Another Christian Being Offered On The PC Alter?

[seer]

So you disagree with Thinker that objective morals exist?

[Joel]

Is it that hard for you to say "yes"? You could say, "Yes, I agree, while noting that the key word is 'IF'." That's all that Seer is trying, painstakingly, to get from you at the moment.

And Sam is correct that a valid argument may still have false premises and false conclusion. But that's still besides the point. That's not the discussion I'm having with Thinker. I'm not, at this point, trying to establish that the premises and conclusion are true. Rather, I'm countering Thinker's claim that no such valid, non-circular argument is possible. He keeps claiming that any argument/theory that has the moral standard internal to God must be circular. That is what I'm disproving. Do you agree with me that Thinker is wrong on that point?

I'm not going to waste my time trying to argue (to Thinker) for the truth of the premises before he can at least admit that.

[JimL]

That doesn't follow. I'll re-paste the argument here, because you didn't respond to it:

P1) "Loving is good" is a property of God.
P2) "God is loving" is a property of God.
C1) "Loving is good" is true.
C1.1) Loving is good.
C2) God is loving.
C3) God is good.

(To translate my quoted comment to refer to these premises: What I'm saying is that P1 does not depend on P2 being true. They are independent premises.)

This argument is non-circular, it is internally consistent, and it has the moral standard being internal to God (thus not independent of God).

Loving is not the same thing as love. That "God is loving" does not equate to "God is love." If God is not love, but is love-ing, then you are distinguishing between the two and love itself becomes independent of the nature of God. And if God is love, then the title of God is superfluous, since Love defines itself as Love. Thats why it is a circular argument.

[Joel]

Loving is not the same thing as love. That "God is loving" does not equate to "God is love." If God is not love, but is love-ing, then you are distinguishing between the two and love itself becomes independent of the nature of God. And if God is love, then the title of God is superfluous, since Love defines itself as Love. Thats why it is a circular argument.

This has nothing to do with my post. Nowhere is "God is love" in the argument. And the fact that I used "love" in the argument is arbitrary. I could have used any moral proposition.

[JimL]

This has nothing to do with my post. Nowhere is "God is love" in the argument. And the fact that I used "love" in the argument is arbitrary. I could have used any moral proposition.

Your argument fails because "Loving" would be an action of God not a property of God, therefore you can not claim as you did in P1 and P2 that "Loving is good" and that "God is loving" are properties of God. You could argue that P1) Love is good, and that P2) God is Loving, with the conclusion being that therefore God is good. But then there would be a distinction between Love itself and a God that is loving. Love would be an objective reality. If on the other hand you want to argue that Love itself is a property of God, then love is subjective and dependent on God.

[Tassman]

Is it that hard for you to say "yes"? You could say, "Yes, I agree, while noting that the key word is 'IF'." That's all that Seer is trying, painstakingly, to get from you at the moment.

OK! Yes, "IF".

But this is no more meaningful than: "IF"

And Sam is correct that a valid argument may still have false premises and false conclusion. But that's still besides the point. That's not the discussion I'm having with Thinker. I'm not, at this point, trying to establish that the premises and conclusion are true. Rather, I'm countering Thinker's claim that no such valid, non-circular argument is possible. He keeps claiming that any argument/theory that has the moral standard internal to God must be circular. That is what I'm disproving. Do you agree with me that Thinker is wrong on that point?

I'm not going to waste my time trying to argue (to Thinker) for the truth of the premises before he can at least admit that.

So you disagree with Thinker that objective morals exist?

I agree with Thinker that objective morals exist, it's the source of these moral that is in dispute.

[seer]

I agree with Thinker that objective morals exist, it's the source of these moral that is in dispute.

Really Tass? When did this happen? You have been telling me (for years now) that ethics were relative, the result of biological and social needs. And you are correct - the source is in dispute - because there isn't any - apart from God.

[Joel]

OK! Yes, "IF".

But this is no more meaningful than: "IF"

But that's not the argument being had with Thinker. As a refresher:
Thinker is insisting that there are only two options:
1) "morality exists independently of god", or
2) "morality is arbitrarily decided by god."

That's what Seer was responding to, and the only reason he asked that question.
By saying "Yes" here, you agree with us that Thinker is wrong on this point.

No, that's not the conclusion. That's the premise (P1).
The conclusion is "C3) God is good."
And there is nothing circular about that argument.

For some reason, you keep thinking I'm arguing something different than what I'm arguing (against Thinker's 'dilemma').

Irrelevant to the point I'm making. A point that you have now agreed with us on. Hopefully Thinker will come back and agree too, so we can move on and maybe discuss the questions you raise here.

Your argument fails because "Loving" would be an action of God not a property of God, therefore you can not claim as you did in P1 and P2 that "Loving is good" and that "God is loving" are properties of God.

I don't think that follows. Even if maybe you had a case that because loving is an action and thus I need to change P2 to "God is loving", that doesn't affect the point I'm making, and it does nothing to argue that "Loving is good" cannot be a property of God.

But then there would be a distinction between Love itself and a God that is loving.

Whether there is or isn't, so what? The argument only refers to "loving" and says nothing about "Love itself".

[The Thinker]

What are you taking about? Try and stay on task Thinker. Do you agree that if God's laws flow from His immutable moral character then they are not arbitrary. Give me a yes or no answer then we can move on.

On condition "if" then yes it is not arbitrary. But then one can ask why god is the way he is. Why not slightly different, if even by just a small amount?

[The Thinker]

Yes.
What's your point?

It's logical proof Jesus wasn't god.

