Does an Omniscient Creator Lead to Fatalism?

[MaxVel]

I cannot go there with you, Max. Let me see if I can express this another way (hopefully this will not yet again earn me a "moving the goal-posts" award).

The common defense of the position you outlined is "knowledge of action does not limit free will." I 100% agree with that assessment: knowledge (knowing) by a third party cannot limit acting. To propose that is absurd (to me, anyway). But I can hold THAT position AND argue that my free will has been constrained, because it is not the knowledge that is contraining my will. It is the creating!

If we assume an all-knowing, allpowerful god, who can know all possible universes, when this god chooses to create specific universe X because of the choices that will be made by its members in this particular universe, this god is using their fore-knowledge to guide action (selecting the universe to create and creating it). That action on the part of this god is what is constraining my will. That choice of which universe to create, limits my choices to the ones this god fore-knew I would make. I am no longer a truly free-will actor, I am merely reading my lines as they were fore-known and going through my choreography as it was fore-known. I am not aware of this, of course. I feel perfectly free. I feel like I am choosing. But I am not.

Make sense?

(It just strikes me that this is amazingly similar to the suggestion that we all occupy a virtual-world simulation, unaware of it from the inside because we are part of it, which has some elements of Descartes philosophical arguments to it, IIRC).

I've only got time for a brief reply...

(1) I agree that God's omniscience of itself doesn't constrain our free will

(2) In any particular universe that is actually created, the particular choices you make are your free choices. That in another, uncreated universe, you [i] might have [i] made some other free choices seems irrelevant, since that 'you' doesn't exist, and even if it did, it would have made its own free choices.



I think that (1) is the key point. God's omniscience doesn't require fatalism. Our 'inability' to make choices that some other version of us might have made in some hypothetical and non-existant universe is no constraint on our free will any more than God instantiating a universe where humans can't fly unaided is a constraint on it.

I don't see free will as being able to choose to do absolutely anything. So not being able to make choices we might have made in an alternative non- existant universe is not a constraint on our freewill either.

[37818]

Are you suggesting that God is not bound by logic?

God is the reason for logic.

That he could be both God and not God at the same time and in the same sense.

God is the reason that cannot be true.

When you say that "freewill" is not a Biblical term, you're right in so far as the term "freewill" is never used in the Bible; however, the concept of freewill is implicitly if not explicitly implied all throughout scripture.

That is an interpretation. God made man to be self willed. And therefore responsible for choices made.

[carpedm9587]

I've only got time for a brief reply...

(1) I agree that God's omniscience of itself doesn't constrain our free will

(2) In any particular universe that is actually created, the particular choices you make are your free choices. That in another, uncreated universe, you [i] might have [i] made some other free choices seems irrelevant, since that 'you' doesn't exist, and even if it did, it would have made its own free choices.



I think that (1) is the key point. God's omniscience doesn't require fatalism. Our 'inability' to make choices that some other version of us might have made in some hypothetical and non-existant universe is no constraint on our free will any more than God instantiating a universe where humans can't fly unaided is a constraint on it.

I don't see free will as being able to choose to do absolutely anything. So not being able to make choices we might have made in an alternative non- existant universe is not a constraint on our freewill either.

It is not the omniscience that is limiting free will, Max, it is the use of that omniscience to create a universe that is fore-known to have specific outcomes. The constraint is due to this god's action - not to this god's fore-knowledge. The constraint is also not due to what I might have done in an unconstrained universe. The constraint is due to the selection of THIS universe because of that fore-knowledge. I do not see how you can escape this conclusion.

[JimL]

It is not the omniscience that is limiting free will, Max, it is the use of that omniscience to create a universe that is fore-known to have specific outcomes. The constraint is due to this god's action - not to this god's fore-knowledge. The constraint is also not due to what I might have done in an unconstrained universe. The constraint is due to the selection of THIS universe because of that fore-knowledge. I do not see how you can escape this conclusion.

