Free Will and Determinism

[shunyadragon]

In what sense do you think epiphenomenalism is not the case, or "too simplistic"?

Source: plato.stanford.edu/.../epiphenomen...

Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs.

Epiphenomenalism is absurd; it is just plain obvious that our pains, our thoughts, and our feelings make a difference to our (evidently physical) behavior; it is impossible to believe that all our behavior could be just as it is even if there were no pains, thoughts, or feelings. (Taylor, 1963 and subsequent editions, offers a representative statement.)

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It is too simplistically mechanistic and robotic. Though the argument for epiphenomenalism does agree with concerning the argument for 'other minds' other than the obvious 'other minds' of the humans around us.

Source: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/#ObvAbs

Our reason for believing in other minds is inference from behavioral effects to mental event causes. But epiphenomenalism denies such a causal connection. Therefore, epiphenomenalism implies the (exceedingly implausible) conclusion that we do not know that others have mental events. (Jackson, 1982, replies to this and several other arguments against epiphenomenalism. The argument is stated, and accepted, by Benecke, 1901.)

The first premise of this argument is a widely held dogma, but it can be denied without absurdity. (See Robinson, 1997.) It is perfectly obvious to everyone that the bodies of human beings are very much alike in their construction, and it requires no sophisticated reasoning to infer that if others are made like me, they probably hurt when affected like me, e.g., when their bodies are stuck with pins, beaten, cut and so on. There is no principle that makes an inference from similar effects to similar causes more secure than an inference from similar causes to similar effects; on the contrary, the latter inference is more secure, because there can sometimes be quite different causes of extremely similar effects. Thus, an inference to other minds that is allowed by epiphenomenalism must be at least as strong as the inferential route to other minds with which it is incompatible.

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What other kind of true (ontological) indeterminacy does scientific research currently point to other than quantum indeterminacy?

Not clear. Why are you asking for another kind of true? ontological indeterminacy.

Are you conflating unpredictability with indeterminsim?

No

Chaos theory is deterministic:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory

No, fractal math, Chaos Theory is neither deterministic nor indeterminate randomness.

In human behavior of choices of alternatives when faced with a decision, the alternatives show a fractal pattern in which we make decisions, which indicate some degree of free will.

You're apparently confusing ontology with epistemology.

No.

Compatibilism is the theory that free will is the freedom to act without external hindrance:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism

Your reaching beyond the definition of compatibilism to arrive at this conclusion.

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism

Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent.[1] Compatibilists believe freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics.[2] They define free will as freedom to act according to one's motives without arbitrary hindrance from other individuals or institutions.

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This is not the metaphysical freedom I have been referring to in my posts on this thread. On the definition of freedom I have clearly been using, compatibilism is a type of determinism.

What freedom are you referring to. I know of no definition of compatibilism that describes it as a type of comparibilism. Please provide a source, unless you are coming up with your own definition.





You haven't been able to understand, or perhaps haven't wanted to understand, what I've written thus far so what's the point? Your argument seems to be:

1.Scientifically verifiable evidence is the only truly justifiable form of knowledge.

No.

2.If there were any other type of justifiable knowledge, there would be scientifically verifiable evidence to support that claim.

The evidence you propose is subjective and anecdotal.

There is no other verifiable evidence, regardless of the source for the claim.

3.There is no such evidence.

True, your claims are based on your faith and belief, and anecdotal and subjective claims which are not verifiable.

4.Therefore, scientifically verifiable evidence is the only truly justifiable form of evidence.

False generalization to conclusions of all different sources of knowledge.

You continue to misconstrue the argument form ignorance. Absence of evidence is different from evidence of absence.

No, you are claiming absence of evidence to support your argument.

That excerpt seems to support the knowledge argument. It does not support your objection. Mary acquires a new phenomenal concept of red.

Not demonstrated by the evidence.

It doesn't have to be limited to what we are capable of in the future. There is neuro-scientific evidence that when two people have the same occurrent belief, eg that today is x date, different physical processes are going on in their brains. Either they are not having the same belief or the same belief is not identical to a physical state.

You still used absolute terms here that science 'cannot,' which is a problem already cited.

The evidence remains that beliefs, but the only evidence we have is that ALL beliefs are a result of a physical state. There is no evidence that beliefs are not identical or not, nor not a result of a physical state, nor that the two people experiencing a concurrent belief are identical or not.

Are you saying that effects are identical to their causes?

No.

We're not arguing with the physical causes or grounds of our ideas. We're arguing about the reasonable grounds of our ideas. We're arguing about our ideas as ideas, even though they include representations of physical states.

