Morality Without Justice

[Jichard]

Well it isn't so much me pretending to know what English terms mean, but moreso whether or not we have the same concept of the terms when we utter the words.

To know the meaning of a term is to known the concept the term place-holds for in a given language. So unless you don't know what an English term means, then you should know the concept in question.

This is a big problem with Wittgenstein and anyone else who have to reject different views of Platonism with respect to universals.

Once again, one can figure out the meaning of a term in given language: look up the term in a dictionary, examine how people use the term in language, see what things people apply the term to and don't apply it to, etc. As I said:

"If you don't know what the term means, then he can point you a dictionary for a definition, pointing you to examples of things to which the term refers, etc. Now, in response, you can make up some global skeptic scenario where you claim that it's still logically possible for you to be using different concepts, even after tassman has point all this out to you. But so what? Tassman doesn't need to show with 100 certainty that the two of you are using the same concept; he just needs to provide evidence that the two of you are. And what I mentioned above suffices for that evidence. After all, it's the evidence we use when trying to get someone to understand a term in a new language."

And there definitely is no false dichotomy, either a realist stance is true with respect to universals or it is false, there is no between. There are different versions of realism (Aristotle's moderate realism) but that still is a realism.

I explained why your dichotomy was a false one: you overlooked other positions, such as Wittgenstein's family resemblance views.

Your whole 'use' 'mention' gig is nothing more than a red herring, as it is diverting attention to a different debate that has nothing to do with what I was arguing.

Already showed how your false dichotomy was based on a use/mention mistake. I even quoted your words to show that. You didn't address my explanation.

Non-realist accounts of universals always fall to the same problem of infinite regress or a circularity that ends up using the same terms that one started off with

For instance take the word mosquito

Well what does it mean to be a mosquito

The dictionary I used says: a slender long-legged fly with aquatic larvae

BUt what is a fly?

You really don't know what a "fly" is? Do you really not know what English terms means?

(of a bird or other winged creature) move through the air under control.

But what does it mean to move through the air under control?

When I move through the air in a parachute am I fly?

You're not a bird or a winged creature, so you're not a fly.

This is why just telling someone to look at a dictionary is lazy, in fact you should have told me to look through an article on national geographic

All and all every classification has to ultimately be grounded in something otherwise it never ends up explaining what exactly the insect actually is and we end up with either an infinite regress of going through terms or some kind of circularity (ie: what is fat? Well it means you're obese? but what is obese? It means you're overweight? But what does it mean to be overweight? It means you're fat).

You didn't really show much of anything. First, you failed to apply the dictionary definition of "fly" correctly, since you forgot that you're not a bird or a other winged creature. Second, you just made the trivial point that we often define our terms by using other points. And... so what? That's not a problem. If you don't like definitions that use terms, then use some other sort of definition, like an ostensive one. But I see no problem in using terms to define other terms. It actually works quite well in real life, where people don't pretend to not understand what a word means. If someone truly has no understanding of what terms mean, then of course you won't be able to define terms for them by using other terms, since they won't know what those other terms mean. But that's irrelevant to real life, since people do actually know the meaning of a least some terms in some language.

Taxonomy is consistent with 'essences' as they act as foundations. This is why science is underpinned by metaphysics.

First, oh no. For example, essentialism about biological species has been run out of philosophy of biology like a red-headed step-child. It's largely now the purview of uninformed creationists.

Second, as I mentioned before essences (or natures) are specified by listing jointly necessary and sufficient conditions. For instance, the essence of X is specified by giving the jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for being X. And one will use terms to specify those conditions. So your own essentialist position is subject t your objection, since you're going to have to specify essences by using terms. No surprise, since communication often uses terms.

[Cornell]

To know the meaning of a term is to known the concept the term place-holds for in a given language. So unless you don't know what an English term means, then you should know the concept in question.

And without a foundation to use as an essence, there is nothing but an infinite regress of terms defining other terms and never getting anywhere on knowing what exactly the person is conceiving of.

Once again, one can figure out the meaning of a term in given language: look up the term in a dictionary, examine how people use the term in language, see what things people apply the term to and don't apply it to, etc. As I said:

"If you don't know what the term means, then he can point you a dictionary for a definition, pointing you to examples of things to which the term refers, etc. Now, in response, you can make up some global skeptic scenario where you claim that it's still logically possible for you to be using different concepts, even after tassman has point all this out to you. But so what? Tassman doesn't need to show with 100 certainty that the two of you are using the same concept; he just needs to provide evidence that the two of you are. And what I mentioned above suffices for that evidence. After all, it's the evidence we use when trying to get someone to understand a term in a new language."

