Where Do Moral Questions Stop?

[Tassman]

No Thinker I asked - why did the chemicals choose lobster. Now you are saying that nothing chooses - is it random? You said in your quote that the brain is doing a vast amount of work - OK, but something is still choosing to use lobster instead of something else. What is doing that, if "I" or chemicals don't decide, what does? Was the lobster example just random?

To be clear, you agree that we are basically biological automatons with no control over that we think or believe?

[seer]

So what if we are conscious? We are no less determined, and as Thinker is arguing the brain makes our decisions before we even are aware of them. So in reality consciousness makes no difference - it does nothing.

So your authority is the blog of a computer hacker. Gotcha!

Regardless, quantum mechanics operates at the level of particles not at the level governed by classical physics which is where we're at.

No, watch the video in the link Homer - those are scientists. And no, particles make up every thing, that is why one of the scientists said in the video that the universe is fundamentally indeterministic - again his words not mine.

Nonsense, if Thinker is correct the decision is made for the monkey before he is even aware of the choice or consequences. The "chemicals" made the choice for him.

[seer]

But consciousness makes no difference Tass. Thinker was clear - the decisions are made before we even become aware of them. So in reality we are biological automatons with no control over that we think or believe.

[JimL]

But consciousness makes no difference Tass. Thinker was clear - the decisions are made before we even become aware of them. So in reality we are biological automatons with no control over that we think or believe.

When you say that the decisions are made before "we" even become aware of them, that doesn't mean that it is not "we" who are making the decisions. If it weren't us who made the decisions then there truly would be a ghost in the machine. We are our brains, so when the brain makes a decision it is "we" who are making the decisions. The brain, i.e. you, unconsciously makes decisions based on the info available to it in the same way that your ghost in the machine would consciously make those same decisions. The difference is that in the former situation, you don't become aware of the decision you made until after you've made it.

[seer]

When you say that the decisions are made before "we" even become aware of them, that doesn't mean that it is not "we" who are making the decisions. If it weren't us who made the decisions then there truly would be a ghost in the machine. We are our brains, so when the brain makes a decision it is "we" who are making the decisions. The brain, i.e. you, unconsciously makes decisions based on the info available to it in the same way that your ghost in the machine would consciously make those same decisions. The difference is that in the former situation, you don't become aware of the decision you made until after you've made it.

If this is not conscious act, if our conscious thoughts are not making the choices - then what exactly is making the decisions? Chemicals?

[Jichard]

And what determines the brains mental states?

Answered:

"There is no single thing that does the determining, unless you're talking about the sum total of all the prior states. I don't need to claim that one particular aspect of that sum total, acts as the sole-determining cause for the effect. Instead, I can point to a number of things in the sum total, where each of those things has a causal influence on the effect."

Well sure, they think we are flesh and blood as well. But your argument is that somehow the self, unlike everything else in nature is not determined. That somehow the brain breaks free of the causal chain.

Not my argument at all. The argument is that free will is compatible with determinism; i.e. compatibilism. You're presupposing a libertarian account of free will

Not saying you are wrong, just not seeing the logic behind the argument. Everyone does make different choices, but their differing choices are based upon the particular physical brain, information processer, they were born with as well as the differing input that evolves it.

Which does absolutely nothing to show that there is no free will. Pointing out that humans have a brain does not show that humans lack free will.

Two exact computers are identical, and if you give two exact computers the exact same input you will get the exact same output.

There are no two computers that are exactly identical. Anyway, that's beside the the point. The computer example was meant to illustrate the problem with your claims that humans are just their informational inputs and if two humans have identical informational inputsthen that means those humans are identical. I showed those claims are your's were incorrect, by showing that two computers can be different, even if they have the same informational input.

Could you explain what you mean by a mental state? What is a mental state dependent upon?

A mental state if a certain variety of brain state. Examples include beliefs, emotions, and so on.

If it is the sum total of prior mental states that does the determining then that is determinism.

It's not the sum total of prior mental states that does the determining, since there are causes that are not not mental states. You seem to be limiting the causes to mental ones. I didn't do that when I wrote: "the sum total of all the prior states."

By calling the present choice an effect of the sum total of prior states, you are not exactly explaining how that present effect/choice, is a free choice. A free agent, in order to be free, it seems to me would need be removed or distinct from the sum total of states about which it chooses from.

Again, you're presupposing a libertarian account of free will. If any event, I have no idea what you mean by "removed or distinct from the sum total of states about which it chooses from". People choose amongst options. Those options need not be the prior causal states. For example, if I choose to go eat breakfast, obviously eating breakfast was not some prior state that caused my choice. It occurred after my choice ,not before it. So it looks like you're conflating prior causes with options.

Yes, the agent is made up of the brains mental states, or in other words, the agent is the brains mental states, but the mental states are all determined, no? If not, then what exactly do you mean by, or how are you defining a mental state?

Free will is compatible with determinism.

Could you explain what you mean by "other forms of information" that brains have access to?

