Is libertarian free will coherent?

[Joel]

What matters is the distinction I gave you, and whether or not you understand it. And it seems that you don't.

I see no indication that Seer doesn't understand the distinction you are making. On the contrary, the fact that he pointed out definitions of "fatalism" that disagreed with yours, indicates that he does understand it. If he thought there was no distinction, he could not have thought those definitions differed from yours.

[Tassman]

In quantum mechanics we have probabilistic events for which we do not know their antecedent physical causes. And some interpretations of quantum mechanics holds that no antecedent physical cause exists. So this is a case of something for which the cause (if any) is utterly unknown to us. And yet we still include the description of this phenomena as physical law.

That is not the difference we are talking about. We are talking about the difference between 'first cause' and infinite regress. In the former, no infinite regress is necessary. And in the latter, there is no "until you get to". Your multiverse is an infinite regress, which has the same inadequacy as any infinite regress.

And what, in your view, is the "inadequacy of any infinite regress"?

But you've already said that that "the don't seem to be" is just an illusion.
And in determinism, there is no "different circumstances". There are only the circumstances that actually occur. And all of those are exactly determined ultimately by ancient conditions, long before we existed.

That's not true. In the case of a 'first cause', that which happens does have a cause: the 'first causer'. Likewise if LFW agents are in some respect first causers, then the thing they LFW cause to happen has a cause: the agent. (And in that sense, the agent isn't something that "happens".)

How can the agent be a first cause when the agent himself is subject to the determined causality of physical law?

[seer]

As Joel said below, labels and definitions don't matter. In case you don't know (which you don't) in philosophy definitions are argued over all the time. Words do not have intrinsic meanings. They mean whatever we want them to mean. Christians for example disagree on what many things mean. Take "faith" for example. Christians disagree over what that means, and there are theological websites that I'm sure contain definitions you don't agree with. So what? What matters is the distinction I gave you, and whether or not you understand it. And it seems that you don't. No surprise: Seer doesn't understand something.

That is fine Thinker, the point is I am using accepted definitions and understandings of what fatalism means. I'm not making it up. Your fatalism is less broad than the sources I quoted, but there clearly are definitions that agree with me. And your distinction then is no less arbitrary. So why does your distinction matter? Because you make it?

[The Thinker]

If it "doesn't matter whether you define thought as a mental state or idea", then let's stick with your mental state definition for now, for consistency.
You stipulated that we are ignoring how they got to state X, so we are ignoring whether the agent freely chose X (and contemplated Y and Z). That's irrelevant. All that matters is whether the agent controls which state to transition to. There is nothing contradictory with starting at state X involuntarily/deterministically and then non-deterministically choosing the next state transition. There is no reason to think that all state transitions must be non-deterministic or all deterministic.

There is indeed something contradictory about the agent choosing the next state transition. That involves the logical paradox of my first post - which you have not at all refuted. As I said, if you grant state X as not being free, then the contemplation of Y over Z and all the consequences of each is not freely willed. So if the agent thinks Y is better than Z in state X, you are admitting that this is not his free choice.

At any rate, you haven't here explained how your think-before-you-think paradox creates a contradiction in this state-machine scenario. Thus this scenario still stands as a refutation of that paradox.

You are clearly delusional now Joel. I'm definitely not going to let this go. Is your "state-machine scenario" determinism? If so, then this is obviously not a contradiction of the think-before-you-think paradox because the thought has a prior determined cause, and thus is not LFW. I never claimed this was a paradox. The "state-machine scenario" is determinism - which means you don't have LFW. The paradox comes when you try to claim LFW. LFW contains the paradox, not determinism. You make no sense here.

Your complaint that "You can't choose what your next [state] will be. In order to do that, you'd have to [be in that state], before you [are in that state]." Is silly. There is no need to be in state Y prior to being in state Y.
This refutation of your paradox was first in post 315 from the beginning through "So this apparent paradox vanishes."

