Free Will and Determinism

[Jim B.]

The common hypothesis I am familiar with is that consciousness is an emergent property of a complex brain. Those traits that led to our complex brain absolutely were selected for based on the intellectual and physical advantages they gave those who had these traits over those that didn't.

Like the ability to make choices based on fine-grained discriminations? That would argue against epiphenomenalism.

[Jim B.]

I so not believe I am confused at all. You are taking only one point, or aspect of our discussion and trying to make a clear and specific distinct between epistemology and ontology in our discussion. It is best you address the issues of our discussion and not try and make an artificial distinction. I believe that indeterminancy and unpredictability can both have ontological and epistemological applications in reference to the 'free will' issue.

How?

[Jim B.]

I would say that you are morally responsible for such a choice if, and only if, your prior free will actions led to this forced choice. This is similar, though perhaps not identical, to why someone who freely choses to become intoxicated is morally responsible for assaulting someone, either with their fists or with a car. This is different than, say, someone whose mental disability caused them to assault someone; they had no choice in entering that mental state. I would guess that these situations would be the exception rather than the rule, though.

But the buck has to stop somewhere, right? The original choice to get drunk is a free choice in what sense, do you think? At least some compatibilists would say that my original choice to get drunk was my free choice if it was in line with my character, etc; ie if there were no external constraints on my choice. I think that at least some of our choices have to be done out of a freedom that's more robust than that. I think some of my choices would have to be where I could have truly decided differently, given the same conditions up to my decision.

And perhaps I am misunderstanding your last couple of sentences, but wouldn't the "subjective sense that I have that my choice was "my" choice" be a "user illusion" in compatiblism? Or is that what you are saying in the first place?

Yes, that's what I'm saying that Dennett and other compatibilists would think. I tend to disagree with that.

[Jim B.]

Your misreading the definition of Chaos Theory. This is not saying Chaos Theory is deterministic. It is saying the Chaos Theory applies to all systems, even those that may be considered deterministic. The concept of being deterministic in your reference applies to the definition of the systems, not Chaos Theory, which is neutral as to whether a system is deterministic or not.

No, it says that chaos theory applies to certain types of deterministic systems, ones that are non-linear and aperiodic. Once again, from the Wikipedia article:

This behavior is known as deterministic chaos, or simply chaos. The theory was summarized by Edward Lorenz as:[6]

Chaos: When the present determines the future, but the approximate present does not approximately determine the future.

Do you see where it says "deterministic chaos, or simply chaos"? That means they are synonymous; they are different ways of expressing the same thing. Lorenz defines Chaos as "When the present determines the future." Chaos theory is the study of a certain type of deterministic system. Chaotic systems are deterministic even if they are unpredictable. Cloud formation and population movements are chaotic systems but they are not indeterministic.

The definitions I have been using in this thread for terms like "free will,""determinism" and the like are the metaphysical definitions. This is what I wanted the thread to be about. If you want it to be about something else, that's fine, but at least justify why you reject my definitions and/or start your own thread.

All ready addressed this, Chaos Theory creates a pattern of many options to make choices in human decision making processes. The evidence for free will decisions is that humans do make free will rational decisions within the constraints of this diversity. If the alternatives were strictly linear, you would not have the diversity of choices in the reality of our world.

Already addressed this. Chaos theory implies extreme sensitivity to initial conditions. It doesn't allow for the ability to have done otherwise.

This does not address the central problem of determinism. Here is the standard definition of determinism from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

The metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future.

To avoid determinism defined metaphysically, per above, one would have to invoke some form of indeterminism. Chaos theory does not provide that. There is a theory being developed called quantum chaology which attempts to reconcile chaos theory with true metaphysical indeterminism. This field would not be necessary if chaos theory could already account for indeterministic systems.