Once again the problem of an infinite regress of finding out what the term really means rears its ugly head. If what you are saying is true, there is no possible way that two people could know that they are speaking of the same concept when they debate.

I explained why your dichotomy was a false one: you overlooked other positions, such as Wittgenstein's family resemblance views.

His view is non realist (conventionalist), and it still fails. The notion of similarity has always been a problem for his nonsensical anti realist stance on universals. He tries to take two different ideas of things, but ultimately treats everything as one, but I can't blame him since he has no choice.

There is a dichotomy, Wittgenstein is a nominalist which is the opposite of Platonism (or realism), as he takes a stance of conventionalism

Already showed how your false dichotomy was based on a use/mention mistake. I even quoted your words to show that. You didn't address my explanation.

The whole 'use' 'mention' nonsense added nothing useful to the discussion, maybe it was a good distraction for you, but you just ended up giving Tassman too much of the benefit of the doubt, and this is probably because he or she is on the same team.

The guy doesn't even take metaphysics seriously and you are going to lecture me on how he supposedly knew something about the problem of universals...please spare me and move on from this.

You really don't know what a "fly" is? Do you really not know what English terms means?

I was just showing you how silly it is to take a position of nominalism, which is something that Wittgenstein held to

You're not a bird or a winged creature, so you're not a fly.



You didn't really show much of anything. First, you failed to apply the dictionary definition of "fly" correctly, since you forgot that you're not a bird or a other winged creature. Second, you just made the trivial point that we often define our terms by using other points. And... so what? That's not a problem. If you don't like definitions that use terms, then use some other sort of definition, like an ostensive one. But I see no problem in using terms to define other terms. It actually works quite well in real life, where people don't pretend to not understand what a word means. If someone truly has no understanding of what terms mean, then of course you won't be able to define terms for them by using other terms, since they won't know what those other terms mean. But that's irrelevant to real life, since people do actually know the meaning of a least some terms in some language.

I was doing that on purpose, and I have to say....Gotcha, because look at what you said

You said I failed to apply a term correctly? So there is a correct way to apply to terms...Well that's pretty just an argument in favor of universals. What you are doing is explaining to me the relations of qualitative identity, which is in the ballpark of the very metaphysical position that I hold to.

as far as defining our terms by using other points, please realize that if you never reach and actual point that describes what the object is you will end up in a regress of definitions.

This isn't a so-what, it's nominalism is incoherent

First, oh no. For example, essentialism about biological species has been run out of philosophy of biology like a red-headed step-child. It's largely now the purview of uninformed creationists.

Then get rid of taxonomy and go define your species in that infinite regress of terms

Second, as I mentioned before essences (or natures) are specified by listing jointly necessary and sufficient conditions. For instance, the essence of X is specified by giving the jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for being X. And one will use terms to specify those conditions. So your own essentialist position is subject t your objection, since you're going to have to specify essences by using terms. No surprise, since communication often uses terms.

According to you I don't need to specify what I am talking about, because all I need is a dictionary.

And I can use terms incorrectly

Last thanks for telling me about the 'nature of communication' in your very last statement as it clearly shows the fact that essentialism is essential to make sense of anything.

[Jichard]

1) Ok so the link says Wittgenstein is a man, what is a man?

Are you pretending not to know what English words mean again?

If so, then I am going to treat you a foreign language speaker who's relatively new to English and thus doesn't know what "man" means. So, please go to the dictionary, open it up to the page for "man", and read the definition.

2) There is no error, you failed to take into consideration the fact that your examples have contingent facts with have explanations for their existence. Without dust and gas, planets would lack an explanation, however we know that dust and gas explain away the contingent planets, and therefore we have an explanation for the existence of planets. Planets don't just pop into existence with no explanation....

Again, who's talking about things popping into existence without explanation?

And we have an explanation for why natural selection occurs; it's a biological process that occurs when certain conditions are met.

remember I am talking about explanations, and nothing explains 'natural selection' ability to create rationality, unless rationality was already a part of reality.

