Is libertarian free will coherent?

[Joel]

It does matter, because fatalism is the belief that nothing you do will affect your future - so why do anything. Determinism is the belief that all effects have causes and that what you do today will affect your future by causing it - so it makes perfect sense to be proactive.

It seems that Seer was talking about determinism, not what you are calling fatalism. I'm not seeing why you think Seer is talking about "fatalism".
But besides, in determinism, whether it makes sense or not to be proactive, you have no control over whether you will be proactive.

Also in your comparison chart, it says that determinism does not lead to defeatism. But it could in another way. Someone could acknowledge that their actions have an effect, but still be led to defeatism by the thought that they cannot control their actions. Also, even if someone were erroneously led to defeatism by the idea of determinism, the person would (by the hypothesis of determinism) be deterministically, inexorably caused to be led to defeatism by the idea of determinism. Moreover under determinism, if anyone ever has a defeatist attitude, for whatever reason, it is determinism that inexorably caused them to have a defeatist attitude.

Also, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines "fatalism" differently than you do: "philosophers usually use the word to refer to the view that we are powerless to do anything other than what we actually do." http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/

Again, if you believe that all events take place by inevitable necessity then by definition that is fatalism.

Who said all things? Some things won't happen. I won't sprout wings and fly anytime ever.

Why are you intentionally misinterpreting what Seer said? He obviously meant all events that happen.

It doesn't matter Thinker, that is the point. Whether fatalism or determinism the bottom line is the same, all events are inevitable and we have no control over what we think, do or say.

Tass, do we have any control over what we think, do or say? And if all our acts are not inevitable in your deterministic sequence of events then what isn't inevitable?

For the thousandth time: "YOU" are not separate from your brain, you ARE your brain. It is our physical brain, following the known laws of science that determines our actions. ALL the available evidence indicates that our decisions (and that of all sentient creatures) are in and of themselves essential components of the deterministic causal chain. Mental states are part of the deterministic sequence of events and play a crucial role in determining what will happen.

If your reply to Seer here is an answer to his question, then you are saying, no, humans do not control what they think, do, or say. It is the inexorable result of "the known laws of science that determines our actions." So you are saying that Seer is correct, that in determinism, "all events are inevitable and we have no control over what we think, do or say."
The only distinction that Thinker made between "fatalism" and "determinism" is that the latter is defined as saying that our actions have consequences, and the former doesn't. But seer wasn't denying that our actions have consequences. He was pointing out that in the definition of both, our actions are fully determined from prior physical states.

[Tassman]

I disagree that it's improbable. But that's not the topic of discussion.

No, I disagreed about overriding. I don't think LFW "overrides the laws and constants of nature." Rather it (if it exists) is part of the whole causal web/fabric. It would be part of the nature of LFW agents.

illusion of being LFW decisions, but in actuality they would be determined. It couldn't be otherwise unless you posit that LBW overrides physical law.

If LFW exists why would it not be classified as physical law? Ultimately physical law is just a description of that which happens.

If it was "classified as physical law", it wouldn't be LFW, because it would function without the essential antecedent causal nature of physical law.

I already addressed that. And it still stands that turtles all the way down would be insufficient to support anything.

[Tassman]

If your reply to Seer here is an answer to his question, then you are saying, no, humans do not control what they think, do, or say. It is the inexorable result of "the known laws of science that determines our actions." So you are saying that Seer is correct, that in determinism, "all events are inevitable and we have no control over what we think, do or say."

In one sense this is true, because given totally identical circumstances one will get identical results every time we make a decision. But, in practical terms given slightly different circumstances, no matter how minuscule, you will get different results. So, whilst events are inevitable, in the human time-frame they don't seem to be and our decisions matter. If we didn't make them the outcomes may be different.

The only distinction that Thinker made between "fatalism" and "determinism" is that the latter is defined as saying that our actions have consequences, and the former doesn't. But seer wasn't denying that our actions have consequences. He was pointing out that in the definition of both, our actions are fully determined from prior physical states.

There is a difference as indicated by the link previously supplied by Thinker.

http://breakingthefreewillillusion.c...m-infographic/without causes.

[seer]

In one sense this is true, because given totally identical circumstances one will get identical results every time we make a decision. But, in practical terms given slightly different circumstances, no matter how minuscule, you will get different results. So, whilst events are inevitable, in the human time-frame they don't seem to be and our decisions matter. If we didn't make them the outcomes may be different.



