Why think God caused the universe to exist?

[Jichard]

The contradictions seem fairly plain, to me.

"There is no state of affairs." The phrase "there is" implies a state of affairs. When one says "there is X," he is affirming that a state of affairs corresponding to X exists.

"There is X" does not imply that X exists, when "X" is "nothing". To say otherwise is to commit a reification fallacy with respect to "nothing"

"Nothing exists." The philosophical "Nothing" cannot exist. If it were a thing which existed, it would most certainly not be nothing.

You're reading the phrase "Nothing exists" as if "nothing" is an existent thing. That's a reification fallacy.

Rather, when we say "nothing" in this sort of context, it is meant as a universal negation. To say "nothing exists" is equivalent to saying "there is no thing which exists." However, we are again faced with the fact that the phrase "there is" necessarily implies the existence of a state of affairs, which is certainly not "nothing."

Same reification falacy as mentioned above, with respect to "there is nothing".

"There is an absence of anything." Again, the implications of "there is" foul this proposition into contradiction. The verb "is" implies presence, which is the opposite of absence. If "there is an absence," then there is something. There cannot, therefore, be an "absence of anything."

"is" doesn't imply presence, in the phrase "there is nothing" or equivalent phrases such as "there is an absence of anything". To say otherwise is to apply to the semantics on existence to non-existence, and thus commit a reification fallacy.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

"There is X" does not imply that X exists, when "X" is "nothing". To say otherwise is to commit a reification fallacy with respect to "nothing"

You're reading the phrase "Nothing exists" as if "nothing" is an existent thing. That's a reification fallacy.

"There is X" most certainly implies that X exists, regardless of that to which X refers. The verb "is" is the conjugation of "to be," the existential verb in English. Using the verb "is" necessarily implies "being," which-- in turn-- necessarily implies existence.

I am not committing a reification fallacy. Quite the contrary, I'm illustrating precisely why the phrase "Nothing exists" constitutes a reification fallacy. Obviously, I agree that the philosophical concept of "nothing" cannot be an existent thing, since the whole point of my argument is that it is illogical to assert that "nothing" could be an actual state.

"is" doesn't imply presence, in the phrase "there is nothing" or equivalent phrases such as "there is an absence of anything". To say otherwise is to apply to the semantics on existence to non-existence, and thus commit a reification fallacy.

"Is" most certainly implies presence. Once again, "is" is a conjugation of the English existential verb. Again, I am not committing a reification fallacy. I am illustrating that such phrases are, themselves, reification fallacies. If the verb "to be" is not being utilized to imply existence, then it is entirely unclear what one means by use of the phrase "There is nothing."

[Quantum Weirdness]

Many theists claim that God caused the universe to exist. For example, the Christian apologist William Lane Craig claims (in his Kalaam cosmological argument) that the universe has a cause because the universe began to exist and everything that begins to exist has a cause. He then argues that God, or a transcendant/spaceless/timeless personal being, caused the universe to exist. I'm going to offer a brief critique of that reasoning. This critique starts with the following claim:

1 : If C causes E, then C temporally precedes E

This is another way of saying that a cause occurs before its effect.

So how to support 1? Well, one can support it in the same way that Craig tries to support his claim that everything that begins to exist has a cause: by pointing out that there are no known counterexamples to the claim and that every example we have of causation confirms the claim.

There is actually. If you let C be "A measurement on an entangled particle" and E be "The state of the other entangled particle is decided", then C and E are simultaneous, even though C caused E. i.e. Quantum Entanglement.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

There is actually. If you let C be "A measurement on an entangled particle" and E be "The state of the other entangled particle is decided", then C and E are simultaneous, even though C caused E. i.e. Quantum Entanglement.

This depends largely upon the interpretation of Quantum Mechanics which is being used. For example, it is not the case that C causes E on the interpretation which I prefer, Two-State Vector Formalism.

[Carrikature]

BP, I think I've followed everything you've said. There is a piece I think is missing regarding the supposed illusion of time. Pardon me as I hack up a post to help sort out what seems to be awry.

I'll try once more to explain. At any single moment, your brain has direct access to data from stimuli of that moment, alone. It does not have direct access to data from prior moments, nor from subsequent moments. Agreed?

Agree.

Similarly, at any single moment, your brain has memories of data to which it had access in previous moments, but does not have memories of data from future moments. Agreed?