You can't escape that conclusion, but don't think that you will ever get most of these christians here to understand or admit to that. It's an interesting thing to watch how the mind works to protect and defend its long held beliefs. This argument has gone on here for a decade now and no matter how many ways you try to word it and explain the very simple logic to them, it just doesn't compute.

[Sparko]

Yes, and everything on that tape is a product of the past, not a view of the future. Damn Sparko, you're a smart guy, why is it you can't grasp this rather simple fact? If like your past, your future already exists a la the Block universe, then like your taped recording you can't alter it in any way. The Sparko in the beginning of the tape recording can't change the actions of the Sparko further on in the tape because it's all already there. Thats how the B-theory of time works, all of time exists, all events in time exist, past, present and future exist, your experience of passing through time is an illusion. Personally I'm not a believer in the B-theory, but it doesn't allow for free will as you seem to think it does.

You really have a hard time with analogies, don't you?

The person on the recording can't change what he does on the tape, but it is all done of his own free will. You can't change any decision you make once you make it. The universe is like the recording, it shows what free will choices were made. The choices make up the final block universe, not the other way around. Just like the free will actions of the people make up the final recording. "now" is just where the play head currently is.

[Sparko]

Given that the omniscient creator knew what these choices would be even before we were created, at what point were these "free-will' choices made?

I know I am going to take my car in for an oil change on Saturday. Now you know it too! Does that mean I don't have free will?

Knowing is not forcing. The knowing comes from the action not the other way around. You seem to have a hard time grasping that.

[carpedm9587]

You really have a hard time with analogies, don't you?

The person on the recording can't change what he does on the tape, but it is all done of his own free will. You can't change any decision you make once you make it. The universe is like the recording, it shows what free will choices were made. The choices make up the final block universe, not the other way around. Just like the free will actions of the people make up the final recording. "now" is just where the play head currently is.

Sparko - what people are trying to convey (I think) is this: When an action is in the past, and you are traveling back to it, the person has already made the choice, it was freely made, and now that it is in the past, the fact that it cannot be changed does not violate free will, because the free will is temporally prior to the action (or at least concurrent), it was exerted to MAKE the choice. In a sense, will precedes action, and the choice of action is "cemented" at the time of the action, so looking at it from the future we have no problem acknowledging the freedom of choice AND the inability to change that choice now that it is made.

But when you attempt to apply the same logic to FUTURE tasks, you create a conundrum. In a sense, you are trying to look at tasks that have NOT YET occurred, and imbue them with the same characteristics as those past tasks. Like the past task, the future task cannot be changed without compromising the knowledge of the perfect knower (even though it has not actually happened), yet you want to preserve the concept of free will (actually, freedom of choice). You simply cannot have both. If will is truly free, then a different choice should be possible. But it is NOT truly possible without compromising the knowledge of the "time traveler," (who is claimed to be omniscient and without error). If a future task MUST be X, then free will becomes an illusion and we are simply playing out our parts of a pre-written script, blind to our own inability to choose. One thing I am constantly told is that atheism provides no framework for purpose. If anything robs the individual of purpose, this sure must be it.

This is all framed in the language of "knowledge of A cannot constrain action of B," which sounds rational, but is merely dancing away from the conundrum. It is easier to see in the other discussion, that brings to focus the real problem (phrased in terms of creative power, not knowledge).

Not sure if that helps, but there it is.

[Adrift]

You really have a hard time with analogies, don't you?

The person on the recording can't change what he does on the tape, but it is all done of his own free will. You can't change any decision you make once you make it. The universe is like the recording, it shows what free will choices were made. The choices make up the final block universe, not the other way around. Just like the free will actions of the people make up the final recording. "now" is just where the play head currently is.

It's a bit over my head, and perhaps yours as well, but I believe articles like this one, and this one actually answer the type of arguments the opponents of Molinism in this thread are attempting to construct. I'd cite them in whole, but they're quite long, and I'm not sure there's an easy way to reduce them down to post-length soundbites.

[mythas]

I know I am going to take my car in for an oil change on Saturday. Now you know it too! Does that mean I don't have free will?

