Another Christian Being Offered On The PC Alter?

[Sam]

Of course Descartes, not Sam, got it wrong. In any case your syllogism was wrong, I fixed it for you. Then you liked my syllogism even though the first premise could not be proven - so then you moved from making a deductive argument to simply call the first premise (of my syllogism) an axiom. But there is no good reason to assume that the axiom is true. Isn't this fun!

Descartes' fallacious reasoning is something every first-year philosophy student learns. It even has a name: "Cartesian Circle".

My syllogism was fine and your "correction" added nothing except a redundant clause at the end.

Axioms are necessarily part of deductive arguments. That you don't know what an axiom is or how it fits into deductive logic is only demonstrating what I've complained about: you don't know what you're talking about.

There is never "a good reason" to assume an axiom is true. If there were it would not be an axiom.

[seer]

Descartes' fallacious reasoning is something every first-year philosophy student learns. It even has a name: "Cartesian Circle".

I'm not necessarily defending his invocation of God for justification. But his points about justification for sense perception remain as strong today.

My syllogism was fine and your "correction" added nothing except a redundant clause at the end.

No it wasn't. You left out a key distinction. And remember you went from making a deductive argument to depending on an axiom.

There is never "a good reason" to assume an axiom is true. If there were it would not be an axiom.
Sam, I'm not defo

Really Sam,

1. The earth is 6 thousand years old.

2. Science claims that the earth is 15 millions years old.

3. Therefore science is wrong.

See that was easy!

[Sam]

I'm not necessarily defending his invocation of God for justification. But his points about justification for sense perception remain as strong today.



No it wasn't. You left out a key distinction. And remember you went from making a deductive argument to depending on an axiom.



Really Sam,

1. The earth is 6 thousand years old.

2. Science claims that the earth is 15 millions years old.

3. Therefore science is wrong.

See that was easy!

That was a fantastic failure of a syllogistic argument. Thank you for demonstrating your inability to even manage that basic demonstration of competence.

If you're going to use the language, learn to do the actual work, seer. Don't make yourself look silly. It just paints a nice target for those who would extrapolate silliness from your arguments to our shared religion.

[seer]

That was a fantastic failure of a syllogistic argument. Thank you for demonstrating your inability to even manage that basic demonstration of competence.

If you're going to use the language, learn to do the actual work, seer. Don't make yourself look silly. It just paints a nice target for those who would extrapolate silliness from your arguments to our shared religion.

No worse than your first attempt. But you do agree that there is no reason not accept my first premise or axiom...

[Joel]

Let's call "loving is Good" X. So, X is a property of god, and god has the property that he conforms to X. Nothing about that says that X cannot exist independently of god...

Okay, but that's not what I'm trying to show! It is also true that nothing about it says that X cannot exist internal to God.
Right now I don't care about arguing whether X can or cannot exist independently of God. I'm just trying to get you to admit that there's nothing illogical or circular about supposing that X is internal to God.

...and it sounds awfully circular to me.

Where is there circularity? It's a straight line.
Take these four propositions:
1) "God is good"
2) "God is loving"
3) "Loving is good"

(1) is dependent on (2) and (3).
(2) and (3) are different properties of God's nature.
(3) does not depend on (1) or (2) being true.
The dependency only goes in one direction, not both directions, thus it isn't circular.

This is ridiculous. God is good because he conforms to X, and X is good because it's a property of god.

That's not what I said. I didn't say X ("Loving is good") is good. Rather, X is the proposition that states what is good.

I don't need to say whether X is good.
It only needs to be the case that X is true (e.g. true that "Loving is good"). And if X is a property of God, then X is true. (If it weren't true, then it would be false to say it is a property of God.)

Maybe it will help if I just write out the chain of reasoning here:

P1) "Loving is good" is a property of God.
P2) "God is loving" is a property of God.
C1) "Loving is good" is true.
C1.1) Loving is good.
C2) God is loving.
C3) God is good.

No circularity there.


(It would be a different topic to discuss whether the Objective Standard itself must be good, and thus self-referential. That would be a question that would apply equally to both of us. If the Standard is self-referential in that way, would it make it circular and thus illogical? But I don't think such questions need to be answered for my purposes here. If it poses any problem, it poses the problem for any claim that objective morality exists, including yours.)

[Starlight]

That Descartes built his epistemological argument on a fallacy isn't a strength.

I recall being very amused in philosophy class when we studied the theory that "Descartes was a atheist whose arguments in meditations were meant as satire intended to show how wrong such arguments were by exposing glaring holes in the logic".

[Sam]

I recall being very amused in philosophy class when we studied the theory that "Descartes was a atheist whose arguments in meditations were meant as satire intended to show how wrong such arguments were by exposing glaring holes in the logic".

Even had that been the case I'd still like 'im better than Hegel.

[Tassman]

No worse than your first attempt. But you do agree that there is no reason not accept my first premise or axiom...

You're joking, right? The conclusion of a deductive argument cannot be shown to be true unless the premise is true. And in this instance the premise is demonstrably false.