Not all information is sensory. For example, memorys are not classified as sensory information.

Without going back to see the context, I believe I was saying that two exactly the same physical brains, with the exact same data input would make the exact same decisions in any particular circumstance. If you disagree, which seems to be the case, what is it that would be the cause of the differing outcomes?

Which is irrelevant, since free will does not require that two identical brains would do different things with different input. That would be acting randomly, not acting freely, since one's act would have nothing to do with the information one had accees to, how one reasoned, etc.

I don't think that something can be said to "in part cause",

Actually, something can be said to "in part cause". In fact, it happens fairly regularly. For example, I am part of the cause for the heat in my room. But I'm not the sole cause.

it is true that no one bit of info is the cause of an action, but the action, for lack of a more articulate way of putting it, is still an effect determined by all prior bits of info taken as a whole. There is no agency apart from the info, apart from the brain, that looks at all the info the brain pocesses, and so makes a decision.

I don't see what this has to do with free will.

Why do you say this. The thought process is fast, but not so fast that there is no process. Also, the effect we are discussing is an action, and the causes of that action, whether they all function as a whole, that whole is still the effect of prior causes.

I say this because parts occur as the same time as the wholes they are apart of. For example, a tire that is apart of a car, exists at the same time as the car the tire apart of. If the part doesn't occur at the same time as X, it makes not sense to claim that it's apart of X. And since causes must occur before their effect, then that means parts never cause the whole.

True, but you are not just suggesting that there is no break in the causal chain, what you are arguing is that there is a break in the otherwise determined causal chain, that somehow the brain free itself from the otherwise determined chain. Again, not saying you are wrong, just not seeing where or how this freedom emerges from the combatibilist perspective.

Not what I'm suggesting. Again, you're presupposing a libertarian account of free will. Free will is compatible with causal determinism.

I really don't think that makes sense. Free will requires causation?

Yes. For example, one makes free choices by reasoning about information, information oe has access through to causal interactions.

If the will is caused, then how is it free?

Presupposing libertarianism again.

Libertarian free will, at least makes sense, in the sense that, if it were a reality, it truly would be free. But of course for that to be true, a agency, ghost in the machine, would be necessary.

Libertarian free will is incoherent, since there's nothing free or rational about it. It's random, not free. It's randomly doing something in spite of information. One is not making a choice due to considering the information differently, reasoning differently, etc. It's just random.

The parts are constitutively related to the whole, but the whole is still the effect of all prior causes by which it becomes a whole.

If X is constitutively related to Y, then X occurs at the same time as Y. And since causes occurs before their effects, then that means X cannot be the cause as Y.

Nope, the shape of an apple is not an analogy for mental states of a brain.

You didn't say why it isn't, and I explained why it is. Once again: "[the] apple's shape is a facet or feature of the apple, just as a brain's mental states are a facet or feature of the brain."

If you disagree with that, then feel free to explain why.

[JimL]

If this is not conscious act, if our conscious thoughts are not making the choices - then what exactly is making the decisions? Chemicals?

Ones informed brain is unconsciously making the decisions based on the limited information that it contains. As in the experiment, one doesn't become consciously aware of a decision that he/she has made, until after they have already made it.

[Tassman]

So what if we are conscious? We are no less determined, and as Thinker is arguing the brain makes our decisions before we even are aware of them. So in reality consciousness makes no difference - it does nothing.

Correct re the bolded. And what do you think the decisions of the brain are based upon if not its neural activity, which subconsciously assesses and solves problems beforehand based upon previous experience and accumulated data. The fact that this collides with your religious presuppositions, doesn't make it wrong. What it makes wrong is your unjustified belief in libertarian free-will.

No, watch the video in the link Homer - those are scientists. And no, particles make up every thing, that is why one of the scientists said in the video that the universe is fundamentally indeterministic - again his words not mine.

Nonsense, if Thinker is correct the decision is made for the monkey before he is even aware of the choice or consequences. The "chemicals" made the choice for him.

And the same applies to us, despite you insistence which is unsupported by a shred of substantive evidence, that the human primate has libertarian free-will. Does your libertarian free-will apply to our primate cousins as well or just us?

If this is not conscious act, if our conscious thoughts are not making the choices - then what exactly is making the decisions? Chemicals?

It's all part of how creatures like us make conscious acts. "What exactly is making the decisions"

[seer]

Ones informed brain is unconsciously making the decisions based on the limited information that it contains. As in the experiment, one doesn't become consciously aware of a decision that he/she has made, until after they have already made it.

Then Jim, if our conscious thoughts are not making decisions then it is non-conscious chemicals that are doing the deciding. And then actually conscious thoughts play no role in the process. We are as I said, biological automatons with no freedom of thought or freedom of behavior.

[seer]

It's all part of how creatures like us make conscious acts. "What exactly is making the decisions"

That is silly Tass, your conscious thoughts play no role in the process if Thinker is correct. The biological brain dictates what you will think and how - right or wrong, true or false. The biological brain has already decided what you will think and do before your conscious mind is even aware of it. Like I said, we are biological automatons with no freedom of thought or freedom of behavior.

