Viability and Abortion

[Teallaura]

That's quite a fascinating response. I'm interested to hear what you think of this CNN article on the subject. I've seen a lot of controversy surrounding recent brain death cases, and I always like to understand what's causing the controversy.

I'll get back to you. Don't have time to do this right at the moment. That and I think I have a cold coming on.

I will come back to this in a few days.

[Yttrium]

I'll get back to you. Don't have time to do this right at the moment. That and I think I have a cold coming on.

No hurry. I hope you get well soon. Colds can be so annoying.

[Joel]

You keep shifting from the capacity to the thing that it's a capacity for.
Yes, the acorn is not a tree or (or maybe "is a tree only in the qualified sense").
But I am not talking about being a tree, but the capacity to become a tree, and that (the capacity) exists in the acorn at least as much as in the tree. It is actual in an acorn, in a way that is not actual in a rock. Yes?

I'm not saying that the acorn "is a tree" (in any sense, qualified or not).

Stepping back out of the analogy, viability refers to a potentiality. If it referred only to babies actually currently living outside the womb, then viability would provide no line for legal abortion, because there already is no longer a pregnancy in that case. When viability is being used as a line for abortion, it matters only for those in utero, and thus for whom viability is only a potential (for those "potentially able" to live outside the womb, not those actually already living outside the womb). So the question of when are babies viable is inherently a question of when do they have that potential vs when do they not have that potential. It is not a question of when are they actually outside the womb. If, for the sake of argument, viability is at 6 months, then a baby in the womb at 9 months has been actually viable (has actually had the potentiality) for 3 months, without actually living outside the womb. But it's as if you are arguing that the baby in the womb at 7 months cannot be actually viable, because the baby is not actually living outside the womb. On the contrary, if I were to argue for viability at 6 months, I would be arguing that that capacity (viability) is actually present after than point, and not present prior to that point. The dividing line would have to do with when that potentiality actually exists, and not when/if the state of living-outside-the-womb is actual.

Do you see the distinction now?

But when we're talking about a non-actualized capacity, we are (by definition, I think) talking about something that might be yet is not.

You have to be more specific. If by "something" you are referring to being a tree, yes, then it "is not".
But if by "something" we refer to the capacity itself, then it exists fully in the acorn. The capacity itself is not something that "might be yet is not".

I'm not making the argument you think I'm making.

Not sure if the capacity to become a tree is lost upon growth, at least when we're talking Platonic forms. Since no tree ever matches the perfect form, all trees are either becoming closer to the perfect form or falling away from it in decay.

Fine. I don't need to insist on that point. I was just trying to help illustrate the fact that I'm talking about something that is actual in the acorn, and thus I'm not talking about something that is actual only in the tree (such as "being a tree").

But this gets us into some serious reverse-Theseus' Paradox problems

Not really. We can conclude that an acorn has the capacity to become a tree and that a rock does not, without supposing that such a capacity exists because the acorn has an immaterial soul, and without a Theseus paradox.

[Sam]

You keep shifting from the capacity to the thing that it's a capacity for.
Yes, the acorn is not a tree or (or maybe "is a tree only in the qualified sense").
But I am not talking about being a tree, but the capacity to become a tree, and that (the capacity) exists in the acorn at least as much as in the tree. It is actual in an acorn, in a way that is not actual in a rock. Yes?

I'm not saying that the acorn "is a tree" (in any sense, qualified or not).

Stepping back out of the analogy, viability refers to a potentiality. If it referred only to babies actually currently living outside the womb, then viability would provide no line for legal abortion, because there already is no longer a pregnancy in that case. When viability is being used as a line for abortion, it matters only for those in utero, and thus for whom viability is only a potential (for those "potentially able" to live outside the womb, not those actually already living outside the womb). So the question of when are babies viable is inherently a question of when do they have that potential vs when do they not have that potential. It is not a question of when are they actually outside the womb. If, for the sake of argument, viability is at 6 months, then a baby in the womb at 9 months has been actually viable (has actually had the potentiality) for 3 months, without actually living outside the womb. But it's as if you are arguing that the baby in the womb at 7 months cannot be actually viable, because the baby is not actually living outside the womb. On the contrary, if I were to argue for viability at 6 months, I would be arguing that that capacity (viability) is actually present after than point, and not present prior to that point. The dividing line would have to do with when that potentiality actually exists, and not when/if the state of living-outside-the-womb is actual.