Again, that's as ridiculous as saying:

nothing explains 'dust's and gas'' ability to create planets, unless planets was already a part of reality

Once again, effects can have properties lacked by their causes

3) You aren't getting my point.

If God does not exist, then somehow consciousness in humans came from a non conscious process of 'natural selection' and this 'natural selection' somehow is the supposed 'explanation' for why or how humans have rationality,

Technically false, since though natural selection is apart of the causal explanation for the existence of rational humans, it's not the only part of the explanation. There are other parts of the explanations, and these parts are the focus of topics like neuroscience and philosophy of mind.

however you haven't shown me how 'natural selection' EXPLAINS how or why humans have rationality, and this is from the second before rationality didn't exist, to the second after rationality existed.

Natural selection is apart of the causal explanation for why rational humans exist. There was selection for organism with various cognitive capacities, and these organisms predominated in the environment. If you want a more detailed explanation of the evolution of human cognition, there are plenty of sources people can point you to.

Humans are dependent upon natural selection, and we can supposedly KNOW how it works, and we can supposedly KNOW how it makes species 'better' for survival, however how exactly can we know what a 'better' is, when we are apart of the very process that, according to you, doesn't think?

Again, that's a ridiculous response, since natural selection does not have to think in order for humans to think. That's as silly as saying that

the process of Earth's orbit around the Sun must think, since humans are apart of that process and humans think

I'm sorry, but this look utterly silly to me. Just because we think about a process, doesn't mean the process itself needs to think. Just because we know about how a process works, doesn't mean the process itself needs to think.

All you do is make an unsupported assumption and run with it. It's as if you are saying that this process is mindless, but yet at the same time can create a variation between populations without having the know what a variation between population is, and yet here we are as humans who are part of this very process, but can understand the difference between a population. Well what property from the universe gave us this ability to distinguish this difference if the property didn't exist as a part of 'natural selection'?

Again utterly fallacious. It's as ridiculous as saying:

It's as if you are saying that this process is not itself a biological species, but yet at the same time can create a variation between populations without having the know what biological species is, and yet here we are as humans who are part of this very process, but can understand the difference between species. Well what property from the universe gave us this ability to distinguish this difference if the property didn't exist as a part of 'natural selection'?

The obvious reply is:

Why in the heck does natural selection have to be a biological species, in order to produce things that are species and understand what a species is?

Parallel reply to you: causal processes do not need to have the same properties as their effects.

This is why natural selection looks like a program placed to do things at such and such time and is the result of a 'knower'. You are trying to say that 'natural selection' has a function of doing such and such, but I cannot see any distinction between a 'function' and a 'purpose' they look exactly identical.

Please don't abuse philosophy of biology. Natural selection is not some program made by a designer. And natural selection does not have a function. Instead, functions in biology are accounted for in terms of natural selection; that's not the same thing as saying that natural selection itself has a function.

4) This makes no sense, explain to me how gravity would cause my ability to reason

That if P --> Q,

P,

thereore Q

To a point where it would 'fall'?????

I didn't say gravity caused your ability to reason. Instead, in response to your claim that:

"Gravity is not a process that involves a causal relation to cognitive faculties"

I pointed out that gravity did enter into causal relations with cognitive faculties:

"No, it does. For example, gravity causes things the fall of many things, including things with cognitive faculties."

[Jichard]

And without a foundation to use as an essence, there is nothing but an infinite regress of terms defining other terms and never getting anywhere on knowing what exactly the person is conceiving of.

Nope. First, in the real world, people actually know what terms mean, without need to use essentialist. Just because you pretend to not know what terms mean, doesn't change that. Second, as I noted in the previous post, your own essentialist position is subject to your objection, since you're going to have to specify essences by using terms.

Once again the problem of an infinite regress of finding out what the term really means rears its ugly head. If what you are saying is true, there is no possible way that two people could know that they are speaking of the same concept when they debate.

Again, no infinite regress, since in the real world people understand what terms mean, and don't do what you're doing, where you pretend not to know what terms mean and instead keep asking for definitions over and over and over and... no matter what terms you're given. So when we give people definitions using terms they understand, they accept the definition and understand it, as opposed to pretending not to understand.

His view is non realist (conventionalist), and it still fails. The notion of similarity has always been a problem for his nonsensical anti realist stance on universals. He tries to take two different ideas of things, but ultimately treats everything as one, but I can't blame him since he has no choice.