Also agree.

At any single moment, these memories form a fairly contiguous bridge to that moment from those recently prior to it. This bridge is what gives the illusion of having "arrived" at that moment from the previous. Whether you subscribe to the A-Theory or the B-Theory, it seems fairly indisputable that memory is the key factor in the phenomenological experience of time.

Also agree that memory is the key factor in the phenomenological experience of time.

Therefore, at any single moment, your brain has the impression that it arrived at that moment from the previous, creating the illusion of time. It also is under the impression that the moment which it occupies is the only real moment, because that moment is the only one to which it has direct access, creating the illusion of "now."

Agree here as well.


The glaring hole, to me, is that our brain only has memories of certain moments. A memory is effectively a snapshot at a given point of space-time. We have those snapshots for certain points and not for others. Each moment experienced is added as another snapshot. At a given point in space-time, we have X number of snapshots. At another moment, we have Y number. That number increases as we move along the bridge. Further, it's not just that we have a continuous bridge of memories (which is extremely important), but also that we are completely missing any memory of a moment that does not fit into that continuous bridge.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

BP, I think I've followed everything you've said. There is a piece I think is missing regarding the supposed illusion of time. Pardon me as I hack up a post to help sort out what seems to be awry.

No worries. I appreciate point-by-point discussion!

The glaring hole, to me, is that our brain only has memories of certain moments. A memory is effectively a snapshot at a given point of space-time. We have those snapshots for certain points and not for others. Each moment experienced is added as another snapshot. At a given point in space-time, we have X number of snapshots. At another moment, we have Y number. That number increases as we move along the bridge. Further, it's not just that we have a continuous bridge of memories (which is extremely important), but also that we are completely missing any memory of a moment that does not fit into that continuous bridge.

I'm not sure I see why this is a glaring hole. Why should we expect to see a memory which would not fit into that continuous bridge?

[Carrikature]

No worries. I appreciate point-by-point discussion!

I'm not sure I see why this is a glaring hole. Why should we expect to see a memory which would not fit into that continuous bridge?

What preferences memories within that bridge over memories without? Why would we only possess a continuous chain of memories and not a random collection of memories? Why not all of them together like the aliens in Slaughterhouse Five?

Unless I'm seriously missing something (which is possible), the B-theory of time would preclude a causal link between points in time. Whatever exists at a given point in space-time cannot give rise to something that exists at another point in space-time. This seems to directly contradict what we observe. At a given point (t6) in space-time, you and I can compare memories of certain points in space-time (t1-t3). We can use that comparison to draw conclusions about what we expect to see at another point in space-time (t8). We can confirm at t10 that the expectations formulated at t6 accurately match what was predicted for t8. Why should this be true? Why would a given set of coordinates have any impact on another set of coordinates?

[Jichard]

There is actually. If you let C be "A measurement on an entangled particle" and E be "The state of the other entangled particle is decided", then C and E are simultaneous, even though C caused E. i.e. Quantum Entanglement.

See Boxing Pythagoras' response.



I don't think a proponent of the Kalaam cosmological argument (and other such consmological arguments for God's existence) would be able to employ the reply you offered.

For example, your reply is counter-intuitive and goes against our experience of how the world worlds (quantum mechanics sometimes does that). That's a problem for proponents of Kalaam, since proponents of Kalaam tend to rely on intuition and appeals to common sense in order to defend their cosmological argument. So it would be special pleading for those proponents to go against intuition / common sense when they find intuition / common sense to be inconvenient for their position.

Furthermore, your example involves:

1 : causation between particles that both already exist within a temporal framework

as opposed to you claiming that:

2 : the particles cause the existence of the very temporal framework those particles exist in

2 involves the particles causing the existence of something that is logically necessary for the particles to exist (a temporal framwork is logically necessary for the existence of temporal particles). And 2 is the sort of claim that a proponent of Kalaam would need to make, in order for simulateneous causation to help their position; that is: the proponent would need to claim that God's temporal state caused the existence of the very temporal framework that is logically necessary for the existence of God's temporal state. But you're discussion of simulateous causation does not allow the Kalaam proponent to do this, since you're not defending 2, but you're instead defending 1.

[Jichard]

"There is X" most certainly implies that X exists, regardless of that to which X refers.