Do you see the distinction now?

I see what you're saying. That argument, to me, seems close to meaningless. To say Object A has Potential X is to implicitly state that Potential X is present in Object A. It's tautological. I see no reason to focus on the distinction between the two. In either case, the potential to live outside of the womb refers to the ability at a given point in time. A 3 week-old fetus has 0% chance of living outside of a womb and therefore does not have the potential to continue to live outside of the womb at three weeks.

You have to be more specific. If by "something" you are referring to being a tree, yes, then it "is not".
But if by "something" we refer to the capacity itself, then it exists fully in the acorn. The capacity itself is not something that "might be yet is not".

I'm not making the argument you think I'm making.

If we're talking about properties like they are ontological things that actually exist, as you seem to be saying, all I can say is that I find that deeply unpersuasive and it's not going to be an effective argument against abortion. That the capacity, as a thing, exists apart from someone's mental construct is very, very contestable.

Not really. We can conclude that an acorn has the capacity to become a tree and that a rock does not, without supposing that such a capacity exists because the acorn has an immaterial soul, and without a Theseus paradox.

No, a Theseus' Paradox still exists if you want to take this route. Gametes would have that same capacity and, given sufficient technology, so would any number of other cells. At what non-arbitrary point does this capacity actualize, if not the moment when the fetus could, in fact, live outside the womb?

[Juvenal]

... and that's how we ended up living the plot of "Judge Dredd".

I'm reminded of something else.

[Bill the Cat]

I see what you're saying. That argument, to me, seems close to meaningless. To say Object A has Potential X is to implicitly state that Potential X is present in Object A. It's tautological. I see no reason to focus on the distinction between the two. In either case, the potential to live outside of the womb refers to the ability at a given point in time. A 3 week-old fetus has 0% chance of living outside of a womb and therefore does not have the potential to continue to live outside of the womb at three weeks.

Embryos can be frozen and survive outside of a womb weeks earlier than that, and can be implanted with reasonable success of survival, so your claim here makes little sense. Survivability is determined by the ability to exist in an environment conducive to growth and development. That is for every stage of a human's existence. Remove the human from the necessary habitable environment and it dies. In the case of an implanted fetus, that environment is the womb. For older human individuals, it could be an environment that contains oxygen or proper temperature.

No, a Theseus' Paradox still exists if you want to take this route. Gametes would have that same capacity and, given sufficient technology, so would any number of other cells. At what non-arbitrary point does this capacity actualize, if not the moment when the fetus could, in fact, live outside the womb?

At fertilization, as seen from the implantation of frozen embryos into surrogates.

[Sam]

Embryos can be frozen and survive outside of a womb weeks earlier than that, and can be implanted with reasonable success of survival, so your claim here makes little sense. Survivability is determined by the ability to exist in an environment conducive to growth and development. That is for every stage of a human's existence. Remove the human from the necessary habitable environment and it dies. In the case of an implanted fetus, that environment is the womb. For older human individuals, it could be an environment that contains oxygen or proper temperature.

Viability has a specific meaning and you're not using it here. To be viable, an organism can live outside of the womb: pumping its own blood, taking in air from its own lungs, etc. Freezing cells for storage is not categorically similar to viability.

At fertilization, as seen from the implantation of frozen embryos into surrogates.

We can freeze gametes, too. If you're following the potential-as-a-thing argument, there is little (if any) distinction between the fertilized and unfertilized ovum.

[Sam]

I'm reminded of something else.

Shamefully, I've yet to read it. Finally picked up "Catch-22" and nearly died of boredom after getting a third through. Classic contemporary literature is strangely hit-and-miss for me.

[Bill the Cat]

Viability has a specific meaning and you're not using it here. To be viable, an organism can live outside of the womb: pumping its own blood, taking in air from its own lungs, etc.

