Why think God caused the universe to exist?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

No Boxing, I asked a pretty straight forward question. Is all matter on top of itself, in an infinitely dense singularity and not on top of itself in an infinitely dense singularity? No one would ever say that the Earth is the North Pole, but that the North Pole was part of the Earth.

Now you are starting to get it. The cosmological singularity is not the universe, but rather a part of the universe, in exactly the same way that the North Pole is not the Earth, but rather a part of the Earth.

[seer]

Now you are starting to get it. The cosmological singularity is not the universe, but rather a part of the universe, in exactly the same way that the North Pole is not the Earth, but rather a part of the Earth.

Boxing that does not makes sense. The singularity was the universe - all matter on top of itself and infinitely dense, not part of the universe... Matter in the universe is no longer on top of itself, and infinitely dense. It is expanding. So where in the universe does this dense singularity that is all the matter of the universe exist? Just asking the question shows that it is incoherent.

[Mountain Man]

Many theists claim that God caused the universe to exist. For example, the Christian apologist William Lane Craig claims (in his Kalaam cosmological argument) that the universe has a cause because the universe began to exist and everything that begins to exist has a cause. He then argues that God, or a transcendant/spaceless/timeless personal being, caused the universe to exist. I'm going to offer a brief critique of that reasoning. This critique starts with the following claim:

1 : If C causes E, then C temporally precedes E

This is another way of saying that a cause occurs before its effect.

So how to support 1? Well, one can support it in the same way that Craig tries to support his claim that everything that begins to exist has a cause: by pointing out that there are no known counterexamples to the claim and that every example we have of causation confirms the claim. Additionally, one can make a conceptual argument in support of the claim. For example, one can note that the very notion of causation involves production or transition; that is: the cause produces an effect, involving a transition from a state where the effect is present to a state where the effect is present. If this were otherwise (for example, if the effect was already there without any action being done by X), then it makes no sense to claim that that X is causally responsible for the effect. But this very production involves a transition from a time when the effect is not present a time where the effect is present [as Craig himself notes, on his notion of change, change entail there being time]. And the cause needs to be present at that earlier time (where the effect is not present) in order to exert the influence that results in the effect.

Now, if theists want to still claim that God caused the universe to exist, then they have at least two options:

option A : don't accept 1
option B : accept 1

Option A just looks like special pleading. After all, why would theists reject a claim as well supported as 1, while accepting equally-supported (or less well-supported) claims they think help their theology, like the universe began to exist?

Option B has some interesting implications, only some of which I'll discuss. If theists take option B and those theists still want to claim that God caused the universe to exist, then that commits these theists to claim that God temporally preceded the universe; that is: God existed before the universe did and did so in a temporal state. But that creates at least three problems:

First, it creates problems for proponents of Craig's Kalaam argument, since they will have trouble accounting for God's temporal state. They can't say God's existence extends infinitely into the past, since defenders of Kalaam usually argue that it is impossible for something to extend infinitely into the past. Yet they also won't want to say that God existed for a finite amount of time into the past, since defenders of Kalaam normally argue that if X existed for a finite amount of time into the past then X must have a cause for it's existence, and they don't won't want to claim that God has a cause of it's existence. So they're stuck.

Second, theists can no longer object to multiverse theories, on the grounds that those theories unjustifiably posit a temporal framework outside of (or preceding) the universe's temporal framework. After all, the theist has done just that, when they claim that God existed temporally before the universe existed.

Third, if there is no time before the universe existed (ex: the universe existed for a finite amount of time and there is no temporal framework other than that of the universe), then, in conjunction with 1, this implies that the universe has no cause. And that means the God would not be the cause of the universe's existence. Parallel points for God not being the cause of the Big Bang; the Bing Bang simply would not have a cause. When this point is combined with the second point above regarding the multiverse, it introduces an interesting tension for theists who accept 1 yet reject the multiverse theory: those theists need to argue that there was time before the universe existed and that there a supernatural God existed during this pre-universe time, while arguing (without special pleading) that there was not a multiverse during this pre-universe time. I wonder how they'll pull that off.

You've apparently misunderstood Craig's argument because what he objects to is an infinite number of causes and not the concept that something could eternally exist without a cause. This is why the multiverse theory fails, because it requires an infinite number of causes.

Source: New Atheism And Five Arguments For God

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-n...#ixzz3jlbGKj6l

© Copyright Original Source

[JimL]

It is true that the whole Earth exists for a person occupying the North Pole, but the whole of Earth is not crammed into that single point of space. Similarly, it is true that the whole of Time exists for a person occupying the present moment, but the whole of Time is not crammed into that single moment.