There is a difference as indicated by the link previously supplied by Thinker.

http://breakingthefreewillillusion.c...m-infographic/without causes.

More nonsense, you and Thinker are only looking at one definition of fatalism and ignoring others:

Fatalism

Fa"tal*ism (?), n. [Cf. F. fatalisme.] The doctrine that all things are subject to fate, or that they take place by inevitable necessity.

http://machaut.uchicago.edu/?resourc...ism&use1913=on

http://1828.mshaffer.com/d/word/fatalism

https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/fatalism?rdfrom=Fatalism

If something takes place by inevitable necessity, which it does in determinism, then it is fatalistic by nature.

[The Thinker]

I added markers [A] and [B] to be able to reference those two parts. The two seem to be different lines of reasoning. I'm not sure of the connection you are drawing between the two.

Yes they are two different lines of reasoning. They are two different points.

Let me take a different approach to refuting [B]. As you've explained before, when you say "thought" you mean mental state. So let's try picturing the agent like a state machine. Let X be the agent's current state. Suppose that there are two possible state transitions from state X: one to state Y and one to state Z. Now if this is a deterministic state machine, then the next state (Y or Z) will be completely determined by the current state and external inputs/causes. But if the state machine is non-deterministic, then Y and Z are both possible.

And we could imagine the not-deterministic state machine agent has LFW in the matter. In state X, then, the agent freely chooses whether to go to state Y or Z. Now your objection says that the agent has to be in state Y (or Z) before being able to transition from state X to state Y (or Z). But that doesn't follow. Rather, the agent, while in state X can be contemplating the idea of state Y (or Z) without yet being in state Y (or Z). Likewise the agent in state X can be contemplating the idea of being in or transitioning to state Y without having yet made the transition. The contemplation of the idea of these things is not the reality. So it does not at all follow that the agent must transition before deciding which transition to make. It is not the case that the agent must be in state Y before freely deciding whether to transition to Y (rather than to Z). The agent needs only be in state X to make the choice.

None of this makes any sense as far as showing LFW. First, you basically just assumed LFW - and that is the very thing that is incoherent. Second, how did the agent freely choose to contemplate the idea of Y vs Z, or Y and Z? Logically demonstrate that this is a freely willed act. State X seems to be the contemplation of state Y or Z, but how did the agent get into that state? You need to show this is a LFW decision. Absolutely nowhere is any state here LFW. Forth, my objection doesn't rest on the agent having to be in state Y before being able to transition from state X to state Y (or Z). My objection is that the agent cannot choose what to even contemplate next, because it is either caused or uncaused. If it is caused, then it isn't free. If it is uncaused, it would literally just appear in consciousness, and the agent could not have any control over it, not state X, state Y or state Z.

So this apparent paradox vanishes.

Not at all. You just asserted that you can contemplate an idea without a contradiction.

I see, so what you are arguing here (pushed back a step, as you say, to the first thing) is that if the agent is uncaused (when the agent LFW controls and causes the agent's action), then the agent cannot control the agent. What does that even mean? In what sense does the agent not control the agent when the agent does control the agent's actions (including perhaps mental actions like contemplating an idea)? Surely the only meaningful sense in which the agent controls the agent is in controlling the agent's actions. That is: all changes that result from the LFW choice (external and/or internal to the agent) are caused and controlled by the agent. All the changes are caused: by the agent. What else is there to control?

What does it mean? It means the agent cannot control it's will, desires, nor its actions. It cannot control anything.

You are saying here that if the agent controls the agents actions AND does not control the agent (whatever that means), then the agent does not control the agent's actions.
You are just making a contradiction. You aren't making any sense.
So the question still stands. If all the changes are caused/controlled by the agent, then none of the changes are uncaused. None of the changes is uncaused or uncontrolled by the agent. So how can you claim there is something yet uncontrolled by the agent? There isn't anything. Thus this supposed paradox of yours vanishes too.

This is why I wanted you to outline a chronological order of events when you think a free will decision is made. You say the agent causes the change or thoughts or actions and that this somehow rescues LFW. It doesn't in any way. First, if the agent itself is uncaused, then the agent cannot control the agent, and the agent has no control as to what its next state will be. Second, if the action that results is caused by the state that the agent is in prior to the action being commenced, and the state the agent is in isn't free, there is no room for LFW here. It would be exactly like if I had a probe in your brain that I could control, and I made you desire X, and that desire for X caused you to get X. At no point does free will exist in this scenario. You would not have gotten X without me controlling your desire with the probe. And if you claim that you could have overridden this desire for X, and chosen not to get it, that mental state would have appeared into your consciousness in exactly the same manner as the desire for X that I controlled would have from your subjective experience. Therefore you cannot say it is freely willed, because you cannot tell me how you were able to have control over this desire from your subjective experience that's different from the desire I caused. From your subjective experience a desire just appears in your consciousness and you automatically claim ownership of it simply because it appeared in your consciousness.