And when an organism lacks the capacity to do so?

Freezing cells for storage is not categorically similar to viability.

Survivability outside the womb. It's sufficiently similar enough to show that a human embryo need not spend 100% of its stage inside of a human female's womb from the second of conception, and thus using an argument like you used - "because it can't live outside the womb" - is an insufficient grounds by which to dismiss its potential to continue to grow and develop as a legitimate argument to include it as a unique separate member of our species worth protecting from termination.

We can freeze gametes, too.

Wholly different. Gametes will never be anything but gametes regardless of their location, unless a male gamete meets a female gamete and their genetic materials comingle.

If you're following the potential-as-a-thing argument, there is little (if any) distinction between the fertilized and unfertilized ovum.

There is tremendous difference. The cellular makeup is distinctly different. The DNA is clearly distinguishable. The subsequent processes that it goes through are entirely different.

[Sam]

And when an organism lacks the capacity to do so?

It ceases to be viable.

Survivability outside the womb. It's sufficiently similar enough to show that a human embryo need not spend 100% of its stage inside of a human female's womb from the second of conception, and thus using an argument like you used - "because it can't live outside the womb" - is an insufficient grounds by which to dismiss its potential to continue to grow and develop as a legitimate argument to include it as a unique separate member of our species worth protecting from termination.

You're not following the argument. No one is dismissing the potential of the zygote, embryo or fetus. What's being argued is:

1) Joel is (I believe) arguing that the ontological or metaphysical potential of viability (property-as-a-thing) is effectively similar to the potential of viability at a given moment (property-as-a-construct).

2) That this metaphysical property-as-a-thing argument has bearing on the abortion debate.

The question isn't whether a zygote or embryo or fetus has the potential to become something; it's whether the zygote/embryo/fetus has a certain property of being that extends personhood to a point in time earlier than the current paradigm of viability allows.

If such properties exist only as constructs, I don't see how the argument works. If such properties exist as things, one still has to demonstrate the sufficient connection between a property of potential and the actualization of that property. And I think that's a heavy lift.

Wholly different. Gametes will never be anything but gametes regardless of their location, unless a male gamete meets a female gamete and their genetic materials comingle.

The property of potential exists, regardless. Otherwise, gametes could not give rise to zygotes. In the case that (I think) Joel is making, the difference is essentially nil.

But even in the case that you're making, I think the logic is flawed. Gametes will never be anything else unless ... focuses on the human intervention regarding embryos and fetuses, while disregarding it for other things. It's essentially putting on blinders to the conclusions of the argument outside of a narrow focus. Which, to be clear, ain't a terrible thing. But it is not persuasive do ignore the objective consequences of an argument while still claiming that the argument is objectively true.

There is tremendous difference. The cellular makeup is distinctly different. The DNA is clearly distinguishable. The subsequent processes that it goes through are entirely different.

in the sense that Joel and I are talking about, there's no real difference. The differences you mention are incidental and are not relevant to the discussion of properties-as-things.

[Bill the Cat]

It ceases to be viable.

Yet we strive to assist those who are in further stages of development when they have the same lack of capacity. We do not seek to remove them from the environment where they maintain their capacity to"pump its own blood, take in air from its own lungs" for no good reason outside of convenience.

You're not following the argument. No one is dismissing the potential of the zygote, embryo or fetus. What's being argued is:

1) Joel is (I believe) arguing that the ontological or metaphysical potential of viability (property-as-a-thing) is effectively similar to the potential of viability at a given moment (property-as-a-construct).

2) That this metaphysical property-as-a-thing argument has bearing on the abortion debate.

The question isn't whether a zygote or embryo or fetus has the potential to become something; it's whether the zygote/embryo/fetus has a certain property of being that extends personhood to a point in time earlier than the current paradigm of viability allows.

And the answer is plainly clear when we don't try to overcomplicate it. Yes, it possesses the property of being on the same path of human growth and development that every member of our species has traveled. No single member has ever NOT been an embryo or a fetus, and embryos and fetuses do not change to become an individual in any other species.