That's not the case. For example, "There is X" can be used in a fictional context, where it's understood that one is not committed to the existence of X. Take the following example: claiming "there is a unicorn" when telling a story about unicorns. In doing this, I'm not implying that unicorns exist. This is one of the central points of certain forms of hermeneutic fictionalism: that one can make statements, where those statements don't commit one to the existence of the entities in question.

Furthermore, one can use the statement "There is X" in a definitional context, as opposed to an ontologically committing context (for further discussion, see sections 3 and 4 of this). The former context is used to define one's terms or talk about some conceptual notion, while the latter context commits one to the existence of stuff. Distinguishing between these two contexts allows people to discuss ideas and concepts, without being committed to the existence of things referred to by said concepts. Thus I can talk about nothing, without being committed to the claim that nothing exists nor that "nothing" refers to anything that could even exist.

Parallel points apply when discussing "There is X" as the consequent of a conditional. For example, when I say "If there are unicorns, then there is a unicorn", I am not thereby committed to the existence of unicorns, just because I said "there is a unicorn". After all, stating a conditional does not commit one to the truth of the conditional's consequent. And similarly so for when saying "There is X" under other modes of speech, such as sarcasm or metaphor. So, for instance, if I sarcastically say "There is a God", that does not commit me to the existence of God, since I was not literally making the claim that there is a God. Similarly so for metaphors such as "There is a fire within me"; I'm not literally claiming that a fire exists within me. Instead, I using the statement to make a metaphorical point.

The verb "is" is the conjugation of "to be," the existential verb in English. Using the verb "is" necessarily implies "being," which-- in turn-- necessarily implies existence.

If what you said was true, then it would be impossible to write fiction using phrases like "There is X", it would be impossible to talk about conceptual ideas (that have no existent referent) using phrases like "There is X", it would be impossible to use "There is X" sarcastically, and so on. After all, the moment you said "There is X", you would talking about something that exists, and discussing neither fiction nor simply elaborating on definitional / conceptual point nor speaking sarcastically. But this clearly isn't the case. So what you said is false.

Anyway, I've given at least five scenarios in which "is" does not necesaarily imply "existence":

1. fiction
2. definitional contexts
3. in a conditional's consequent
4. sarcasm
5. metaphor

In your counter-reply, you seem to use a grammatical argument to try and support your claim otherwise But your argument does not work, since you oversimplify how terms/sentences get their meaning in languages like English. Your rargument falls afoul of the fact that the meaning of an English sentence can change greatly based on the context. That is illustrated in the list I gave you above. Each of those listed cases represent instances in which the meaning of the statement "There is X" changes due to the context in which the statement is used. For example, for 5, a statements meaning can change when the statement is used metaphorically. Yet in your argument, you seem to be using a narrow context for "There is X", a context in which "There is X" is meant to literally refer to something X that exists. My point is that that is not the context in which I am using the statement "There is nothing", since using that statement is such a context would commit a reification fallacy.

I am not committing a reification fallacy.

In interpreting "Nothing exists" as a referring to something concrete, you are committing a reification fallacy, since you're assuming that a context that applies to literal, concrete interpretations of "X exists", also applies to "Nothing exists".

Quite the contrary, I'm illustrating precisely why the phrase "Nothing exists" constitutes a reification fallacy.

It commits the reification fallacy, only if you apply a literalist, concrete interpretative context to the semantics of the statement. But that's exactly the context which I did not apply to the statement. Instead, I can apply apply another context to my statement (such as either 2 or 3 from my above list).

Obviously, I agree that the philosophical concept of "nothing" cannot be an existent thing, since the whole point of my argument is that it is illogical to assert that "nothing" could be an actual state.

I have not asserted that "nothing" was a concrete, existent state.

"Is" most certainly implies presence. Once again, "is" is a conjugation of the English existential verb. Again, I am not committing a reification fallacy. I am illustrating that such phrases are, themselves, reification fallacies.

Addressed above.

If the verb "to be" is not being utilized to imply existence, then it is entirely unclear what one means by use of the phrase "There is nothing."

Above, I gave examples how one can use terms like conjugations of the verb "to be", without implying the existence of something. For example, one could use interpretation 3 from my above list, to try and provide a semantic interpretation of "There is nothing", using a bi-conditional that is meant as a conceptual analysis of "There is nothing". This could take the form of:

There is nothing iff for every concrete or abstract X, X does not exist

Thus, one could clearly state the meaning of "There is nothing", even if "is" is not being being use there to imply the existence of something.

