The Honest Atheist?

[Paprika]

Yeah, I don't really feel I missed Papikra's point.

But you have.

If we're talking about a maximally great being's omniscience, then we're talking about this maximally great being's ability to know all there is to know. Its absurd to imagine that there is a being who's knowledge surpasses one who's knowledge encapsulates all that there can be known. If we're talking about a maximally great being's omnipotence, we're talking about this maximally great being's ability to actualize any possible state of affairs. Its absurd to talk of a being who can surpass a being who's omnipotence can actualize any possible state of affairs. When we talk of a being who is maximally moral, we're referring to a necessary being who (probably poorly defined) is all sustaining and true to his complete nature. It is absurd to to talk of a being who can out surpass one's own sustaining values and duties.

As I said above: It may be true that it is coherent to speak of a maximum of some qualities, but Plantinga's argument is implictly talking about all [excellent?] qualities or properties.

In my opinion, the ontological argument starts off as more of a mind exercise, rather than direct evidence for God.

All right, but I'm treating it as a logical argument as it was designed.

Its wrong footed to get hung up on quantities of "maximal" (at least at the beginning of the argument, and/or whether or not these maximal abilities are intrinsic). As far as great making abilities are concerned there probably are intrinsic maximums; There must be a limit (regardless of whether that limit is extrinsic or intrinsic),

"Probably"? Why "must" there be a limit?

however, that's not really the point of the Ontological Argument.

Quite, but it is a implicit assumption which is not justified within the argument.

All that said though, I still don't see anything in Plantinga's version of the argument that says anything about a maximally great being having a maximum number of properties. Plantinga seems to define only 3 major properties.

Why should a maximally great being have only 3 major properties? And if not 3, then why any bounded number?

[Paprika]

The meaning of "greatest integer" is obvious. It just happens to be inconsistent with what we ordinarily mean by "integer."

Yes. My point is: similarly, could not "maximally great being" be inconsistent?

[shunyadragon]

Yes. My point is: similarly, could not "maximally great being" be inconsistent?

As a Theist I have a problem with many of the intellectual arguments concerning the nature of God using limited human terminology. such arguments get tangled in trivial meaning of such things as "maximally great" trying to define what cannot be defined.

More simply God is simply God, undefinable and unknowable from the human perspective. The Revelation of God's attributes, is what we are capable of knowing.

[Adrift]

As I said above: It may be true that it is coherent to speak of a maximum of some qualities, but Plantinga's argument is implictly talking about all [excellent?] qualities or properties.

Can you show me where he implicitly talks about all qualities are properties? In the argument's of his that I've read on the subject, he doesn't really get into more than the three.

"Probably"? Why "must" there be a limit?

Because properties like knowledge, power, and moral goodness have intrinsic maximums. Omniscience, "all-knowing", is defined as knowing all that can be known, and omnipotence is defined as being able to actualize any possible state of affairs. There aren’t any greater possible conditions for those aspects of knowledge and power. It is conceptually impossible for a being to be able to do more than this.

What you appear to be arguing is popularly known as the "Lost Island" refutation by Gaunilo of Marmoutiers. Basically, Gaunilo argued that one could always add another tree, or another beach to the greatest island to make it greater so that one could always conceive of a greater island. The response, though, is that the ontological argument escapes this critique because God's primary properties do have intrinsic limits. Let me cite the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy again,

Source: Kenneth Einar Himma, Associate Professor, Seattle Pacific University, Department of Philosophy

The problem here is that the qualities that make an island great are not the sort of qualities that admit of conceptually maximal qualities. No matter how great any island is in some respect, it is always possible to imagine an island greater than that island in that very respect. For example, if one thinks that abundant fruit is a great-making property for an island, then, no matter how great a particular island might be, it will always be possible to imagine a greater island because there is no intrinsic maximum for fruit-abundance. For this reason, the very concept of a piland is incoherent.

But this is not true of the concept of God as Anselm conceives it. Properties like knowledge, power, and moral goodness, which comprise the concept of a maximally great being, do have intrinsic maximums. For example, perfect knowledge requires knowing all and only true propositions; it is conceptually impossible to know more than this. Likewise, perfect power means being able to do everything that it is possible to do; it is conceptually impossible for a being to be able to do more than this.