If such properties exist only as constructs, I don't see how the argument works. If such properties exist as things, one still has to demonstrate the sufficient connection between a property of potential and the actualization of that property. And I think that's a heavy lift.

This is what I mean by overcomplicating the subject. I realize I stepped into your and Joel's conversation, but from where I sit, it's like you are making an extra effort to have us stare at the one tree while missing the forest it is in.

The property of potential exists, regardless. Otherwise, gametes could not give rise to zygotes. In the case that (I think) Joel is making, the difference is essentially nil.

An individual gamete does not give rise to a zygote. It must be matched with the corresponding other sex' gamete, and only then can it do more. A single gamete does not possess the potential in and of itself. I'm not 100% sure just what Joel is arguing, but that's my 2 cents on the matter.

But even in the case that you're making, I think the logic is flawed. Gametes will never be anything else unless ... focuses on the human intervention regarding embryos and fetuses, while disregarding it for other things.

Such as?

It's essentially putting on blinders to the conclusions of the argument outside of a narrow focus.

Not really. It is making a distinction of survivability based on it remaining in its natural environment and what the subsequent natural processes are.

Which, to be clear, ain't a terrible thing. But it is not persuasive do ignore the objective consequences of an argument while still claiming that the argument is objectively true.

I see attempts at rebuttals of the potentiality argument as focused on obfuscating the issue and dissecting the dissected arguments to, as the Mormons say, "offend for a word".

You've got to follow the argument here — in the sense that Joel and I are talking about, there's no real difference.

Then IMHO it is pointless. The human growth and development process for a distinct individual begins at conception. Before that, the constituent parts are not an individual member of our species. There is no guarantee that a single individual will make it to the last stages of growth and development, but it certainly can not continue if removed from its habitable environment.

The differences you mention are incidental and are not relevant to the discussion of properties-as-things.

They mean far greater than a discussion of "properties as things", which is a tiny micro-sliver of the overall discussion.

[Teallaura]

That's quite a fascinating response. I'm interested to hear what you think of this CNN article on the subject. I've seen a lot of controversy surrounding recent brain death cases, and I always like to understand what's causing the controversy.

I'm just bumping this so I can respond later. Haven't forgotten!

[Joel]

I see what you're saying. That argument, to me, seems close to meaningless. To say Object A has Potential X is to implicitly state that Potential X is present in Object A. It's tautological. I see no reason to focus on the distinction between the two.

The relevant distinction is between having the potential and not having it. (I.e., is viable or is not viable.)
Whereas it seemed that you kept shifting instead to speak of the distinction between having the potential for X, and X being actual.

The distinction you kept shifting to is not the thing under discussion.
Or perhaps you were trying to argue that because "potential for X" is not "X is actual", therefore there is no such thing as a distinction between having or not having the potential? Which also is false, as I've been pointing out. And such a distinction is necessarily assumed by the person using viability as the dividing line.
Or it's possible I've been misunderstanding you and have been arguing against that misunderstanding.

In either case, the potential to live outside of the womb refers to the ability at a given point in time. A 3 week-old fetus has 0% chance of living outside of a womb and therefore does not have the potential to continue to live outside of the womb at three weeks.

My argument in the OP is that that conclusion about 0% chance is reached only by restricting consideration to today's technology. If we remove that qualification then there is no reason to think that the fetus can't survive outside the womb (at three weeks), if sufficient technological assistance were applied. (Today we merely don't know how.)

If we're talking about properties like they are ontological things that actually exist, as you seem to be saying, all I can say is that I find that deeply unpersuasive and it's not going to be an effective argument against abortion. That the capacity, as a thing, exists apart from someone's mental construct is very, very contestable.

I'm not sure what your point is here. I'll try to guess: When I've written about a capacity "existing in the acorn", I only meant that as a shorthand for saying that the acorn has that property. When I say that property "exists" I mean that it is actual that the acorn has that property. I do not intend to say that the property exists as a thing in the abstract, apart from particular things that have that property.