How did you choose it then? Thoughts appear in consciousness and we have no control over them (because in reality they have prior causes.) But claiming you are in control of your thoughts would require another you to control what thoughts enter into your consciousness. This in fact is exactly what you're trying to do - perhaps without realizing it - by claiming that the "agent" causes the thoughts or actions. It's like trying to posit something else that controls your thoughts and actions by making something up out of thin air. Even if I ignore that for the moment, all it does is push the problem back. You haven't resolved anything. So if state Y pops into your consciousness, you couldn't have chosen it - it just appeared (in reality due to prior causes). Claiming the agent caused it explains nothing. What caused the agent to cause it? You say nothing - the agent is uncaused. Well then it had no control over what it caused because you cannot control something uncaused - this is why you'll never win this debate. If you think "I'm not going to think about ice cream," - that itself was a thought that popped into your consciousness beyond your control - so subsequent restraints from thinking about ice cream are not in your control. And in post 315 all you wrote was "Rather, the agent, while in state X can be contemplating the idea of state Y (or Z) without yet being in state Y (or Z)." But you've already conceded that this state of contemplation is determined without their control, and so the agent has no control over what options he's entertaining. Your saying LFW just comes in somewhere. Nonsense.


You have not refuted the paradox at all. All you keep doing is just saying that you can freely choose. You have not at all logically explained it.

None of this is a rebuttal to my refutation. If all changes are caused and controlled by the agent, then none of the changes is uncontrolled by the agent. So it is absurd for you to claim that there is something remaining not controlled by the agent. The refutation stands, because you have not rebutted it.

If? I just wrote that causing X is not the same thing as controlling X in the LFW way. I mentioned that a determined person can cause X but that doesn't show they can control X. You're once again just asserting something without any justification. You're seriously getting delusional.

The rest of this post is miscellaneous comments and answers to questions:

Mostly you are here complaining that I'm making a negative argument (against this second objection of yours) instead of making a positive argument.

As for your questions:
What part of the agent is the causer? By definition it's the part that causes the changes that occur. I don't care what label we use to call it.

That's a non-answer and you know it. What part is it? The soul? The mind? The what?

"If the agent is originally uncaused, why isn't whatever decision it made to make an action uncaused too?"
I don't know what you are asking. The changes are all caused and controlled by the agent. The agent was not caused to do so. The "decision" is not something separate from or in addition to that.

This makes no sense as an attempt to explain LFW. As I wrote above, you're just positing another you - another thing, out of thin air mind you, to try and explain your thoughts or actions. It is literally just like trying to have the thought before the thought by claiming the agent chooses and causes your thoughts. In your case, the agent somehow has the thought or impulse to cause you to have the thought or take an action. Do you not see how ridiculous this is? You claim the agent itself is uncaused, and yet it has LFW to cause your thoughts and actions. If the agent is uncaused, then it cannot have control over what it causes. If you say the agent caused X, and I ask what caused the agent to cause X, and you say "Nothing. It's uncaused," then the agent had no control over what it caused because by definition you cannot control something uncaused - because then it would have to have a cause.

You seem confused about some things being chosen by the agent and other things not. Now I understand that you think LFW is an illusion, but within that illusion, it seems to humans that some things in their mind happen under their control and that other things don't. This is the normal human experience. You should be familiar with it, if you are human.

I am fully aware that we have the illusion of free will, it's one of the best illusions in the world. Its because when a thought appears in our consciousness we naturally ascribe it our own volition and choice. But a deeper examination will reveal that this is impossible. You cannot choose your thoughts in the same way that you can't cause yourself to be born. By you positing an agent causing you to do things you've basically just tried to resolve the thought-before-you-have-the-thought paradox by claiming the "agent" is somehow separate from and/or prior to you or your mind.

That is a description of a deterministic state machine (state transitions are determined by current state and external input), and thus not what I'm talking about. Freedom would "come in" by being a non-deterministic state machine (state transitions are not fully determined by current state and external input).

I'm not talking about determinism, but I'm exposing a problem with your attempted explanation of LFW. You say the agent causes actions. That means that whatever the agent wants the action will come later. So for example, agent wants X --> agent causes X. That's basically been your explanation. Here's the problem. Why does the agent want X? What's the explanation of why the agent is in that state? If it has a prior cause that isn't the agent it isn't free, if it is uncaused it isn't free (since you cannot control uncaused things.) So the agent wants X out of its control. Where does LFW come in? Merely being indeterministic is not LFW. Hate to break that you ya buddy. You might say the agent can still choose to cause X or not, so it can be in two states (1) I will do X; or (2) I won't do X. Do these states have causes? If they do, no free will, if they are uncaused, no free will. Same problem.