There is a dichotomy, Wittgenstein is a nominalist which is the opposite of Platonism (or realism), as he takes a stance of conventionalism

Same false dichotomy, since on Wittgenstein's position, there's still a distinction between use and mention, yet he does not accept your essentialist position. So you were incorrect in treating things as a false dichotomy between mentioning a term and using the term in an essentialist way

The whole 'use' 'mention' nonsense added nothing useful to the discussion, maybe it was a good distraction for you, but you just ended up giving Tassman too much of the benefit of the doubt, and this is probably because he or she is on the same team.

Not really. Tassman responded to you in the way I expect: by clarifying that he was talking about mosquitos themselves, not the term "mosquito"; that is: tassman was using the term "mosquito", not mentioning it.

The guy doesn't even take metaphysics seriously and you are going to lecture me on how he supposedly knew something about the problem of universals...please spare me and move on from this.

I'm saying that he knew better than to fall for your slide between use and mention, even though he might not have known those distinctions by their names.

I was just showing you how silly it is to take a position of nominalism, which is something that Wittgenstein held to

You were pretending not to know what "fly" meant.

I was doing that on purpose, and I have to say....Gotcha, because look at what you said

You said I failed to apply a term correctly? So there is a correct way to apply to terms...Well that's pretty just an argument in favor of universals.

Not really. It's an argument in favor of you not pretending to know what "(of a bird or other winged creature)". The definition of "fly" clearly included "(of a bird or other winged creature)". You pretended not to know what that meant, so you could pretend not to know that you're not a fly. That doesn't show that universal exist. Instead, it just show that definitions (that use words) won't work on people who pretend not to know what words mean.

What you are doing is explaining to me the relations of qualitative identity, which is in the ballpark of the very metaphysical position that I hold to.

No, I'm explaining to you why definitions (that use words) won't work on people who pretend not to know what words mean.

as far as defining our terms by using other points, please realize that if you never reach and actual point that describes what the object is you will end up in a regress of definitions.

This isn't a so-what, it's nominalism is incoherent

First, there is no infinite regress, since in the real world people understand what terms mean, and don't do what you're doing, where you pretend not to know what terms mean and instead keep asking for definitions over and over and over and... no matter what terms you're given. So when we given people definitions using terms they understand, they accept the definition, as opposed to pretending not to understand.

Second, you haven't shown that nominalism is incoherent. You've instead just engaged in a specific instance of a more trivial, general point:

If someone asks you to explain X, and they're going to keep asking for more explanations no matter what you say (without ever accepting any explanation you offer), then there's no chance of giving them an explanation they will accept. You'll just have to go on forever, or stop wasting your time with them.

That point applies to any position, including positions like you'rs that offer essentialist definitions of essences.

Then get rid of taxonomy and go define your species in that infinite regress of terms

We actually don't need to do that. If you've stayed abreast of modern biology, you know that we still have modern taxonomies, without the need for an infinite regress of terms nor a need for essentialism. And that's because biologists (unlike you) don't pretend not to know what terms means, so when they're given definitions that use terms those biologists understand, the biologists accept the definitions and understand them, as opposed to pretending not to know what the words mean.

According to you I don't need to specify what I am talking about, because all I need is a dictionary.

And I can use terms incorrectly

You terms terms incorrectly be pretending not to know what the terms means in the definition you're given.

Last thanks for telling me about the 'nature of communication' in your very last statement as it clearly shows the fact that essentialism is essential to make sense of anything.

That's false, since biologists get along pretty well in making sense of species, without needing to resort to essentialism. Same for numerous other terms that people understand very well (and use in communication) without needing to provide strict necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of those terms.

[Cornell]

Are you pretending not to know what English words mean again?

If so, then I am going to treat you a foreign language speaker who's relatively new to English and thus doesn't know what "man" means. So, please go to the dictionary, open it up to the page for "man", and read the definition.

Yeah I guess when you say an English word, I should automatically know the essence of said word and understand what you are conceiving about.

Again, who's talking about things popping into existence without explanation?

And we have an explanation for why natural selection occurs; it's a biological process that occurs when certain conditions are met.

I was talking about things which pop into existence without explanation, and this is why you shouldn't jump into things mid-debate as if you know what's fully going on.

Anyways what you described is incomplete.