This does not demonstrate LFW.

Furthermore, you need to logically demonstrate that the agent controls the changes in an LFW manner. Being the cause of something does not logically entail LFW. I can be the cause of something that I was determined to cause. You just made a giant question begging assumption in claiming the agent "controls" its actions.

This much is true of both the deterministic agent (autonomous robot) and the LFW agent. In both cases all the changes are caused by the agent. The difference between them, of course, is that the LFW agent could have done otherwise than he did.

The possibility of being able to do otherwise does not rescue LFW. Indeterminism is just as incompatible to LFW as determinism is, because the agent is not in control of the indeterminism. For the agent to cause X would show that X isn't indetermined, it would be determined by the agent. And if the agent's prior state that resulted in it causing X is indetermined, then you've basically got the randomness problem and you're stuck on that horn of the dilemma. Nothing about this logically demonstrates that the agent was in control of its state that caused the action, or the action.

The bolded part is an assumption of determinism. Is that what your argument has really been all along? You assume determinism to prove determinism?

Absolutely not. I have not assumed determinism, or even materialism at all on this thread. Something must cause the agent's actions. On dualism, the agent's mind/soul/whatever does. That is to say its thoughts do. The agent desires X, and then it acts on X. But my argument doesn't even rely on this. It is flexible and can adapt to any chronology you throw at it.

Now the prior mental state might limit what options are available to the agent. E.g. in the state-machine model above, the fact of being in state X from which only states Y and Z are possible, limits the options to Y and Z. But that doesn't mean that the mere fact of being in state X is sufficient to determine/cause which state (Y or Z) will be next.

How can the prior mental state limit the latter mental state if the latter mental state is completely uncaused? What forces constrain it and why does this happen? How could it happen to something uncaused?

The quote was "all changes that result from the LFW choice (external and/or internal to the agent)..."
The intended antecedent to the parenthetical was "changes", not "choice". It would have been more clear had I placed it closer to the antecedent:
"all changes (external and/or internal to the agent) that result from the LFW choice..."
I'm sorry for any confusion that caused.

The problem I have is with the "external and/or internal to the agent" part. Give me examples of each.

Basically, I'm just asking you to explain one scenario where an agent makes a LFW decision such that you can logically demonstrate in a non-question begging manner that the agent is in control of its will.

[The Thinker]

It seems that Seer was talking about determinism, not what you are calling fatalism. I'm not seeing why you think Seer is talking about "fatalism".
But besides, in determinism, whether it makes sense or not to be proactive, you have no control over whether you will be proactive.

Also in your comparison chart, it says that determinism does not lead to defeatism. But it could in another way. Someone could acknowledge that their actions have an effect, but still be led to defeatism by the thought that they cannot control their actions. Also, even if someone were erroneously led to defeatism by the idea of determinism, the person would (by the hypothesis of determinism) be deterministically, inexorably caused to be led to defeatism by the idea of determinism. Moreover under determinism, if anyone ever has a defeatist attitude, for whatever reason, it is determinism that inexorably caused them to have a defeatist attitude.

No seer was talking about fatalism, and I had to correct him.

Also, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines "fatalism" differently than you do: "philosophers usually use the word to refer to the view that we are powerless to do anything other than what we actually do." http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/

Why are you intentionally misinterpreting what Seer said? He obviously meant all events that happen.

It wasn't obvious. And fatalism includes ideas of what will happen in the future, whereas on determinism you don't know the future. Fatalism includes the idea that nothing you do can change an outcome. Determinism is the opposite, what you do has effects that can effect outcomes.

If your reply to Seer here is an answer to his question, then you are saying, no, humans do not control what they think, do, or say. It is the inexorable result of "the known laws of science that determines our actions." So you are saying that Seer is correct, that in determinism, "all events are inevitable and we have no control over what we think, do or say."
The only distinction that Thinker made between "fatalism" and "determinism" is that the latter is defined as saying that our actions have consequences, and the former doesn't. But seer wasn't denying that our actions have consequences. He was pointing out that in the definition of both, our actions are fully determined from prior physical states.