Ideas maybe ideas,so what?!?!?! Ideas remain a product of physical neurological activity. There is no evidence for any other source.

Exactly. Infinite regress is a barrier to our reasonable existence, to the self-consistency or lack of it of our ideas and arguments.

Not exactly at all. Infinite regress is no such barrier to anything.

So we agree? Your belief that beliefs are physical processes cannot be identical to a physical process.

So we agree? I never claimed the above, beliefs are a direct result result of a physical process. There is no other evidence of any other source of beliefs.

[Jim B.]

No I did not say libertarian free would make us robotic, neither is a likely possibility.

It's not always easy to know exactly what you're saying. I'm trying my best, though.

Epiphenomenalism is too simplistic, and does not reflect my view.

In what sense do you think epiphenomenalism is not the case, or "too simplistic"?

Than your post was not clear you seemed to think the relationship that (Quantum determinism cancels out? (bad wording) would translate to 'event causation which would be strictly deterministic.' This is foolishness. There is no relationship here that would determine the result is a deterministic world.

What other kind of true (ontological) indeterminacy does scientific research currently point to other than quantum indeterminacy?

Research has shown the function of our brain, thought processes, and choices show a distinct fractal relationship where we do make decisions within a range of choices that reflect a fractal pattern, and we do frequently make different choices within a range of possibilities that are not deterministic in nature. Actually, neither libertarian free will nor determinism is likely considering the present objective evidence. A variation of the compatibilist view is more likely.

Are you conflating unpredictability with indeterminsim? Chaos theory is deterministic:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory

You're apparently confusing ontology with epistemology.

Compatibilism is the theory that free will is the freedom to act without external hindrance:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism

This is not the metaphysical freedom I have been referring to in my posts on this thread. On the definition of freedom I have clearly been using, compatibilism is a type of determinism.

They ALL are a product of physical processes, and result in results expressed in the physical world. There is no evidence to support any other cause and effect relationship. If you have any evidence other than anecdotal conjecture I am willing to listen.

You haven't been able to understand, or perhaps haven't wanted to understand, what I've written thus far so what's the point? Your argument seems to be:

1.Scientifically verifiable evidence is the only truly justifiable form of knowledge.
2.If there were any other type of justifiable knowledge, there would be scientifically verifiable evidence to support that claim.
3.There is no such evidence.
4.Therefore, scientifically verifiable evidence is the only truly justifiable form of evidence.

http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/circular.html

No help relies on conjecture and anecdotal assumptions, not reality. There is no evidence presented in this hypothetical example that any other information was necessary other than physical information. At best this is an argument from ignorance trying to demonstrate what physical information is not.

You continue to misconstrue the argument form ignorance. Absence of evidence is different from evidence of absence.

That excerpt seems to support the knowledge argument. It does not support your objection. Mary acquires a new phenomenal concept of red.

'Cannot' is an unwarranted assumption concerning what we are capable of in the future.

It doesn't have to be limited to what we are capable of in the future. There is neuro-scientific evidence that when two people have the same occurrent belief, eg that today is x date, different physical processes are going on in their brains. Either they are not having the same belief or the same belief is not identical to a physical state.

When they both reflect originating physical properties and resulting in the expression in physical properties is not distinguishable as two things.



Ideas originate from physical things, and can result and translate in physical things.

Are you saying that effects are identical to their causes? We're not arguing with the physical causes or grounds of our ideas. We're arguing about the reasonable grounds of our ideas. We're arguing about our ideas as ideas, even though they include representations of physical states.

Knowledge is the result of a physical thing the brain. All objective evidence clearly demonstrates we do not have knowledge without the brain.

No one's disputing that.

Infinite regress arguments are hockus bogus ridiculous. 'Infinite regress' is concept in math to understand a particular type of infinity, and not any sort of barrier in the nature of our physical existence.

Exactly. Infinite regress is a barrier to our reasonable existence, to the self-consistency or lack of it of our ideas and arguments.

Of course, knowledge is a representation and not an identity. Your knowledge would be the result of a physical thing the neurological activity of your brain.

So we agree? Your belief that beliefs are physical processes cannot be identical to a physical process.

[shunyadragon]

Were you responding to my post?!? I was assuming, for the sake of argument, that quantum indeterminacy did NOT scale up to the macro level. I wasn't inferring a relationship. Why would you think I said that libertarian free will would make us robotic? It's just the opposite.

No I did not say libertarian free would make us robotic, neither is a likely possibility.

So it seems that you are not an epiphenomenalist? Do you believe in libertarian free will? If consciousness is purely a physical process, then it must conform to event causation (assuming that quantum indeterminacy gets cancelled out at macro scales) which would be strictly deterministic.