I see no reason to think freedom cannot be limited.
And I have denied that LFW is a violation or overriding or overcoming of physical law. If LFW exists, it is part of the whole interconnected web of causation. If LFW exists, its causation/force on objects is one force among many competing forces. (E.g. a LFW agent may be pushing on a piece of steel that is being pulled in a different direction by a magnet. The two forces sum. Neither is a violation of physics.)

Why can it be limited? By what? LFW (if it exists) would have to overcome physical law. There is no way LFW can exist in a deterministic universe. It would have to break free of it. If we imagine indeterminism, that doesn't resolve the problem either. Your soul/mind/thoughts would have to have causal impact on atoms. Physical says that's impossible. The only way it could occur is via a violation of physical law - and that would not impose a physical limit.

[The Thinker]

That is fine Thinker, the point is I am using accepted definitions and understandings of what fatalism means. I'm not making it up. Your fatalism is less broad than the sources I quoted, but there clearly are definitions that agree with me. And your distinction then is no less arbitrary. So why does your distinction matter? Because you make it?

Why does my distinction matter? Really? Um, because it totally changes the way one deals with life and sees the relationship between cause and effect. Gee, that might be a good reason. Are you really that slow? I don't care what terms you use. I care about the concept.

[The Thinker]

I see no indication that Seer doesn't understand the distinction you are making. On the contrary, the fact that he pointed out definitions of "fatalism" that disagreed with yours, indicates that he does understand it. If he thought there was no distinction, he could not have thought those definitions differed from yours.

What seer doesn't get is that he's hung up on semantics.

[seer]

Why does my distinction matter? Really? Um, because it totally changes the way one deals with life and sees the relationship between cause and effect. Gee, that might be a good reason. Are you really that slow? I don't care what terms you use. I care about the concept.

Do you hear yourself? If one changes the way one deals with life it is only because we are determined to. We have no control.

[seer]

I am fully aware that we have the illusion of free will, it's one of the best illusions in the world.

Yes, deceived by the evolutionary process again!

[Joel]

In quantum mechanics we have probabilistic events for which we do not know their antecedent physical causes. And some interpretations of quantum mechanics holds that no antecedent physical cause exists. So this is a case of something for which the cause (if any) is utterly unknown to us. And yet we still include the description of this phenomena as physical law.

That's beside the point, which is that it is still considered physical law.

And what, in your view, is the "inadequacy of any infinite regress"?

What? I've stated this repeatedly to you as my main point, and you haven't disagreed, so I assumed you agreed.
It's that 'turtles all the way down' is insufficent to support anything.

As I wrote in post #200, considering the literal example of turtles all the way down:

"Consider the hypothesis of an infinite stack of turtles supporting something (say a ham sandwich). We could just as easily conceive of the top of the stack (and the sandwich) being a foot higher or lower. (Or a mile or an infinite distance) There's nothing about an infinite stack of turtles that would determine which it is. Thus there would have to be yet something else determining that.
Likewise we could just as easily conceive of the whole stack in free-fall, and thus not supporting the sandwich at all. There's nothing about an infinite stack of turtles that would say it would support the sandwich rather than itself be in free-fall. Thus there would have to be yet something else determining that.
However you look at, it utterly fails as an explanation for how the sandwich is being supported where it is."

Nobody has denied that actions would be effective under determinism. It's just that "if we didn't make such decisions" would be impossible. So the point here is that you aren't actually disagreeing with Seer on this. You are both saying that under determinism, our actions are determined, cannot be otherwise than they are, and thus we cannot control them.

How can the agent be a first cause when the agent himself is subject to the determined causality of physical law?

Firstly, a 'first cause' could be not subject to physical law (as believed of God in standard Christian theology).

Secondly, I believe I already explained this when I first discussed causality as being like a 'web'. Your question is like asking how a car's engine could drive its driveshaft (and thus wheels) at the same time an electromagnet is pulling on the car. The two forces sum. The two causes can be thought of as two threads in the web that meet together, and their interaction yields the final effect. Likewise I would propose that a LFW choice is one thread, that may meet other threads in the web and combine to yield the final result. The only difference in the case of LFW, is that the LFW thread has a recent beginning. Your question seems silly to a proponent of LFW. No proponent of LFW thinks that having the ability of LFW would prevent, say, someone from coming up behind you and knocking you down.