The standard definition of determinism, quoted above, means that, according to compatibilist free will, given the same past leading up to my action, I could not have acted differently. In other words, compatibilists are saying that even though I am determined metaphysically (per the SEP definition above) I am still 'free' in the sense that I still bear moral responsibility for at least some of my actions. Compatibilism is not a metaphysical theory; it's one about ascribability of moral responsibility.

I am repeating some points because of your failure to comprehend. The highlighted above indicates you are taking an extreme libertarian view of 'freedom' for your own narrow definition, which does not apply to 'freedom' in compatibilism. You still have not provided justification for your view that compatibilism is a variation of determinism. This view is yours alone and is not reflected in the current academic view of the contrasting libertarian, compatibilism, and deterministic natures of the potential will. You have failed to provide a good reference that would also define compatibilism as a form of determinism.

Metaphysics is what this thread is about.

Your conclusions concerning the results of the reference concerning Mary's knowledge of red remain anecdotal and subjective and based on belief and not the objective reality of the anecdotal observations, which the skeptics of this work are justified to point out.

Nowhere in the excerpt you quoted does it argue for Mary gaining an ability. "Based on belief." What does that mean? Everything we say and write are based on our beliefs. The question is and remains "Are our beliefs justified?" The knowledge argument is about the subjective; it is not itself subjective. You're confusing the medium and the object of thought. How do you justify what Mary learns as nothing more than gaining an ability?

Your failure to comprehend and respond coherently on subjects such as a academic reference for supporting compatibilism as a form of determinism is also very tiring.

Please point out to me where I have failed to understand such a reference and I will try again.

There is no objective evidence to conclude nor justify 'cannot.' It is an unwarranted claim as to what science may determine things 'cannot' be what they appear to be are at present' at a future date. This clearly true of some scientific view like those of Quantum Mechanics, and behavioral science.

This is not an attack upon science. It says that science has, at present, an actual meaning and definition. I have no idea what you meant in the bolded passage. Science is a human activity. it is part of human society. As a heuristic device, science in the 17th century excluded certain things, such as consciousness intentionality and purpose form its purview in order to better isolate and control the variables for certain other kinds of phenomena. Science may expand to be able to accomodate these other features, but within the 17th century model, it doesn't seem able to.

[shunyadragon]

From the Wikipedia article: Chaos Theory:
This happens even though these systems are deterministic, meaning that their future behavior is fully determined by their initial conditions, with no random elements involved.[3] In other words, the deterministic nature of these systems does not make them predictable.

Your misreading the definition of Chaos Theory. This is not saying Chaos Theory is deterministic. It is saying the Chaos Theory applies to all systems, even those that may be considered deterministic. The concept of being deterministic in your reference applies to the definition of the systems, not Chaos Theory, which is neutral as to whether a system is deterministic or not.

You assume the point at issue once again. Non-linearity is not the same as indeterminism. Please provide an explanation how non-linearity can get us to any conception of free will.

All ready addressed this, Chaos Theory creates a pattern of many options to make choices in human decision making processes. The evidence for free will decisions is that humans do make free will rational decisions within the constraints of this diversity. If the alternatives were strictly linear, you would not have the diversity of choices in the reality of our world.

Example: If the nature of human choices were strictly linear and robotic when presented with a choice of twenty different types of pie, one would choice their favorite pie every time, but since their is a chaotic nature of the possible choices with many factors other than just 'the favorite pie,' allow for free will to make choices based on many variables. This is clearly the evidence concerning the nature of human choices in reality.

You're just repeating what you said before without addressing my points. Freedom from outside hindrances is not the definition of 'freedom' I have been using so far in this thread. I'm referring to libertarian or metaphysical free will.This kind of free will is the idea that given the same initial conditions, I could have chosen/acted differently. This is different from chaotic systems which exhibit extreme sensitivity to initial conditions.

