Why think God caused the universe to exist?

[Jichard]

An admission of defeat, surely!



Your continual repetition of the same selective cherry-picked quotes has been has been dealt with over and over and over again by myself and several other people including by Jichard in #193 of this thread:

"Your misrepresentations of Harris were pointed out here:
http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...109#post182109

Your misrepresentations of Vilenkin were pointed out here:
http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...495#post231495
http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...585#post230585

So you don't need to keep intentionally misrepresenting others".

But don't let that stop you seer. Just keep on repeating your same cherry-picked quotes from the silly ol' scientists if it help keeps your faith intact, your need is greater than mine.

seer is simply unable to tell the truth when it comes to citing sources. Harris and Carrolhimself could come on here and correct seer's misrepresentations, and no doubt seer would still resort to those same misrepresentations.

At this point, seer has me on ignore because I'm not falling for this.

[Tassman]

seer is simply unable to tell the truth when it comes to citing sources. Harris and Carrol himself could come on here and correct seer's misrepresentations, and no doubt seer would still resort to those same misrepresentations.

I'm sure.

At this point, seer has me on ignore because I'm not falling for this.

Standard procedure, I'm afraid!

[Boxing Pythagoras]

The same way there can be an infinite number of real numbers between 0 and 1 on the open interval:

(0, 1]

even though there is no first real number on that interval. That's how I conceptualize it.

This is exactly right. Even if the universe is past-finite, that does not necessarily imply that there was ever a first moment of time. Of course, many theologians would immediately dismiss this based on the archaic, Aristotelian belief that actual infinites cannot exist-- a belief which is not shared by the overwhelmingly vast majority of mathematicians, philosophers of mathematics, and philosophers of science, mind you.

[robrecht]

The same way there can be an infinite number of real numbers between 0 and 1 on the open interval:

(0, 1]

even though there is no first real number on that interval. That's how I conceptualize it.

I think we used to refer to that as a half-open or half-closed interval. I'm not trying to be pedantic, but I am curious why you choose to conceptualize this as an interval that is open at 0 but closed at 1. I totally get why it is open at 0, and I think we agree about singularities, if it is even possible to agree about singularities, but I'm actually curious why the interval is closed at 1. Is it perhaps an outdated presentocentric bias?

[shunyadragon]

I think we used to refer to that as a half-open or half-closed interval. I'm not trying to be pedantic, but I am curious why you choose to conceptualize this as an interval that is open at 0 but closed at 1. I totally get why it is open at 0, and I think we agree about singularities, if it is even possible to agree about singularities, but I'm actually curious why the interval is closed at 1. Is it perhaps an outdated presentocentric bias?

I believe this is simply an example of an infinite set defining the limits as 0 and 1. There is no reason that a different infinite set cannot be defined differently.

[seer]

Your continual repetition of the same selective cherry-picked quotes has been has been dealt with over and over and over again by myself and several other people including by Jichard in #193 of this thread:

"Your misrepresentations of Harris were pointed out here:
http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...109#post182109

Your misrepresentations of Vilenkin were pointed out here:
http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...495#post231495
http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...585#post230585

So you don't need to keep intentionally misrepresenting others".

But don't let that stop you seer. Just keep on repeating your same cherry-picked quotes from the silly ol' scientists if it help keeps your faith intact, your need is greater than mine.

That is a falsehood Tass, for instance tell me exactly HOW I misrepresented Harris. Be specific please. For instance I said: Except Harris doesn't think that consciousness can be accounted for "even in principle." How am I misquoting?

[robrecht]

I believe this is simply an example of an infinite set defining the limits as 0 and 1. There is no reason that a different infinite set cannot be defined differently.

Of course. There are an infinite number of infinite sets. That was not my question.

[Jichard]

I think we used to refer to that as a half-open or half-closed interval.

You can refer to it as half-open. That is technically right. My mistake.

I'm not trying to be pedantic, but I am curious why you choose to conceptualize this as an interval that is open at 0 but closed at 1. I totally get why it is open at 0, and I think we agree about singularities, if it is even possible to agree about singularities, but I'm actually curious why the interval is closed at 1. Is it perhaps an outdated presentocentric bias?

Because the present time exists. It's not "presentocentric bias" to note that the present time exists. After all, the present time exists even on the B-theory of time.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

I think we used to refer to that as a half-open or half-closed interval. I'm not trying to be pedantic, but I am curious why you choose to conceptualize this as an interval that is open at 0 but closed at 1. I totally get why it is open at 0, and I think we agree about singularities, if it is even possible to agree about singularities, but I'm actually curious why the interval is closed at 1. Is it perhaps an outdated presentocentric bias?

I wouldn't necessarily go so far as to say it is presentocentric. The arguments against an infinite set of past moments generally begin with a distinct effect which presumably occurs at a finite moment, and then work backwards from there. The interval (0,1] can serve as a sort of naive model of a situation in which a distinct effect occurs at a finite moment, and is preceded by an infinite set of moments, despite the fact that the whole interval has a hard, finite boundary.

[shunyadragon]

Of course. There are an infinite number of infinite sets. That was not my question.

That does not concern my answer. It was simply an example of a set of infinites.

[JimL]

There would be a time at which the laws of physics were in effect. But there would need to be a first instant of time where this was the case.



The same way there can be an infinite number of real numbers between 0 and 1 on the open interval:

(0, 1]

even though there is no first real number on that interval. That's how I conceptualize it.



If there was a first instant of time, then that first instant would be t=0 and the singularity would exist there. But Smith (as I'm reading him) denies that the singularity is a real state. So there would be no first instant of the universe, though the universe would still be past-finite.