That distinction I made is a huge difference. It's the difference between something thinking "Why should I do anything? It's all gonna happen anyway," and "Nothing will happen unless it is caused, and therefore if I want things to happen, I have to cause them."

[seer]

It wasn't obvious. And fatalism includes ideas of what will happen in the future, whereas on determinism you don't know the future. Fatalism includes the idea that nothing you do can change an outcome. Determinism is the opposite, what you do has effects that can effect outcomes.

the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines "fatalism" differently than you do: "philosophers usually use the word to refer to the view that we are powerless to do anything other than what we actually do.

So Thinker, do we have the power to do other than what we actually do?

[Joel]

Let me take a different approach to refuting [B]. As you've explained before, when you say "thought" you mean mental state. So let's try picturing the agent like a state machine. Let X be the agent's current state. Suppose that there are two possible state transitions from state X: one to state Y and one to state Z. Now if this is a deterministic state machine, then the next state (Y or Z) will be completely determined by the current state and external inputs/causes. But if the state machine is non-deterministic, then Y and Z are both possible.

And we could imagine the not-deterministic state machine agent has LFW in the matter. In state X, then, the agent freely chooses whether to go to state Y or Z. Now your objection says that the agent has to be in state Y (or Z) before being able to transition from state X to state Y (or Z). But that doesn't follow. Rather, the agent, while in state X can be contemplating the idea of state Y (or Z) without yet being in state Y (or Z). Likewise the agent in state X can be contemplating the idea of being in or transitioning to state Y without having yet made the transition. The contemplation of the idea of these things is not the reality. So it does not at all follow that the agent must transition before deciding which transition to make. It is not the case that the agent must be in state Y before freely deciding whether to transition to Y (rather than to Z). The agent needs only be in state X to make the choice.

None of this makes any sense as far as showing LFW. First, you basically just assumed LFW - and that is the very thing that is incoherent. Second, how did the agent freely choose to contemplate the idea of Y vs Z, or Y and Z? Logically demonstrate that this is a freely willed act. State X seems to be the contemplation of state Y or Z, but how did the agent get into that state? You need to show this is a LFW decision. Absolutely nowhere is any state here LFW. ...Not at all. You just asserted that you can contemplate an idea without a contradiction.

All of this part of your reply is irrelevant. You said it was okay if I just made a negative argument. So I am here arguing against your think-before-you-think paradox. So your complaint (repeated throughout your post) that I'm not making a positive argument is irrelevant. Your only valid reply here is to show why your think-before-you-think paradox creates a contradiction even in the scenario I described. (That is, you need to state the X for which the scenario implies both X and NOT-X.)
My scenario here shows a way in which we can conceive LFW without your paradox. And how the agent got into state X is irrelevant. The only relevant state transition is the transition from X. And LFW is not a state.

Forth, my objection doesn't rest on the agent having to be in state Y before being able to transition from state X to state Y (or Z).

Yes, it does, as you have stated it. You defined "thought" as "mental state" and not as "idea". So the "thoughts" here are states X, Y, and Z. Your argument in your OP is, "You can't choose what your next [state] will be. In order to do that, you'd have to [be in that state], before you [are in that state]." (I've replaced "thought"s here with "states", to make it clear.)
Which is silly when we picture it as a state machine as I've done here.

...My objection is that the agent cannot choose what to even contemplate next, because it is either caused or uncaused. If it is caused, then it isn't free. If it is uncaused, it would literally just appear in consciousness, and the agent could not have any control over it, not state X, state Y or state Z.

Nope, that's your other objection. Here we were talking only about your think-before-you-think objection. This other objection was addressed in the latter part of my post.

To summarize. In my previous post I refuted your think-before-you-think objection, and you here have not said anything to rebut my refutation.
Now on to the other ("uncontrolled") objection:

You are saying here that if the agent controls the agents actions AND does not control the agent (whatever that means), then the agent does not control the agent's actions.
You are just making a contradiction. You aren't making any sense.
So the question still stands. If all the changes are caused/controlled by the agent, then none of the changes are uncaused. None of the changes is uncaused or uncontrolled by the agent. So how can you claim there is something yet uncontrolled by the agent? There isn't anything. Thus this supposed paradox of yours vanishes too.

