Is Creation ex nihilo

[shunyadragon]

I think my reason's better

That is understandable since you are an atheist, Both work.

[arnoldo]

The Quantum zero-point cosmos is not capable of change in and of itself. The universes arise from it by God's Creation, not by the nature of the Quantum zero-point cosmos which does not change its nature.

Mortimer J Adler stated the following,

We may or may no think of the cosmos of having aseity, wherease we must think of God as having aseity.

Does the Quantum zero-point cosmos have aseity?

[shunyadragon]

Mortimer J Adler stated the following,

Does the Quantum zero-point cosmos have aseity?

In the Theist view no, in the Ontological Naturalist (atheist/strong agnostic) yes. In the Theist view Natural Law is underlain by Divine Law. In the Ontological Naturalist view Natural Law is aseitic.

[JimL]

The Baha'i Faith.

Circular! You have faith because you have faith.

[shunyadragon]

Circular! You have faith because you have faith.

No, this has been discussed before without resolution.

[One Bad Pig]

He's a middle-Platonist like most of the early church fathers. Some would consider that to be similar to later idealists, or that idealists grew out of the Platonist tradition, but I think that is rather anachronistic.

I don't think it is generally accurate to call early church fathers middle-Platonists; rather, those who were philosophically trained thought that middle Platonism was the closest available comparison to Christian beliefs, and so tended to use its language to make theological arguments.

From my vacation "light reading":

Source: N. T. Wright (quoting Richard Bauckham)

'It was actually not Jewish but Greek philosophical categories which made it difficult to attribute true and full divinity to Jesus.' The Nicene and other creeds were thus a way, not of capitulating to Greek philosophy, but of resisting it, and reasserting, as best they could in the language available to them, the christological monotheism of the New Testament.

© Copyright Original Source

Paul and the Faithfulness of God p. 652, fn 124

[robrecht]

I don't think it is generally accurate to call early church fathers middle-Platonists; rather, those who were philosophically trained thought that middle Platonism was the closest available comparison to Christian beliefs, and so tended to use its language to make theological arguments.

From my vacation "light reading":

Source: N. T. Wright (quoting Richard Bauckham)

'It was actually not Jewish but Greek philosophical categories which made it difficult to attribute true and full divinity to Jesus.' The Nicene and other creeds were thus a way, not of capitulating to Greek philosophy, but of resisting it, and reasserting, as best they could in the language available to them, the christological monotheism of the New Testament.

© Copyright Original Source

Paul and the Faithfulness of God p. 652, fn 124

That's a good point. There was some variety within middle Platonism. I think it's fair to call them neo-Platonists or Christian neo-Platonists, just as Thomas is considered a Christian Aristotelian.

[psstein]

My turn to be anal here.
You should have said "ontological naturalist". Most scholarly theists (not I, however) are Methodological Naturalists.

Depends how you define "methodological naturalism," which I've actually had to change my thinking about. I think in history, there's no a priori reason to rule out some sort of divine action, provided that the evidence warrants such a claim. I would not interpret Joan of Arc's visions in such a way, largely because there are good reasons to believe they were merely psychological.

[shunyadragon]

Depends how you define "methodological naturalism," which I've actually had to change my thinking about. I think in history, there's no a priori reason to rule out some sort of divine action, provided that the evidence warrants such a claim. I would not interpret Joan of Arc's visions in such a way, largely because there are good reasons to believe they were merely psychological.

I corrected this and it was an error. I intended 'Ontological Naturalism.' There is no reason to rule out Divine action in any case, even those where there may be an obvious Natural explanation. I believe that God primarily uses natural processes for Divine actions.

[Adrift]

Question: Does scripture determine that creation ex nihilo the only option?

If you're referring to Christian scripture, it would appear that it heavily suggests it. So, for instance, Genesis 1:1 reads, In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The phrase "heavens and the earth" is, according to Old Testament scholars (Matthews, Waltke, Sailhammer, Walton, etc) a merism (a type of figure of speech), that points to two extremes "heaven" and "earth", and refers to the entirety or the totality of the universe. John 1:1-3 also points towards a view of creatio ex nihilo as does Hebrew 11:3.

Before the New Testament, there seemed to be divergent Jewish views on the issue, so in 2 Maccabees 7:28 we read, I beg you, child, to look at the heavens and the earth and see all that is in them; then you will know that God did not make them out of existing things.*, on the other hand you have Wisdom 11:17 For not without means was your almighty hand, that had fashioned the universe from formless matter.

[shunyadragon]

If you're referring to Christian scripture, it would appear that it heavily suggests it. So, for instance, Genesis 1:1 reads, In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The phrase "heavens and the earth" is, according to Old Testament scholars (Matthews, Waltke, Sailhammer, Walton, etc) a merism (a type of figure of speech), that points to two extremes "heaven" and "earth", and refers to the entirety or the totality of the universe. John 1:1-3 also points towards a view of creatio ex nihilo as does Hebrew 11:3.

I can see the possibility that "heaven and earth" could possibly refer to the Creation of our universe only and not all of existence. It is most likely that the original authors who wrote this may not comprehend the difference.

