminacy? Is there an inherent looseness in the causal joints of the world? Or does it arise through chaotic behavior alone or chaotic behavior in concert with quantum effects? You're confusing seeking clarity and an actual coherent candidate for an explanation with being mechanistic.

First, I do not believe true Quantum effects can be demonstrated in the macro world. Chaos Theory only comes into play as the fractal nature of our possible 'tree of choices,' and the fact that we often make different choices that cannot be easily explained by determinism. On the other hand, the range of our choices, and many of our choices are indeed limited and obviously have elements of determinism, for example; as determined by natural law, our limits of our decision making process due to our nature, our evolution as a social intelligent omnivore that make many of our decisions based on our need to survive.

There are philosophers and scientists who are known as 'hard incompatibilists' who think that free will is impossible even if determinism is false. I am just speculating about how to answer that objection. How does indeterminism help us in arguing for free will? How do we answer the charge that free will, in the libertarian sense, is an incoherent idea?

The problem is the anecdotal subjective elements in the nature of human will. I will give this more thought.

Do you hold out the possibility of libertarian free will?

I do not believe in the possibility of libertarian free will, like determinism it is true extreme. I believe I believe aspects of determinism and indeterminism potentially exist in human decision making systems. My belief in terms of humans is: 'We have a will and it is not necessarily free.'

I think that causal indeterminism ala Robert Kane, and agent causation, ala Reid, Taylor, Swinburne and others are both live possibilities.

No comment at present, except I agree with 'possibilities.'

[Jim B.]

I never proposed that our will was entirely indeterministic, or libertarian free will, just that the evidence cannot justify the extremes.

I wonder if libertarianism is as 'extreme' as you seem to assume. It is not the idea that our will is entirely indeterministic or that we are not heavily constrained by various factors such as genetics, natural laws, causality. It's not the idea that we can do whatever our whims suggest. It's the idea that in some cases, our decisions are not absolutely necessitated by the past and the laws even though those decisions are based on our conscious intentions and purposes.

First, I do not believe true Quantum effects can be demonstrated in the macro world. Chaos Theory only comes into play as the fractal nature of our possible 'tree of choices,' and the fact that we often make different choices that cannot be easily explained by determinism. On the other hand, the range of our choices, and many of our choices are indeed limited and obviously have elements of determinism, for example; as determined by natural law, our limits of our decision making process due to our nature, our evolution as a social intelligent omnivore that make many of our decisions based on our need to survive.

Yes, our decision tree is highly constrained. This alone does not count against libertarianism.

I do not believe in the possibility of libertarian free will, like determinism it is true extreme. I believe I believe aspects of determinism and indeterminism potentially exist in human decision making systems. My belief in terms of humans is: 'We have a will and it is not necessarily free.'

I agree that our will is not necessarily free. This question has more to do with coming up with coherent possibilities aided by science, and then those possibilities might gain or lose plausibility based on further empirical and philosophical work, etc...