HOW or WHY is it that natural selection becomes a process that does such and such when certain conditions are met?

That is what I want to, as that is the bigger question.

Again, that's as ridiculous as saying:

nothing explains 'dust's and gas'' ability to create planets, unless planets was already a part of reality

Once again, effects can have properties lacked by their causes

Ok so are you saying that it's possible that your thoughts which you post here could be a property that wasn't caused by your brain? If that is the case then who am I arguing with?

Technically false, since though natural selection is apart of the causal explanation for the existence of rational humans, it's not the only part of the explanation. There are other parts of the explanations, and these parts are the focus of topics like neuroscience and philosophy of mind.

Well it would only be false if you explained to me what exactly happened and show me that rationality can come from non rationality, so where is this explanation? For something to be false you would need to provide me with the truth....so where is it?

Natural selection is apart of the causal explanation for why rational humans exist. There was selection for organism with various cognitive capacities, and these organisms predominated in the environment. If you want a more detailed explanation of the evolution of human cognition, there are plenty of sources people can point you to.

And this gets me no where,

How did consciousness come from non consciousness? Did natural selection pull it from the multiverse? Did consciousness just pop into existence?

I have been asking this question for years now and I have yet to hear anything remotely coherent that doesn't involve magic.

Again, that's a ridiculous response, since natural selection does not have to think in order for humans to think. That's as silly as saying that

the process of Earth's orbit around the Sun must think, since humans are apart of that process and humans think

I'm sorry, but this look utterly silly to me. Just because we think about a process, doesn't mean the process itself needs to think. Just because we know about how a process works, doesn't mean the process itself needs to think.

Well now you are kind of getting a bit certain of yourself here, so

If you are so sure that natural selection does not have to think in order to think, then why don't you demonstrate it to me from your third person perspective.

I want you to get into sort of a the first person perspective of this natural selection from your third person perspective and demonstrate to me.

How exactly could you or anyone possibly know what does and what doesn't have the ability to think from your third person perspective.

It only go this point, because you sound so absolutely certain of the case that natural selection wasn't programmed or isn't currently thinking.

Again utterly fallacious. It's as ridiculous as saying:

It's as if you are saying that this process is not itself a biological species, but yet at the same time can create a variation between populations without having the know what biological species is, and yet here we are as humans who are part of this very process, but can understand the difference between species. Well what property from the universe gave us this ability to distinguish this difference if the property didn't exist as a part of 'natural selection'?

The obvious reply is:

Why in the heck does natural selection have to be a biological species, in order to produce things that are species and understand what a species is?

Because the response of 'natural selection makes things fit for the best survival' is so incredibly ad-hoc and mine works the other way around. By this very debate I'm finding more flaws in 'natural selection' minus God and to me it looks like it isn't even defined properly.

Like when did natural selection start? Did it start prior to the first living organism or did it program itself into the first organism? Your 'side' is riddled with problems that is so clear and distinct that I have no idea why more atheists aren't skeptical of it.

Another problem

If natural selection doesn't know what its doing, because it doesn't think, then it doesn't care about 'truth' as...it doesn't think, but yet it creates beings that do think so then the only position to take here with regards to knowledge is a radical skepticism, because everything I know just amounts to beliefs that give me a better survival fitness.

Parallel reply to you: causal processes do not need to have the same properties as their effects.

Then according to you, a God can come into being from an existence with no God.

So Theism is always justified since it is always possible for a God to come from No God. At any time a God can just pop into existence unexplained into your godless reality and this would make Theism true.

If you want to throw away causal principles then you need to realize the absurdities that follow.

Please don't abuse philosophy of biology. Natural selection is not some program made by a designer. And natural selection does not have a function. Instead, functions in biology are accounted for in terms of natural selection; that's not the same thing as saying that natural selection itself has a function.

What your saying makes no sense.

If natural selection doesn't function in a way, then don't speak of its activities.

Those who are atheists in philosophy of biology need to apply a bit more skepticism to natural selection, because it looks like nothing but magic.

I didn't say gravity caused your ability to reason. Instead, in response to your claim that:

"Gravity is not a process that involves a causal relation to cognitive faculties"

I pointed out that gravity did enter into causal relations with cognitive faculties:

"No, it does. For example, gravity causes things the fall of many things, including things with cognitive faculties."

