Homophobic Trump...

[carpedm9587]

Correct, that moral reasoning somehow gives us a better more valid understanding of ethics and moral duties. If it doesn't, and it doesn't, why even call it moral reasoning in the first place? Why not just call it what it is - what Carp personally prefers or not.

Your complaint, again, is that it does not provide us with a better absolute/objective framework.... so more "green is not blue" complaint.

[carpedm9587]

Where is your rational argument Carp? One that isn't base on your self-serving premises and rationalizations? Oh wait - it doesn't exist, and Fluffy is blue... Let's face it Carp you are just making stuff up and calling it rational.

I have already responded to this.

[Sparko]

So back to the value of life. If your moral reasoning that killing is bad because of the value of human life, why does that actually make killing wrong? Why is your reasoning any better than the guy who just murdered 49 people in New Zealand arguing that life has no value so he is free to kill whom he wishes?

[JonathanL]

"I have no problem concluding that a person eating worms is disgusting for anyone anywhere at any time"
"That does not make my disgust less relative/subjective to me"

I think what you are doing, Chrawnus, is taking "is wrong for anyone anywhere anytime" and translating it "wrong to anyone anywhere anytime." In my parallel example, I am stating that I find the act of eating worms disgusting, when done by anyone anywhere anytime. That does not make my disgust an absolute/objective standard. It remains my disgust. Likewise, I find act X immoral when done by anyone anywhere anytime. That does not make my moral conclusion an absolute/objective standard. It remains my moral conclusion.

What I'm doing is taking "is wrong for anyone anywhere anytime" at face value, and not equating it with statements like "I find the act of eating worms disgusting, when done by anyone anywhere anytime". The first statement is describing a moral wrong, the other is describing a personal distaste, and they're not the same thing at all. Finding something reprehensible and finding it distasteful are two completely different things.

I am not having any problem. Indeed, it is far easier for me than for anyone to show that such a thing as an absolute/objective moral standard actually exists.

Of course it's easier to play pretend than it is to actually put some effort into arriving at a moral framework that isn't riddled with holes and built from the ground up with circular reasoning.

[carpedm9587]

But there is no reason what so ever to believe 'alignment' is preferrable to 'non-alignment'.

Of course there is. Our moral frameworks exist to drive decision making between "ought" and "ought not" action. They drive us to maximize what we perceive to be "good" and minimize what we perceive to be "bad" as a result of choice of action. Having those around me making the same choices I make with respect to "maximizing good" has an obvious benefit and desirability. The alternative is to suggest that having the people around me NOT optimize what I perceive to be good is equal in value to me as having them optimize it. I would take that as an absurd claim on its face.

But thanks for providing at least some now material to discuss. I was getting bored with the same round and round with Sparko and Seer.

And in your case the "underlying valuing" is not rationally arrived at either, because values that are subjective are per definition not rationally arrived at. If they were then they would be objective values, not subjective.

It is possible that the underlying values are not rationally arrived at. Seer and Sparko are a case in point. But it is also possible that they are. For example, I find an implicit contradiction in the notion of "not valuing life" since I am living, and that would have me not valuing my own existence.

And that's ignoring the fact that you haven't explained how you justify your unstated assumption that "using reason to arrive at moral judgements" is better than "handed in a book". On what basis? Obviously there's no objective basis for that assumption, given that you do not believe in objective values, so how do you justify it without going in circles?

This I've answered several times, so I'll let my previous responses stand. You'll find them in this thread and other places this has been discussed. I have to admit to getting tired of continually repeating the same points.

You're building a framework alright, but moral it is not. At least not in anything more than name.

Your opinion is duly noted. I'm not sure what else there is to say.

[carpedm9587]

ah the old cuisenart tactic of chopping up a post into incomprehensible replies. peppered with "already answered" non answers and repeating yourself.

Another indication that you are realizing you have lost the argument but don't want to admit it.