The general point here, then, is this: Anselm's argument works, if at all, only for concepts that are entirely defined in terms of properties that admit of some sort of intrinsic maximum. As C.D. Broad puts this important point:

[The notion of a greatest possible being imaginable assumes that] each positive property is to be present in the highest possible degree. Now this will be meaningless verbiage unless there is some intrinsic maximum or upper limit to the possible intensity of every positive property which is capable of degrees. With some magnitudes this condition is fulfilled. It is, e.g., logically impossible that any proper fraction should exceed the ratio 1/1; and again, on a certain definition of "angle," it is logically impossible for any angle to exceed four right angles. But it seems quite clear that there are other properties, such as length or temperature or pain, to which there is no intrinsic maximum or upper limit of degree.

If any of the properties that are conceptually essential to the notion of God do not admit of an intrinsic maximum, then Anselm's argument strategy will not work because, like Guanilo's concept of a piland, the relevant concept of God is incoherent. But insofar as the relevant great-making properties are limited to omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection (which do admit of intrinsic maximums), Anselm's notion of a greatest possible being seems to avoid the worry expressed by Broad and Guanilo

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Plantinga himself replies to this objection by stating,

Source: God, Freedom, and Evil

Anselm clearly has in mind such properties as wisdom, knowledge, power, and moral excellence or moral perfection. And certainly knowledge, for example, does have an intrinsic maximum: if for every proposition p, a being B knows whether or not p is true, then B has a degree of knowledge that is utterly unsurpassable. So a greatest possible being would have to have this kind of knowledge: it would have to be omniscient. Similarly for power; omnipotence is a degree of power that can't possibly be excelled. Moral perfection or moral excellence is perhaps not quite so clear; still a being could perhaps always do what is morally right, so that it would not be possible for it to be exceeded along those lines.

© Copyright Original Source

Why should a maximally great being have only 3 major properties? And if not 3, then why any bounded number?

I don't know. Perhaps only the three properties, omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection are all that are required to establish that a greatest conceivable being exists, and/or perhaps its because only those three properties possess intrinsic maximums.

[Paprika]

Dude, look at your own source:

The general point here, then, is this: Anselm's argument works, if at all, only for concepts that are entirely defined in terms of properties that admit of some sort of intrinsic maximum. As C.D. Broad puts this important point:

[The notion of a greatest possible being imaginable assumes that] each positive property is to be present in the highest possible degree. Now this will be meaningless verbiage unless there is some intrinsic maximum or upper limit to the possible intensity of every positive property which is capable of degrees. With some magnitudes this condition is fulfilled. It is, e.g., logically impossible that any proper fraction should exceed the ratio 1/1; and again, on a certain definition of "angle," it is logically impossible for any angle to exceed four right angles. But it seems quite clear that there are other properties, such as length or temperature or pain, to which there is no intrinsic maximum or upper limit of degree.

If any of the properties that are conceptually essential to the notion of God do not admit of an intrinsic maximum, then Anselm's argument strategy will not work because, like Guanilo's concept of a piland, the relevant concept of God is incoherent. But insofar as the relevant great-making properties are limited to omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection (which do admit of intrinsic maximums), Anselm's notion of a greatest possible being seems to avoid the worry expressed by Broad and Guanilo

Thanks for the admission: Anselm's argument (and Plantinga's) necessitates that the great-making properties MUST have a maximum, otherwise the argument fails.

It is heartening that I have not been the only one to ask "Why?" Why should a maximally great being have only the three characteristics that (supposedly) are easily defined to have a maximum?

Can you show me where he implicitly talks about all qualities are properties? In the argument's of his that I've read on the subject, he doesn't really get into more than the three.

Yes, I wonder why he only discusses three

Perhaps only the three properties, omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection are all that are required to establish that a greatest conceivable being exists, and/or perhaps its because only those three properties possess intrinsic maximums.

"Perhaps" is fine for meditation, but terrible for a logical argument.

For reference:

Plantinga's argument therefore makes two implicit assumptions:
1) For every [excellent] property there exists a maximum
2) There exists a maximum number of properties

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Plantinga himself replies to this objection by stating,

Source: God, Freedom, and Evil

Anselm clearly has in mind such properties as wisdom, knowledge, power, and moral excellence or moral perfection. And certainly knowledge, for example, does have an intrinsic maximum: if for every proposition p, a being B knows whether or not p is true, then B has a degree of knowledge that is utterly unsurpassable. So a greatest possible being would have to have this kind of knowledge: it would have to be omniscient. Similarly for power; omnipotence is a degree of power that can't possibly be excelled. Moral perfection or moral excellence is perhaps not quite so clear; still a being could perhaps always do what is morally right, so that it would not be possible for it to be exceeded along those lines.

