Why think God caused the universe to exist?

[Adrift]

And wouldn't we be left with an effect (the universe) without a cause?

You'll have to read the paper, but that doesn't appear to be the case:



I wouldn't argue for B-theory myself, since I think that intuitively A-theory makes more sense.

[seer]

You'll have to read the paper, but that doesn't appear to be the case:



I wouldn't argue for B-theory myself, since I think that intuitively A-theory makes more sense.

Yes, I have been reading through it

It is not clear, however, that this must be the case. Why would it be impossible for there
be a state of affairs in which God exists changelessly and timelessly without the universe,
and for there to be a first moment of creation in which God creates the B-series of events
which include the first moment of cosmic inflation, and every other tenseless moment? If
it is possible for the first moment of the B-series to exist a finite time ago in the past, then
it seems we have a case for a first moment of time that is in need of a cause just as
everything else which begins to exist. I am not convinced that the B-series is descriptive
of a block universe that is not in need of an explanation; I am also not convinced that the
universe on the B-theory can simply exist.

[shunyadragon]

Just so you are aware, there have been defenses of the Kalam argument on the B-theory of time.

It is obvious that Curtis Metcalf does not understand the B-Theory of time. He applies the same argument for A-Theory of Time to B-Theory of time which is ridiculous. He argues that B-Theory must be an actual infinite, blatantly ridiculous.

Source: B-theory of time.

Thus far I have given a brief treatment to the historical context and the supporting arguments concerning the actual infinite. In doing so, I have inserted the B-theory at times to suggest that it is compatible with (at least) these parts of the kalam cosmological argument. It would be impossible to establish fully the case for the B-theory here, Metcalfe, Curtis, 2013, UMSL, p.20 especially because so much of that case rests on a linguistic analysis about the translatability of tensed sentences to tenseless ones. However, it is important to say a bit about the B-theory and its relationship to the way we are understanding time within the larger kalam cosmological argument, especially since I am attempting to generalize the argument in a way that it is compatible with the B-theory.

© Copyright Original Source

You may attempt to do so, but the bottom line is you cannot generalize the argument in a way that is compatible with the B-theory, because A-theory is far too Newtonian. Arguments for the A-Theory of time are not compatible with the B-Theory of time. Time is only relative to the Time/Space relationship of our universe, or any possible universe and beyond this time does not exist. There is no sense of infinity, actual infinity, and eternity beyond the relative time in our universe.

When people ask if the universe has always existed what they really want to know is did the universe exist in the infinite past. The prevailing view among cosmologists seems to be that the universe, along with time, began at the Big Bang. So, of course, in a sense, the universe has always existed, that is, it has always existed as long as time has existed. But that's a bit different from what most people mean when they ask "has the universe always existed?" The answer to their actual implied question is, no, the universe (including time) is not past-infinite. It began.

True, but only in terms of our universe and any other possible universe, which none are past infinite.

[Adrift]

He argues that B-Theory must be an actual infinite.

No he isn't. He's arguing the exact opposite of that. Regardless, I'm not championing his view on Kalam and B-Theory. I only pointed it out to BP so that he was aware that not all Kalam arguments rely on A-theory.

True, but only in terms of our universe and any other possible universe, which none are past infinite.

I don't really know what point you're trying to make here, and honestly I don't really care.

[shunyadragon]

No he isn't. He's arguing the exact opposite of that. Regardless, I'm not championing his view on Kalam and B-Theory. I only pointed it out to BP so that he was aware that not all Kalam arguments rely on A-theory.

I don't really know what point you're trying to make here, and honestly I don't really care.

That is obvious, but he did equate the argument for time being actual infinite applies to the B-theory, which is ridiculous on all counts, because actual infinites only occurs with in a greater time reference such as the time/space relationship within a universe. This is not compatible with B-theory of time.

[37818]

Jichard,

Ultimately, one must really start with an uncaused existence. Whatever else one may suppose there has to be some kind of uncaused existence.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

A honest question Boxing that I asked a few times now, perhaps you missed it. If as you say, our experience of time is an illusion, why do we always, without exception, experience it only going one way. If all "moments" of time (past present and future) actually exist why do we never have the illusion of going backward in time. What causes this forward illusion and why only that? Thanks...

We had a very long thread, some time back, in which I attempted to answer this very question. I'll see if I can dig it up, but in the meantime, I'll recommend Sean Carroll's book From Eternity to Here, as well as Simon Prosser's 2011 paper Why Does Time Seem to Pass?

Just so you are aware, there have been defenses of the Kalam argument on the B-theory of time.

I was aware that there were some people attempting to formulate versions of the KCA compatible with B-Theory, but I had not yet encountered one. Thanks! I'll give it a read, tonight.

When people ask if the universe has always existed what they really want to know is did the universe exist in the infinite past.

I disagree. I would say that what they really want to know is, "Was there ever a time when the universe did not exist?" And the answer to that is, quite obviously, no.

I wouldn't argue for B-theory myself, since I think that intuitively A-theory makes more sense.