There's no content here for me to respond to...

[carpedm9587]

So back to the value of life. If your moral reasoning that killing is bad because of the value of human life, why does that actually make killing wrong?

I didn't say "killing" is bad. Specifically, randomly taking human life is a moral ill in my moral framework (and that of most people). Since the moral framework exists to protect/enhance what we value, the line of reasoning is pretty self-evident. If I value human lives (including my own), randomly taking human lives is an immoral act. If people generally accepted "randomly taking human lives" as moral and permissible, my own safety and that of those I value would be at significantly greater risk. Ergo, the prohibition against randomly taking human life.

Why is your reasoning any better than the guy who just murdered 49 people in New Zealand arguing that life has no value so he is free to kill whom he wishes?

I have no idea if it is or it is not. I don't know what he values and I don't know how he arrived at his moral conclusions. He may be reasoning perfectly logically from what he values, and he may have arrived at the subjective conclusion that his act was moral or even morally required. I (and most others) will disagree with him and seek to contain his actions as a consequence.

[seer]

It is possible that the underlying values are not rationally arrived at. Seer and Sparko are a case in point. But it is also possible that they are. For example, I find an implicit contradiction in the notion of "not valuing life" since I am living, and that would have me not valuing my own existence.

What contradiction? What if you were on the verge of suicide? And the fact that you value your own life does not logically lead to valuing the lives of others. It could just as well mean that you exploit the lives of others for your own ends. So once gain you haven't said anything rational save that you subjectively value your own life. And if you could not rationally justify your own existence would that make you less likely to value your own life? Of course not, rationality has nothing to do with it...

[carpedm9587]

What I'm doing is taking "is wrong for anyone anywhere anytime" at face value, and not equating it with statements like "I find the act of eating worms disgusting, when done by anyone anywhere anytime". The first statement is describing a moral wrong, the other is describing a personal distaste, and they're not the same thing at all.

Yes, Chrawnus - they are. They are both a form of preference - one culinary and the other moral. Unless I miss my guess, you are sliding into Sparko and Seer's error: objecting that moral relativism/subjectivism is not absolute/objective. As I've said to them - that's not an objection or an argument - it's a restatement of the definition of the terms.

Finding something reprehensible and finding it distasteful are two completely different things.

OK - explain exactly how they are "completely different."

Of course it's easier to play pretend than it is to actually put some effort into arriving at a moral framework that isn't riddled with holes and built from the ground up with circular reasoning.

It has nothing to do with pretense, Chrawnus. ALL moral frameworks are "built from the ground up using (sometimes) circular reasoning." Yours. Mine. Seer's. Sparko's. All of them. They are all subjective/relative to what we value. That's simply how it works. When push comes to shove - we will end up with, "because I value X" as our justification. For Sparko and Seer (and presumably you) it will be because you value your god - or you value the books of the bible. Morality is a form of preference. It is not different in kind from the other things in life we prefer except a) it is about behavior) and b) it is a term we tend to use for behavior related to what we most closely value.

Indeed - moral law and moral frameworks have much in common with social law and social frameworks.

[Sparko]

I didn't say "killing" is bad. Specifically, randomly taking human life is a moral ill in my moral framework (and that of most people). Since the moral framework exists to protect/enhance what we value, the line of reasoning is pretty self-evident. If I value human lives (including my own), randomly taking human lives is an immoral act. If people generally accepted "randomly taking human lives" as moral and permissible, my own safety and that of those I value would be at significantly greater risk. Ergo, the prohibition against randomly taking human life.



I have no idea if it is or it is not. I don't know what he values and I don't know how he arrived at his moral conclusions. He may be reasoning perfectly logically from what he values, and he may have arrived at the subjective conclusion that his act was moral or even morally required. I (and most others) will disagree with him and seek to contain his actions as a consequence.