I am repeating some points because of your failure to comprehend. The highlighted above indicates you are taking an extreme libertarian view of 'freedom' for your own narrow definition, which does not apply to 'freedom' in compatibilism. You still have not provided justification for your view that compatibilism is a variation of determinism. This view is yours alone and is not reflected in the current academic view of the contrasting libertarian, compatibilism, and deterministic natures of the potential will. You have failed to provide a good reference that would also define compatibilism as a form of determinism.

"Comparibilism" must have been a typo.

Yes, but it should not effect the context of the discussion.

All claims are based on belief. Please provide actual evidence that anything I am claiming is based upon 'faith,' as in religious faith. I could make a similar claim that your beliefs are based upon your faith in science. Without substantiation, these are ad hominem attacks and have no place here. This is getting very tiresome.

Your conclusions concerning the results of the reference concerning Mary's knowledge of red remain anecdotal and subjective and based on belief and not the objective reality of the anecdotal observations, which the skeptics of this work are justified to point out.

Your failure to comprehend and respond coherently on subjects such as a academic reference for supporting compatibilism as a form of determinism is also very tiring.

How?!? Provide evidence and argument for once.

This is matter of fact of the nature of your argument. There is no objective evidence either way.

This is silly. You apparently misunderstand the different sense of the words "can" and "cannot." It's not as if I am impugning the powers and capabilities of science by saying it has an actual nature and definition. To say that things 'cannot' be other than they are is all I am saying. If you disagree with that, please cite actual reasons just this once.

There is no objective evidence to conclude nor justify 'cannot.' It is an unwarranted claim as to what science may determine things 'cannot' be what they appear to be are at present' at a future date. This clearly true of some scientific view like those of Quantum Mechanics, and behavioral science.

Causal and ontological reduction are different. You keep conflating the two. I am the 'cause' of my actions. I am not my actions.

They are of course different, but as far as our discussion they cannot be distinctly separated as I cited in the reference. Of course you are materially not your actions, but you are the 'cause' of your actions. You and your actions are clear not entirely separable in terms of cause and effect relationships. Again it is best to address the discussion and not 'split frog hairs.'

[HumbleThinker]

So it seems that you are not an epiphenomenalist? Do you believe in libertarian free will? If consciousness is purely a physical process, then it must conform to event causation (assuming that quantum indeterminacy gets cancelled out at macro scales) which would be strictly deterministic.

I can think of things that, even if they are the "products of physical processes," wouldn't be physical processes: mathematical objects, the ideas that I'm expressing right now as I type these keys, ...

You may be interested in research of stochastic neural networks as models for our neurology.

[HumbleThinker]

The big question is the relationship of consciousness and the free will question. Is consciousness epiphenomenal or does it really have causal impact? There are good reasons to think that it's not a physical process, even if caused by physical processes. If that's the case, how could this non-physical thing have an impact on physical processes? If it's selected for, then what is its selectional advantage, other than the ability to make choices?

The common hypothesis I am familiar with is that consciousness is an emergent property of a complex brain. Those traits that led to our complex brain absolutely were selected for based on the intellectual and physical advantages they gave those who had these traits over those that didn't.

[shunyadragon]

You're confused about what I was saying. I was pointing out the ontology and epistemology difference in reference to the free will issue. Unpredictability is an epistemological concept (what we or any minds can predict to a given level of certainty) as opposed to indeterminacy, which does not depend upon what we or any minds can know. Indeterminacy is an ontological property. A given state is indeterministic inherently and not just relative to a knower. I hope this clears things up a bit.

I so not believe I am confused at all. You are taking only one point, or aspect of our discussion and trying to make a clear and specific distinct between epistemology and ontology in our discussion. It is best you address the issues of our discussion and not try and make an artificial distinction. I believe that indeterminancy and unpredictability can both have ontological and epistemological applications in reference to the 'free will' issue.