And can you please acknowledge that my argument is internally consistent and non-circular, and that it has the moral standard being internal to God? Or show how it's not?

No. Has nothing I wrote to you been able to make you understand that there are only 3 possible positions a theist can take when it comes to the euthyphro dilemma?:

(1) morality is arbitrarily decided by god
(2) morality exists independently of god
(3) make a circular argument that god is good.

You don't like (1) and have tried to distance yourself from (3) so the only way for morality not to be arbitrary and where you don't have to make a circular argument, is to side with (2), which is what you did in your recent comment when you stated that loving is good independently of god.

You wrote:

1) "God is good"
2) "God is loving"
3) "Loving is good"

(1) is dependent on (2) and (3).
(2) and (3) are different properties of God's nature.
(3) does not depend on (1) or (2) being true.

The dependency only goes in one direction, not both directions, thus it isn't circular.

If (1) is dependent on (3) and (3) does not depend on (1) and (2), then (3) is true independently of god, and that is the view I take: morality exists independently of god.

If you are merely questioning the truth of my premises P1 and P2, then that is beside the point. That would do nothing to show the argument to be invalid or circular, which is what you are trying to argue. Whether the premises are true, I have given you a valid, non-circular argument, in which the moral standard is internal to God. Yes?

No. Claiming the moral standard is internal to god requires that you make a circular argument.

That's beside my point. My point is that my argument is internally consistent and non-circular, and that it has the moral standard being internal to God. Thinker claims that that is impossible, and I'm showing that it is possible.

You just admitted in the above quote that loving is good independently of god being good or loving. Therefore god is not the moral standard.

[seer]

On condition "if" then yes it is not arbitrary. But then one can ask why god is the way he is. Why not slightly different, if even by just a small amount?

If He is past eternal, and has an immutable moral character, then I don't think the question is meaningful. "I Am as I Am" is probably the best answer we could get or hope for.

[seer]

You just admitted in the above quote that loving is good independently of god being good or loving. Therefore god is not the moral standard.

Again Thinker how would you justify your independent moral standard without using a circular argument? Why is something good because your independent standard says it is good? And can you show, at least in theory, that this standard it is not arbitrary?

[Joel]

Welcome back, Thinker.

It's logical proof Jesus wasn't god.

Irrelevant to the point at hand.

And can you please acknowledge that my argument is internally consistent and non-circular, and that it has the moral standard being internal to God? Or show how it's not?

No. Has nothing I wrote to you been able to make you understand that there are only 3 possible positions a theist can take when it comes to the euthyphro dilemma?:

(1) morality is arbitrarily decided by god
(2) morality exists independently of god
(3) make a circular argument that god is good.

I understand that you keep thinking that those are the only possible positions. But I've refuted that by giving a counter-example. I gave you an argument demonstrating a position that is none of those three. And you have yet to reply to it. So, for your convenience, here it is again:

P1) "Loving is good" is a property of God.
P2) "God is loving" is a property of God.
C1) "Loving is good" is true.
C1.1) Loving is good.
C2) God is loving.
C3) God is good.

This argument is non-circular, it is internally consistent, and it has the moral standard being internal to God (thus not independent of God).

...in your recent comment when you stated that loving is good independently of god.

You wrote:
[...]
If (1) is dependent on (3) and (3) does not depend on (1) and (2), then (3) is true independently of god

That doesn't follow.
Besides, as I've clarified before, all I meant to say was that P1 does not depend on P2 being true. They are independent premises. And that in no way implies that either premise is true independently of God. Indeed, they cannot be true independently of God.

Claiming the moral standard is internal to god requires that you make a circular argument.

Wrong, as I have demonstrated by providing the above argument that is non-circular, is internally consistent, and has the moral standard being internal to God. to which you have not yet replied.

On condition "if" then yes it is not arbitrary. But then one can ask why god is the way he is. Why not slightly different, if even by just a small amount?

You cannot get away from the necessity that there exist an Uncaused Cause. Whatever it is, your question here applies to it (just as much for you as for anyone), and thus cannot be a serious objection to it.

[JimL]

I understand that you keep thinking that those are the only possible positions. But I've refuted that by giving a counter-example. I gave you an argument demonstrating a position that is none of those three. And you have yet to reply to it. So, for your convenience, here it is again:

P1) "Loving is good" is a property of God.
P2) "God is loving" is a property of God.
C1) "Loving is good" is true.
C1.1) Loving is good.
C2) God is loving.
C3) God is good.

Fail! Loving is not a property. Love is a property, the use of which in your argument makes it circular. Love is good - God is love- love is good - love is good is true - god is love - god is good.

You cannot get away from the necessity that there exist an Uncaused Cause. Whatever it is, your question here applies to it (just as much for you as for anyone), and thus cannot be a serious objection to it.

The eternal Cosmos is an uncaused cause, all that exists is eternal, those things which have a beginning, have a beginning only with respect to themselves, with respect to the eternal, they too are eternal. What do you think happens to the stuff of the universe, do you think that the something that has existence, becomes nothing. Just like nothing can't become something, aka from nothing, nothing comes, so likewise something can not become nothing.

[Tassman]

Really Tass? When did this happen? You have been telling me (for years now) that ethics were relative, the result of biological and social needs. And you are correct - the source is in dispute - because there isn't any - apart from God.

If He is past eternal[/B], and has an immutable moral character, then I don't think the question is meaningful.

Your whole argument is based upon the conditional "IF", i.e. it's based upon unsubstantiated conjecture.

"I Am as I Am" is probably the best answer we could get[/B] or hope for.

...which is no answer at all.