So if there is no objective truth value in your argument for the value of human life versus someone else's argument that human life has no value, then why should we think your "rational basis" for morality is any better than the mass murderer's?

1. I value human life therefore killing people at random is immoral.
2. I don't value human life therefore killing people at random is moral.

Logically and rationally, if morals are subjective, there is no difference in those two arguments.

therefore your claim that morals based on a rational basis is somehow better than basing them on "a book" is false.

[carpedm9587]

What contradiction? What if you were on the verge of suicide?

It depends on the circumstances related to the suicide.

And the fact that you value your own life does not logically lead to valuing the lives of others.

Sure it does - that is where the social contract comes in. It is why we seek alignment in our moral frameworks. What I value is best protected when everyone around me is valuing and moralizing as I do. It is the basis for the "golden rule."

It could just as well mean that you exploit the lives of others for your own ends.

Which suggests a world where everyone does that which puts me at greater risk, ergo, a choice I reject.

So once gain you haven't said anything rational save that you subjectively value your own life.

I do subjectively value my own life - no question about it.

And if you can not rationally justify your own existence would you make you less likely to value your own like?

I am not having a problem rationally justifying my existence. I enjoy life. I savor living. It brings me joy. It brings me happiness. It would be an irrational act for me to seek to end that reality - by definition. Happiness is what we are drawn to - not what we escape from.

Of course not, rationality has nothing to do with it...

As you wish...

But it seems far more rational to me than "what does the book say?"

[JonathanL]

Of course there is. Our moral frameworks exist to drive decision making between "ought" and "ought not" action. They drive us to maximize what we perceive to be "good" and minimize what we perceive to be "bad" as a result of choice of action. Having those around me making the same choices I make with respect to "maximizing good" has an obvious benefit and desirability. The alternative is to suggest that having the people around me NOT optimize what I perceive to be good is equal in value to me as having them optimize it. I would take that as an absurd claim on its face.

But thanks for providing at least some now material to discuss. I was getting bored with the same round and round with Sparko and Seer.

I don't see how this solves the problem. It's your subjective opinion that "having the people around me NOT optimize what I perceive to be good is equal in value to me as having them optimize it" is absurd on the face of it, but why do you even believe that? As far as I can see you're simply pushing the problem back one step, but you're not solving it. You're simply moving the need for justification onto another subjective value, but it's still there glaring anyone who looks at it in the face.

It is possible that the underlying values are not rationally arrived at. Seer and Sparko are a case in point. But it is also possible that they are. For example, I find an implicit contradiction in the notion of "not valuing life" since I am living, and that would have me not valuing my own existence.

And the belief that existence is preferrable to non-existence is rationally arrived at in your worldview how exactly?

This I've answered several times, so I'll let my previous responses stand. You'll find them in this thread and other places this has been discussed. I have to admit to getting tired of continually repeating the same points.

I'm not about to slough through 40 pages of back and forth with you and seer for something that would take you 5-10 minutes to type down, at most.

Your opinion is duly noted. I'm not sure what else there is to say.

"Your opinion is duly noted" is a quite appropriate way to respond to any assertion from you about morality and moral reasoning.

[Charles]

I think a very basic error in Carpe's way of describing moral reality is his idea that we all work from our own moral framework. He seems to insist it is relative/subjective since an individual must hold the idea. That, however, does not follow, since an individual can work with a framework that is not subjective. Claiming otherwise is begging the question.

[carpedm9587]

So if there is no objective truth value in your argument for the value of human life versus someone else's argument that human life has no value, then why should we think your "rational basis" for morality is any better than the mass murderer's?

You are under no obligation to do so, Sparko. You seem, again, to be complaining that relative/subjective moral frameworks cannot offer absolute/objective moral statements. That's still not an argument. Green is not blue is not an argument - it's merely an observation of a reality.

1. I value human life therefore killing people at random is immoral.
2. I don't value human life therefore killing people at random is moral.

Logically and rationally, if morals are subjective, there is no difference in those two arguments.