[Joel]

There is indeed something contradictory about the agent choosing the next state transition. That involves the logical paradox of my first post - which you have not at all refuted. As I said, if you grant state X as not being free, then the contemplation of Y over Z and all the consequences of each is not freely willed. So if the agent thinks Y is better than Z in state X, you are admitting that this is not his free choice.


You are clearly delusional now Joel. I'm definitely not going to let this go. Is your "state-machine scenario" determinism? If so, then this is obviously not a contradiction of the think-before-you-think paradox because the thought has a prior determined cause, and thus is not LFW. I never claimed this was a paradox. The "state-machine scenario" is determinism - which means you don't have LFW. The paradox comes when you try to claim LFW. LFW contains the paradox, not determinism. You make no sense here.


How did you choose it then? Thoughts appear in consciousness and we have no control over them (because in reality they have prior causes.) But claiming you are in control of your thoughts would require another you to control what thoughts enter into your consciousness. This in fact is exactly what you're trying to do - perhaps without realizing it - by claiming that the "agent" causes the thoughts or actions. It's like trying to posit something else that controls your thoughts and actions by making something up out of thin air. Even if I ignore that for the moment, all it does is push the problem back. You haven't resolved anything. So if state Y pops into your consciousness, you couldn't have chosen it - it just appeared (in reality due to prior causes). Claiming the agent caused it explains nothing. What caused the agent to cause it? You say nothing - the agent is uncaused. Well then it had no control over what it caused because you cannot control something uncaused - this is why you'll never win this debate. If you think "I'm not going to think about ice cream," - that itself was a thought that popped into your consciousness beyond your control - so subsequent restraints from thinking about ice cream are not in your control. And in post 315 all you wrote was "Rather, the agent, while in state X can be contemplating the idea of state Y (or Z) without yet being in state Y (or Z)." But you've already conceded that this state of contemplation is determined without their control, and so the agent has no control over what options he's entertaining. Your saying LFW just comes in somewhere. Nonsense.


You have not refuted the paradox at all. All you keep doing is just saying that you can freely choose. You have not at all logically explained it.

Just to keep things organized and on track, the above is your reply in defense of your think-before-you-think paradox.

But nothing you wrote here explains at all why that paradox holds (and causes a contradiction) in the case of a non-deterministic state machine. There is no need to be in state Y before being in state Y. So this paradox of yours remains refuted.

But here are some comments/answers to the questions, in case it's helpful:

- People sometimes choose contrary to what they think is better. People are imperfect. So what?
- No as I've repeated several times now, I'm talking about a non-deterministic state machine. Not a deterministic one.
- We don't need to know "how" to know something is possible. Even if we "making something up out of thin air", if it is internally consistent, then it's logically possible. So this complaint of yours does nothing to indicate logical impossibility.
- Your complaints of uncaused/uncontrolled belong in the discussion of your other paradox, and do not help you defend this think-before-you-think paradox.
- I did not concede that state X was determined. I said that that is irrelevant. If the set of options (possible next states) happens to be determined, that set of options is not sufficient to determine which option will be selected, and so does not imply that the choice of next state is determined.

None of this is a rebuttal to my refutation. If all changes are caused and controlled by the agent, then none of the changes is uncontrolled by the agent. So it is absurd for you to claim that there is something remaining not controlled by the agent. The refutation stands, because you have not rebutted it.

If? I just wrote that causing X is not the same thing as controlling X in the LFW way. I mentioned that a determined person can cause X but that doesn't show they can control X. You're once again just asserting something without any justification. You're seriously getting delusional.

This is your entire reply in defense of your second (uncaused/uncontrolled) paradox. But it's a non-response. It's only a complaint about the method of argument. What you seem to fail to realize is that any discussion/argument/exploration of whether some proposition X is logically possible begins with supposing "If X were true, then..." and explore whether it leads to a contradiction (A and NOT-A) or we find that we can't find a contradiction. This starting with "If X were true, then..." is required whether you are trying to argue X is impossible, or if I'm trying to rebut you. Thus your complaint that I included a ""If X were true, then..." is entirely inappropriate and illogical.

But I'll respond here to something you misplaced into the discussion of the previous paradox:

What caused the agent to cause it? You say nothing - the agent is uncaused. Well then it had no control over what it caused because you cannot control something uncaused - this is why you'll never win this debate.