Epiphenomenalism is too simplistic, and does not reflect my view.

Than your post was not clear you seemed to think the relationship that (Quantum determinism cancels out? (bad wording) would translate to 'event causation which would be strictly deterministic.' This is foolishness. There is no relationship here that would determine the result is a deterministic world.

How do fractal relationships as described by Chaos Theory explain free will? The preclusion of a "robotic deterministic nature" though necessary, is not sufficient for establishing free will.

Research has shown the function of our brain, thought processes, and choices show a distinct fractal relationship where we do make decisions within a range of choices that reflect a fractal pattern, and we do frequently make different choices within a range of possibilities that are not deterministic in nature. Actually, neither libertarian free will nor determinism is likely considering the present objective evidence. A variation of the compatibilist view is more likely.

So you're claiming that consciousness, as well as the thoughts I am expressing right now, as well as Hamlet and Beethoven's 9th etc etc are all "physical" processes. What's the argument again?

They ALL are a product of physical processes, and result in results expressed in the physical world. There is no evidence to support any other cause and effect relationship. If you have any evidence other than anecdotal conjecture I am willing to listen.

There is Frank Jackson's epistemic argument featuring 'Mary'. We could start there.

No help relies on conjecture and anecdotal assumptions, not reality. There is no evidence presented in this hypothetical example that any other information was necessary other than physical information. At best this is an argument from ignorance trying to demonstrate what physical information is not.

If some other substrate, like a silicon-based computer, could produce consciousness, then consciousness cannot be identical to its physical substrate, whether silicon, brains, etc.

'Cannot' is an unwarranted assumption concerning what we are capable of in the future.

Leibniz's Law (the indiscernability of identicals): If two things are identical, they have all the same properties. Phenomenal and physical concepts don't have all the same properties,therefore they're not identical.

When they both reflect originating physical properties and resulting in the expression in physical properties is not distinguishable as two things.

If you believe that you know that your ideas are physical things, . . .

Ideas originate from physical things, and can result and translate in physical things.

. . . that knowledge cannot be a physical thing without an infinite regress of knowledge.

Knowledge is the result of a physical thing the brain. All objective evidence clearly demonstrates we do not have knowledge without the brain.

Infinite regress arguments are hockus bogus ridiculous. 'Infinite regress' is concept in math to understand a particular type of infinity, and not any sort of barrier in the nature of our physical existence.

The representation of a thing cannot be identical to the thing itself.

The representation of a thing is physical relationship to the thing itself. The representation of thing cannot exist without the thing existing. This means nothing.

If my knowledge were a physical thing, there'd be no way of my knowing that that is true. Knowledge is representation and not identity.

Of course, knowledge is a representation and not an identity. Your knowledge would be the result of a physical thing the neurological activity of your brain.

There must be a distinction between my knowledge and what I know in order for the term to have any meaning.

The distinction is not clear.

No problem, what you know is a product of the neurological activity of the brain in response to the relationship to the nature of the world around you both subjective and objective. It has been objectively observed that their is relationship between knowledge, meaning and the relationship to the sensory experience of the world beyond the brain. 'Must be' is not a determining assumption of the nature of the relationship between the brain and the mind,

[Jim B.]

Your drawing conclusions that are false concerning the relationship between quantum indeterminancy and cause and effect events in the macro world. Quantum indeterminancy is only a cause and effect relationship in the Quantum level of existence. Absolutely no such relationship can be inferred. No, libertarian free is not a viable assumption that would make us robotic.

Were you responding to my post?!? I was assuming, for the sake of argument, that quantum indeterminacy did NOT scale up to the macro level. I wasn't inferring a relationship. Why would you think I said that libertarian free will would make us robotic? It's just the opposite.

Actually, the relationship of cause and effect relationships in the real world and the relationship and function in brains in both humans and animals, as well as ALL of our macro existence is a fractal relationships as described in Chaos Theory. This in and of itself would preclude any possibility of a robotic deterministic nature of everything including the relationship and nature of the brain and the mind.

How do fractal relationships as described by Chaos Theory explain free will? The preclusion of a "robotic deterministic nature" though necessary, is not sufficient for establishing free will.

All this remains the product of physical processes that are obviously manifest in the physical world. The distinction is artificial without a clear boundary.

So you're claiming that consciousness, as well as the thoughts I am expressing right now, as well as Hamlet and Beethoven's 9th etc etc are all "physical" processes. What's the argument again?

There is Frank Jackson's epistemic argument featuring 'Mary'. We could start there.

