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This forum is open discussion between atheists and all theists to defend and debate their views on religion or non-religion. Please respect that this is a Christian-owned forum and refrain from gratuitous blasphemy. VERY wide leeway is given in range of expression and allowable behavior as compared to other areas of the forum, and moderation is not overly involved unless necessary. Please keep this in mind. Atheists who wish to interact with theists in a way that does not seek to undermine theistic faith may participate in the World Religions Department. Non-debate question and answers and mild and less confrontational discussions can take place in General Theistics.
Forum Rules: Here
This forum is open discussion between atheists and all theists to defend and debate their views on religion or non-religion. Please respect that this is a Christian-owned forum and refrain from gratuitous blasphemy. VERY wide leeway is given in range of expression and allowable behavior as compared to other areas of the forum, and moderation is not overly involved unless necessary. Please keep this in mind. Atheists who wish to interact with theists in a way that does not seek to undermine theistic faith may participate in the World Religions Department. Non-debate question and answers and mild and less confrontational discussions can take place in General Theistics.
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Faith Without Reason (A Response to Richard Dawkins, et al)
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Originally posted by MaxVel View PostThat would be why he is a professional, well-qualified and widely published philosopher, and you're just some goofball on TWeb.
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Additionally, your OP's general point is pretty trivial. Basically, it involves making an epistemic point apart of your position, so that when people object to that epistemic point, they've made a de facto objection to your position. That's pretty trivial to do, and one can do that for any old position. For example, one could re-define positive atheism such that it includes the claim that positive atheism is rational. That way, if someone tried to object de jure (and not de facto) to positive atheism by saying that positive atheism was irrational, one could just turn around and claim that that is really a de facto objection.
Of course, that trivial strategy has the problems I noted elsewhere. For example, if you do it for Christianity, it's a strawman and ad hoc definition of Christianity. Furthermore, it doesn't change the fact that one can make a de jure objection to a belief that the Christian God exists, without making de facto objection to it:
"Now, Plantinga might claim that what I wrote above represents a de facto objection to Christianity. After all, he might claim that if the Christian God made us, then the Christian God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. So to deny that we have such a system is to deny that Christianity is true, which is a de facto objection to Christianity. However, this reply from Plantinga would fail. After all, Christianity doesn't actually commit one to the claim that God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. For example, there are instances in the Bible where God seems to befuddle peope's cognitive systems for its own purposes. Furthermore, the question of whether the Christians God exists is different from the question of what particular Christians claim that the Christian God did with respect human cognitive systems. One can offer a de facto objection to the latter, without giving a de facto objection to the former. And that would allow one to offer a de jure objection to Christianity, without offering a de facto objection the belief that the Christian God exists."Last edited by Jichard; 08-02-2015, 11:56 AM.
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Originally posted by Jichard View PostAre you sure that this is the type of objection they offer? Because I think you might be strawmanning them. After all, one doesn't need to be completely sure that a religion is false in order to know it's false, anymore than I need to be 100% certain that the Earth is round to know that the Earth is round. Knowledge doesn't require epistemic certainty. I bring this up because I think you might be confusing some atheists saying that they are not 100% sure whether Christianity (or another religion) is false with those atheists saying that they do not know whether Christianity (or another religion) is false. And that might explain why you attributed the above claims to them.
Originally posted by Jichard View PostFirst, one can offer a more plausible criterion of "proper basicality", on which belief that God exists would not be properly basic. And one can do that without resorting to classical foundantialism. One could, for example, do so while advocating foundherentism or modest foundatioalism. Tyler Wunder defends such a criterion in the form of universal sanction.
Originally posted by Jichard View PostSecond, the Great Pumpkin objection nammers Plantinga's position, and leads him to resort to a form of epistemic relativism that makes no sense. Really, using Plantinga's methodology, you could argue that any number of absurd beliefs count as properly basic.