I get what you are saying, but what I don't get is where does the experience of times flow reside? The mind is no less a part of spacetime than everything else, so, if, like everything else, all instants of the mind exist eternally along the time line, how do you explain the experience of the passage of time. It is not enough to simply assert it to be an illusion.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Boxing that does not makes sense. The singularity was the universe -

Once again, no it was not.

all matter on top of itself and infinitely dense

"All matter" is in no way analogous to "the whole universe."

Just asking the question shows that it is incoherent.

No, you're asking the question that shows you don't understand what a singularity is.

I get what you are saying, but what I don't get is where does the experience of times flow reside? The mind is no less a part of spacetime than everything else, so, if, like everything else, all instants of the mind exist eternally along the time line, how do you explain the experience of the passage of time. It is not enough to simply assert it to be an illusion.

You're on the right track. The mind is no less a part of space-time than anything else in the universe. At any given moment, a particular brain state has access only to two things: the data it is receiving at that moment regarding outside stimuli, and memory of data regarding outside stimuli. It seems that memories are generated along a particular direction in Time which is defined by entropy, so it is reasonable to assume that there may be some entropic factor in the creation of memory. Since a brain state is only aware of the outside stimuli at the moment in time which it occupies, and since it is able to recall stimuli from moments previous to the one it occupies, that brain state is under the illusion that it arrived at the moment it occupies from the previous one. This scenario would apply equally to all brain states, therefore leading each to the illusion that it arrived at its moment from the previous. Just like successive, static frames of film give the illusion of motion, these separate and static brain states therefore give the illusion of temporal progression.

[seer]

Once again, no it was not.

"All matter" is in no way analogous to "the whole universe."

No, you're asking the question that shows you don't understand what a singularity is.

Boxing, when all of matter was on top of itself in a dense singularity as Hawking said - that was not the whole of the universe? There was more external to that? There was something else? In any case we could word the problem like this: all matter is on top of itself in a dense singularity and not on top of itself in a dense singularity.

[seer]

Since a brain state is only aware of the outside stimuli at the moment in time which it occupies, and since it is able to recall stimuli from moments previous to the one it occupies, that brain state is under the illusion that it arrived at the moment it occupies from the previous one. This scenario would apply equally to all brain states, therefore leading each to the illusion that it arrived at its moment from the previous. Just like successive, static frames of film give the illusion of motion, these separate and static brain states therefore give the illusion of temporal progression.

Then why don't I have knowledge of the future me? Does not my brain occupy all future states as well? Is there not outside stimuli and entropy in the future? So why don't we have knowledge of our own personal future?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Boxing, when all of matter was on top of itself in a dense singularity as Hawking said - that was not the whole of the universe?

No. Once again, that is a description of a very particular region of space-time. It is certainly not the whole of the universe.

Then why don't I have knowledge of the future me?

I explained this. Your brain state at any moment is limited to knowledge about the moment in which it exists, and memory of previous moments. It is not at all surprising that you haven't got knowledge of subsequent events.

There is no individual brain state which represents the "real" you. Each and every one of those brain states belongs to you. That does not imply that each brain state would have access to the same data.

[seer]

No. Once again, that is a description of a very particular region of space-time. It is certainly not the whole of the universe.

But what you are saying is that all matter is and is not a dense singularity. That both conditions exist as we speak. I'm sorry, that is a contradiction, since all matter is included. All matter is expanding and all matter is a dense singularity. There are no particular regions that are not included - it is universal.

I explained this. Your brain state at any moment is limited to knowledge about the moment in which it exists, and memory of previous moments. It is not at all surprising that you haven't got knowledge of subsequent events.

There is no individual brain state which represents the "real" you. Each and every one of those brain states belongs to you. That does not imply that each brain state would have access to the same data.

Why not, I have already experienced the future, why don't I remember that? No matter where on the time line I am, I have still existed in the future, and have those experiences. Yet somehow they are wiped from my mind but my present and past experiences are not.

[JimL]

You're on the right track. The mind is no less a part of space-time than anything else in the universe. At any given moment, a particular brain state has access only to two things: the data it is receiving at that moment regarding outside stimuli, and memory of data regarding outside stimuli. It seems that memories are generated along a particular direction in Time which is defined by entropy, so it is reasonable to assume that there may be some entropic factor in the creation of memory. Since a brain state is only aware of the outside stimuli at the moment in time which it occupies, and since it is able to recall stimuli from moments previous to the one it occupies, that brain state is under the illusion that it arrived at the moment it occupies from the previous one. This scenario would apply equally to all brain states, therefore leading each to the illusion that it arrived at its moment from the previous. Just like successive, static frames of film give the illusion of motion, these separate and static brain states therefore give the illusion of temporal progression.