This is why I wanted you to outline a chronological order of events when you think a free will decision is made. You say the agent causes the change or thoughts or actions and that this somehow rescues LFW. It doesn't in any way. First, if the agent itself is uncaused, then the agent cannot control the agent,

You are repeating that same nonsense. What I asked was for you to explain how that is not nonsense, if you can. Surely "control" can only mean controlling a change. But all the changes are caused/controlled by the agent. So there's no change left uncontrolled. So it seems absurd for you to claim that there is something remaining not controlled by the agent. Again, if you think your absurdity is meaningful, explain it. Because you have not yet done so, my refutation of this other objection of yours still stands.

Now your two objections still stand refuted, I will make responses to remaining miscellaneous things:

Second, if the action that results is caused by the state that the agent is in prior to the action being commenced, and the state the agent is in isn't free,

That would be a deterministic state machine, and thus not what I'm talking about.

How can the prior mental state limit the latter mental state if the latter mental state is completely uncaused?

Human abilities (including LFW if humans have it) are limited. A LFW human would not be able to choose to fly like superman. The agent cannot cause an action that the agent is not capable of causing. Being uncaused in ones choice of next state (Y or Z), among those next states that the agent is capable of transitioning to, does not imply omnipotence. I don't know why you think it would.

The problem I have is with the "external and/or internal to the agent" part. Give me examples of each.

Really? You contemplating an idea is internal. Kicking a ball is external (the the ball is external to the agent).

[The Thinker]

the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines "fatalism" differently than you do: "philosophers usually use the word to refer to the view that we are powerless to do anything other than what we actually do.

So Thinker, do we have the power to do other than what we actually do?

No of course not, but once again the distinction is that fatalism is the idea that nothing we do has impact and that certain things are inevitable no matter what we do. Determinism is not that. On determinism, things don't just happen, they need to be caused and our actions are what causes them. That an online resource may define something different than me is irrelevant. I'm sure I can point to some key words of your worldview and find definitions you don't agree with.

[Joel]

illusion of being LFW decisions, but in actuality they would be determined. It couldn't be otherwise unless you posit that LBW overrides physical law.

If it was "classified as physical law", it wouldn't be LFW, because it would function without the essential antecedent causal nature of physical law.

In quantum mechanics we have probabilistic events for which we do not know their antecedent physical causes. And some interpretations of quantum mechanics holds that no antecedent physical cause exists. So this is a case of something for which the cause (if any) is utterly unknown to us. And yet we still include the description of this phenomena as physical law.

I already addressed that. And it still stands that turtles all the way down would be insufficient to support anything.

That is not the difference we are talking about. We are talking about the difference between 'first cause' and infinite regress. In the former, no infinite regress is necessary. And in the latter, there is no "until you get to". Your multiverse is an infinite regress, which has the same inadequacy as any infinite regress.

In one sense this is true, because given totally identical circumstances one will get identical results every time we make a decision. But, in practical terms given slightly different circumstances, no matter how minuscule, you will get different results. So, whilst events are inevitable, in the human time-frame they don't seem to be and our decisions matter. If we didn't make them the outcomes may be different.

But you've already said that that "the don't seem to be" is just an illusion.
And in determinism, there is no "different circumstances". There are only the circumstances that actually occur. And all of those are exactly determined ultimately by ancient conditions, long before we existed.

without causes.

That's not true. In the case of a 'first cause', that which happens does have a cause: the 'first causer'. Likewise if LFW agents are in some respect first causers, then the thing they LFW cause to happen has a cause: the agent. (And in that sense, the agent isn't something that "happens".)

No seer was talking about fatalism, and I had to correct him.

He really wasn't. He was talking about not being able to control your actions, which is true of determinism. He was not talking about your actions having no consequences.

It wasn't obvious.

Come on, he was quoting a dictionary definition, "Fa"tal*ism (?), n. [Cf. F. fatalisme.] The doctrine that all things...take place by inevitable necessity."
You really think the dictionary definition isn't obviously referring to things that actually occur?

And fatalism includes ideas of what will happen in the future, whereas on determinism you don't know the future.

In determinism, someone who knew all the relevant antecedent facts would know the future.

That distinction I made is a huge difference. It's the difference between something thinking "Why should I do anything? It's all gonna happen anyway," and "Nothing will happen unless it is caused, and therefore if I want things to happen, I have to cause them."

Sure. But in the latter case (determinism) you have no control over whether you will cause them or not. That is determined by a deterministic causal web going back to before you were born.

[seer]

That an online resource may define something different than me is irrelevant. I'm sure I can point to some key words of your worldview and find definitions you don't agree with.

Right a philosophy site disagrees with you, or more correctly, has a more broad view of what fatalism entails. Why is their definition (and the others I linked earlier) not acceptable? Because they don't agree with you?