But the fact that the acorn has that property is a matter of actuality/ontology. As can be seen by comparing the acorn to a rock, which does not have that property. Try planting an acorn and planting a rock and you can even observe the difference. It is a real/actual fact about the acorn. It is true about the acorn at least as much as is true about the tree. (Is that a better way of phrasing it?)

No, a Theseus' Paradox still exists if you want to take this route. Gametes would have that same capacity and, given sufficient technology, so would any number of other cells. At what non-arbitrary point does this capacity actualize, if not the moment when the fetus could, in fact, live outside the womb?

If the logic of viability pushes the point further back than fertilization (and to absurd results), that's not really my concern here. My intent in the OP was to provide further argument that viability (interpreted as charitably as possible) does not provide a reasonable dividing line at any time after fertilization. If viability also leads to absurd results, so much the worse for viability. I'm not one of the people suggesting that viability is the/a reasonable dividing line.

The problem with viability that you hint at here is that it by definition includes the help of "artificial aid", which could be anything at all. Maybe 'artificial aid' could possibly turn a mound of dirt into an adult human being, thus mounds of dirt are "viable human beings". I agree that that may be a serious problem for those arguing for viability.

But that doesn't show that the whole idea of capacities in general is imaginary/meaningless. After all, there is a real difference in results between planting an acorn and planting a rock. Or likewise, the 3-week fetus left to its natural course (pregnancy) tends to become an adult engaging in things like reason and choice, whereas a rock left to its natural course tends to remain a rock. Thus there is a real difference there.

Embryos can be frozen and survive outside of a womb weeks earlier than that

What's more: in principle an embryo existing today could be frozen until some future date at which the technology exists to enable the embryo to grow outside the womb. Thus that embryo is viable.

[Sam]

The relevant distinction is between having the potential and not having it. (I.e., is viable or is not viable.)
Whereas it seemed that you kept shifting instead to speak of the distinction between having the potential for X, and X being actual.

The distinction you kept shifting to is not the thing under discussion.
Or perhaps you were trying to argue that because "potential for X" is not "X is actual", therefore there is no such thing as a distinction between having or not having the potential? Which also is false, as I've been pointing out. And such a distinction is necessarily assumed by the person using viability as the dividing line.
Or it's possible I've been misunderstanding you and have been arguing against that misunderstanding.


My argument in the OP is that that conclusion about 0% chance is reached only by restricting consideration to today's technology. If we remove that qualification then there is no reason to think that the fetus can't survive outside the womb (at three weeks), if sufficient technological assistance were applied. (Today we merely don't know how.)


I'm not sure what your point is here. I'll try to guess: When I've written about a capacity "existing in the acorn", I only meant that as a shorthand for saying that the acorn has that property. When I say that property "exists" I mean that it is actual that the acorn has that property. I do not intend to say that the property exists as a thing in the abstract, apart from particular things that have that property.

But the fact that the acorn has that property is a matter of actuality/ontology. As can be seen by comparing the acorn to a rock, which does not have that property. Try planting an acorn and planting a rock and you can even observe the difference. It is a real/actual fact about the acorn. It is true about the acorn at least as much as is true about the tree. (Is that a better way of phrasing it?)


If the logic of viability pushes the point further back than fertilization (and to absurd results), that's not really my concern here. My intent in the OP was to provide further argument that viability (interpreted as charitably as possible) does not provide a reasonable dividing line at any time after fertilization. If viability also leads to absurd results, so much the worse for viability. I'm not one of the people suggesting that viability is the/a reasonable dividing line.

The problem with viability that you hint at here is that it by definition includes the help of "artificial aid", which could be anything at all. Maybe 'artificial aid' could possibly turn a mound of dirt into an adult human being, thus mounds of dirt are "viable human beings". I agree that that may be a serious problem for those arguing for viability.

But that doesn't show that the whole idea of capacities in general is imaginary/meaningless. After all, there is a real difference in results between planting an acorn and planting a rock. Or likewise, the 3-week fetus left to its natural course (pregnancy) tends to become an adult engaging in things like reason and choice, whereas a rock left to its natural course tends to remain a rock. Thus there is a real difference there.


