It makes no sense to object to a position by pointing out that someone disagrees with it. But apparently this is taken as an OK objection to moral realism.
But suppose one accepts that fallacious line of reasoning. Then by that logic, one should reject theism, since most philosophers reject theism.
Now some might try to evade this point by acting as if the majority of philosophers hold views that they don't actually hold.
But, of course, this won't work, since the majority of philosophers reject theism and accept moral realism:
http://philpapers.org/surveys/result...1&grain=coarse
So why does it make sense for some theists to object to moral realism by saying that not all atheist philosophers accept it, when those same theists don't have a problem with atheist philosophers not accepting theism?
And why do some theists cite disagreement when it suits their purposes, but discard it when it doesn't, for no apparent reason other than ideological convenience? Isn't that special pleading?
Originally posted by seer
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Originally posted by seer
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Originally posted by seer
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http://philpapers.org/surveys/result...1&grain=coarse
So why does it make sense for some theists to object to moral realism by saying that not all atheist philosophers accept it, when those same theists don't have a problem with atheist philosophers not accepting theism?
And why do some theists cite disagreement when it suits their purposes, but discard it when it doesn't, for no apparent reason other than ideological convenience? Isn't that special pleading?
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