[Carrikature]

That's not the case. For example, "There is X" can be used in a fictional context, where it's understood that one is not committed to the existence of X. Take the following example: claiming "there is a unicorn" when telling a story about unicorns. In doing this, I'm not implying that unicorns exist. This is one of the central points of certain forms of hermeneutic fictionalism: that one can make statements, where those statements don't commit one to the existence of the entities in question.

I don't think your example works. Within the context of a story, claiming "there is a unicorn" does state that unicorns exist. It's implicit in fiction as a genre that statements can be made which are meant to be true only within the context of the story. If you tell me in a story that unicorns exist, I will absolutely understand you to mean that unicorns exist in the fictional world.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

What preferences memories within that bridge over memories without? Why would we only possess a continuous chain of memories and not a random collection of memories? Why not all of them together like the aliens in Slaughterhouse Five?

Unless I'm seriously missing something (which is possible), the B-theory of time would preclude a causal link between points in time. Whatever exists at a given point in space-time cannot give rise to something that exists at another point in space-time. This seems to directly contradict what we observe. At a given point (t6) in space-time, you and I can compare memories of certain points in space-time (t1-t3). We can use that comparison to draw conclusions about what we expect to see at another point in space-time (t8). We can confirm at t10 that the expectations formulated at t6 accurately match what was predicted for t8. Why should this be true? Why would a given set of coordinates have any impact on another set of coordinates?

For precisely the same reason that we do not find ourselves in New York, one moment, and then Tokyo the next, and on Saturn's moon Titan shortly thereafter. It would seem that we occupy a fairly contiguous region of space-time. There is no more reason to expect that we should have discontinuous memories from one moment to the next than to expect that we should occupy discontinuous locations in space from one moment to the next.

That's not the case. For example, "There is X" can be used in a fictional context, where it's understood that one is not committed to the existence of X.

Even in a fictional context, the existence of X is implied by the verb "to be." It's simply understood that we are asserting that this existence only applies to the fictional world, and is not intended to be a claim about the real world. When someone says, "There is a unicorn," even in the context of a fictional story, we imagine a world in which a unicorn exists.

Furthermore, one can use the statement "There is X" in a definitional context, as opposed to an ontologically committing context (for further discussion, see sections 3 and 4 of this). The former context is used to define one's terms or talk about some conceptual notion, while the latter context commits one to the existence of stuff. Distinguishing between these two contexts allows people to discuss ideas and concepts, without being committed to the existence of things referred to by said concepts. Thus I can talk about nothing, without being committed to the claim that nothing exists nor that "nothing" refers to anything that could even exist.

The definitional context does not evade the existential nature of "to be." When I say, for example, "a triangle is a plane figure with three sides meeting at three vertices to form three internal angles," I am saying that the phrase "a triangle" exists as a reference to the provided definition. Similarly, I could say something to the effect of "nothing is a universal negation." In this definitional context, I am not making a claim about the ontology of that to which we refer by the phrase "nothing." However, I am making a claim about the ontology of the phrase, itself.

Parallel points apply when discussing "There is X" as the consequent of a conditional. For example, when I say "If there are unicorns, then there is a unicorn", I am not thereby committed to the existence of unicorns, just because I said "there is a unicorn". After all, stating a conditional does not commit one to the truth of the conditional's consequent.

The fact that you are not committed to the consequent does not imply that the consequent ceases to discuss the ontology of a unicorn. Even if the consequent is false, the phrase "there is a unicorn" still makes a claim about a unicorn's existence.

And similarly so for when saying "There is X" under other modes of speech, such as sarcasm or metaphor. So, for instance, if I sarcastically say "There is a God", that does not commit me to the existence of God, since I was not literally making the claim that there is a God. Similarly so for metaphors such as "There is a fire within me"; I'm not literally claiming that a fire exists within me. Instead, I using the statement to make a metaphorical point.

Unless you are attempting to say that the phrase "nothing exists" is intended sarcastically or metaphorically, I'm not sure why you would even raise this point. Still, in both your examples, the existential nature of "to be" is still present. When a person sarcastically states, "There is a God," that person's intention is to call attention to the ontology of God. Sure, the fact that it is intended sarcastically means that the person saying it doesn't actually believe the claim; but one needn't believe a claim for that claim to be about ontology. Similarly, in metaphor, when someone says, "There is a fire within me," he may not mean that a literal fire exists; however, he most certainly does mean that there is something existent which is being represented by the idea of fire-- for example, he might actually be telling us that a desire or an ambition or a fury exists in his emotional state.