If some other substrate, like a silicon-based computer, could produce consciousness, then consciousness cannot be identical to its physical substrate, whether silicon, brains, etc.

Leibniz's Law (the indiscernability of identicals): If two things are identical, they have all the same properties. Phenomenal and physical concepts don't have all the same properties,therefore they're not identical.

If you believe that you know that your ideas are physical things, that knowledge cannot be a physical thing without an infinite regress of knowledges. The representation of a thing cannot be identical to the thing itself. If my knowledge were a physical thing, there'd be no way of my knowing that that is true. Knowledge is representation and not identity. There must be a distinction between my knowledge and what I know in order for the term to have any meaning.

[shunyadragon]

Is the rational human spirit that does make choices a product of the brain Shuny?

The rational human spirit is the soul distinct and apart from the mind which is a product of the brain. This is a question for the other thread.

So it is the immaterial rational soul that governs the physical brain.

[seer]

There is not good evidence that consciousness and the mind are not a product of the brain. Many animals other than homo sapiens and primates have demonstrated that they consciousness. I do not see any difference between being a product of a physical process and being a physical process. All the present evidence we currently have at hand indicates that the mind and consciousness are product of the brain.

Is the rational human spirit that does make choices a product of the brain Shuny?

The essential identity of every human being is a rational and immortal soulIt is through the exercise of the powers of the soul that human progress is achievedhttp://www.bahai.org/beliefs/life-spirit/human-soul/

So it is the immaterial rational soul that governs the physical brain.

[shunyadragon]

So it seems that you are not an epiphenomenalist? Do you believe in libertarian free will? If consciousness is purely a physical process, then it must conform to event causation (assuming that quantum indeterminacy gets cancelled out at macro scales) which would be strictly deterministic.

Your drawing conclusions that are false concerning the relationship between quantum indeterminancy and cause and effect events in the macro world. Quantum indeterminancy is only a cause and effect relationship in the Quantum level of existence. Absolutely no such relationship can be inferred. No, libertarian free is not a viable assumption that would make us robotic.

Actually, the relationship of cause and effect relationships in the real world and the relationship and function in brains in both humans and animals, as well as ALL of our macro existence is a fractal relationships as described in Chaos Theory. This in and of itself would preclude any possibility of a robotic deterministic nature of everything including the relationship and nature of the brain and the mind.

I can think of things that, even if they are the "products of physical processes," wouldn't be physical processes: mathematical objects, the ideas that I'm expressing right now as I type these keys, ...

All this remains the product of physical processes that are obviously manifest in the physical world. The distinction is artificial without a clear boundary.

[Jim B.]

The selective process surely can be the ability to make choices. In fact it is likely not simply the ability to make choices, but the increased ability to make choices as the intelligent omnivore homo sapien evolved. Other primates and higher mammals makes choices also. but on a simpler scale.

There is not good evidence that consciousness and the mind are not a product of the brain. Many animals other than homo sapiens and primates have demonstrated that they consciousness. I do not see any difference between being a product of a physical process and being a physical process. All the present evidence we currently have at hand indicates that the mind and consciousness are product of the brain.

So it seems that you are not an epiphenomenalist? Do you believe in libertarian free will? If consciousness is purely a physical process, then it must conform to event causation (assuming that quantum indeterminacy gets cancelled out at macro scales) which would be strictly deterministic.

I can think of things that, even if they are the "products of physical processes," wouldn't be physical processes: mathematical objects, the ideas that I'm expressing right now as I type these keys, ...

[shunyadragon]

The big question is the relationship of consciousness and the free will question. Is consciousness epiphenomenal or does it really have causal impact? There are good reasons to think that it's not a physical process, even if caused by physical processes. If that's the case, how could this non-physical thing have an impact on physical processes? If it's selected for, then what is its selectional advantage, other than the ability to make choices?

The selective process surely can be the ability to make choices. In fact it is likely not simply the ability to make choices, but the increased ability to make choices as the intelligent omnivore homo sapien evolved. Other primates and higher mammals makes choices also. but on a simpler scale.

There is not good evidence that consciousness and the mind are not a product of the brain. Many animals other than homo sapiens and primates have demonstrated that they consciousness. I do not see any difference between being a product of a physical process and being a physical process. All the present evidence we currently have at hand indicates that the mind and consciousness are product of the brain.

[Jim B.]

The big question is the relationship of consciousness and the free will question. Is consciousness epiphenomenal or does it really have causal impact? There are good reasons to think that it's not a physical process, even if caused by physical processes. If that's the case, how could this non-physical thing have an impact on physical processes? If it's selected for, then what is its selectional advantage, other than the ability to make choices?

[Jim B.]