[HumbleThinker]

I have no problem with the idea that our choices are limited, even severely limited, and that there are all sorts of constraints on our thoughts and actions. One question I have is: If I am "free" to make only one possible choice in any given situation, in what sense am I morally responsible for that choice? I can "endorse" that choice as being one that falls in line with who I am, i.e. my beliefs and desires up to the moment of that choice, but that just pushes the question of ultimate responsibility back one step further, since I wouldn't be responsible for my beliefs and desires, etc. The subjective sense that I have that my choice was "my" choice, one that I as a conscious subject could have chosen differently about given the same conditions, would be a "user illusion" along with the whole concept of moral responsibility. Those things would be nothing more than "stances" as Daniel Dennett would say.

I would say that you are morally responsible for such a choice if, and only if, your prior free will actions led to this forced choice. This is similar, though perhaps not identical, to why someone who freely choses to become intoxicated is morally responsible for assaulting someone, either with their fists or with a car. This is different than, say, someone whose mental disability caused them to assault someone; they had no choice in entering that mental state. I would guess that these situations would be the exception rather than the rule, though.

And perhaps I am misunderstanding your last couple of sentences, but wouldn't the "subjective sense that I have that my choice was "my" choice" be a "user illusion" in compatiblism? Or is that what you are saying in the first place?

[Jim B.]

I apologize. I missed this. I want to emphasize that beliefs, thoughts, ideas and consciousness are not physical processes, nor effects identical with causes, but simply the result of physical neurological processes of the brain. In tis manner they can be identified with a physical process.

Your confusion over Ontology and Epistemology needs clarifying.

You're confused about what I was saying. I was pointing out the ontology and epistemology difference in reference to the free will issue. Unpredictability is an epistemological concept (what we or any minds can predict to a given level of certainty) as opposed to indeterminacy, which does not depend upon what we or any minds can know. Indeterminacy is an ontological property. A given state is indeterministic inherently and not just relative to a knower. I hope this clears things up a bit.

[Jim B.]

I thought it would be worth while to comment on your post further particularly after I gave more thought to your misuse of 'identical.'

You have not demonstrated that you understand the term "identical." There are several understandings of this terms and you haven't exhibited an understanding of any of them yet. All you do is repeat the same causal points, which miss the point.

The argument does support my view. The view in the reference is that Mary's comprehension of red is based on her neurological (and optical) abilities to process, which she has in common with most humans, and comprehend the color red, and not a new phenomenal concept other than her own natural abilities.

Please show specifically in the excerpt you quoted, where that is argued for. The "gaining an ability" argument is a variant on behaviorism which does not address the central point of Kripke's et al's "rigid designator" argument.

This an important misconception concerning the evidence concerning the similarity of concurrent beliefs of different individuals. The observed evidence of the fractal nature of the physical world, and the neurological nature of our brains pretty much excludes the likely hood of beliefs in different individual being 'identical.' Yes there is obviously similar beliefs, but not identical. The fractal nature of our physical existence can demonstrated by observation such as: All Maple leaves and clouds look like Maple leaves and clouds, but no two Maple leaves nor clouds are 'identical.'

Do you mean "occurrent"? And are you saying that my belief that 1=1 is only "similar" to yours? Pray tell!

The previous source on epiphenomilism concerning 'other minds' pretty much demonstrates the limitations of the theological concepts of other minds, and addresses the observed similarities of 'other minds based on the similarities of the physical nature of human beings,

What do 'theological concepts' have to do with any of this?!? Arguments for epiphenomenalism and other minds are not the same. Justifying one does not necessarily support the other.

[Jim B.]

No, fractal math, Chaos Theory is neither deterministic nor indeterminate randomness.

From the Wikipedia article: Chaos Theory:
This happens even though these systems are deterministic, meaning that their future behavior is fully determined by their initial conditions, with no random elements involved.[3] In other words, the deterministic nature of these systems does not make them predictable.[

In human behavior of choices of alternatives when faced with a decision, the alternatives show a fractal pattern in which we make decisions, which indicate some degree of free will.

You assume the point at issue once again. Non-linearity is not the same as indeterminism. Please provide an explanation how non-linearity can get us to any conception of free will.