© Copyright Original Source

Emphasis added.

If this is the way that Plantinga defines "maximal knowledge," then I'll have to disagree with Plantinga's claim that it has an intrinsic maximum-- at least insofar as a discrete, finite maximum is concerned. The set of all possible propositions is an infinite set.

[Doug Shaver]

Yes. My point is: similarly, could not "maximally great being" be inconsistent?

That would depend on what we ordinarily mean by "great being." The term seems a lot vaguer to me than "integer," but I don't recall seeing it being used in a way that precludes the existence of some being that is greater than any other.

[Adrift]

Dude, look at your own source:


Thanks for the admission: Anselm's argument (and Plantinga's) necessitates that the great-making properties MUST have a maximum, otherwise the argument fails.

Well, I believe I already admitted that the properties under discussion have intrinsic maximums. I'm sorry if that was previously unclear.

It is heartening that I have not been the only one to ask "Why?" Why should a maximally great being have only the three characteristics that (supposedly) are easily defined to have a maximum?

It should be noted that these three great making properties are not unique to Plantinga. For theologians tackling the ontological argument, they go back as far as Anselm..

Yes, I wonder why he only discusses three

Well, again, this goes back to Anselm. I can think of a number of reasons we may not talk of, say, God's height, or his temperature, or his color, or what have you. There are a number of properties that do necessarily apply to a spiritual being. Plantinga does talk about the property of love, and wonders aloud if love, too, can have an intrinsic maxima, but never attempts to answer the question.

"Perhaps" is fine for meditation, but terrible for a logical argument.

Ok. Again, I'm no expert. Just a lay person with an interest in the subject. By the way, I'm sensing quite a bit of hostility from you on this subject, and I'm not really certain why. I was hoping I made clear from the start that I'm not a specialist, and that I don't think the ontological argument by itself is one that will convince others of God's existence. I think its a neat little mind exercise, but that's about it. From your tone you seem very impatient with me, as though I'm attempting to foist the argument on you. I'm not. I'm only interested in discussing it, and sharing what I remember reading about it. It might help if you actually read his argument in whole yourself. You can find a free copy of God, Freedom, and Evil here if you're interested.

[Paprika]

Well, I believe I already admitted that the properties under discussion have intrinsic maximums.

The point is that all the excellent properties must have a maximum for the argument to work, including but not limited to the three Plantinga discusses.

There are a number of properties that do necessarily apply to a spiritual being. Plantinga does talk about the property of love, and wonders aloud if love, too, can have an intrinsic maxima, but never attempts to answer the question.

Again, because he doesn't, the argument is incomplete, because the argument necessitates that all excellent properties that a "maximally great" being is supposed to have must have a maximum, not just the three he discusses (which have supposedly easily defined maximums). As Plantinga does not prove that there are no more than those three or that those other than the three discussed have a maximum, the argument has a hole.

[Adrift]

Emphasis added.

If this is the way that Plantinga defines "maximal knowledge," then I'll have to disagree with Plantinga's claim that it has an intrinsic maximum-- at least insofar as a discrete, finite maximum is concerned. The set of all possible propositions is an infinite set.

Plantinga is not the only one who defines maximal knowledge this way. As you've seen from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy webpage, its also how the author of that page, Kenneth Einar Himma (Associate Professor, Seattle Pacific University, Department of Philosophy) seems to define it. Philosopher Stephen T. Davis, professor of philosophy at Claremont McKenna college writes in his book Christian Philosophical Theology,

Source: Christian Philosophical Theology by Stephen T. Davis

being red-headed, for example, is not (as we might say) a great-making property because a red-headed thing is not (other things being equal) necessarily greater than a non-red-headed thing. But other properties clearly are relevant to the greatness of the things that have them (or fail to have them). The property of being all-powerfulbeing a prime numberbeing pregnant and being six feet tall, for example. But some properties dobeing tall, for example. Some tall people are taller than other tall people. The same would be true of being wise, being polite, and being learned.

