Paul�s basket escape from Damascus (Robert Eisenman)

[Paprika]

What makes you wrong is your failure to remember that the discussion is not over yet. Or at least, I'm not done with it.

So when do you plan to allow the gospels narrative sans trial narratives into the discussion?

From scratch? I'd have to write a whole book. If you think you know a counterexample, I could do something with that.

You're making a claim about how all historians internally reason; that most of them don't realise it but some special few people do. The burden of proof is not on me to show that it is so.

Source: Carrier, Proving History, p. 45

Since BT is formally valid and its premises (the probabilities we enter into it) constitute all that we can relevantly say about the likelihood of any historical claim being true, it should follow that all valid historical reasoning is described by Bayes's Theorem . . . . If I'm correct, and it is true that BT models what all historians actually do when they think and reason correctly about evidence and explanations, historians would do well to know more about it.

© Copyright Original Source

This, I'm afraid, doesn't demonstrate what I was asking for. It certainly does assert that it happens, but nothing is shown.
[/QUOTE]

[robrecht]

I'll give you my take on it, but I strongly urge anyone who wants to really get it to do lots of googling. I am confident that my understanding conforms to what most of the real experts would say, but I wouldn't dare ask anyone to just take my word for it.

You have a proposition P, and you have some fact or set of facts E that you think is or might be evidence for P. Strictly speaking, your background knowledge is all of the knowledge you have other than E -- every last thing you know or think you know. Of course, usually most of it will be irrelevant to any consideration of P's likelihood, but this cannot be decided arbitrarily. No fact can be ignored just because it might influence your analysis in some way you'd like to avoid.

It would say it is defined for and by everyone participating in a given discussion about a particular proposition. If you and I are discussing the authenticity of the Testimonium Flavianum, neither of us can be held to account for any facts of which neither of us is aware, no matter how many other people might already have learned them. Of course, if those facts should be taken into account, then even if we both accept the outcome of a Bayesian analysis of the Testimonium, we could both be wrong. Bayes can't tell us the actual truth about anything. All it can tell us is whether, considering the information we actually have to work with, we're being logically consistent in our application of that knowledge.

The error would lie in disregarding any portion of it that ought to influence the probabilities we assign to the equation's variables.

If I want to know whether Josephus wrote some part of the Testimonium Flavianum, then chances are it will be safe for me to ignore anything I know about the pre-Columbian Aztec civilization. But if I also happen to know something about Philo's writings, then I'd better pay some attention to it. That noted . . . suppose someone challenges my analysis by saying, "Actually, you should revise your estimate of P(E|~H), because we know that the pre-Columbian Aztecs did such-and-such." Then I might have a problem, depending on how good an argument my adversary has.

So, bottom line, it seems like you are saying, 'yes', 'background knowledge' is subjectively defined, either by an individual or multiple partners in a discussion. It is not necessarily real knowledge because it may only be 'what one thinks one knows'. Thus, I would suggest we should not call it 'knowledge' but merely 'opinion'? Do you agree?

[OingoBoingo]

So, you equate credentials with authority? Then here is my authority: Carrier, Richard C. . Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2012.

Are you familiar with the critiques on Carrier's methodology?








Here is a step by step critique of Carrier's methodology by Philosopher of Physics, Probability, Confirmation Theory, and Philosophy of Science, Tim McGrew:

Richard Carrier on Bayes' Theorem

Carrier is considered to be in the extreme fringe of New Testament studies, and has very little background in the fields he writes about. He's not a mathematician, does not hold any degrees in probability, does not hold any degrees in New Testament studies, (as far as I can tell) is not employed by any university, and is mostly known for being an online antitheism evangelist and Christ mythicist with a PhD in Ancient History. Maybe you knew this though, and it's the reason you made statements like:

"I strongly doubt that you would regard as authoritative any literature that I could cite."

[Doug Shaver]

It is not necessarily real knowledge because it may only be 'what one thinks one knows'. Thus, I would suggest we should not call it 'knowledge' but merely 'opinion'? Do you agree?