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism

Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent.[1] Compatibilists believe freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics.[2] They define free will as freedom to act according to one's motives without arbitrary hindrance from other individuals or institutions.

© Copyright Original Source

You're just repeating what you said before without addressing my points. Freedom from outside hindrances is not the definition of 'freedom' I have been using so far in this thread. I'm referring to libertarian or metaphysical free will.This kind of free will is the idea that given the same initial conditions, I could have chosen/acted differently. This is different from chaotic systems which exhibit extreme sensitivity to initial conditions.

What freedom are you referring to. I know of no definition of compatibilism that describes it as a type of comparibilism. Please provide a source, unless you are coming up with your own definition.

"Comparibilism" must have been a typo.

True, your claims are based on your faith and belief, and anecdotal and subjective claims which are not verifiable.

All claims are based on belief. Please provide actual evidence that anything I am claiming is based upon 'faith,' as in religious faith. I could make a similar claim that your beliefs are based upon your faith in science. Without substantiation, these are ad hominem attacks andnhave no place here. This is getting very tiresome.

No, you are claiming absence of evidence to support your argument.

How?!? Provide evidence and argument for once.

You still used absolute terms here that science 'cannot,' which is a problem already cited.

This is silly. You apparently misunderstand the different sense of the words "can" and "cannot." It's not as if I am impugning the powers and capabilities of science by saying it has an actual nature and definition. To say that things 'cannot' be other than they are is all I am saying. If you disagree with that, please cite actual reasons just this once.

Ideas maybe ideas,so what?!?!?! Ideas remain a product of physical neurological activity. There is no evidence for any other source.

So we agree? I never claimed the above, beliefs are a direct result result of a physical process. There is no other evidence of any other source of beliefs.

Causal and ontological reduction are different. You keep conflating the two. I am the 'cause' of my actions. I am not my actions.

[Jim B.]

Source: plato.stanford.edu/.../epiphenomen...

Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs.

Epiphenomenalism is absurd; it is just plain obvious that our pains, our thoughts, and our feelings make a difference to our (evidently physical) behavior; it is impossible to believe that all our behavior could be just as it is even if there were no pains, thoughts, or feelings. (Taylor, 1963 and subsequent editions, offers a representative statement.)

© Copyright Original Source

Taylor is an agent causation theorist. Of course he would think that. The point of philosophy is to take assumptions that are "just plain obvious" and that seem ridiculous to doubt and subject them to rational inquiry, including empirical research and arguments.




Jackson is the author of the knowledge argument. Our reasons for believing in other minds is on a par with our believing in folk psycholgical entities. I believe that these beliefs can be justified, but they must be justified! One cannot just revert to argument from tradition and/or authority, e.g. "it's just plain obvious" or "everyone knows that..."

The first premise of this argument is a widely held dogma, but it can be denied without absurdity. (See Robinson, 1997.) It is perfectly obvious to everyone that the bodies of human beings are very much alike in their construction, and it requires no sophisticated reasoning to infer that if others are made like me, they probably hurt when affected like me, e.g., when their bodies are stuck with pins, beaten, cut and so on. There is no principle that makes an inference from similar effects to similar causes more secure than an inference from similar causes to similar effects; on the contrary, the latter inference is more secure, because there can sometimes be quite different causes of extremely similar effects. Thus, an inference to other minds that is allowed by epiphenomenalism must be at least as strong as the inferential route to other minds with which it is incompatible. [/cite]

But the argument for other minds is different than the ones for causal efficacy/epiphenomenalism. We cannot assume that just because others have minds similar to our own that epiphenomenalism is false: this all assumes the crucial point, that my phenomenal states are causing my behaviors. I agree that they are, but such beliefs have to be justified. It's circular reasoning.

[shunyadragon]

Are you saying that effects are identical to their causes? We're not arguing with the physical causes or grounds of our ideas. We're arguing about the reasonable grounds of our ideas. We're arguing about our ideas as ideas, even though they include representations of physical states.