This could take the form of:

There is nothing iff for every concrete or abstract X, X does not exist

Thus, one could clearly state the meaning of "There is nothing", even if "is" is not being being use there to imply the existence of something.

An interesting definition. By this definition, it seems fairly clear that "There is nothing" could never be true. If X does not exist, then "the absence of X" does exist. Whether or not you think an "absence" is a concrete entity, it most certainly would qualify as being an abstract entity. Therefore, it could never be true that both X does not exist and "the absence of X" does not exist. Therefore, "There is nothing" is tautologically false.

[Carrikature]

For precisely the same reason that we do not find ourselves in New York, one moment, and then Tokyo the next, and on Saturn's moon Titan shortly thereafter. It would seem that we occupy a fairly contiguous region of space-time. There is no more reason to expect that we should have discontinuous memories from one moment to the next than to expect that we should occupy discontinuous locations in space from one moment to the next.

I'm asking why that would be the case. Nothing about B-theory tells us to expect such continuity, afaict.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

I'm asking why that would be the case. Nothing about B-theory tells us to expect such continuity, afaict.

Sure it does. That which we consider to be a certain human being occupies a contiguous region of space-time, on the B-Theory. It's a single, continuous worldline. It is unsurprising that such a region would contain information about itself and close neighboring regions. It would be surprising to find that such a region contained data about another region to which it was entirely disconnected.

[Jichard]

Even in a fictional context, the existence of X is implied by the verb "to be."

That doesn't get you to your conclusion for the reason I already noted; namely: you're side-stepping the contextual factors through which statements and terms get their meaning. These contexts allow for "is" not to imply the existence of something. I'll address your replies to this point later in this post

It's simply understood that we are asserting that this existence only applies to the fictional world, and is not intended to be a claim about the real world. When someone says, "There is a unicorn," even in the context of a fictional story, we imagine a world in which a unicorn exists.

Fictional worlds don't exist, by definition; if a world existed, then the world wouldn't be fictional. Discussions of what goes on in a fictional world therefore need not imply the existence of the thing in question. Thus, the example of fiction provides an example in which "There is X" does not imply the existence of X. And that argues against your original claim, since you said saying that "There is X" necessarily implies that X exists.

The definitional context does not evade the existential nature of "to be." When I say, for example, "a triangle is a plane figure with three sides meeting at three vertices to form three internal angles," I am saying that the phrase "a triangle" exists as a reference to the provided definition. Similarly, I could say something to the effect of "nothing is a universal negation." In this definitional context, I am not making a claim about the ontology of that to which we refer by the phrase "nothing." However, I am making a claim about the ontology of the phrase, itself.

That seems to be a use-mention mistake, since you seem to be treating your statement as mentioning the term "a triangle", when your statement using the term "a triangle". It's akin to saying that this statement is about the phrase "a cat":

"A cat is a quarduped"

But that's not a statement about the phrase; i.e. that statement is not mentioning the phrase. Instead, the statement is using the phrase. A statement about the phrase would instead be a statement like:

"A cat is four-letter term"

Anyway, a definitional context does not imply that one is implying the existence of the thing being discussed. This is shown by the fact that there is no contradiction between saying "An X is Y" and "X does not exist". For example, the follwing two statements don't contradict: "A married bachelor is an unmarried male who is married" and "A married bachelor does not exist".

The fact that you are not committed to the consequent does not imply that the consequent ceases to discuss the ontology of a unicorn. Even if the consequent is false, the phrase "there is a unicorn" still makes a claim about a unicorn's existence.

Discussing X's ontology is not the same thing as implying that X exists. In fact, it doesn't even imply that X could even possibly exist. For example, as I noted above, one can discuss the ontology of married bachelors, while noting that married bachelors don't exist and could not even possibly exist. So your claims about "discuss[ing] the ontology of [X]" don't suffice for supporting your original claims that:

""There is X" most certainly implies that X exists, regardless of that to which X refers."
""Is" most certainly implies presence."

Furthermore, the above example of "married bachelors" rebuts your above two quoted claims.