[Joel]

Right a philosophy site disagrees with you, or more correctly, has a more broad view of what fatalism entails. Why is their definition (and the others I linked earlier) not acceptable? Because they don't agree with you?

Arguing definitions doesn't matter. If Thinker wants to make the distinction he is making, then it can be a distinction regardless of what labels we use to refer to them. What Thinker thinks is important is the distinction itself, not the labels.
Though why he thinks you were referring to what he calls "fatalism" is a mystery to me. It seemed you were only referring to what he calls "determinism", and not to what he calls "fatalism".

[The Thinker]

All of this part of your reply is irrelevant. You said it was okay if I just made a negative argument. So I am here arguing against your think-before-you-think paradox. So your complaint (repeated throughout your post) that I'm not making a positive argument is irrelevant. Your only valid reply here is to show why your think-before-you-think paradox creates a contradiction even in the scenario I described. (That is, you need to state the X for which the scenario implies both X and NOT-X.)
My scenario here shows a way in which we can conceive LFW without your paradox. And how the agent got into state X is irrelevant. The only relevant state transition is the transition from X. And LFW is not a state.

It definitely is relevant, because then you'd basically be saying we don't have control over what thoughts appear in our consciousness. I need you to show me this in order to show my (1). Are you basically giving up that we have control over our will?

As far as a positive vs negative argument, you didn't show that the contradiction is void, and you might need to provide a positive argument to show it. Your scenario here did not conceive in any way a way out of the paradox. You're delusional. Once again, you just keep asserting that the agent makes a LFW decision at a certain point. Do you not see this?

Yes, it does, as you have stated it. You defined "thought" as "mental state" and not as "idea". So the "thoughts" here are states X, Y, and Z. Your argument in your OP is, "You can't choose what your next [state] will be. In order to do that, you'd have to [be in that state], before you [are in that state]." (I've replaced "thought"s here with "states", to make it clear.)
Which is silly when we picture it as a state machine as I've done here.

It doesn't matter whether you define thought as a mental state or idea. In neither case can you choose your next mental state or idea. So this point is mute. Let's say state X is thinking about a stealing a watch. State Y is "I'm going to steal it." And state Z is "I'm not going to steal it." Let's ignore how you even got to state X since you do not care whether we always have free will over our thoughts. So someone is in state X. They had no free will control over why their consciousness in state X - it just appeared in their consciousness beyond their control. So they are thinking about stealing a watch. They have not yet concluded that they will steal it (which is state Y) or that they won't (state Z).

So how does the agent "freely" choose between Y or Z? He contemplated Y and Z. When he did, he entertained the consequences of both, let's say. When he was doing this, how did he freely choose what he thought when he was contemplating Y and Z? How could he have chosen what thoughts to think instead of them just appearing in consciousness? You can't say that he freely chose to contemplate Y and Z because that would mean he freely chose to be in state X, and you've been saying all along that it doesn't matter if he freely choose state X. You see, this is why it is important to establish state X as being free, because otherwise you're starting out non-free and then claiming that somehow free will just appears.

Nope, that's your other objection. Here we were talking only about your think-before-you-think objection. This other objection was addressed in the latter part of my post.

To summarize. In my previous post I refuted your think-before-you-think objection, and you here have not said anything to rebut my refutation.

What? Quote the alleged refutation of the think-before-you-think problem. I don't see it anywhere.

Now on to the other ("uncontrolled") objection:


You are repeating that same nonsense. What I asked was for you to explain how that is not nonsense, if you can. Surely "control" can only mean controlling a change. But all the changes are caused/controlled by the agent. So there's no change left uncontrolled. So it seems absurd for you to claim that there is something remaining not controlled by the agent. Again, if you think your absurdity is meaningful, explain it. Because you have not yet done so, my refutation of this other objection of yours still stands.

Not a single one of your objections stand because LFW requires a contradiction. It requires saying we have control over our will, and yet our will would have to be uncaused. If it's uncaused, we couldn't have control over it. And again, caused and controlled are not the same thing. A determined person can cause an event, but that doesn't mean they had control over it in the libertarian sense. Think about what you're asking me to take seriously:

1. An uncaused agent somehow gets to state X - and they had no control over it. (This is the agent not being able to control the agent - which you already admit)
2. The agent in state X concludes to state Y "freely" (but this is not logically explained at all by you - but merely asserted)
3. The agent "freely" makes state Y actionable by physically stealing the watch. (but again, this is not logically explained at all by you - but merely asserted. You haven't even explained what causes the action. You say it's the agent, but what part? Is it a thought that forced the action? The mind? The soul? What?)