Before the New Testament, there seemed to be divergent Jewish views on the issue, so in 2 Maccabees 7:28 we read, I beg you, child, to look at the heavens and the earth and see all that is in them; then you will know that God did not make them out of existing things.*, on the other hand you have Wisdom 11:17 For not without means was your almighty hand, that had fashioned the universe from formless matter.

The view that our universe was Created from an infinite Quantum zero-point cosmos would compatible with Creation from 'formless matter' and the concept that it was not made (Created) from 'existing things.' I realize that these citations may have different interpretations, but also understand that the original authors may not comprehend the difference between Creation ex nihilo and Creation from an existing infinite Quantum zero-point cosmos.

[Jichard]

It's been awhile since I've read Mortimer J Adler's cosmolgoical arguments but this sums it up pretty nicely.




I've been meaning to re-read Adler due to another thread dealing with issues of morality/ethics and now with this thread concerning the cosmological argument.

Adler's argument is fallacious, or at least the linked argument above is fallacious. His argument commits mistakes common to make cosmological and ontological arguments. For example, Adler's arguments equivocates on the term contingent. To see why, note that the term "contingent" can be used in at least two, non-equivalent senses, as follows:

• Causal contingency:
  This sense of contingency denotes a cause, usually a cause that is required for a certain effect. For example, when someone says your getting this job is contingent upon you filling out the job application, this means that filling out the job application will be part of the cause of you getting the job, and without this job application as apart of the cause, the required effect (getting the job) will not occur. People often employ causal contingency by using the phtrase "contingent upon", as in the job example I gave above.
• Modal contingency:
  This sense of contingency just means "possible and non-necessary". Modal contingency comes in a number of forms, depending on the sort of modality one is talking about (ex: logical, broadly logical / metaphysical, physical). For example, the statement Apples exist or it is not the case that apples exist is a logically necessary statement, since it is entailed by standard propositional logic (in this case, the statement is an instance of "P or ~P"). The statement Apples exist is logically possible, since the statement does not contradict any standard logical formalism. The statement is also not logically necessary, since the statement is not entailed by any standard logical formalism. That means the statement Apples exist is logically possible and logically non-necessary, and thus the same statement logically contingent.

Causal contingency is a non-modal form of contingency, so it would be a mistake to confuse modal contingency with causal contingency. But Adler makes this mistake. There's a discussion of causal contingecy in the following quote:

"3. The existence of the cosmos as a whole is radically contingent (meaning that it needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence to preserve it in being, and prevent it from being annihilated, or reduced to nothing)"

Yet in the following defense of 3, there is switch to discussing modal contingency:

"The reason we can conceive the cosmos as being radically rather than superficially contingent is due to the fact that the cosmos which now exists is only one of many possible universes that might have in fact existed in the past, and might still exist in the future. This is not to say that any cosmos other than this one ever did exist in the past, or ever will exist in the future. It is not necessary to go that far in order to say that other universes might have existed in the past and might exist in the future. If other universes are possible, than this one also is merely possible, not necessary"

That's fallacious reasoning. Pointing out that it's modally possible for the universe to be some other way, does nothing to show that the universe is causally contingent. For example, pointing out that the non-existence of the universe is compatible with any standard logical formalism, and is not entailed by any standard logical formalism (that is: the universe's existence is logically contingent) says absolutely nothing about whether the universe has a cause of its existence, and thus it says absolutely nothing about whether or not the universe is causally contingent.


There are a number of other problems. I'll discuss a few. First, God's existence is not logically necessary, nor metaphysically necessary, nor physically necessary. So by Adler's own logic, that would mean that God's existence is either impossible or that God's existence requires a cause. Second, Adler runs into problems if he thinks God has libertarian free will. On standard accounts of libertarian free will:

For an agent A to have libertarian free will with respect to action Y in situation S, then it must be metaphysically possible for A to do Y in S and it must be metaphysically possible for A to do not-Y in S

So if God has libertarian free will, then what God does is not metaphysically necessary; that is: it's possible for God to act differently than God actually acts. Which, according to Adler's reeasoning, would mean that God's existence requires a cause.

Third, Also, the statement here fails:

"4. If the cosmos needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence, then that cause must be a supernatural being, supernatural in its action, and one the existence of which is uncaused, in other words, the Supreme Being, or God"

If the cosmos has a cause, then it is not the case that the cause need be God. This is because that universe's cause can lack attributes definitive of being God. For example, traditional theists typically define God as being omniscient, omnipotent, having a mind, and so on. The universe's cause (if there is such a thing) need not have those features, and thus need not be God. It need not even be a "Being", since "Being" (in this context) normally denotes a mind or spirit, yet Adler's argument has yet to show that the universe's cause is a mind or spirit. Basically, Adler is making a mistake common to many apologists: he argues forthe existence of some vague thing "X", and then leaps to conclusion that that X is God. This is as absurd as arguing that there must be a cause for the existence of complex organisms, and then leaping to the conclusion that that cause is the type of God you believe. It's just God-of-the-gaps reasoning and a non sequitur.

[Jichard]

I solved the Problem of Evil (twice, two different ways)

I solved it, too. The solution involves denying God's existence.

