Does an Omniscient Creator Lead to Fatalism?

[carpedm9587]

No, you do not have it right. JimL's point (as I understood it) is that there are only two ways in which God could know the future, and which one of them is right depends on whether the A-theory of time, or B-theory of time is right. I'm saying that if he wants to make such a claim he's obliged (atleast if he want's to persuade anyone) to give an argument as to why there couldn't possibly be any other ways to know the future under the two different theories of time, not why there couldn't possibly be another way of looking at time.

You said I don't have it right, and then essentially repeated what I said?

Let's look at it this way: If I was putting forth one of the different first cause arguments, and at the end of the argument I claimed that the beginning of the universe had to have had a personal cause, would you require me to explain why I thought that the first cause couldn't possibly be anything other than a personal cause (assuming that you had been convinced by the argument up to that point) or would you simply think that if you couldn't come up with any counter-examples that showed how an impersonal cause for the beginning of the universe was possible you would be intellectually obliged to accept the claim that the only option was a personal cause?

No - I would ask you to explain how you show your statement that the universe HAD to have a personal cause can be shown to be true. What other theories might exist, as yet undiscovered, is irrelevant. It's pure speculation. Ergo, if we currently know of only two ways to consider time, and it can be shown that neither approach is amenable to the idea of a god (and I don't think this has been shown, BTW), it is reasonable to then suggest that god likely does not exist, based on what we know. If you want to claim there is NOT a problem with the concept of god because there is a possible third way, no problem. Now you need to provide that third way.

[One Bad Pig]

That's not an argument.

It's an observation, which is true if (and only if) every outcome is chosen by the creator.

[JimL]

You said I don't have it right, and then essentially repeated what I said?



No - I would ask you to explain how you show your statement that the universe HAD to have a personal cause can be shown to be true. What other theories might exist, as yet undiscovered, is irrelevant. It's pure speculation. Ergo, if we currently know of only two ways to consider time, and it can be shown that neither approach is amenable to the idea of a god (and I don't think this has been shown, BTW), it is reasonable to then suggest that god likely does not exist, based on what we know. If you want to claim there is NOT a problem with the concept of god because there is a possible third way, no problem. Now you need to provide that third way.

My argument is not that neither approach, neither the A or B theory of time, is amenable to the idea of god, or to the possible existence of a god, my argument is that neither approach is amenable to the idea of a future omniscient god. You say that you don't think that has been shown to be the case, and theists have for years been telling me the same thing, but they never actually explain where the fault in the argument lies. I'd be most interested in your thoughts regarding this. If i've been missing something all these years I'd surely appreciate someone to pointing it out to me.

[JonathanL]

You said I don't have it right, and then essentially repeated what I said?

Uh no, what you said is not the same as what I said. I said JimL has to provide support for his claim that there are only two possible ways for God to know the future, not that there are only two possible ways to look at time. They're not the same thing, at all.

No - I would ask you to explain how you show your statement that the universe HAD to have a personal cause can be shown to be true. What other theories might exist, as yet undiscovered, is irrelevant. It's pure speculation. Ergo, if we currently know of only two ways to consider time, and it can be shown that neither approach is amenable to the idea of a god (and I don't think this has been shown, BTW), it is reasonable to then suggest that god likely does not exist, based on what we know. If you want to claim there is NOT a problem with the concept of god because there is a possible third way, no problem. Now you need to provide that third way.

Again, it's not about possible ways to consider time, but about possible ways for God to know the future under those two views of time.

[JimL]

No, that isn't how this works. You're the one who claimed that there are only two logical ways in which the future could be known, so you're the one who's going to have to give an argument for why there couldn't possibly be any other ways to know the future. Unless you're able to do that I'm completely justified in dismissing your argument.

Well thats just silly. The nature of time and knowledge of events occuring within it are the topics. There are only 2 possibilities concerning the future, it is either opened or closed. Therefore there are only 2 possibilities concerning ones knowledge of that future. 1) Because the future is closed, time is static, it's all there, nothing changes, and 2) because it's pre-determined by the creator thereof. The first reason falls under the B-theory of time and the conclusion is rather obvious, if all of time exists, if the future exists, then nothing actually changes ergo free will is an impossibility. In the second scenario, which would fall under the A-theory of time, my argument is that the only way one could know the future of existence would be if as the creator he engineered it that way, he predetermined how the dominoes would fall so to speak. Now, no, you're not justified in completely dismissing that argument unless you can actually refute it with and argument of your own.

[Juvenal]

A creator intentionally choosing the future history of its creations directly contradicts free choice for its created creatures.

It's an observation, which is true if (and only if) every outcome is chosen by the creator.

I think the premise is inescapable if we also grant omniscience, though I'd also argue that omniscience isn't a necessary property of a supreme deity.

A god can blink, I'd imagine, and doing so to create free choice seems like a reasonably interesting enterprise. Subtler gradations of omniscience are possible. A god remains omnipotent if it chooses not to use all of its power. Analogously, an omniscient being could choose not to know.