Knowing is not forcing. The knowing comes from the action not the other way around. You seem to have a hard time grasping that.

You are completely missing the point sparko. It's not just knowing it is creating. If I am the creator of your universe and I am able to decide every minute starting detail of your week and also know the consequences of what each subtle change in your week will be, and then I pick the set of starting conditions that makes you get your oil changed, then I would argue no you have no free will in getting your oil changed. It is merely the result of the starting conditions I picked.

[Tassman]

I know I am going to take my car in for an oil change on Saturday. Now you know it too! Does that mean I don't have free will?

[carpedm9587]

It's a bit over my head, and perhaps yours as well, but I believe articles like this one, and this one actually answer the type of arguments the opponents of Molinism in this thread are attempting to construct. I'd cite them in whole, but they're quite long, and I'm not sure there's an easy way to reduce them down to post-length soundbites.

OK - I posted links to two articles in another thread, each with a two line summary of the key points in the articles I wanted to emphasize, and was told I was "borderline" treading on the "don't argue by weblink" rule. And this is OK?

I TRULY do not understand the rules around here...

[carpedm9587]

What is being proposed is something akin to this:

I have a coin which I am going to flip 100 times. Coin flips are random, so each coin flip can come up a head or a tail. There are 2^100 or (just over 1 million) outcomes of this little experiment. But I have a unique power - I can see all 1M+ possible "universes" of this experiment, and I can "create" the one in which the coins act according to my plan (alternating heads and tails throughout). The argument being made is that we can have BOTH this power AND maintain that the coin flips are still random because they are random within the universe I "create."

To use a phrase I have heard here a great deal, this requires some enormous "hand-waving." My act of selecting the "universe" that turns out exactly the way I want it essentially "pins" the coin flips. The illusion is that they are random, but I specifically picked this universe to produce the exact results I want. Within the universe they have the illusion of randomness - but from my god-like vantage - I know they do not. You see - my choice was for the "randomness" to turn out a specific way, just as God's choice is for my "free will" to be used a certain way. I am powerless to choose otherwise, or the universe god created would not be the universe god created, which is a contradiction.

[Adrift]

OK - I posted links to two articles in another thread, each with a two line summary of the key points in the articles I wanted to emphasize, and was told I was "borderline" treading on the "don't argue by weblink" rule. And this is OK?

I TRULY do not understand the rules around here...

I'm not arguing by weblink. In fact, I'm pretty sure I haven't engaged with opponents of Molinism at all in this thread. I brought the articles to Sparko's attention because I figured it'd be helpful for him to both understand the arguments I'm assuming some people here are attempting to formulate (but in my opinion, are not getting across very well), as well as Craig's solution to them. The rules on TWeb haven't changed in this regard since you were last here. In fact, very few of TWeb's rules have changed at all.

[carpedm9587]

I'm not arguing by weblink. In fact, I'm pretty sure I haven't engaged with opponents of Molinism at all in this thread. I brought the articles to Sparko's attention because I figured it'd be helpful for him to both understand the arguments I'm assuming some people here are attempting to formulate (but in my opinion, are not getting across very well), as well as Craig's solution to them. The rules on TWeb haven't changed in this regard since you were last here. In fact, very few of TWeb's rules have changed at all.

My suggestion would be to provide such links, directed to an individual, in a PM. When you post links to articles, claim they provide responses to objections stated in the thread, it very much appears that you are "arguing by web link."

Of course, that's just my opinion. I'm a visitor and you're a mod, so the call is clearly yours.

[Adrift]

My suggestion would be to provide such links, directed to an individual, in a PM. When you post links to articles, claim they provide responses to objections stated in the thread, it very much appears that you are "arguing by web link."

Of course, that's just my opinion. I'm a visitor and you're a mod, so the call is clearly yours.

I'm not a mod. And as long as I'm clearly not breaking any rules I think I'll post as I see fit. Why don't you worry about yourself carpe? Or if you have a major issue with how I post, or TWeb's rules take it to the Padded Room.