The "or think you know" is my sop to people who try to argue about whether we really know anything about the past. The problem arises because of the part of the standard definition of knowledge that says the truth of X is a necessary condition for anyone to know X.

We all believe that Julius Caesar died by assassination, not from any natural cause, and we think our evidence for that belief is so good as to preclude anything like reasonable doubt. So, we all think we know that Julius Caesar was assassinated. But do we really know it? There are people who argue that if there is any possibility that we're wrong, then we don't know it. I call that an infallibilist epistemology. I reject it, and so do most philosophers. It is possible that Caesar actually did die of natural causes, despite all the evidence we have that he was assassinated, and if that should be the case, then we are mistaken when we say we know he was assassinated. But that doesn't mean we're not entitled to say we know it.

As for the subjectivity of knowledge, it is easy to conflate our knowledge with the objects of our knowledge. Knowing is something that each of us does with their own brain and not anybody else's brain, but the things we know are objectively real. Assuming it really happened, Caesar's assassination is a historical fact. It did happen, and nobody's feelings about the matter can change that. But there are some facts of history that some people, because of their feelings, will never accept. They will not believe them and so they will never know them. But the rest of us do know them because our feelings do not prevent us from properly assessing the relevant evidence.

[Doug Shaver]

Then at least lay out the relevant background facts pertaining to the Sanhedrin.

When I say something about the Sanhedrin that you actually believe is errononeous, you may challenge me then. I will not attempt to anticipate every possible objection to every statement I make.

The gospel texts do not say it was a "trial" either.

The label is irrelevant. The gospels say he was brought to the Sanhedrin, accused of certain offenses against Jewish law, confronted with witnesses against him, and questioned about those accusations. The other sources do not say that any of those things occurred.

[Doug Shaver]

The question raised as this juncture is whether anyone can practically use "every last thing you know or think you know" in a Bayesian analysis. Do you?

Bayes reminds us that we have to at least try. All of us can only do the best we can. No historical method guarantees that we will always succeed in distinguishing truth from falsehood. Bayes, in my judgment, gives us the best odds.

[Doug Shaver]

So when do you plan to allow the gospels narrative sans trial narratives into the discussion?

I'm working on that post now, as time permits.

If you think you know a counterexample, I could do something with that.

You're making a claim about how all historians internally reason; that most of them don't realise it but some special few people do. The burden of proof is not on me

It is if you say I'm wrong. If you are content just to say, "I don't believe you," we can leave it at that.

This, I'm afraid, doesn't demonstrate what I was asking for.

It is exactly what you asked for. You asked me to quote an authority who says what I say.

You started this discussion by asking me to show you how I use Bayes to reach a certain conclusion. You did not ask me to prove that Bayes was the right way to reach that conclusion. If you are asking for that proof now, I must ask that you start a new thread. I won't derail this one with it.

[Doug Shaver]

Are you familiar with the critiques on Carrier's methodology?

I've read a few. I disagree with them. For me to respond to them in this thread would, I believe, constitute a major derailment.

[robrecht]

While all of that is true, the Sanhedrin is a very specific body. It can be made up of high priests. It can be made up of Elders. It can be made up of just about anyone - there is much thought that goes into the decision making. Since it is a special body, it would only be called the Sanhedrin.

For example, you wouldn't call the Supreme Court of the United States anything other than the Supreme Court. You wouldn't call them the Judges, or the Justices, or the Appellate Judges, or the "principal men and women." No, you would only refer to them as the Supreme Court.

The Sanhedrin is the Jewish Supreme Religious Court.

NORM

Do not be overly swayed by the later language of the Great Knesset in the Pirke Abot or the use of Sanhedrin language in other, even later traditions in the Talmud. For Josephus, the five συνεδρία (sanhedriaοἱ πρῶτοι τῶν Ἰουδαίων). See Antiquities 14,91 and 14,165-180.