Perhaps I'm committing a common sense fallacy, but I personally haven't had an issue thinking of our choices in compatiblist terms for a while, just not in the classical compatiblist sense as the OP does. It seems consistent with experience and what we know of our brain that non-deterministic process limit our choices at any one time, perhaps even theoretically to a single choice, and that we freely choose from that. Our choices, our biology, the events that happen to us because of or without relation to our choices, and other impacts I didn't list all seem to impact our ability to choose in a future moment, whether in the short-term or the long term, just in a non-deterministic manner.

I have no problem with the idea that our choices are limited, even severely limited, and that there are all sorts of constraints on our thoughts and actions. One question I have is: If I am "free" to make only one possible choice in any given situation, in what sense am I morally responsible for that choice? I can "endorse" that choice as being one that falls in line with who I am, i.e. my beliefs and desires up to the moment of that choice, but that just pushes the question of ultimate responsibility back one step further, since I wouldn't be responsible for my beliefs and desires, etc. The subjective sense that I have that my choice was "my" choice, one that I as a conscious subject could have chosen differently about given the same conditions, would be a "user illusion" along with the whole concept of moral responsibility. Those things would be nothing more than "stances" as Daniel Dennett would say.

[HumbleThinker]

Nicely written and argued. Good job. A suggestion: instead of "true self" which as Humble Thinker points out, is somewhat vague, what about referring to the person's "beliefs and desires arrived at free of outside interference"? That has potential problems too. Oh well...

I've always had trouble making sense out of compatibilism, but then again, every position related to free will has serious problems, imo! It's hard to reconcile my coming to a decision that's "up to me" and freely arrived at that's also necessitated by prior conditions. If decisions are only a matter of weighing the relative merits and demerits of various reasons in light of a given set of beliefs and desires, then it's hard to see how the sense that it's up to me is anything more than a 'user illusion', in which case, hard determinism is really the case.

Perhaps I'm committing a common sense fallacy, but I personally haven't had an issue thinking of our choices in compatiblist terms for a while, just not in the classical compatiblist sense as the OP does. It seems consistent with experience and what we know of our brain that non-deterministic process limit our choices at any one time, perhaps even theoretically to a single choice, and that we freely choose from that. Our choices, our biology, the events that happen to us because of or without relation to our choices, and other impacts I didn't list all seem to impact our ability to choose in a future moment, whether in the short-term or the long term, just in a non-deterministic manner.

[Jim B.]

Nicely written and argued. Good job. A suggestion: instead of "true self" which as Humble Thinker points out, is somewhat vague, what about referring to the person's "beliefs and desires arrived at free of outside interference"? That has potential problems too. Oh well...

I've always had trouble making sense out of compatibilism, but then again, every position related to free will has serious problems, imo! It's hard to reconcile my coming to a decision that's "up to me" and freely arrived at that's also necessitated by prior conditions. If decisions are only a matter of weighing the relative merits and demerits of various reasons in light of a given set of beliefs and desires, then it's hard to see how the sense that it's up to me is anything more than a 'user illusion', in which case, hard determinism is really the case.

[fm93]

I meant one's deepest commitments when I said "one's true self."

Eh, that's still kind of vague.

Do you think it would be better to define determinism as the view that every event including human behavior is guaranteed to take place given that certain conditions are met?

That's closer to the definitions I've seen.

If the process of deliberation is not determined, then one's choosing of X instead of Y would be arbitrary or random.

Technically, that may be a false dichotomy. But (and my apologies if I've misunderstood you somehow) that doesn't seem to answer my question. You wrote:

Even though a person is determined to buy a particular car, he can still go through the process of deliberation.

You seem to be saying that the action of buying a particular car might be deterministic, but the process of deliberation is not. But how would go about proving this? How would you refute the suggestion that the process of deliberation is ALSO deterministic, and that each step and conclusion of your deliberation process was pre-determined?

[Jaxb]

The position for which you're arguing is called compatibilism. If I may offer some brief comments:


-You seem to be presupposing that there indeed ARE actions for which people can be held morally responsible, when that assertion is very often the issue being disputed.

-Your definition of determinism as "the idea that every event including human behavior has a sufficient cause other than itself" is unusual.

-You don't seem to have defined exactly what you mean by "one's true self."

-Regarding your rebuttal of Taylor, what's your response to the suggestion that the process of deliberation itself is determined?

I meant one's deepest commitments when I said "one's true self."

Do you think it would be better to define determinism as the view that every event including human behavior is guaranteed to take place given that certain conditions are met?

If the process of deliberation is not determined, then one's choosing of X instead of Y would be arbitrary or random.