[Tassman]

That is silly Tass, your conscious thoughts play no role in the process if Thinker is correct. The biological brain dictates what you will think and how - right or wrong, true or false. The biological brain has already decided what you will think and do before your conscious mind is even aware of it.

The biological brain, with its accumulated data, is a part of the totality of who we are seer, you fail to grasp this.

Like I said, we are biological automatons with no freedom of thought or freedom of behavior.

Is that how you view the non-human primates, i.e. as automatons? Are they really so different from us?

[JimL]

Then Jim, if our conscious thoughts are not making decisions then it is non-conscious chemicals that are doing the deciding. And then actually conscious thoughts play no role in the process. We are as I said, biological automatons with no freedom of thought or freedom of behavior.

What difference does consciousness make? The unconscious brain makes decisions based upon the information it has. Its an information processer! A ghost in the machine would also make decisions based upon the information it has. Why should the latter example be deemed more free than the former? If the conscious self, ghost in the machine, opts to do a thing, its choice is no less dependent upon information than the unconscious brain would be in face of the same dilemma. So what real difference would consciousness make? Can consciousness choose in an informationless way, or are its choices dependent upon information, in fact the same information that the unconscious brains choices are dependent upon? You would argue that the conscious self could look at the same information available to the unconscious brain and choose differently than the unconscious brain. But then I would ask you, based on what would the conscious self, faced with the same dilemma, and the same information, as the unconscious self, make a different decision? The answer would be that "the conscious self would make a different decision because it has recourse to info that the unconscious self is not privy to. But that doesn't make the conscious decision any more or less free than the unconscious one, it just makes it a more knowledgeable decision.

So what you need to explain is how the existence of consciousness itself alters the otherwise deterministic laws of nature.

[seer]

The biological brain, with its accumulated data, is a part of the totality of who we are seer, you fail to grasp this.

The point Tass is that you claimed that conscious thoughts played a role - they don't if Thinker is correct. Biology makes all your decisions for you, dictates what you will believe or how you will act before you are even aware. And again, when the Muslim rapes and kills the twelve Kurdish girl he is only doing what his biology dictates.

Is that how you view the non-human primates, i.e. as automatons? Are they really so different from us?

No Tass, I want you to agree that we are merely biological automatons with no freedom of thought or freedom of behavior in your world. I want to see you accept this.

[seer]

You would argue that the conscious self could look at the same information available to the unconscious brain and choose differently than the unconscious brain. But then I would ask you, based on what would the conscious self, faced with the same dilemma, and the same information, as the unconscious self, make a different decision? The answer would be that "the conscious self would make a different decision because it has recourse to info that the unconscious self is not privy to. But that doesn't make the conscious decision any more or less free than the unconscious one, it just makes it a more knowledgeable decision.

So what you need to explain is how the existence of consciousness itself alters the otherwise deterministic laws of nature.

The first difference Jim, is that there is freedom in my position. I wake up, I have a number of conscious choices in what I will wear and what I will eat. I do the choosing, I'm not determined to do one thing over the other. This also, in the big picture, makes me morally responsible for my behavior. Which is completely lost if determinism is correct. Finally, what do you mean - how do chemicals makes choices? Chemicals are chemicals they don't make choices. Why would chemicals dictate that I choose a red shirt over a green? What do chemicals know of shirts? They are chemicals for goodness sake.

[JimL]

The first difference Jim, is that there is freedom in my position. I wake up, I have a number of conscious choices in what I will wear and what I will eat. I do the choosing, I'm not determined to do one thing over the other.

That doesn't answer my question. That you do the choosing is true, but that your choices are conscious and free choices is just your belief, not necessarily a fact.

This also, in the big picture, makes me morally responsible for my behavior.

That too is a belief, not necessarily a fact.

Which is completely lost if determinism is correct. Finally, what do you mean - how do chemicals makes choices? Chemicals are chemicals they don't make choices. Why would chemicals dictate that I choose a red shirt over a green? What do chemicals know of shirts? They are chemicals for goodness sake.

There are underlying reasons for eveything you do, for every choice you make, including the choice of shirt to wear. You talk of chemicals in the brain as if they have no purpose, as if they do nothing. All the knowledge you have is stored in those so called chemicals and your choices are based on that knowledge. So your position is that you have a number of choices to make, and thats true, but that is true whether or not you are conscious or unconscious of those choices. The fact that there are many choices to make tells us nothing about the nature of the choice made. Consciousness just means that you are aware of the choices you make, it doesn't mean that awareness makes them. So why do you assume that consciousness means agency? The evidence, afaics, is that consciousness is nothing more than an awareness of what you, i.e. what your brain, chooses to do, its not an agency of some sort that operates the brain. If you think about it, its a rather silly idea. Why on earth would an agent in its own right have need of a distinct information processer in order to make choices. What kind of agent would that even be?