Your explanation that the uncaused agent causes an action is incoherent. There are so many problems logical with it. If the agent is originally uncaused, why isn't whatever decision it made to make an action uncaused too? Why are some states the agent has caused and others uncaused? Are you saying that uncaused states just appear to the agent? Does the agent have any control over what's caused and uncaused?

Now your two objections still stand refuted, I will make responses to remaining miscellaneous things:

Nope. You must be seriously delusional Joel.

That would be a deterministic state machine, and thus not what I'm talking about.

This is not requiring determinism but merely that the action has a cause - which you told me is the case. If the action is caused because of the state that the agent was in prior to the action, and the agent had no control over that state, then the action isn't at all free. You need to explain where the freedom comes in.

Human abilities (including LFW if humans have it) are limited. A LFW human would not be able to choose to fly like superman. The agent cannot cause an action that the agent is not capable of causing. Being uncaused in ones choice of next state (Y or Z), among those next states that the agent is capable of transitioning to, does not imply omnipotence. I don't know why you think it would.

But this only holds true if they have physical causes that are limited by the laws of physics. If they are truly uncaused, there should be no logical reason why there are any limitations whatsoever except logical limitations. And the whole idea of having a dualistic soul (just for example) is that the soul can break free from physical law and essentially violate it -- otherwise how does the soul overcome the physical determination of the body by natural physical laws?

[The Thinker]

Right a philosophy site disagrees with you, or more correctly, has a more broad view of what fatalism entails. Why is their definition (and the others I linked earlier) not acceptable? Because they don't agree with you?

As Joel said below, labels and definitions don't matter. In case you don't know (which you don't) in philosophy definitions are argued over all the time. Words do not have intrinsic meanings. They mean whatever we want them to mean. Christians for example disagree on what many things mean. Take "faith" for example. Christians disagree over what that means, and there are theological websites that I'm sure contain definitions you don't agree with. So what? What matters is the distinction I gave you, and whether or not you understand it. And it seems that you don't. No surprise: Seer doesn't understand something.

Even Wiki mentions the distinction:

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatalism

Determinists generally agree that human actions affect the future but that human action is itself determined by a causal chain of prior events. Their view does not accentuate a "submission" to fate or destiny, whereas fatalists stress an acceptance of future events as inevitable. Determinists believe the future is fixed specifically due to causality; fatalists and predeterminists believe that some or all aspects of the future are inescapable, but, for fatalists, not necessarily due to causality.

© Copyright Original Source

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatalism

[...]

1. An attitude of resignation in the face of some future event or events which are thought to be inevitable.
2. That acceptance is appropriate, rather than resistance against inevitability. This belief is very similar to defeatism.

© Copyright Original Source

[Joel]

It doesn't matter whether you define thought as a mental state or idea. In neither case can you choose your next mental state or idea. So this point is mute. Let's say state X is thinking about a stealing a watch. State Y is "I'm going to steal it." And state Z is "I'm not going to steal it." Let's ignore how you even got to state X since you do not care whether we always have free will over our thoughts. So someone is in state X. They had no free will control over why their consciousness in state X - it just appeared in their consciousness beyond their control. So they are thinking about stealing a watch. They have not yet concluded that they will steal it (which is state Y) or that they won't (state Z).

So how does the agent "freely" choose between Y or Z? He contemplated Y and Z. When he did, he entertained the consequences of both, let's say. When he was doing this, how did he freely choose what he thought when he was contemplating Y and Z? How could he have chosen what thoughts to think instead of them just appearing in consciousness? You can't say that he freely chose to contemplate Y and Z because that would mean he freely chose to be in state X, and you've been saying all along that it doesn't matter if he freely choose state X. You see, this is why it is important to establish state X as being free, because otherwise you're starting out non-free and then claiming that somehow free will just appears.

What? Quote the alleged refutation of the think-before-you-think problem. I don't see it anywhere.

If it "doesn't matter whether you define thought as a mental state or idea", then let's stick with your mental state definition for now, for consistency.
You stipulated that we are ignoring how they got to state X, so we are ignoring whether the agent freely chose X (and contemplated Y and Z). That's irrelevant. All that matters is whether the agent controls which state to transition to. There is nothing contradictory with starting at state X involuntarily/deterministically and then non-deterministically choosing the next state transition. There is no reason to think that all state transitions must be non-deterministic or all deterministic.