Originally posted by Jichard View PostThird, even if a belief is properly basic, that does not necessarily imply that one is rational in holding that belief. For example, one may be aware of large amounts of evidence that weigh against the belief and one might choose to evade addressing that countervailing evidence. Or one may inetionally avoid trying to see if belief in God best explains other information in the world. To put the point another way: one's belief that God exists may be irrational, if one fails to display various epistemic virtuessuch as avoiding wishful thinking, giving due consideration to available evidence, etc. [implying a link between epistemic virtues and being rational].
Originally posted by Jichard View PostFourth, one can offer a naturalistic account of a properly functionaing cognitive system, and then present evidence that theistic belief isn't really the output of such a properly functioning system. Instead, it results from dysfunction in the system. This undermines Plantinga's argument, since Plantinga's argument depends theistic belief being the output of a properly functioning cognitive system. So how might one go about developing this objection? Well, "function" is already naturalized in biology in terms of natural selection. One can then use that to argue that the function of the human cognitive system (in large part) is to produce true beliefs and reason about them in truth-conducive ways. One then argues that theistic belief isn't the output of such a functioning system. For example, theistic belief results more from intuitive thinking and rationalizations of intuitive thinking, as opposed to more truth-conducive, analytic reasoning.[/INDENT]
Originally posted by Jichard View PostThis largely stems from Plantinga's slightly incorrect views on what qualifies as "knowledge". He thinks knowledge is "true belief + warrant", and thinks he's correctly analyzed "warrant" to be something like being produced by properly functioning cognitive system working in the environment it was designed for. But faith need not qualify as warrant, given some of the reasons I went over above. For example, faith doesn't qualify if faith involves failing with respect to the epistemic virtues, by doing things such as ignoring evidence against one's position, engaging in wishful thinking, and so on. Nor does faith qualify if it's the result of unreliable cognitive processes.
Originally posted by Jichard View PostNow, Plantinga might claim that what I wrote above represents a de facto objection to Christianity. After all, he might claim that if the Christian God made us, then the Christian God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. So to deny that we have such a system is to deny that Christianity is true, which is a de facto objection to Christianity. However, this reply from Plantinga would fail. After all, Christianity doesn't actually commit one to the claim that God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. For example, there are instances in the Bible where God seems to befuddle peope's cognitive systems for its own purposes. Furthermore, the question of whether the Christians God exists is different from the question of what particular Christians claim that the Christian God did with respect human cognitive systems. One can offer a de facto objection to the latter, without giving a de facto objection to the former. And that would allow one to offer a de jure objection to Christianity, without offering a de facto objection the belief that the Christian God exists.
And I disagree: there can be a de jure objection apart from a de facto objection, for the reasons I went over above. For example, one can claim that theistic belief results from unreliable cognitive processes / unreliable reasoning, without claiming that theistic belief is false.
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Originally posted by The Pixie View PostWhat makes you think their names are passing away?
Originally posted by The Pixie View PostUnlikely, I am pretty sure Marx realised Christianity pre-dated Capitalism.
Originally posted by The Pixie View PostWhy should we suppose this belief is true? It seems to me that this belief is informed by religion. You already think God exists and is responsible for the mountains, therefore when you see the beauty of the mountains, you get a sensus divinitatus. If you do not start from the assumption that God exists, you do not get this sensus divinitatus.
Originally posted by The Pixie View PostThe argument, then is based on the assumption that God exists, and is therefore circular.
Originally posted by The Pixie View PostCan we really have confidence in such a belief in the same we can about what we had for breakfast?
Originally posted by The Pixie View PostAny argument that starts from faith is really saying you have to assume the conclusion. Which brings us back to why some might suppose Christisanity is irrational.
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Originally posted by Jichard View PostAdditionally, your OP's general point is pretty trivial. Basically, it involves making an epistemic point apart of your position, so that when people object to that epistemic point, they've made a de facto objection to your position. That's pretty trivial to do, and one can do that for any old position. For example, one could re-define positive atheism such that it includes the claim that positive atheism is rational. That way, if someone tried to object de jure (and not de facto) to positive atheism by saying that positive atheism was irrational, one could just turn around and claim that that is really a de facto objection.
