The Argument From Reason...

[Markus River]

[T]hat the mind is dependent on the brain does not mean that the mind can be reduced to the physical or is identical to the brain.

Of course it's not identical to the brain, the mind is an emergent property of the brain. Just as wetness is not identical to water, but rather is an emergent property of water. Take away the water and you have no wetness. Take away the brain and you have no mind / consciousness. At least, none that anybody has been able to observe and measure.

[seer]

Perhaps you should try some direct, empirical experimentation on the matter. I’d suggest removing your brain and have your remaining consciousness report back on the results.

Sorry, you are missing the point. That because the mind is dependent on the brain does not mean that the mind can be reduced to the physical or is identical to the brain. Or that we have any idea how consciousness is possible.

[Markus River]

Yes he believes that. I think any materialist must. Of course rationality is lost. But that does not bear on his point about consciousness.

Perhaps you should try some direct, empirical experimentation on the matter. I’d suggest removing your brain and have your remaining consciousness report back on the results.

[seer]

Did atheist Sam Harris also get it right when he wrote that;

The idea of free will "cannot be mapped on to any conceivable reality" and is incoherent. And he writes in Free Will that neuroscience "reveals you to be a biochemical puppet."

So according to Harris, whether you get to heaven or not, is completely out of your hands. Every decision you think you’ve made throughout your whole life was preordained at the moment you achieved consciousness.

Yes he believes that. I think any materialist must. Of course rationality is lost. But that does not bear on his point about consciousness.

[Markus River]

Well no, it is more complicated than that, atheist Sam Harris gets it right...

Did atheist Sam Harris also get it right when he wrote that;

The idea of free will "cannot be mapped on to any conceivable reality" and is incoherent. And he writes in Free Will that neuroscience "reveals you to be a biochemical puppet."

So according to Harris, whether you get to heaven or not, is completely out of your hands. Every decision you think you’ve made throughout your whole life was preordained at the moment you achieved consciousness.

[seer]

It seems to me that consciousness is nothing more than an emergent property of complex brain evolution.

Well no, it is more complicated than that, atheist Sam Harris gets it right...

The problem, however, is that no evidence for consciousness exists in the physical world.

Physical events are simply mute as to whether it is “like something” to be what they are. The only thing in this universe that attests to the existence of consciousness is consciousness itself; the only clue to subjectivity, as such, is subjectivity. Absolutely nothing about a brain, when surveyed as a physical system, suggests that it is a locus of experience. Were we not already brimming with consciousness ourselves, we would find no evidence of it in the physical universe—nor would we have any notion of the many experiential states that it gives rise to. The painfulness of pain, for instance, puts in an appearance only in consciousness. And no description of C-fibers or pain-avoiding behavior will bring the subjective reality into view.

If we look for consciousness in the physical world, all we find are increasingly complex systems giving rise to increasingly complex behavior—which may or may not be attended by consciousness. The fact that the behavior of our fellow human beings persuades us that they are (more or less) conscious does not get us any closer to linking consciousness to physical events. Is a starfish conscious? A scientific account of the emergence of consciousness would answer this question. And it seems clear that we will not make any progress by drawing analogies between starfish behavior and our own. It is only in the presence of animals sufficiently like ourselves that our intuitions about (and attributions of) consciousness begin to crystallize. Is there “something that it is like” to be a cocker spaniel? Does it feel its pains and pleasures? Surely it must. How do we know? Behavior, analogy, parsimony.

Most scientists are confident that consciousness emerges from unconscious complexity. We have compelling reasons for believing this, because the only signs of consciousness we see in the universe are found in evolved organisms like ourselves. Nevertheless, this notion of emergence strikes me as nothing more than a restatement of a miracle. To say that consciousness emerged at some point in the evolution of life doesn’t give us an inkling of how it could emerge from unconscious processes, even in principle.

https://www.samharris.org/blog/the-m...-consciousness

[Markus River]

I agree that consciousness is, to a massive extent, dependent on the brain.

"Massive extent", that's a rather vague quantification. How big is massive? And by what method have you quantified it? What mechanism do you offer for whatever non-massive value of consciousness that is, presumably, independent of the brain?

It seems to me that consciousness is nothing more than an emergent property of complex brain evolution.

[Tassman]

Again, I addressed this argument. You have yet to address mine.

Philosophical speculation is NOT addressing the argument.

I agree that consciousness is, to a massive extent, dependent on the brain. All the same, because consciousness is the rug under which the Early Moderns swept everything that didn't fit the Mechanical Philosophy, consciousness cannot in principle have a mechanistic explanation, regardless of how dependent it is on the brain.

If consciousness is “dependent on the brain”, as you say, then it cannot exist without it.

[DaveTheApologist]

There is absolutely no evidence for consciousness and intellect beyond the physical activity of the living brain.

Again, I addressed this argument. You have yet to address mine.