You've committed an error of equivocation here. In the last sentence, you shifted the predicate of "uncaused" from the agent to that which the agent caused, without justification. That which the agent caused is caused: by the agent. And thus you can't logically argue that it is uncaused (and thus uncontrolled).

The result here is that you haven't addressed my objection to this second paradox of yours either: "If all changes are caused and controlled by the agent, then none of the changes is uncontrolled by the agent. So it is absurd for you to claim that there is something remaining not controlled by the agent."


The remainder of this post below is the miscellaneous section, which I have pared down a bit, to keep it from getting too big.

That is a description of a deterministic state machine (state transitions are determined by current state and external input), and thus not what I'm talking about. Freedom would "come in" by being a non-deterministic state machine (state transitions are not fully determined by current state and external input).

I'm not talking about determinism, but I'm exposing a problem with your attempted explanation of LFW. You say the agent causes actions. That means that whatever the agent wants the action will come later. So for example, agent wants X --> agent causes X. That's basically been your explanation. Here's the problem. Why does the agent want X? What's the explanation of why the agent is in that state? If it has a prior cause that isn't the agent it isn't free,

First, I don't have a problem with the agent starting a causal chain that occurs over time (e.g. effect A, which then causes B, which then causes C,...). The agent would only indirectly cause B and C, by causing A. The only thing the agent directly caused would be A.

Secondly, wanting to do an action is insufficient to cause you to do it. People, when deliberating, often want multiple mutually-exclusive actions (E.g. you both want to finish your homework, and want to play with your friends but cannot do both). So wanting X is insufficient to determine that X occurs. So it doesn't imply that X is unfree (even if the wanting, itself, were unfree).

Thirdly, let me try to salvage what I think you are trying to say here. I think you are saying that the LFW agent in state X both selects state Y as the next state and causes the transition to state Y. And then you are saying that they have a temporal causal order. But perhaps they are simultaneous, or are even the same thing (different ways of referring to the same thing). There's no reason to suppose a selecting and then a separate transition. But even if you did want to think of them as distinct and ordered, they could be like the A, B, C just above. That is, it could be that the only thing the agent directly causes is the selection of Y (event A), and then A deterministically causes event B (which is the transition). In which case the whole chain would be caused, because the agent caused event A.

I see no reason to think freedom cannot be limited.
And I have denied that LFW is a violation or overriding or overcoming of physical law. If LFW exists, it is part of the whole interconnected web of causation. If LFW exists, its causation/force on objects is one force among many competing forces. (E.g. a LFW agent may be pushing on a piece of steel that is being pulled in a different direction by a magnet. The two forces sum. Neither is a violation of physics.)

Why can it be limited? By what? LFW (if it exists) would have to overcome physical law. There is no way LFW can exist in a deterministic universe. It would have to break free of it. If we imagine indeterminism, that doesn't resolve the problem either. Your soul/mind/thoughts would have to have causal impact on atoms. Physical says that's impossible. The only way it could occur is via a violation of physical law - and that would not impose a physical limit.

This doesn't actually respond to what I said. "If LFW exists, its causation/force on objects is one force among many competing forces." It's as if you were complaining that magnets cannot exist because they would have to be able to overcome physical law (such as gravity), and that therefore, magnets would be omnipotent. Or that quantum indeterminate events cannot occur because it would require violating physical law.

[seer]

Why does my distinction matter? Really? Um, because it totally changes the way one deals with life and sees the relationship between cause and effect. Gee, that might be a good reason. Are you really that slow? I don't care what terms you use. I care about the concept.

And what does the concept of determinism do to our sense of moral responsibility if it is all out of our control?

[The Thinker]

Do you hear yourself? If one changes the way one deals with life it is only because we are determined to. We have no control.

So?

[The Thinker]

And what does the concept of determinism do to our sense of moral responsibility if it is all out of our control?

That's irrelevant to whether determinism or LFW is true or not. First and foremost, I care about truth. Social consequences are secondary. For me personally, determinism has not in any way made me a less moral person.

[seer]

That's irrelevant to whether determinism or LFW is true or not. First and foremost, I care about truth. Social consequences are secondary. For me personally, determinism has not in any way made me a less moral person.