[seer]

You're joking, right? The conclusion of a deductive argument cannot be shown to be true unless the premise is true. And in this instance the premise is demonstrably false.

Don't tell me that, tell Sam. I generally agree with you. For once.

[The Thinker]

You and Joel are doing fine on that question, so let me try again: Why is something good because your objective standard of morality says it's good? How is that standard not arbitrary?

Yeah, but I want you to answer it, that's why I asked you. And your answer to my question is relevant for your question to me. So let me try again:Are you suggesting that the circular argument theists have to make to try and show that god is the source of good is a basic belief that is asserted without any evidence?

Is it possible Thinker that you are not answering because you know you will end up impaled on one of the same horns that you suggest we are impaled on? Be honest now...

As far as being impaled on a horn, I gladly take one of the horns of the dilemma: morality exists independently of god. There is no dilemma for atheists, only for theists who want to fallaciously assert, as you do, that morality depends on god.

[seer]

Yeah, but I want you to answer it, that's why I asked you. And your answer to my question is relevant for your question to me. So let me try again:Are you suggesting that the circular argument theists have to make to try and show that god is the source of good is a basic belief that is asserted without any evidence?


As far as being impaled on a horn, I gladly take one of the horns of the dilemma: morality exists independently of god. There is no dilemma for atheists, only for theists who want to fallaciously assert, as you do, that morality depends on god.

That is not the point Thinker. You seem to be suggesting that the problem for theists is that their argument would end up being circular. But how do you avoid the very same thing with your "objective" standard? It is a double standard. And you should deal with Joel's latest post #650

[The Thinker]

Okay, but that's not what I'm trying to show! It is also true that nothing about it says that X cannot exist internal to God.
Right now I don't care about arguing whether X can or cannot exist independently of God. I'm just trying to get you to admit that there's nothing illogical or circular about supposing that X is internal to God.

My primary concern is that you acknowledge that objective moral values exist independently of god and that is fallacious to argue god is needed for objective morality. As far as circularity, the euthyphro dilemma only requires a theist make a circular argument if they try and insist moral values come from god. You could admit that morality exists independently of god, or take the position that morality is arbitrarily decided by god. Neither of those positions involve circularity.

Where is there circularity? It's a straight line.
Take these four propositions:
1) "God is good"
2) "God is loving"
3) "Loving is good"

(1) is dependent on (2) and (3).
(2) and (3) are different properties of God's nature.
(3) does not depend on (1) or (2) being true.
The dependency only goes in one direction, not both directions, thus it isn't circular.

If (3) does not depend on (1) and (2) being true, then loving is good for reasons independently of god, which is my view. If you agree with this, then you take the second horn of the dilemma, that god commands it because it is good. If you take that view, then there is no circularity, as I mentioned above. So yes.

That's not what I said. I didn't say X ("Loving is good") is good. Rather, X is the proposition that states what is good.

I don't need to say whether X is good.
It only needs to be the case that X is true (e.g. true that "Loving is good"). And if X is a property of God, then X is true. (If it weren't true, then it would be false to say it is a property of God.)

OK, OK. As per what I wrote above, there is no circularity, but that requires you to take the position that things are good independently of god, and that's all I need as an atheist to show it is fallacious for theists, like Seer, to assert over and over again that without god there can be no objective morality. Agree?

[seer]

My primary concern is that you acknowledge that objective moral values exist independently of god and that is fallacious to argue god is needed for objective morality. As far as circularity, the euthyphro dilemma only requires a theist make a circular argument if they try and insist moral values come from god. You could admit that morality exists independently of god, or take the position that morality is arbitrarily decided by god. Neither of those positions involve circularity.

Again Thinker, how can morality be arbitrarily decided if it is grounded in His immutable nature? Again, it is not that God arbitrarily chooses not to lie, but that He can not lie. His very nature is truthfulness. That is not arbitrary. And again, how do you avoid a circular argument for your objective standard? Why is something good because your standard says that it is good?

[Joel]

If (3) does not depend on (1) and (2) being true, then loving is good for reasons independently of god

That doesn't follow. I'll re-paste the argument here, because you didn't respond to it:

P1) "Loving is good" is a property of God.
P2) "God is loving" is a property of God.
C1) "Loving is good" is true.
C1.1) Loving is good.
C2) God is loving.
C3) God is good.

(To translate my quoted comment to refer to these premises: What I'm saying is that P1 does not depend on P2 being true. They are independent premises.)

This argument is non-circular, it is internally consistent, and it has the moral standard being internal to God (thus not independent of God).

[Tassman]

That doesn't follow. I'll re-paste the argument here, because you didn't respond to it:

P1) "Loving is good" is a property of God.
P2) "God is loving" is a property of God.
C1) "Loving is good" is true.
C1.1) Loving is good.
C2) God is loving.
C3) God is good.

(To translate my quoted comment to refer to these premises: What I'm saying is that P1 does not depend on P2 being true. They are independent premises.)

This argument is non-circular, it is internally consistent, and it has the moral standard being internal to God (thus not independent of God).

The premises are bald assertions, i.e. logical fallacies. They cannot be shown to be true, therefore the conclusions cannot be shown to be true.