Smith's points (as I read him) are as follows:

1. The singularity state doesn't exist since the state is physically impossible
2. Time doesn't apply since the very that apply to time, don't apply to the singularity state

And I'm getting this reading of Smith from the following:

"The cosmic singularity is a hypothetical time t=0 at which all the laws of nature, space and time break down. It is hypothetical or merely imaginary because if it did exist, it would be a physically impossible state, due to the breakdown of all laws, even the laws required for time to exist. This breakdown at the hypothetical t=0 implies there is no first instant t=0 of the finitely old time-series and that each instant is preceded by earlier instants."

I'm not a Platonist about the laws of physics, though I suspect Smith treats the laws as abstract objects in some of his other work. Instead, I take the term "laws of physics" to mean either one of two things:

1. the descriptions, terms, statement, concepts, etc. that are used to describe regularities, patterns, occurrences, etc. in the physical world (or in other hypothetical worlds)
2. the regularities, patterns, occurrences, etc. in the physical world

On reading 1, physical laws don't "exist in themselves prior to the the universe" since there are no descriptions, terms, concepts, etc. existent prior to the universe. And on reading 2, the physical laws don't "exist in themselves prior to the the universe" because there are no patterns, occurrences, regularities, etc. of the physical world occurring before the universe exists (on the position I sketched out)



My mistake. I'l try to be clearer.

The point is that if there was a first instant of time, then that first instant of time would be t=0. However, there is no such first instant of time (i.e. the singularity) since the singularity state is physically impossible and the laws of time do not apply to that singularity state. However, this does not imply that the universe is past-infinite; instead, the universe is past-finite, just as the following opening interval of real numbers has no first member:

(0, [...], 1]

even though that interval is shorter than the following interval of real numbers:

(∞, [...], 0, [...], 1]

The problem is the phrase "emerged from out of nothing". That phrase is an abuse of language that commits a reification fallacy. This is because the phrase "emerge from out of X", treats X as a concrete state of affairs that things transition from; to "emerge" entails there being a transition between states. For example, saying that "babies emerge from out of the womb" treats "the womb" as a concrete state-of-affairs that one can transition from. But that means it makes no sense to use the phrase "emerged from out of nothing" since "nothing" is not a concrete state-of-affairs that can be transitioned from.

So basically, the phrase "something emerged from nothing" incorrectly presupposes that there is a state called "nothing", from which "something" then emerges via a transition. And use of this phrase is what causes people to ask how "something emerge from nothing"; it leads people to want to know what explains the transition from "nothing" to "something". But my point is that there is no such transition, since "nothing" is a not a concrete state than can be transitioned from. Pointing this out does away with any need to explain the supposed transition.



But that doesn't help them at all.

Remember, the theists in question want to infer:

1 : the universe emerged from nothing

from:

2: nothing existed but the universe

I'm pointing out that if they do that, then unless they want to engage in special pleading, they need to infer:

3 : God emerged from nothing

from:

4: nothing existed but God

But of course these theists won't infer 3 from 4. So they should not infer 1 from 2, on pain of special pleading.

Your objection seems to be that theists will reply that the universe is past-finite, while God is eternal. But that doesn't help since 2 could be true even if the universe is past-finite, and 4 could be true even if God were eternal. So the reply doesn't show how the inference from 2 to 1 could be justified, while the inference from 4 to 3 were justified. After all, the mere fact that the universe is 14 billions years old does not imply that there is some state called "nothing", apart from the universe, from which the universe emerged, anymore than God being eternal implies that there is some state state called "nothing", apart from God, from which God emerges.

Basically what seems to be implicit in this argument is that though time begins to exist, there is no first instant at which this beginning takes place. I think a more common sense argument is that the reason that there is no first instant of time is because time, like the greater cosmos itself, has no first instant, it is infinite. The changes that take place within the greater cosmos, such as the emergence of a baby universe, begin within time, and so have a first intant at which time begins for them, but that wouldn't necessarily be the beginning of time itself. Within that baby universe one could still make the same philosophical argument of there being an infinite many instants within a finite boundary. Time then for each effect that has a beginning within the greater cosmos would be a different time with respect to each other, but time for each effect would align perfectly with respect to cosmic time. The problem that people have with this idea i think is the infinite regress problem, ie that there must be a first instant of time itself , or as some would put it, a first movement. A perpetual motion machine is an impossibility they would say. I think the opposite is probably true, i.e. that a perpetual motion nature to existence is a necessity no matter what you take that existence to be. I could of course be completely of base here as i am not an educated philosopher, but much of the above sounds like philosophical mumbo jumbo to the common man and i don't think that even the philosophically educated can fully make sense of it.

[robrecht]

That does not concern my answer. It was simply an example of a set of infinites.

But your "answer" was not in fact an answer to the question I asked.

[robrecht]

You can refer to it as half-open. That is technically right. My mistake.



Because the present time exists. It's not "presentocentric bias" to note that the present time exists. After all, the present time exists even on the B-theory of time.

I think I need to learn more about this B-theory of time. Does only the present time exist in the B-theory of time. Not the future also?? I would have thought that future time also existed, but, like I say, I do not know much about this B-theory of time.

[Tassman]

That is a falsehood Tass, for instance tell me exactly HOW I misrepresented Harris. Be specific please. For instance I said: Except Harris doesn't think that consciousness can be accounted for "even in principle." How am I misquoting?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

I think I need to learn more about this B-theory of time. Does only the present time exist in the B-theory of time. Not the future also?? I would have thought that future time also existed, but, like I say, I do not know much about this B-theory of time.

The future does exist on the B-Theory. I definitely think Jichard made a bit of a mistake, there.