What's more: in principle an embryo existing today could be frozen until some future date at which the technology exists to enable the embryo to grow outside the womb. Thus that embryo is viable.

No, the embryo is not viable. This is the point in (if you will) a nutshell: you're arguing that the possession of a property of potential is functionally the same as the possession of a property of actuality. Thus, you say that a zygote has the property "viable", which you assert is the same property as that possessed by an 40 week-old fetus. You assume that this property exists as-a-thing, an actual property that is carried around. None of this makes very much sense.

Things that have the potential to become another thing do not necessarily carry around the property of being that thing: while an acorn may become a tree, it does not have the property "tree" in any actualunder normal conditions, albeit with artificial aid. An artificial womb is not facilitating "normal conditions" outside of the womb; it would be simply replacing the functionality of the womb itself.

[Joel]

The relevant distinction is between having the potential and not having it. (I.e., is viable or is not viable.)
Whereas it seemed that you kept shifting instead to speak of the distinction between having the potential for X, and X being actual.

No, the embryo is not viable. This is the point in (if you will) a nutshell: you're arguing that the possession of a property of potential is functionally the same as the possession of a property of actuality. Thus, you say that a zygote has the property "viable", which you assert is the same property as that possessed by an 40 week-old fetus. You assume that this property exists as-a-thing, an actual property that is carried around. None of this makes very much sense.

Things that have the potential to become another thing do not necessarily carry around the property of being that thing: while an acorn may become a tree, it does not have the property "tree" in any actual sense. It is not ontologically a tree.

There you go again.
You somehow think I'm arguing something like:
1) X has the potential for T
2) Therefore X has the property of T (or "is a T")
I'm not arguing that at all. I have said that in various ways.

I keep talking only about whether X has the potential for T, and you keep thinking that I'm talking about whether X has the property T.
The only property I'm talking about is whether X has the potential for T.

If the argument is between "having the potential" and "lacking the potential" then your argument is not about the actual viability of a zygote, as defined by the contemporary usage of "viable"....Viability means living outside of the womb under normal conditions, albeit with artificial aid. An artificial womb is not facilitating "normal conditions" outside of the womb; it would be simply replacing the functionality of the womb itself.

Viability, in the contemporary usage, is certainly about "having the potential" or "lacking the potential".
That is, the question being raised is when does the fetus have the potential to live outside the womb. As I quoted before, the definition given in Roe v Wade was "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid."

The actualization of that potential would be: living outside the mother's womb, perhaps with artificial aid.
If the baby is actually "living outside the mother's womb, perhaps with artificial aid", then there is no question of abortion. The pregnancy is no more. If "viability" means "living outside the mother's womb, perhaps with artificial aid", then it is irrelevant to abortion because there is no pregnancy to terminate.

Therefore, if "viability" can have any relevance to abortion, it must refer to the state prior to that being actual--i.e. to the potential. It has to be able to describe a fetus in the womb (for which living outside the womb is only potential).

Thus its definition cannot be:
"living outside the mother's womb, perhaps with artificial aid"
but can be:
"potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid."

Indeed, the person arguing for viability is arguing that a fetus at, say, 30 weeks has the potential and at 3 weeks does not. They are drawing a line based on when they think that exists. Surely they are not claiming that a 30 week fetus in the womb is actually living outside the womb, but rather is "potentially able to do so". Correct?


Second, you suggest here here adding a new condition: "under normal conditions". At first glance "under normal conditions, albeit with artificial aid" appears to be contradictory. Artificial aid creates non-normal conditions. I think you are trying to (ad hoc) limit the amount/kind of artificial aid which is permitted under the definition. It's not clear that there is any such non-arbitrary limit. A point on the spectrum of when the suitable environment is "too much like the mother's womb" seems arbitrary.

If an objective point such as you want were found, then that could put a stop to my argument in the OP. In which case I would fall back to the standard argument that it's irrelevant. That the particular kind of environment required is irrelevant to the question of right to life and murder. All humans have environmental requirements.