Then your response is a non-sequitur as I was specifically talking about 'causal relations'

[Cornell]

Nope. First, in the real world, people actually know what terms mean, without need to use essentialist. Just because you pretend to not know what terms mean, doesn't change that. Second, as I noted in the previous post, your own essentialist position is subject to your objection, since you're going to have to specify essences by using terms.

So how do they know what terms mean if there only option is an infinite regress of defining terminology?

essentialism is not subject to my objection, because you automatically refute yourself once you KNOW what essentialism means,

Basically essentialism can only POSSIBLY refute itself if essentialism had an essence of its own, but if things have essences then essentialism is true.

There is no way out, you just have to concede the fact that essences exist.

Again, no infinite regress, since in the real world people understand what terms mean, and don't do what you're doing, where you pretend not to know what terms mean and instead keep asking for definitions over and over and over and... no matter what terms you're given. So when we give people definitions using terms they understand, they accept the definition and understand it, as opposed to pretending not to understand.

They THINK they know what the words mean...big difference

If I ask them to justify how they know what the words mean they would ultimately end up in an infinite regress and never speak about anything, because the terms would never truly be defined. No foundations, no where to go but planting one's feet firmly in mid-air

nominalism fails

Same false dichotomy, since on Wittgenstein's position, there's still a distinction between use and mention, yet he does not accept your essentialist position. So you were incorrect in treating things as a false dichotomy between mentioning a term and using the term in an essentialist way

Wittgenstein is a conventionalist, and it appears that you are unaware of what that position is and therefore you fail to realize that there are only two options available to universals. Realist or non-realist

Now that I have dug deeper in this 'use' 'mention' red herring there is no distinction between using a word and mentioning it. The terms always have some essence about it that describes what it truly is when either mentioned or used.

I use the word addition

I mention the word addition

The nature of the term 'addition' doesn't change either way. The concept is the same

So now that I have engaged on your red herring, it is clear that there is no distinction between a 'use' and a 'mention' that is just garbage that nominalists, relativists about truth and radical empiricists use as a smoke screen to cover up their horrible positions.

Not really. Tassman responded to you in the way I expect: by clarifying that he was talking about mosquitos themselves, not the term "mosquito"; that is: tassman was using the term "mosquito", not mentioning it.

I see no difference between using the word and mentioning it. By talking about mosquitos themselves you are ultimately grounding yourself into an ontological commitment of knowing what a 'mosquito' is otherwise you aren't talking about anything.

I'm saying that he knew better than to fall for your slide between use and mention, even though he might not have known those distinctions by their names.

Thank God I was skeptical of Wittgenstein in my early years. You are falling into the same trap that Wittgenstein fell into when he failed to realize the notion of similarity.

It seems as though this man pointed out a 'similar' problem

Sluga H., Family Resemlance, Grazer Philosophische Studien 71 (2006) 14

You were pretending not to know what "fly" meant.

I still showed you how all of this supports essentialism

Not really. It's an argument in favor of you not pretending to know what "(of a bird or other winged creature)". The definition of "fly" clearly included "(of a bird or other winged creature)". You pretended not to know what that meant, so you could pretend not to know that you're not a fly. That doesn't show that universal exist. Instead, it just show that definitions (that use words) won't work on people who pretend not to know what words mean.

If I don't know what the definition of a fly is, and there is ultimately one definition of fly that fits what 'flyness' or 'being a fly' really is, then yes, a universal exists. a fly is something that particular things have in common, namely characteristics or qualities.

So I can't be wrong, (because in nominalism there is no wrong way to define a term) but I can be right and that is an advantage to holding to universals.

Plato and his 'one over many' argument is pure brilliance.

No, I'm explaining to you why definitions (that use words) won't work on people who pretend not to know what words mean.

What would it matter if universals didn't exist? Who the heck cares of people know what a word means, but yet the word is nothing but a human convention that doesn't accurately reflect the thing itself?

First, there is no infinite regress, since in the real world people understand what terms mean, and don't do what you're doing, where you pretend not to know what terms mean and instead keep asking for definitions over and over and over and... no matter what terms you're given. So when we given people definitions using terms they understand, they accept the definition, as opposed to pretending not to understand.

Yes there is an infinite regress and I can show this by consistently asking you what a definition means until you notice the case that you will be doing this indefinitely.