Intuition tends to make for a poor epistemic gauge. The Flat Earth and geocentrism make more intuitive sense than modern physics, as well, but that hardly validates them.

[seer]

We had a very long thread, some time back, in which I attempted to answer this very question. I'll see if I can dig it up, but in the meantime, I'll recommend Sean Carroll's book From Eternity to Here, as well as Simon Prosser's 2011 paper Why Does Time Seem to Pass?

Yes, see if you can. I remember that thread and I don't remember if you answered. But this is not merely about the illusion of the passage of time but why we only experience this in one direction. That seems to be a serious problem with no forthcoming answer.

Prosser did say this, and I hope I'm understanding him correctly:

I acknowledge that the view proposed here is far from the whole story about why
time seems to pass; at the very least, the account of the phenomenology of passage must
be integrated with an account of our differing attitudes to events depending on whether
we think of them as past, present or future. I have also said very little about the
direction of experienced passage; I suspect that the asymmetry of memory is relevant to
this, but I acknowledge that the absence of a developed account of this is a significant
omission.

I think he agrees that it is a serious objection.

[Adrift]

Intuition tends to make for a poor epistemic gauge. The Flat Earth and geocentrism make more intuitive sense than modern physics, as well, but that hardly validates them.

I'm not so worried about it. I think there's probably better evidence for A-theory than for flat earth theories or geocentrism.

[seer]

I'm not so worried about it. I think there's probably better evidence for A-theory than for flat earth theories or geocentrism.

One wonders, if something so fundamental to human experience is an illusion - what else are we being deceived about? How do we trust anything we experience?

[Adrift]

One wonders, if something so fundamental to human experience is an illusion - what else are we being deceived about? How do we trust anything we experience?

Perhaps we're all just minds in vats afterall.

[seer]

Perhaps we're all just minds in vats afterall.

Yes, but I have a nicer vat than you! Silk curtains, designer electrodes and stuff!

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Yes, see if you can. I remember that thread and I don't remember if you answered. But this is not merely about the illusion of the passage of time but why we only experience this in one direction. That seems to be a serious problem with no forthcoming answer.

That's where Carroll's book does a better job. Dr. Carroll gives one of the best explanations I've ever heard about just what entropy is, and why the Arrow of Time arises from it. From there, the illusory experience of time's passage can be reconciled as being an artifact of entropic influence on brain states.

Prosser did say this, and I hope I'm understanding him correctly:

I think he agrees that it is a serious objection.

He doesn't seem to think that it is a serious objection so much as an important and unanswered question.

I'm not so worried about it. I think there's probably better evidence for A-theory than for flat earth theories or geocentrism.

There really isn't.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Just so you are aware, there have been defenses of the Kalam argument on the B-theory of time.

I just read the paper, but I was not really impressed. Mr. Metcalfe's solution to adapting the KCA for the B-Theory seems to be simply dropping a 4-dimensional block universe into an A-Series of super-time. For example, he says:

Even if the moment of the Big Bang exists tenseless, it need not have existed from all eternity.

Well, actually, yes. That is exactly what it means. Tenseless time means that all individual moments of time are eternally extant. Metcalfe seems to be equivocating two different definitions of the word "eternal." On the one hand, eternal can mean "not undergoing temporal progression" or "timeless," and it is in this sense that it is meant when discussing a B-Theory universe and the God of Classical Theology. On the other hand, eternal can mean "existing for an infinite amount of time," and it is in this sense that Metcalfe objects to the eternality of the B-Theory universe.

Metcalfe attempts to show that the universe cannot be eternal in that latter sense, then fallaciously assumes this similarly means that it cannot be eternal in the former sense.

So, while the whole paper attempts to pay lip service to the idea of the B-Theory, Metcalfe still seems to suppose that there must have been some state before the first moment of time. This is nonsensical. If there exists some state which is temporally prior to a certain moment of time, that moment cannot be the first moment of time. Further, if this state was timeless, as Metcalfe states, then it is entirely nonsensical to suppose that this state was before any moment of time, let alone the first. A thing which is timeless, by simple definition, cannot be temporally ordered.

Honestly, I think Mr. Metcalfe's attempt at formulating the KCA is even worse than Dr. Craig's.

[Adrift]

There really isn't.

I think there probably is. A-theory still has (or recently had) a number of reputable academic defenders including philosophers Ian Hinckfuss (University of Queensland), John Lucas (Merton College, Oxford), E.J. Lowe (Durham University), John Bigelow (Monash University), Trenton Merricks (University of Virginia), Ned Markosian (University of Massachusetts), Thomas Crisp (Biola), William Craig (Talbot), Michael Tooley (University of Colorado Boulder), Quentin Smith (Western Michigan University), Storrs McCall (McGill University), Peter Ludlow (Northwestern University), George Schlesinger (University of North Carolina), Robert Adams (Yale), Peter Forrest (University of New England), and Dean Zimmerman (Rutgers)

(list compiled by Dean Zimmerman in ).

Conversely, I don't know of any modern reputable academics who still hold to Flat Earth theory or Geocentrism. Do you?