Furthermore, remember that you said that in saying "there is X", I am implying that X exists. However, that's not the case in the case of conditionals. When I say that "there is X" in the phrase "If there is Y, then there is X", I am not discussing X's existence; I use the statement "there is X", without ever using it to imply that X exists. In your response, I think you imply that the issue is whether the consequent is false or true. But that isn't the issue. The point is that in a conditional, the consequent isn't even being asserted. This similar to how questions are not literal assertions, nor are statements made in fictional contexts, and so on. And since the statement is not even being asserted, it makes no sense to claim that use of the statement implies that one is claiming that X exists.

Unless you are attempting to say that the phrase "nothing exists" is intended sarcastically or metaphorically, I'm not sure why you would even raise this point.

It's meant to rebut the claims I quoted from you above; it rebuts your claims by showing that "there is X" does not imply that X exists, and that "is" does not imply presence.

Still, in both your examples, the existential nature of "to be" is still present. When a person sarcastically states, "There is a God," that person's intention is to call attention to the ontology of God. Sure, the fact that it is intended sarcastically means that the person saying it doesn't actually believe the claim; but one needn't believe a claim for that claim to be about ontology.

Addressed above, when I pointed about that discussing X's ontology is not the same as imply that X exists, nor is it the same as imply that it's even possible for X to exist. Basically, the atheist's statement does not imply that God exists, nor that God is present, contrary to your claims quoted above.

Similarly, in metaphor, when someone says, "There is a fire within me," he may not mean that a literal fire exists; however, he most certainly does mean that there is something existent which is being represented by the idea of fire-- for example, he might actually be telling us that a desire or an ambition or a fury exists in his emotional state.

The metaphor need not refer to anything that exists. For example, the statement can be used as a metaphor that expresses an emotion without reporting the emotion, akin to how the phrase "Boo!" expresses dislike, without making some report that refers to the existence of dislike. This would be a non-cognitivist interpretation of the metaphor, and illustrates how "is" phrases can be used in ways that don't impy the existence of X. After all, one of the points of certain forms of non-cognitivism is that statements (such as statements using "is") can be be used in certain contexts to express states, as opposed to reporting the existence of something or discussing ontology.

An interesting definition. By this definition, it seems fairly clear that "There is nothing" could never be true. If X does not exist, then "the absence of X" does exist. Whether or not you think an "absence" is a concrete entity, it most certainly would qualify as being an abstract entity. Therefore, it could never be true that both X does not exist and "the absence of X" does not exist. Therefore, "There is nothing" is tautologically false.

A few points.

First, treating absences as real, existent things, looks like a reification fallacy.

Second, one can deny the existence of abstract entities (ex: nominalism). That's why I included "abstract" in my bi-conditional:

There is nothing iff for every concrete or abstract X, X does not exist

Thus, one could reject that "the absence of X" is about some abstract, negative state that can exist. So you would be incorrect in saying that "it could never be true that both X does not exist and "the absence of X" does not exist".

Third, suppose one thinks that absences could exist. I think it would still be the case that your explanation runs afoul of the distinction between properties/particulars, (or maybe the distinction between states and what those states occur in). To see why, note that typically when you discuss "the absence of X", you're discussing X's absence within a state of affairs. For example, when I mention "the absence of unicorns", I'm talking about an existent context in which unicorns are not present. This context might be the planet Earth up until now, or the universe, or ... So "the absence of unicorns" is said to be present in said contexts. One can phrase this as "the absence of unicorns" is a state within this existent context or that "an absence of unicorns" is a negative property instantiated by this particular context. This reasoning, if anything, is what would allow one to claim that absences could exist. However, this reasoning does not apply to this:

Z : There is nothing iff for every concrete or abstract X, X does not exist

After all, given Z, there is not an existent context to act as the particular that instantiates the negative property of "absence of X" nor is there a context in which "the absence of unicorns" could be a state. Thus, it would make no sense to claim that an absence exists given Z. To say otherwise would be to conflate the existence contexts/particulars containing absences with the non-existence of contexts/particulars.

[Carrikature]

Sure it does. That which we consider to be a certain human being occupies a contiguous region of space-time, on the B-Theory. It's a single, continuous worldline. It is unsurprising that such a region would contain information about itself and close neighboring regions. It would be surprising to find that such a region contained data about another region to which it was entirely disconnected.

Yet we only have partial access to the region. That continuous region of space-time includes what we view as our future selves.