[shunyadragon]

While the term ex nihilo is not to be found in the texts, neither is any concept of a "pre-exiting primordial chaos." Any kind of chaos must consist of some kind of underlining order to be a chaos. It is not possible for chaos without an order.

It would be unrealistic to find specific references like these in ancient texts like Genesis. That is why these texts are open to so much interpretation and speculation. The citation, Wisdom 11:17 For not without means was your almighty hand, that had fashioned the universe from formless matter., could be interpreted as referring to a "pre-exiting primordial existence."

[arnoldo]

Adler's argument is fallacious, or at least the linked argument above is fallacious. His argument commits mistakes common to make cosmological and ontological arguments. For example, Adler's arguments equivocates on the term contingent. To see why, note that the term "contingent" can be used in at least two, non-equivalent senses, as follows:

• Causal contingency:
  This sense of contingency denotes a cause, usually a cause that is required for a certain effect. For example, when someone says your getting this job is contingent upon you filling out the job application, this means that filling out the job application will be part of the cause of you getting the job, and without this job application as apart of the cause, the required effect (getting the job) will not occur. People often employ causal contingency by using the phtrase "contingent upon", as in the job example I gave above.
• Modal contingency:
  This sense of contingency just means "possible and non-necessary". Modal contingency comes in a number of forms, depending on the sort of modality one is talking about (ex: logical, broadly logical / metaphysical, physical). For example, the statement Apples exist or it is not the case that apples exist is a logically necessary statement, since it is entailed by standard propositional logic (in this case, the statement is an instance of "P or ~P"). The statement Apples exist is logically possible, since the statement does not contradict any standard logical formalism. The statement is also not logically necessary, since the statement is not entailed by any standard logical formalism. That means the statement Apples exist is logically possible and logically non-necessary, and thus the same statement logically contingent.

Causal contingency is a non-modal form of contingency, so it would be a mistake to confuse modal contingency with causal contingency. But Adler makes this mistake. There's a discussion of causal contingecy in the following quote:

"3. The existence of the cosmos as a whole is radically contingent (meaning that it needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence to preserve it in being, and prevent it from being annihilated, or reduced to nothing)"

Yet in the following defense of 3, there is switch to discussing modal contingency:

"The reason we can conceive the cosmos as being radically rather than superficially contingent is due to the fact that the cosmos which now exists is only one of many possible universes that might have in fact existed in the past, and might still exist in the future. This is not to say that any cosmos other than this one ever did exist in the past, or ever will exist in the future. It is not necessary to go that far in order to say that other universes might have existed in the past and might exist in the future. If other universes are possible, than this one also is merely possible, not necessary"

That's fallacious reasoning. Pointing out that it's modally possible for the universe to be some other way, does nothing to show that the universe is causally contingent. For example, pointing out that the non-existence of the universe is compatible with any standard logical formalism, and is not entailed by any standard logical formalism (that is: the universe's existence is logically contingent) says absolutely nothing about whether the universe has a cause of its existence, and thus it says absolutely nothing about whether or not the universe is causally contingent.


There are a number of other problems. I'll discuss a few. First, God's existence is not logically necessary, nor metaphysically necessary, nor physically necessary. So by Adler's own logic, that would mean that God's existence is either impossible or that God's existence requires a cause. Second, Adler runs into problems if he thinks God has libertarian free will. On standard accounts of libertarian free will:

For an agent A to have libertarian free will with respect to action Y in situation S, then it must be metaphysically possible for A to do Y in S and it must be metaphysically possible for A to do not-Y in S

So if God has libertarian free will, then what God does is not metaphysically necessary; that is: it's possible for God to act differently than God actually acts. Which, according to Adler's reeasoning, would mean that God's existence requires a cause.

Third, Also, the statement here fails:

"4. If the cosmos needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence, then that cause must be a supernatural being, supernatural in its action, and one the existence of which is uncaused, in other words, the Supreme Being, or God"

If the cosmos has a cause, then it is not the case that the cause need be God. This is because that universe's cause can lack attributes definitive of being God. For example, traditional theists typically define God as being omniscient, omnipotent, having a mind, and so on. The universe's cause (if there is such a thing) need not have those features, and thus need not be God. It need not even be a "Being", since "Being" (in this context) normally denotes a mind or spirit, yet Adler's argument has yet to show that the universe's cause is a mind or spirit. Basically, Adler is making a mistake common to many apologists: he argues forthe existence of some vague thing "X", and then leaps to conclusion that that X is God. This is as absurd as arguing that there must be a cause for the existence of complex organisms, and then leaping to the conclusion that that cause is the type of God you believe. It's just God-of-the-gaps reasoning and a non sequitur.

Do you agree with Adler's premise #1 and #2?

1. The existence of an effect requiring the concurrent existence and action of an efficient cause implies the existence and action of that cause.

2. The cosmos as a whole exists.

3. The existence of the cosmos as a whole is radically contingent (meaning that it needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence to preserve it in being, and prevent it from being annihilated, or reduced to nothing).

4. If the cosmos needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence, then that cause must be a supernatural being, supernatural in its action, and one the existence of which is uncaused, in other words, the Supreme Being, or God.