Of course, that trivial strategy has the problems I noted elsewhere. For example, if you do it for Christianity, it's a strawman and ad hoc definition of Christianity. Furthermore, it doesn't change the fact that one can make a de jure objection to a belief that the Christian God exists, without making de facto objection to it:
"Now, Plantinga might claim that what I wrote above represents a de facto objection to Christianity. After all, he might claim that if the Christian God made us, then the Christian God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. So to deny that we have such a system is to deny that Christianity is true, which is a de facto objection to Christianity. However, this reply from Plantinga would fail. After all, Christianity doesn't actually commit one to the claim that God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. For example, there are instances in the Bible where God seems to befuddle peope's cognitive systems for its own purposes. Furthermore, the question of whether the Christians God exists is different from the question of what particular Christians claim that the Christian God did with respect human cognitive systems. One can offer a de facto objection to the latter, without giving a de facto objection to the former. And that would allow one to offer a de jure objection to Christianity, without offering a de facto objection the belief that the Christian God exists."
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Originally posted by ShrimpMaster View PostThey offer many objections. This is one of them. Strawmanning or not I was using them as an example. I don't really care to harp on whether they do or not. I just was poking fun... Further, you actually do need 100% certainty that a religion is false to know that it is false. Otherwise, what are you talking about when you claim Christianity is false? That it might be false, therefore, it is??? Sounds ludicrous... If I know a fact that contradicts a truth-claim and that fact has epistemic warrant, then I know that truth-claim is false.
And what is the criterion you are suggesting??? Foundherentism is circular. Even though it tries to avoid the circularity of coherentism. Universal sanction is also a weak grounding for properly basic beliefs. Apart from the fact that the belief in God enjoys proper basicality under universal sanction (after-all a majority [>95%] of the world believes in some form of theism); universal sanction is not a truth criterion. Who defines 'normal' beliefs or 'normal' living conditions? Further, we can think of counterfactuals that would be obviously false. For instance, humans that hold beliefs that are not produced by cognitive faculties aimed at truth. If these were the only people left on earth, then universal sanction would not properly identify whether a belief is true or false.
This is where you are confused. Plantinga is not arguing for the truth of his model. He is saying that if Christianity is true, then something like his model (or close to it) is true. Further, what absurd beliefs are you talking about? Plantinga handles the Great Pumpkin objection in his book. I would need more details on your objection to clarify...
Wrong, the beliefs produced by the sensus divinitatis would be attributable to a cognitive faculty functionally properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief. If the belief in God is produced in this way, then it would satisfy epistemic warrant.
[quote] You think biological evolution is aimed at the production of true beliefs? Evolution is defined by random mutation and natural selection. Belief producing faculties would be aimed at producing beliefs that are conducive to the survival of the species. Whether they are true or not is not relevant to evolution.
First, Randomness is not a part of the definition of evolution. In fact randomness has no causal relationship to evolution. True, true beliefs are not necessarily, and not likely relevant to the natural selection in evolution.
I already answered this above, but Plantinga handles this clearly in his book. Again, the beliefs produced by the sensus divinitatis would be attributable to a cognitive faculty functionally properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief.
A few objections in here... 1) We must be clear that Plantinga is not arguing for the truth of his model. He is saying that if Christianity is true, then his model (or something like his model) is true. An objection to the sensus divinitatus would be a de facto objection in the case of a person who accepts Plantinga's model. I don't really see how the bible commits you to a belief in the sensus divinitatus is relevant or not. If you accept Plantinga's model, then an objection to the sensus divinitatus is a de facto objection. 2) First, I have no idea what passages you are talking about. Second, I don't see how God 'befuddling' peoples cognitive processes is relevant. That would not remove the epistemic warrant of the sensus divinitatus. 3) Pretty similar to #1 - because an objection to what God does with peoples cognitive processes is not objectionable without objecting to Christian truth claims. I think this is a result of the misunderstandings I corrected in the other objections. Remember, the beliefs produced by the sensus divinitatis would be attributable to a cognitive faculty functionally properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief. Thanks
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Originally posted by ShrimpMaster View PostThe point of Plantinga's project with WCD is to make Christianity "intellectually acceptable". If it does that, then he has done his job.