Now, of the properties that admit of degrees, some of them possess, so to speak, a conceivable or intrinsic maximum, and others do not. The property of being tallbeing powerful

© Copyright Original Source

Also Mark C. Murphy, professor of religious philosophy at Georgetown University also defines God's maximal properties in this way. While discussing God's authority in his book, An Essay on Divine Authority, Murphy goes into a tangent to compare authority with God's other properties and writes,

Source: Essay on Divine Authority by Mark C. Murphy

For omniscience, omnipotence, and goodness are plausibly characterized in terms of God's standing in a specific relationship to a certain class of necessary existents: the totality of this class of existents defines the intrinsic maximum with respect to which one can exhibit that property. The class of existents with respect to which God has knowledge is the class of propositions: God knows the truth-value of every proposition. The class of existents with respect to which God has power is the class of possible states of affairs (actually, some subclass of the class of possible states of affairs, to avoid the paradoxes of omnipotence): God has the power to actualize every member of that class. The class of existents with respect to which God is good is the class of truths of appropriate valuing: God wills and acts in accordance with those truths of appropriate valuing. These classes can set an upper bound of knowledge, power, and goodness, and thus can define an intrinsic maximum for the respective perfections.

© Copyright Original Source

A number of other philosophers also seem to agree on the definition of intrinsic maximum for the three properties under discussion. Maybe they're all wrong, I don't know, but somehow I doubt any objections to it on this forum are anything new to those who've studied the subject out professionally.

[Paprika]

The GCB is a thing (3) that possesses all of its G-properties that admit of no intrinsic maximum (if there are any) to a degree unsurpassed by any other thing. (This might include properties like being benevolent or loving; if so, then God is more loving than all other things.)

I hold that God is the GCB in some such sense as this.

This definition is complete (with respect to my point 1).

However, though this definition works for all the beings that actually exist (in our universe), it clearly does not for beings in all possible worlds. Hence it does not save Plantinga's argument (and probably does not save Anselm's).

It also fails with regards to my point 2: why should the G-properties be bounded in number?

[Adrift]

This definition is complete (with respect to my point 1).

However, though this definition works for all the beings that actually exist (in our universe), it clearly does not for beings in all possible worlds. Hence it does not save Plantinga's argument (and probably does not save Anselm's).

It also fails with regards to my point 2: why should the G-properties be bounded in number?

Here Feser discusses the fact that Plantinga himself "concedes that a rational person need not accept this argument, and claims only that a rational person could accept it."

[Paprika]

I also, again, recommend reading Edward Feser's blog. Here Feser discusses the fact that Plantinga himself "concedes that a rational person need not accept this argument, and claims only that a rational person could accept it."

Feser says that Plantinga's admission is that there need not necessarily be a maximally great being because there need not necessarily be a maximum: this is precisely what I argued some time back to be a hole in a class of ontological arguments and have been arguing up to this point.

One reason it might be doubted, Plantinga tells us, is that a rational person could believe that there is a possible world in which the property of “no-maximality” – that is, the property of being such that there is no maximally great being – is exemplified. And if this is possible, then the first and key premise of Plantinga’s argument is false. In short, Plantinga allows that while a reasonable person could accept his ontological argument, another reasonable person could accept instead the following rival argument:

1. No-maximality is possibly exemplified.

2. If no-maximality is possibly exemplified, then maximal greatness is impossible.

3. So maximal greatness is impossible.

(Feser's attempts to save the force of the argument by claiming that "the rational position (again, at least if we buy the whole “possible worlds” framework in the first place) would be to accept his key premise rather than the key premise of the “no-maximality” argument"; but I think it's rather weak.)

So: as I've been able to find the flaw in Plantinga's argument which he agrees exists without having read his work, I see no point in reading it.

[shunyadragon]

Because that's all that it takes to show Maximal Excellence? Again, here's Plantinga's formulation of the argument (as presented in The Nature of Necessity).

1. There is a possible world W in which there exists a being with maximal greatness.

2. Maximal greatness entails having maximal excellence in every possible world.

I do not accept #1 and #2 as necessarily leading to the conclusion of omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect being. Though the maximal greatness by definition could simply be Natural Law, and nothing more. So where do we go from here?

The main problem is that it is Begging the Question, compare one and ten.

this falls victim to the same problem as Gitt's foolishness. ( Git - an unpleasant or contemptible foolish person. Also Gastrointestinal Tract)

[firstfloor]

In order to avoid the serious mistake of worshiping a false god it is best to worship none and avoid idolising the Bible. This is how a Christian might understand the wisdom of atheism. The shy god that hides from humanity does not wish to be worshiped. God is a distraction. Our godly mission is to achieve maximum ignorance of God.
By taking the neutral atheist position you are respecting the real God by waiting to be properly introduced.