This is what I do with nominalists and they still refuse to admit that their position is incoherent...it is what it is

Second, you haven't shown that nominalism is incoherent. You've instead just engaged in a specific instance of a more trivial, general point:

If someone asks you to explain X, and they're going to keep asking for more explanations no matter what you say (without ever accepting any explanation you offer), then there's no chance of giving them an explanation they will accept. You'll just have to go on forever, or stop wasting your time with them.

That point applies to any position, including positions like you'rs that offer essentialist definitions of essences.

Then you don't know what essentialism is

For one 'the buck stops here' when explaining an essence, and there is no need to go on an endless event of defining terms over and over with no where to stop. people just know what some natures are, and they know this by conceptual analysis as things just become clear and distinctly true.

David Oderberg has pretty much put this debate to rest in his 2007 book on essentialism.

We actually don't need to do that. If you've stayed abreast of modern biology, you know that we still have modern taxonomies, without the need for an infinite regress of terms nor a need for essentialism. And that's because biologists (unlike you) don't pretend not to know what terms means, so when they're given definitions that use terms those biologists understand, the biologists accept the definitions and understand them, as opposed to pretending not to know what the words mean.

Ok let's out this to the test then, what does it mean to say that an African elephant has large ears?

IF there is no such thing as 'largeness' then What does 'large' mean?

You terms terms incorrectly be pretending not to know what the terms means in the definition you're given.

It is a game I play with nominalists who refuse to admit that their position is incoherent, it is totally fair game.

That's false, since biologists get along pretty well in making sense of species, without needing to resort to essentialism. Same for numerous other terms that people understand very well (and use in communication) without needing to provide strict necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of those terms.

They only get along pretty well, because they ASSUME PLATONISM when speaking of species, they look at universals as things which are indispensable and are necessary to make sense of the world when speaking about biology.

Wittgenstein would cause nothing but problems for them, and his talks of 'family resemblance' are incredibly implausible and should be rejected.

[Cornell]

The whole 'use' 'mention' Wittgenstein nonsense has gotten me to the point where I think Ludwig is one of the most overrated philosophers in the history of philosophy and the man is nothing more than a sophist (keep in mind that the man is dead, so I am not actually saying this to Wittgenstein's face in a debate with Ludwig himself).

You can't help but 'use' a word when you 'mention' it in a proposition, but the mentioning of the word can be the truth-bearer of the term that ultimately becomes something that is being used at the same time in said proposition that consists of having a truth-bearer involves of the propositional content.

A mosquito would be the SUBJECT of the proposition and therefore it is inescapable to use the word in a specific way after you mention it. You have to be implying something about the term in a sentence when you mention it. There is ontological commitment to a term where anyone 'uses' it or 'mentions' it.

This whole 'use' 'mention' thing is pure abject sophistry and Wittgenstein is becoming so easy to refute.

[Tassman]

If metaphysics has no way to test in of itself its own premises then why do different views of the theory of truth, free will, persistence, ontology and universals exist?

physics presupposes metaphysics not the other way around, a physicist cannot even make a proposition about the external world without assuming the fact that a solipsism is false and that she isn't plugged into the matrix to begin with.

You don't know metaphysics, and if you want to know how it can test itself then do some research on CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS.

If the principle of uniformity is merely a hypothesis then there is no reason to make a claim about the speed of light in the first place, because the speed of light would have no uniformity of nature and therefore could possibly be the case where the speed of light becomes unintelligible. For instance while measuring the speed of light it would become possible that 'light' morphs into a 'butterfly' for no reason at all, since there is no uniformity of nature which therefore makes any talk of the 'speed of light' just a bunch of nonsense.

This is why metaphysics underpins physics, and you don't even realize it.

You obviously didn't get my point about humans popping into existence 3 billion years ago, of course no one has said it, and they won't say it because evolution is dictated by causal principles and if it wasn't then talking about evolution and natural selection becomes unintelligible. All you did is post what 'natural selection' is, and not how or why it even exists, so you have no foundation to your claim.

God did it (is responsible for physical existence) makes much more sense than "mindlessness just did it itself from itself and now we see itself being itself', God also has more explanatory power and scope, is less ad-hoc, and is consistent with what we see in reality, so a necessary rational consciousness beats out the whatever mindless mechanistic magic you believe in.

Try being skeptical of a reality with no necessary mind governing it, in fact just use half the skepticism you use against God and you will see why Theism > Atheism.