First, Plantinga's defense is trivial, and can be employed in defense of almost any position.
Second, Plantinga's defense doesn't actually convert de jure objections to de facto objections, since it involves and ad hoc re-definition and strawmanof what Christianity is committed to. Someone can have a de jure objection (without a de facoto objection) to what Christianity is actually committed to, evne if they have a de facto objection to the strawman Plantinga erects.
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Originally posted by ShrimpMaster View PostThey offer many objections. This is one of them. Strawmanning or not I was using them as an example. I don't really care to harp on whether they do or not. I just was poking fun... Further, you actually do need 100% certainty that a religion is false to know that it is false. Otherwise, what are you talking about when you claim Christianity is false? That it might be false, therefore, it is??? Sounds ludicrous... If I know a fact that contradicts a truth-claim and that fact has epistemic warrant, then I know that truth-claim is false.
And what is the criterion you are suggesting???
Foundherentism is circular. Even though it tries to avoid the circularity of coherentism.
Universal sanction is also a weak grounding for properly basic beliefs. Apart from the fact that the belief in God enjoys proper basicality under universal sanction (after-all a majority [>95%] of the world believes in some form of theism);
Second, universal sanction is not a poll of how many people accept a claim. See here for further discussion of what universal sanction is:
Wunder, Tyler. "Warrant and Religious Epistemology: A Critique of Alvin Plantinga's Warrant Phase."
Third, theistic belief doesn't meet the criterion of universal sanction, since skepticism about theistic belief (tout court) is pragmatically conceivable. After all, there are plenty of psychologically healthy people (who are skeptical about theistic) belief, and manage to get along just fine.
universal sanction is not a truth criterion.
Who defines 'normal' beliefs or 'normal' living conditions?
Further, we can think of counterfactuals that would be obviously false. For instance, humans that hold beliefs that are not produced by cognitive faculties aimed at truth. If these were the only people left on earth, then universal sanction would not properly identify whether a belief is true or false.
This is where you are confused. Plantinga is not arguing for the truth of his model.
He is saying that if Christianity is true, then something like his model (or close to it) is true.
"After all, he might claim that if the Christian God made us, then the Christian God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. So to deny that we have such a system is to deny that Christianity is true, which is a de facto objection to Christianity. However, this reply from Plantinga would fail. After all, Christianity doesn't actually commit one to the claim that God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. For example, there are instances in the Bible where God seems to befuddle peope's cognitive systems for its own purposes. Furthermore, the question of whether the Christians God exists is different from the question of what particular Christians claim that the Christian God did with respect human cognitive systems. One can offer a de facto objection to the latter, without giving a de facto objection to the former. And that would allow one to offer a de jure objection to Christianity, without offering a de facto objection the belief that the Christian God exists."
Further, what absurd beliefs are you talking about?
Plantinga handles the Great Pumpkin objection in his book.
Wrong, the beliefs produced by the sensus divinitatis would be attributable to a cognitive faculty functionally properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief. If the belief in God is produced in this way, then it would satisfy epistemic warrant.
You think biological evolution is aimed at the production of true beliefs?
Evolution is defined by random mutation and natural selection.