But my question is where comes the expserience of the flow of time. If all of time exists, if all events in time exist, if there is no actual passage of time, then, whether you want to call it "now" or not, all of those events are happening in conjuction with each other. So, how do you explain the experience of times passage? In other words, I exist here in the present, and experience the present time, but according to B-Theory I also exist both in the past as well as in the future, all in conjunction with my existence in the present, but even though all of time exists, all events are frozen together as one, I experience only one of those moments at a time. I don't think the film analogy works, because the illusion there is do to the motion of the film and according to B-Theory, existence is static.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

But what you are saying is that all matter is and is not a dense singularity. That both conditions exist as we speak. I'm sorry, that is a contradiction, since all matter is included. All matter is expanding and all matter is a dense singularity. There are no particular regions that are not included - it is universal.

Once again, you are quite mistaken about this. The singularity describes a very particular region of space-time. All matter at that particular region is infinitely dense, on certain models. Not all matter, throughout the whole of space-time.

Why not, I have already experienced the future, why don't I remember that? No matter where on the time line I am, I have still existed in the future, and have those experiences.

This is exactly the opposite of what I said, which is that your brain state at any particular moment does not have access to data from subsequent moments. The fact that all moments of time exist does not mean your brain at any given moment has access to all other moments, any more than your brain has access to all areas of space simply because they all exist.

But my question is where comes the expserience of the flow of time. If all of time exists, if all events in time exist, if there is no actual passage of time, then, whether you want to call it "now" or not, all of those events are happening in conjuction with each other. So, how do you explain the experience of times passage? In other words, I exist here in the present, and experience the present time, but according to B-Theory I also exist both in the past as well as in the future, all in conjunction with my existence in the present, but even though all of time exists, all events are frozen together as one, I experience only one of those moments at a time. I don't think the film analogy works, because the illusion there is do to the motion of the film and according to B-Theory, existence is static.

I added emphasis to the most important phrase of your reply. To say, "I experience only one of those moments at a time," is tautological. That's true regardless of whether one holds to the A-Theory or the B-Theory.

I think your hang-up, and the most difficult one to understand for most people, is that your brain state at any given moment intuitively believes itself to be in a preferred place-- as if that particular brain state is the "real" one, while all the others are simply potential or faded away or otherwise "unreal." You have this intuition that the word "now" represents some actual and absolute physical truth about the universe. It is often quite vexing for people to wrap their heads around the fact that "now" is not an absolute truth about the universe. Quite the opposite, in fact, "now" is an entirely relative concept and is meaningless in the absence of some referent.

Once a person can get beyond the conceptual difficulties in understanding that there is no universal "now," it becomes far easier to grasp the rest of the B-Theory. Unfortunately, this isn't the easiest of tasks.

[seer]

Once again, you are quite mistaken about this. The singularity describes a very particular region of space-time. All matter at that particular region is infinitely dense, on certain models. Not all matter, throughout the whole of space-time.

Yes Boxing all matter. Are you suggesting that all matter was not contained in the singularity? That the matter that is around us and expanding is different from that matter that was in the dense singularity? Where did this other matter come from?

This is exactly the opposite of what I said, which is that your brain state at any particular moment does not have access to data from subsequent moments. The fact that all moments of time exist does not mean your brain at any given moment has access to all other moments, any more than your brain has access to all areas of space simply because they all exist.

But that is the point - what prevents me from having knowledge of these subsequent since I have experienced them. What makes them different than present or past experiences?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Yes Boxing all matter. Are you suggesting that all matter was not contained in the singularity? That the matter that is around us and expanding is different from that matter that was in the dense singularity? Where did this other matter come from?

Once again, the singularity describes a very specific region of space-time. It is not a description of the whole of space-time. Nor does the singularity "contain" anything.

But that is the point - what prevents me from having knowledge of these subsequent since I have experienced them. What makes them different than present or past experiences?

I explained precisely what makes them different. Your brain state at time t has no access to data from any moment subsequent to t.

[seer]

Once again, the singularity describes a very specific region of space-time. It is not a description of the whole of space-time. Nor does the singularity "contain" anything.

Contained may have been the wrong word - but all matter was "on top of itself" in a dense singularity. So I will ask again, was that all the matter that existed or exists or is there other, different matter around?

I explained precisely what makes them different. Your brain state at time t has no access to data from any moment subsequent to t.

Yes, but WHY? Why do I have access to the present and past but not the future. My brain state at t as access to the past. Especially since I too experience the future.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Contained may have been the wrong word - but all matter was "on top of itself" in a dense singularity. So I will ask again, was that all the matter that existed or exists or is there other, different matter around?

It is all the matter which existed at the time of the singularity. Once again, the singularity describes a very particular region of space-time. It does not describe the whole of space-time.

Yes, but WHY? Why do I have access to the present and past but not the future. My brain state at t as access to the past. Especially since I too experience the future.

No, your brain state at t has memories of the past. It does not have access to the past. Memories develop along the temporal direction defined by the typical evolution of entropy. As such, memories develop from moments previous to time t but not subsequent to time t.