Then why did you say this:

Why does my distinction matter? Really? Um, because it totally changes the way one deals with life and sees the relationship between cause and effect. Gee, that might be a good reason. Are you really that slow? I don't care what terms you use. I care about the concept.

It sounds like you are concerned about social consequences. That using the term fatalism may some how cause negative results.

[The Thinker]

Just to keep things organized and on track, the above is your reply in defense of your think-before-you-think paradox.

But nothing you wrote here explains at all why that paradox holds (and causes a contradiction) in the case of a non-deterministic state machine. There is no need to be in state Y before being in state Y. So this paradox of yours remains refuted.

Well if I fail short to directly address any of your points, just let me know. Sometimes I might focus on a particular point you made, but it may not be the point that's most important to you.

In regards to the think-before-you-think paradox, it definitely still holds. There is no logical way out of it. You do have to be in state state Y before being in state Y, and you've tried to resolve this by claiming the "agent" causes your thought/action. But that only pushes the problem back, and of course it leads to the infinite regress problem. So you're forced to claim that the originator your thoughts have no cause - regardless of whether you call it an agent (which never made any sense anyway) or anything else, and that means you (or the agent) has no control over it. Saying that the agent has control over the actions doesn't resolve anything. That decision or impulse in the agent to either materialize the action or not faces the same problem: either it is caused or it is uncaused. Same dilemma. Saying the agent causes it is not a resolution.

No matter what you do, there is no way out of the dilemma, or trilemma (depending how you look at it). Every thing that you claim is LFW is either going to have a prior cause or not. If it has a prior cause it isn't free - regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism holds. And if it doesn't have a cause, the agent has no control over it - since it is logically impossible to have any control over something uncaused.


So no Joel, you haven't resolved the paradox at all. All you've repeatedly done is assert it.

But here are some comments/answers to the questions, in case it's helpful:

- People sometimes choose contrary to what they think is better. People are imperfect. So what?
- No as I've repeated several times now, I'm talking about a non-deterministic state machine. Not a deterministic one.
- We don't need to know "how" to know something is possible. Even if we "making something up out of thin air", if it is internally consistent, then it's logically possible. So this complaint of yours does nothing to indicate logical impossibility.
- Your complaints of uncaused/uncontrolled belong in the discussion of your other paradox, and do not help you defend this think-before-you-think paradox.
- I did not concede that state X was determined. I said that that is irrelevant. If the set of options (possible next states) happens to be determined, that set of options is not sufficient to determine which option will be selected, and so does not imply that the choice of next state is determined.

- Determinism/indeterminism is not a deciding factor in LFW. As I already mentioned, indeterminism doesn't automatically logically entail LFW. Indeterminism just means randomness. Randomness isn't LFW or my (1). You still face the logical paradox I've previously mentioned. In quantum mechanics, measurement is probabilistic, but the wave function evolves deterministically according to Schrodinger's equation.
- The "how" question was referring to the logical possibility of being able to choose your thoughts and control them, my (1), not specifically the mechanism behind it (although, that may be relevant in order to explain the logical possibility).
- The various different problems I mentioned relate to one another because when you try to get out of one problem a certain way it forces me to mention the additional problem with that.
- If it's irrelevant then you should have no problem debating this under the assumption that state X is determined or somehow out of the agent's control. Since state X is deliberating whether or not to do Y or Z, and their deliberation is what leads to whether it's Y or Z, then their choice can't be free. If for example, I control your deliberation on whether or not to steal a watch, and I make stealing the watch a lot more appealing and enticing, and you end up stealing the watch because of this, then this isn't LFW.

This is your entire reply in defense of your second (uncaused/uncontrolled) paradox. But it's a non-response. It's only a complaint about the method of argument. What you seem to fail to realize is that any discussion/argument/exploration of whether some proposition X is logically possible begins with supposing "If X were true, then..." and explore whether it leads to a contradiction (A and NOT-A) or we find that we can't find a contradiction. This starting with "If X were true, then..." is required whether you are trying to argue X is impossible, or if I'm trying to rebut you. Thus your complaint that I included a ""If X were true, then..." is entirely inappropriate and illogical.