So we agree? Your belief that beliefs are physical processes cannot be identical to a physical process.

I apologize. I missed this. I want to emphasize that beliefs, thoughts, ideas and consciousness are not physical processes, nor effects identical with causes, but simply the result of physical neurological processes of the brain. In tis manner they can be identified with a physical process.

Your confusion over Ontology and Epistemology needs clarifying.

Source: https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=epistemology

Epistemology - the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, and scope. Epistemology is the investigation of what distinguishes justified belief from opinion.

© Copyright Original Source

The question here is an overlapping epistemological/ontological question as to whether your view is knowledge or opinion. There is an epistemological element here 'about the way we know' the relationship between the mind and the brain, and an ontological issue concerning 'about what the brain and the mind are.'

Source: http://www.webpages.uidaho.edu/engl257/classical/ontology_and_epistemology.htm

Ontology and Epistemology

Ontology: The branch of metaphysics (philosophy concerning the overall nature of what things are) is concerned with identifying, in the most general terms, the kinds of things that actually exist. In other words addressing the question: What is existence? and What is the nature of existence? When we ask deep questions about "what is the nature of the universe?" or "Is there a god?" or "What happens to us when we die?" or "What principles govern the properties of matter?" we are asking inherently ontological questions.

Epistemology: The branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of knowledge itself, its possibility, scope, and general basis. More broadly: How do we go about knowing things? or How do we separate true ideas from false ideas? or How do we know what is true? or "How can we be confident when we have located 'truth'?" "What are the systematic ways we can determine when something is good or bad?"

So ontology is about what is true and epistemology then is about methods of figuring out those truths.

The split between Plato and Aristotle is both ontological and epistemic. The split between religion and science is both ontological and epistemic. For example, religion and science offer two very different ontologies (theories about what is out there) and epistemology (ways to figure out what is out there). And the split between Plato and Aristotle matches exactly the split between religion and science...and you should leave this class understanding why and how!

© Copyright Original Source

[shunyadragon]

I thought it would be worth while to comment on your post further particularly after I gave more thought to your misuse of 'identical.'

You haven't been able to understand, or perhaps haven't wanted to understand, what I've written thus far so what's the point? Your argument seems to be:

Read the references and you will understand my argument, in particular the Stanford Philosophical Dictionary,

That excerpt seems to support the knowledge argument. It does not support your objection. Mary acquires a new phenomenal concept of red.

The argument does support my view. The view in the reference is that Mary's comprehension of red is based on her neurological (and optical) abilities to process, which she has in common with most humans, and comprehend the color red, and not a new phenomenal concept other than her own natural abilities.

It doesn't have to be limited to what we are capable of in the future. There is neuro-scientific evidence that when two people have the same occurrent belief, eg that today is x date, different physical processes are going on in their brains. Either they are not having the same belief or the same belief is not identical to a physical state.

This an important misconception concerning the evidence concerning the similarity of concurrent beliefs of different individuals. The observed evidence of the fractal nature of the physical world, and the neurological nature of our brains pretty much excludes the likely hood of beliefs in different individual being 'identical.' Yes there is obviously similar beliefs, but not identical. The fractal nature of our physical existence can demonstrated by observation such as: All Maple leaves and clouds look like Maple leaves and clouds, but no two Maple leaves nor clouds are 'identical.'

The previous source on epiphenomilism concerning 'other minds' pretty much demonstrates the limitations of the theological concepts of other minds, and addresses the observed similarities of 'other minds based on the similarities of the physical nature of human beings,



Are you saying that effects are identical to their causes? We're not arguing with the physical causes or grounds of our ideas. We're arguing about the reasonable grounds of our ideas. We're arguing about our ideas as ideas, even though they include representations of physical states.

So we agree? Your belief that beliefs are physical processes cannot be identical to a physical process.[/QUOTE]