Belief producing faculties would be aimed at producing beliefs that are conducive to the survival of the species. Whether they are true or not is not relevant to evolution."Genetic/developmental processes would be aimed at producing wings that are conducive to the survival of the species. Whether those wings fly is not relevant to evolution."The mistakes with such a claim are apparent. For example, it overlooks the fact that wings help the organism's survival, in large part, due to the wings being capable of flight. Parallel point for beliefs and cognitive processes: they tend to help the organisms survival, in large part, due to the beliefs being true and the cognitive processes resulting in largely true beliefs. To put the point another way: you're basically overlooking the features (such as being true) that help a trait realize the role of aiding in an organism's survival. Roles have realizers.
Now, of course, you can construct some logically possible scenario where false beliefs promote survival. But that doesn't undermine the point, anymore than does pointing out some logically possible scenario in which wings aid an organism's survival without that aid being due to flight. Logical possibility does not imply plausibility or being likely.
I already answered this above, but Plantinga handles this clearly in his book. Again, the beliefs produced by the sensus divinitatis would be attributable to a cognitive faculty functionally properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief.
A few objections in here... 1) We must be clear that Plantinga is not arguing for the truth of his model. He is saying that if Christianity is true, then his model (or something like his model) is true. An objection to the sensus divinitatus would be a de facto objection in the case of a person who accepts Plantinga's model. I don't really see how the bible commits you to a belief in the sensus divinitatus is relevant or not. If you accept Plantinga's model, then an objection to the sensus divinitatus is a de facto objection."He is saying that if Christianity is true, then something like his model (or close to it) is true."But if accepting the Bible does not imply accepting something like A/C, that provides evidence that one can accept the central tenets of Christianity without accepting something like A/C. And that undermines your claim.
Furthermore, as I explained in my post, since Christianity does not entail something like the A/C model, then giving a de facto objection to A/C does not entail giving a de facto objection to Christianity itself. Thus, one could offer a de jure objection to Christianity (without offering a de fato objection to Christianity), even if some theists decide to define their own personal form of Christianity in a way that incorporates A/C, such that one cannot offer a de jure objection to their position without offering a de facto one.
2) First, I have no idea what passages you are talking about.
Second, I don't see how God 'befuddling' peoples cognitive processes is relevant. That would not remove the epistemic warrant of the sensus divinitatus.
3) Pretty similar to #1 - because an objection to what God does with peoples cognitive processes is not objectionable without objecting to Christian truth claims.Last edited by Jichard; 08-03-2015, 11:34 PM.
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Originally posted by ShrimpMaster View PostI haven't heard from them recently and any attack on religion is usually directed toward radical Muslims, which seems kind of desperate.
Read the communist manifesto...
When the ancient world was in its last throes, the ancient religions were overcome by Christianity. When Christian ideas succumbed in the 18th century to rationalist ideas, feudal society fought its death battle with the then revolutionary bourgeoisie. The ideas of religious liberty and freedom of conscience merely gave expression to the sway of free competition within the domain of knowledge.
Nothing is easier than to give Christian asceticism a Socialist tinge. Has not Christianity declaimed against private property, against marriage, against the State? Has it not preached in the place of these, charity and poverty, celibacy and mortification of the flesh, monastic life and Mother Church? Christian Socialism is but the holy water with which the priest consecrates the heart-burnings of the aristocrat.
Neither of these suggest "Marx thought Christianity was a result of the deprivations of Capitalism". I am wondering where you got this idea from.
The sensus divinitatus specifically occasions the belief "these mountains were made by God". Why is this significant? In short, this provides a furnishing for the proper basicality of the belief in God.
Interesting position to take, but not very convincing.
Are you saying that the belief that is not a belief that "these mountains were made by God" affords knowledge of God? Can you give an example of something you came to know about God after you got this sensus divinitatus? Something that you did not know before hand.
It isn't based on the assumption that God exists...
Can we really have confidence in such a belief in the same we can about what we had for breakfast?
Comparing to a belief god exists based on a belief that is not a belief that some mountains were made by God, if we assume in advance that God made the mountains, I would say that is several orders of magnitude better.
It is a model not an argument...My Blog: http://oncreationism.blogspot.co.uk/
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