The idiocy of leftist judges...

[Diogenes]

According to some people, anyway.

According to some people, 2+2=5 for sufficiently large quantities of "2".


Even in a utility sense, "realism" is best used to indicate independence from minds, which would include human practices. Otherwise, there's no "realness" other than certain people believe x to true, but that's descriptive relativism. settings. Applying fuzzy truth values to morality is essential on par with fuzzy truth values on how to play Monopoly and whether you can buy properties on the first round.

You could perhaps get away with MMR with modality and truth in other possible worlds (though the stipulation would probably have to include modal realism to entail any sort of realism).

[seer]

That's just another way of claiming that you are using the One True Definition^TM of moral realism.

I'm using that standard definition, what moral realism has meant since I have been reading about it. Heck, if you are correct one could define moral realism as a small furry creature with four legs...

[Stoic]

I'm using that standard definition, what moral realism has meant since I have been reading about it. Heck, if you are correct one could define moral realism as a small furry creature with four legs...

You may be right; the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article may be wrong. I'm no expert, so I can't really say.

But even if you and I agree that a moral realist has to hold that morality is objective, that would still allow someone who is not a moral realist to believe that there are true moral statements.

And there could be a lot of philosophers who accept or lean toward moral realism who don't think morality is entirely objective.

So I don't think your emotional argument for objective morality has legs.

[seer]

But even if you and I agree that a moral realist has to hold that morality is objective, that would still allow someone who is not a moral realist to believe that there are true moral statements.

What would that look like?

[Stoic]

What would that look like?

It could look like ethical subjectivism, as one example.

Interestingly, that article contains the following paragraph:

There is some debate as to whether moral realism should continue to require the metaphysical thesis, and therefore if ethical subjectivists should be considered moral realists. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord argues that moral realism should not require mind-independence since there are morally relevant psychological facts which are necessarily mind-dependent, which would make ethical subjectivism a version of moral realism. This has led to a distinction being made between robust moral realism (which requires all three of the theses) and minimal moral realism (which requires only the first two, and is therefore compatible with ethical subjectivism).

That helps explain the divide on whether moral realism requires that moral facts be mind independent. Robust moral realism does, but minimal moral realism doesn't.

[seer]

It could look like ethical subjectivism, as one example.

Interestingly, that article contains the following paragraph:

There is some debate as to whether moral realism should continue to require the metaphysical thesis, and therefore if ethical subjectivists should be considered moral realists. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord argues that moral realism should not require mind-independence since there are morally relevant psychological facts which are necessarily mind-dependent, which would make ethical subjectivism a version of moral realism. This has led to a distinction being made between robust moral realism (which requires all three of the theses) and minimal moral realism (which requires only the first two, and is therefore compatible with ethical subjectivism).

That helps explain the divide on whether moral realism requires that moral facts be mind independent. Robust moral realism does, but minimal moral realism doesn't.

If moral realism is not about mind independence then we are just back to the subjective or relative. The entire distinction is gone.

[Stoic]

If moral realism is not about mind independence then we are just back to the subjective or relative. The entire distinction is gone.

I guess that depends on whether you believe there can be objective facts about human minds.

[Diogenes]

I guess that depends on whether you believe there can be objective facts about human minds.

Saying "Person X believes the the sky is blue" is not the same as saying "The sky is blue".

[Stoic]

Saying "Person X believes the the sky is blue" is not the same as saying "The sky is blue".

Absolutely.

[Sparko]

Absolutely.

monkey-drums.gif

[Machinist]

It could look like ethical subjectivism, as one example.

Interestingly, that article contains the following paragraph:

There is some debate as to whether moral realism should continue to require the metaphysical thesis, and therefore if ethical subjectivists should be considered moral realists. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord argues that moral realism should not require mind-independence since there are morally relevant psychological facts which are necessarily mind-dependent, which would make ethical subjectivism a version of moral realism. This has led to a distinction being made between robust moral realism (which requires all three of the theses) and minimal moral realism (which requires only the first two, and is therefore compatible with ethical subjectivism).

That helps explain the divide on whether moral realism requires that moral facts be mind independent. Robust moral realism does, but minimal moral realism doesn't.

dude.JPG