At any rate, you haven't here explained how your think-before-you-think paradox creates a contradiction in this state-machine scenario. Thus this scenario still stands as a refutation of that paradox.
Your complaint that "You can't choose what your next [state] will be. In order to do that, you'd have to [be in that state], before you [are in that state]." Is silly. There is no need to be in state Y prior to being in state Y.
This refutation of your paradox was first in post 315 from the beginning through "So this apparent paradox vanishes."

Now to your second objection:

You are repeating that same nonsense. What I asked was for you to explain how that is not nonsense, if you can. Surely "control" can only mean controlling a change. But all the changes are caused/controlled by the agent. So there's no change left uncontrolled. So it seems absurd for you to claim that there is something remaining not controlled by the agent. Again, if you think your absurdity is meaningful, explain it. Because you have not yet done so, my refutation of this other objection of yours still stands.

Not a single one of your objections stand because LFW requires a contradiction. It requires saying we have control over our will, and yet our will would have to be uncaused. If it's uncaused, we couldn't have control over it. And again, caused and controlled are not the same thing. A determined person can cause an event, but that doesn't mean they had control over it in the libertarian sense. Think about what you're asking me to take seriously:

1. An uncaused agent somehow gets to state X - and they had no control over it. (This is the agent not being able to control the agent - which you already admit)
2. The agent in state X concludes to state Y "freely" (but this is not logically explained at all by you - but merely asserted)
3. The agent "freely" makes state Y actionable by physically stealing the watch. (but again, this is not logically explained at all by you - but merely asserted. You haven't even explained what causes the action. You say it's the agent, but what part? Is it a thought that forced the action? The mind? The soul? What?)

Your explanation that the uncaused agent causes an action is incoherent. There are so many problems logical with it. If the agent is originally uncaused, why isn't whatever decision it made to make an action uncaused too? Why are some states the agent has caused and others uncaused? Are you saying that uncaused states just appear to the agent? Does the agent have any control over what's caused and uncaused?

Nope. You must be seriously delusional Joel.

None of this is a rebuttal to my refutation. If all changes are caused and controlled by the agent, then none of the changes is uncontrolled by the agent. So it is absurd for you to claim that there is something remaining not controlled by the agent. The refutation stands, because you have not rebutted it.

The rest of this post is miscellaneous comments and answers to questions:

Mostly you are here complaining that I'm making a negative argument (against this second objection of yours) instead of making a positive argument.

As for your questions:
What part of the agent is the causer? By definition it's the part that causes the changes that occur. I don't care what label we use to call it.

"If the agent is originally uncaused, why isn't whatever decision it made to make an action uncaused too?"
I don't know what you are asking. The changes are all caused and controlled by the agent. The agent was not caused to do so. The "decision" is not something separate from or in addition to that.

You seem confused about some things being chosen by the agent and other things not. Now I understand that you think LFW is an illusion, but within that illusion, it seems to humans that some things in their mind happen under their control and that other things don't. This is the normal human experience. You should be familiar with it, if you are human.

If the action is caused because of the state that the agent was in prior to the action, and the agent had no control over that state, then the action isn't at all free. You need to explain where the freedom comes in.

That is a description of a deterministic state machine (state transitions are determined by current state and external input), and thus not what I'm talking about. Freedom would "come in" by being a non-deterministic state machine (state transitions are not fully determined by current state and external input).

Human abilities (including LFW if humans have it) are limited. A LFW human would not be able to choose to fly like superman. The agent cannot cause an action that the agent is not capable of causing. Being uncaused in ones choice of next state (Y or Z), among those next states that the agent is capable of transitioning to, does not imply omnipotence. I don't know why you think it would.

But this only holds true if they have physical causes that are limited by the laws of physics. If they are truly uncaused, there should be no logical reason why there are any limitations whatsoever except logical limitations. And the whole idea of having a dualistic soul (just for example) is that the soul can break free from physical law and essentially violate it -- otherwise how does the soul overcome the physical determination of the body by natural physical laws?

I see no reason to think freedom cannot be limited.
And I have denied that LFW is a violation or overriding or overcoming of physical law. If LFW exists, it is part of the whole interconnected web of causation. If LFW exists, its causation/force on objects is one force among many competing forces. (E.g. a LFW agent may be pushing on a piece of steel that is being pulled in a different direction by a magnet. The two forces sum. Neither is a violation of physics.)