That's correct - the killer may come to exactly that conclusion and it is rationally based on what he values (assuming your statements are correct). The problem here is?

therefore your claim that morals based on a rational basis is somehow better than basing them on "a book" is false.

No - it means that two people can use reason and arrive at opposing moral conclusions. I have outlined the reason why rationality is better than "following the herd." I'll do it one more time for those who had difficulty the first hundred times.

There is a simple progression to engaging in a moral discussion debate when two people do not align.

1) Attempt to influence the underlying valuing so they align (these may be done by rational arguments, emotional arguments, social arguments, etc.
2) When the underlying valuing aligns, use reason to arrive at a common moral conclusion.

If 1) is not possible, then 2) is not possible, and all that is left is ignore, isolate/separate, or contend.
If 1) is possible, the 2) is possible and alignment is possible

The "from the book" or "follow the herd" moralizer is stuck on 1). They cannot be reasoned with because 1) their basis is not grounded in reason and 2) they are not using reasoning to arrive at moral conclusions. So whatever the herd does/wants is what they will do/want. Any alignment will be a matter of probability, not reason.

But someone who is reasoning to moral conclusions has the possibility of getting to 2). That is what makes it "better." There is no guarantee of alignment. But there is a possibility that does not exist with the "follow the herd" moralizer. You and Seer like to keep focusing on the Maoist, who may well be another example of not being able to get past 1). You ignore the students in the youth program, or the scout troop, or the neighbors, or the married couple who disagree but engage in the process and arrive at an alignment of moral positions.

But, you will object, how will they know that their aligned position is the RIGHT one? THAT is yet another example of complaining there is no absolute/objective conclusion from a relative/subjective process. Again - not an argument. Just a restatement of definitions.
Second,

[Sparko]

You are under no obligation to do so, Sparko. You seem, again, to be complaining that relative/subjective moral frameworks cannot offer absolute/objective moral statements. That's still not an argument. Green is not blue is not an argument - it's merely an observation of a reality.



That's correct - the killer may come to exactly that conclusion and it is rationally based on what he values (assuming your statements are correct). The problem here is?



No - it means that two people can use reason and arrive at opposing moral conclusions. I have outlined the reason why rationality is better than "following the herd." I'll do it one more time for those who had difficulty the first hundred times.

There is a simple progression to engaging in a moral discussion debate when two people do not align.

1) Attempt to influence the underlying valuing so they align (these may be done by rational arguments, emotional arguments, social arguments, etc.
2) When the underlying valuing aligns, use reason to arrive at a common moral conclusion.

If 1) is not possible, then 2) is not possible, and all that is left is ignore, isolate/separate, or contend.
If 1) is possible, the 2) is possible and alignment is possible

The "from the book" or "follow the herd" moralizer is stuck on 1). They cannot be reasoned with because 1) their basis is not grounded in reason and 2) they are not using reasoning to arrive at moral conclusions. So whatever the herd does/wants is what they will do/want. Any alignment will be a matter of probability, not reason.

But someone who is reasoning to moral conclusions has the possibility of getting to 2). That is what makes it "better." There is no guarantee of alignment. But there is a possibility that does not exist with the "follow the herd" moralizer. You and Seer like to keep focusing on the Maoist, who may well be another example of not being able to get past 1). You ignore the students in the youth program, or the scout troop, or the neighbors, or the married couple who disagree but engage in the process and arrive at an alignment of moral positions.

But, you will object, how will they know that their aligned position is the RIGHT one? THAT is yet another example of complaining there is no absolute/objective conclusion from a relative/subjective process. Again - not an argument. Just a restatement of definitions.
Second,

If two people can logically reason complete opposite conclusions, then your reasoning is meaningless. It is as seer said, just ad-hoc after the fact justification for your values. Your reasoning is no better than someone who reasons that they base their morals on a book they believe was inspired by God.