First off, I have much more to say on the subject than this. This is just one point I'm mentioning. And none of what I said is nonsense. Your "If" is assuming the very thing that is logically impossible. To me, your response is like saying, "If married bachelors exist, then invite one to the party." So yeah sure, if the agent has control over its thoughts and actions, then it's thoughts and actions are not uncontrolled. If square-circles exist, then it's possible we might find one.

You've committed an error of equivocation here. In the last sentence, you shifted the predicate of "uncaused" from the agent to that which the agent caused, without justification. That which the agent caused is caused: by the agent. And thus you can't logically argue that it is uncaused (and thus uncontrolled).

The result here is that you haven't addressed my objection to this second paradox of yours either: "If all changes are caused and controlled by the agent, then none of the changes is uncontrolled by the agent. So it is absurd for you to claim that there is something remaining not controlled by the agent."

What caused the agent to cause it? You say nothing - the agent is uncaused. Well then it had no control over what it caused because you cannot control something uncaused - this is why you'll never win this debate.

There is no equivocation because the same problem exists for everything the agent does you think is LFW. Either it will have a cause or it won't. You're fundamentally stuck with those two options. Let's trace the chain of causality. First the agent enters state X and it's uncaused and thus the agent couldn't have had control of it. Then (somehow) the agent enters state Y. You claim state Y is caused by the agent. So whatever it is that you think the agents makes a LFW choice, it still will have a cause or it won't. I already listed the problems with this.

Plus your explanation makes no sense. You're acting as if the "agent" is something different from the person, as if the agent is another mind behind the scenes causing our thoughts and actions that we don't have access to. Previously you said the agent is the mind. So how could the mind cause the mind? Your view makes no logical sense. It needs explaining. I'd prefer a chronological order of events of all the relevant things involved in a LFW thought and action.

And I really need you to logically explain how and where LFW enters the picture on your view. You say the agent causes the action, but nothing caused the agent to cause the action. That would mean that whatever mental state or will (or whatever you want to call it) the agent is in prior to the action that is the necessary cause of the action cannot be freely willed - because that state has no cause. I don't see any place where and how LFW comes in. No matter what you propose you're always going to face the initiating thing that is necessary for the action to either have a prior cause or not. And in that case you face the same problems.

The remainder of this post below is the miscellaneous section, which I have pared down a bit, to keep it from getting too big.

First, I don't have a problem with the agent starting a causal chain that occurs over time (e.g. effect A, which then causes B, which then causes C,...). The agent would only indirectly cause B and C, by causing A. The only thing the agent directly caused would be A.

Secondly, wanting to do an action is insufficient to cause you to do it. People, when deliberating, often want multiple mutually-exclusive actions (E.g. you both want to finish your homework, and want to play with your friends but cannot do both). So wanting X is insufficient to determine that X occurs. So it doesn't imply that X is unfree (even if the wanting, itself, were unfree).

Thirdly, let me try to salvage what I think you are trying to say here. I think you are saying that the LFW agent in state X both selects state Y as the next state and causes the transition to state Y. And then you are saying that they have a temporal causal order. But perhaps they are simultaneous, or are even the same thing (different ways of referring to the same thing). There's no reason to suppose a selecting and then a separate transition. But even if you did want to think of them as distinct and ordered, they could be like the A, B, C just above. That is, it could be that the only thing the agent directly causes is the selection of Y (event A), and then A deterministically causes event B (which is the transition). In which case the whole chain would be caused, because the agent caused event A.

To your 2nd point, I know that. I'm talking about situations where you want X and you do X. The thing that is the sufficient cause of the action either has a cause or not. And you're stuck in the same dilemma.

To your 3rd point, it doesn't matter if they are simultaneous or not, you're still stuck in the dilemma. Hopefully soon enough you will realize that. If the agent directly causes Y, that cause either has a cause or it doesn't, and you know what entails from that.

This doesn't actually respond to what I said. "If LFW exists, its causation/force on objects is one force among many competing forces." It's as if you were complaining that magnets cannot exist because they would have to be able to overcome physical law (such as gravity), and that therefore, magnets would be omnipotent. Or that quantum indeterminate events cannot occur because it would require violating physical law.

LFW would not be a force in the Standard Model or Gravity, and it would be an injection of energy into the universe that didn't previously exist, and that would violate the law of the conservation of energy. So LFW would require a miracle because it would require violating physical law.

(This part is an aside from the main topic of the coherency of LFW.)