I agree that consciousness is, to a massive extent, dependent on the brain. All the same, because consciousness is the rug under which the Early Moderns swept everything that didn't fit the Mechanical Philosophy, consciousness cannot in principle have a mechanistic explanation, regardless of how dependent it is on the brain.

[Tassman]

Now, this method of sweeping anything that doesn't "fit" under the rug of the mind has proven to be extremely successful for the mastery of nature. But using the precedent of those successes as "evidence" that the same method will allow you to get rid of even what's under the rug itself is manifestly absurd. What are you going to do, claim that the mind itself is just a product of the mind? That's ridiculous.

.

There is absolutely no evidence for consciousness and intellect beyond the physical activity of the living brain.

[seer]

You're definitely missing the point.

A flame will not exist without fuel, heat, and an oxidizing agent. Remove any one, and the flame will cease to be. That does not mean that a flame is identical to the presence of fuel, heat, and an oxidizing agent. None of those, on their own or jointly, constitute an instance of combustion. The flame may be explained by the co-presence of these factors, likewise, the presence of heat may well be explained by the action of the flame once said flame is ignited.

Great example!

[DaveTheApologist]

Which is not to say they are actually “true”, particularly when it comes to subjective supernatural experiences - especially given that such experiences vary from person to person and can be contradictory. Ultimately, ALL subjective experiences are physical because their existence depends upon a functioning physical brain. No brain, no subjective experience.

You're definitely missing the point.

A flame will not exist without fuel, heat, and an oxidizing agent. Remove any one, and the flame will cease to be. That does not mean that a flame is identical to the presence of fuel, heat, and an oxidizing agent. None of those, on their own or jointly, constitute an instance of combustion. The flame may be explained by the co-presence of these factors, likewise, the presence of heat may well be explained by the action of the flame once said flame is ignited.

So a thing can be wholly dependent on a set of other things, while still being distinct from them, and without epiphenominalism.

Now, the proof that consciousness is not physical can be seen from the history of philosophy. In the early modern period, secondary qualities (the color red as it appears in your visual field, the taste of sugar as it is tasted, the sound of middle C as it is heard, heat as it is felt) were relegated to the mind, along with anything that smelled like formal or final causes. Only primary qualities (size, shape, number, and motion) were regarded as existing externally. We've added to that list (things like mass, charge, temperature), but only those things which can be described in a mathematically precise way are allowed to be "physically fundamental."

Now, this method of sweeping anything that doesn't "fit" under the rug of the mind has proven to be extremely successful for the mastery of nature. But using the precedent of those successes as "evidence" that the same method will allow you to get rid of even what's under the rug itself is manifestly absurd. What are you going to do, claim that the mind itself is just a product of the mind? That's ridiculous.

Your options are pretty simple. Hold on to the idea that the apparent qualitative features of things, their apparently goal-directed causal tendencies, and distinctions between the categories they belong to either always or for the most part exist only in the mind - which, since the mind then has features that don't hold in the physical world, entails that the mind is distinct from the physical world - OR reject that idea, go for some kind of broadly classical world picture on which secondary qualities, teleology, and natural kinds are mind independent aspects of reality, and hope the result is more friendly to naturalism (spoiler alert - it isn't, but that's a story for another thread).

[Tassman]

Like you said: are ALL subjective experiences and ultimately only "true" for the recipient.

Which is not to say they are actually “true”, particularly when it comes to subjective supernatural experiences - especially given that such experiences vary from person to person and can be contradictory. Ultimately, ALL subjective experiences are physical because their existence depends upon a functioning physical brain. No brain, no subjective experience.

[seer]

Your experience of meatballs on a specific occasion is not in principle beyond scientific investigation, just as the subjective experience of any sentient creature enjoying a specific pleasure is not beyond investigation. It depends upon many factors such as mood, genetic makeup, environmental circumstances and social pressures etc. But ultimately, it is a physical experience because it is dependent upon a functioning physical brain. No brain, no meatball experience for you nor favorite banana experience for a chimpanzee.

Like you said: are ALL subjective experiences and ultimately only "true" for the recipient.

Even if the brain reproduces the taste and smell that experience is beyond science to know. Like you said it is ONLY true for me. Science can not reproduce the taste or smell no matter how much they know about the brain. Just as science could never know the inner life of a dog, how the dog experiences the world, no matter how well the map its brain.

[Tassman]

Really then science should be able to reproduce the smell and taste of my mother's meatballs. Or know how it tastes to me. Like you said in the other thread: "are ALL subjective experiences and ultimately only "true" for the recipient."

Which puts these experiences beyond scientific investigation or knowledge. Which destroys physicalism....

Your experience of meatballs on a specific occasion is not in principle beyond scientific investigation, just as the subjective experience of any sentient creature enjoying a specific pleasure is not beyond investigation. It depends upon many factors such as mood, genetic makeup, environmental circumstances and social pressures etc. But ultimately, it is a physical experience because it is dependent upon a functioning physical brain. No brain, no meatball experience for you nor favorite banana experience for a chimpanzee.