I've been thinking of non-theistic moral realism (NMN) for a while and I was wondering what everyone thought of it.
NMN: There are objective moral values and duties. The values supervene on intrinsically valuable non-normative properties, and the intrinsically valuable non-normative properties make or cause normative objective values to be. The intrinsically valuable non-normative properties also serve as reasons for action, which serve as the action-guiding principles grounding duties. The duties are objective because the reasons are objective; and the reasons are objective because the intrinsically valuable non-normative properties are objective.
NMN admits the existence of brute moral facts and grounds it in the primitive "making-relation" subsisting between the non-normative properties and the normative properties of the values upon which they supervene. The theist is wont to ask about the metaphysical grounding of the non-normative properties themselves. But the non-theist protests that this explanation-expectation is unnecessary because the brute fact of the "making-relation" is sufficient for the grounding. Any objection, they say, lodged against its being a brute fact could equally apply to God's nature/commands.
This is a heavily summarized view from a philosopher from DePauw University called Erik Wielenberg.
NMN: There are objective moral values and duties. The values supervene on intrinsically valuable non-normative properties, and the intrinsically valuable non-normative properties make or cause normative objective values to be. The intrinsically valuable non-normative properties also serve as reasons for action, which serve as the action-guiding principles grounding duties. The duties are objective because the reasons are objective; and the reasons are objective because the intrinsically valuable non-normative properties are objective.
NMN admits the existence of brute moral facts and grounds it in the primitive "making-relation" subsisting between the non-normative properties and the normative properties of the values upon which they supervene. The theist is wont to ask about the metaphysical grounding of the non-normative properties themselves. But the non-theist protests that this explanation-expectation is unnecessary because the brute fact of the "making-relation" is sufficient for the grounding. Any objection, they say, lodged against its being a brute fact could equally apply to God's nature/commands.
This is a heavily summarized view from a philosopher from DePauw University called Erik Wielenberg.
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