I can imagine nothing more dreadful than creating an entire universe, and denying oneself the opportunity to be surprised.

[Tassman]

Yes, but just because one does not do something doesn't mean that one cannot do it. Logically, if one cannot do X, then it clearly implies that one does not do X, but not doing X does not in any way imply that one cannot do X.

If one can do X but chooses not to you are giving the option of choice. So why introduce the notion that one do it...you're just muddying the water. One does not do that which one cannot do.

But they clearly don't have the same outcome. Not doing X, and not being able to do X are clearly two distinctly different things. Not being able to do X is one of possible reasons for not doing X, but it's not the only one. Not choosing to do X is another reason.

See above.

[37818]

Infinite being is required to be omniscience. All causes are finite - what is finite is not and can not be fully omniscient in so far as it is finite. An uncaused cause would be both infinite and finite. (John 1:1-3).

[Sparko]

Quit babbling on physics you don't understand any better than you can spell atheist. Yes, there's a space-time continuum, and even one we can visualize with pretty little cones. No, that doesn't imply an outside perspective in which causality is reversed.

Really, Sparkles.

Never claimed causality was reversed. Knowledge is not Causality.

[Adrift]

That would hinge on God's intent, would it not? If God's intent is "create universe such that these particular people choose x" then I agree. If God's intent is different, say, "create universe such that the most people freely choose" then I'm not seeing a necessary contradiction.

Yeah, that's really a major and missing component to these sorts of discussion, I think, especially coming from some Molinist perspectives. God would prefer that all come to saving faith, but free will prevents that from happening. So a Molinist view of God's foreknowledge doesn't suggest that everyone will come to saving faith, or necessarily that particular people will choose x (perhaps a more Calvinist leaning Molinist would suggest this), but that the most people who can choose x freely will choose it. God creates and orchestrates creation with a bit of a compromise based on his knowledge of our free will decisions, and the knowledge that not everyone will make the right choice. This is not much different, in my opinion, than, say, the shop owner, who does all he can to increase traffic into his store with in-store incentives. Incentives that he knows that will get traffic. He can't get everyone to come into the shop to do their shopping, but he can orchestrate things in such a way that the most people doing their shopping will shop at his store. Even under this compromised situation, while God's will is overall carried out, in the particulars sometimes not. He doesn't force his will on others, so some will choose contrary to their own self-interests, which is obviously not something that God would prefer.

I don't know, those are just a few of my thoughts on your post.

[One Bad Pig]

I think the premise is inescapable if we also grant omniscience, though I'd also argue that omniscience isn't a necessary property of a supreme deity.

I'm not certain that foreknowledge is necessarily causation.

A god can blink, I'd imagine, and doing so to create free choice seems like a reasonably interesting enterprise. Subtler gradations of omniscience are possible. A god remains omnipotent if it chooses not to use all of its power. Analogously, an omniscient being could choose not to know.

Possibly, but that would run afoul of Rom 8:29: "For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren."

I can imagine nothing more dreadful than creating an entire universe, and denying oneself the opportunity to be surprised.

I can't imagine what God would make of that.

[JimL]

Never claimed causality was reversed. Knowledge is not Causality.

No, knowledge is not causality, but knowledge of future events is evidence as to the cause of those events. When you ask yourself how the knowledge came about, then maybe you'll understand.

[Sparko]

No, knowledge is not causality, but knowledge of future events is evidence as to the cause of those events. When you ask yourself how the knowledge came about, then maybe you'll understand.

not if the knowledge is dependent on the action and not the other way around. If God is outside of time, then time has nothing to do with "when" he knew what you did or will do. Logically the chain of events is Action --> Knowledge and time is not included at all.

[JimL]

not if the knowledge is dependent on the action and not the other way around. If God is outside of time, then time has nothing to do with "when" he knew what you did or will do. Logically the chain of events is Action --> Knowledge and time is not included at all.

We've been over this before Sparko. If time flows and the future is open then god can't see it whether he's outside of it or not. If the future does not exist, then it does not exist period, whether you are in or outside of time. In other words you can't see the future, or have knowledge of the future, if the future doesn't exist. And if it does exist, in other words, if the future is closed, then god being outside of time could see it, and could have knowledge of it, but there would be no free will because if the future is closed in that way, then its always been closed, nothing changes, choices aren't made. Do you really not understand this?

[Juvenal]

I'm not certain that foreknowledge is necessarily causation.

For a clairvoyant, not so much, but when that clairvoyant is creating what he's seeing, it's inescapable.

Unless it chooses to blink.

Possibly, but that would run afoul of Rom 8:29: "For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren."

I'd also argue that an inerrant sacred text isn't necessary for a supreme being. If Paul is wrong, God is still God. And of course, if Paul is right, God is still God. You understand that God, for me, is strictly an idea, but being the good platonic idealist that I am, it's enough to allow me to claim God exists.

I doubt that would satisfy Paul, which is fair enough, as Paul doesn't satisfy me either.

I can't imagine what God would make of that.

If he didn't want folks to trust me, why did he give me perfect hair?