Josephus only very rarely refers to the Jerusalem sanhedrin and generally uses the term as a common noun denoting the palace court or sometimes merely an impromptu council of counselors or friends gathered together by Herod or Caesar, for example, in Antiq 17,301:

Καίσαρός τε συνέδριον φίλων τε τῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ Ῥωμαίων τῶν πρώτων συνάγοντος ἐν ἱερῷ Ἀπόλλωνος ...Antiq Life 64 69 381), and that this Jewish body in Tiberius did deliberate on the Sabbath (Life 278-279, cf Rocca). Josephus also quotes from older official correspondence of the king and of the council of elders and the commune of the priests in Jerusalem (Antiq Antiq 7,412).

The usage of Josephus should also inform our understanding and eventual interpretation of Mark's use of the term.

[Paprika]

It is if you say I'm wrong. If you are content just to say, "I don't believe you," we can leave it at that.

I guess we'll have to leave it at this, since you're not willing to demonstrate with any example

It is exactly what you asked for. You asked me to quote an authority who says what I say.

Nope. I asked you to "produce any authoritative literature to show that Bayes' Theorem is a normal way historical scholars evaluate evidence." You only produced a scholar who asserted that historical scholars actually use it without knowing how. This, of course, doesn't show what that it is so.

[Paprika]

When I say something about the Sanhedrin that you actually believe is errononeous, you may challenge me then. I will not attempt to anticipate every possible objection to every statement I make.

Laying out the most pertinent of your beliefs about the Sanhedrin doesn't involve anticipating every possible objection, but rather allowing the reader to know what facts you're using as B. Otherwise, with very little knowledge of your B, why should the reader take your analysis seriously?

[Carrikature]

I feel like this discussion is about as effective as a discussion over a given variable in the Drake equation...

[robrecht]

I feel like this discussion is about as effective as a discussion over a given variable in the Drake equation...

Stick around; I have a feeling it will get better.

[robrecht]

The "or think you know" is my sop to people who try to argue about whether we really know anything about the past. The problem arises because of the part of the standard definition of knowledge that says the truth of X is a necessary condition for anyone to know X.

We all believe that Julius Caesar died by assassination, not from any natural cause, and we think our evidence for that belief is so good as to preclude anything like reasonable doubt. So, we all think we know that Julius Caesar was assassinated. But do we really know it? There are people who argue that if there is any possibility that we're wrong, then we don't know it. I call that an infallibilist epistemology. I reject it, and so do most philosophers. It is possible that Caesar actually did die of natural causes, despite all the evidence we have that he was assassinated, and if that should be the case, then we are mistaken when we say we know he was assassinated. But that doesn't mean we're not entitled to say we know it.

As for the subjectivity of knowledge, it is easy to conflate our knowledge with the objects of our knowledge. Knowing is something that each of us does with their own brain and not anybody else's brain, but the things we know are objectively real. Assuming it really happened, Caesar's assassination is a historical fact. It did happen, and nobody's feelings about the matter can change that. But there are some facts of history that some people, because of their feelings, will never accept. They will not believe them and so they will never know them. But the rest of us do know them because our feelings do not prevent us from properly assessing the relevant evidence.

Could we consider the background knowledge to be something like the scholarly consensus of critical scholars, if there is one, on issues not presently under debate? In order not to beg the question, I generally consider this population to be critical scholars who have comparable expertise to members of SNTS (Society of NT Studies), AJR (Academy for Jewish Research), or other comparable scholarly societies relevant to the topic under discussion. I certainly do not intend to limit debate upon items for which there is a general or strong consensus but I think ideally we should be generally aware of scholarship in the areas that we are discussing.

[Doug Shaver]

Laying out the most pertinent of your beliefs about the Sanhedrin doesn't involve anticipating every possible objection,

I'm not going to try to guess, out of all the facts that I'm aware of, which ones you think are the most pertinent.

but rather allowing the reader to know what facts you're using as B.

Until I give them reason to suspect otherwise, the reader should assume that their background knowledge and mine are coextensive.