Is libertarian free will coherent?

[Jim B.]

Who or what is the "self" that's doing this causing of yours? Does it exist in isolated splendour or does it in fact comprise a life-time of subconscious memories and experiences of which you are largely unaware? I suggest the latter. This can't be described as 'LFW' because it directs nothing, itself being shaped and formed by unconscious processes from inputs, memory function, etc, to thought and action.

And what you are writing is likewise motivated by subconscious memories and experiences of which you are largely unaware, so you cannot know what you are really intending to say. And if you cannot know what you're intending to say, no one else can either. It's a self-refuting argument.

[Tassman]

And what you are writing is likewise motivated by subconscious memories and experiences of which you are largely unaware, so you cannot know what you are really intending to say. And if you cannot know what you're intending to say, no one else can either. It's a self-refuting argument.

[The Thinker]

That is literally the opposite of what I said. See the bolded parts.

You're all over the place constantly contradicting yourself.

Assuming further explanation is necessary (which it shouldn't be), take this as a supplement to my paragraph:
X does Y.
Thus, Y is caused, by X.

Agreed.

Whether X does Y is controlled, by X.
Whether X does Y is caused, by X.

False. Since X is uncaused to do Y, X has no control over it. Hence no LFW.

Thus, X causes itself to do Y. (Thus X doing Y is caused.)

Nope. Causing yourself to do something is an oxymoron. We've already agreed that X is uncaused to do Y and you already agreed you cannot control that which is uncaused. Now your nonsense is X causes itself to do Y. That's logically impossible. That's like saying the universe causes itself to exist.

The above statements of causes are not multiple causes, not a sequence of causes. There is only one, atomic, cause-and-control: X.
X is not in turn caused or controlled by any prior cause or controller. X is the relevant (and sufficient) causer and controller.
X is not the thing needing to be caused/controlled. Rather, the only thing needing to be controlled is "whether X does Y", which is not identical to X.

Which is logically impossible. I'm done with you. X doesn't "cause itself." That's like saying the universe causes itself to exist - something you would never accept me saying. You're literally trying to posit something incoherent to save yourself from the incoherency of LFW. Joel you're just sad.

[Joel]

This is your same old argument.
You say the relevant cause (X) is either caused or uncaused, and you also argue that in either case, the effect of X can't be controlled. But your argument assumes that there needs to exist a control prior to X, which ignores the possibility that X itself could be the exercising of control, thus requiring no prior control (nor prior cause for that matter)--no need for X to be controlled. It is sufficient for LFW if X controls which effect it causes.

X does Y.
Thus, Y is caused, by X.
Whether X does Y is controlled, by X.
Whether X does Y is caused, by X.
Thus, X causes itself to do Y. (Thus X doing Y is caused.)
The above statements of causes are not multiple causes, not a sequence of causes. There is only one, atomic, cause-and-control: X.
X is not in turn caused or controlled by any prior cause or controller. X is the relevant (and sufficient) causer and controller.
X is not the thing needing to be caused/controlled. Rather, the only thing needing to be controlled is "whether X does Y", which is not identical to X.

Causing yourself to do something is an oxymoron.
...That's logically impossible. That's like saying the universe causes itself to exist.

No, even robots cause themselves to do things. When it is said that nothing can cause itself, what is meant is nothing can cause itself to come to be. But nothing in what I've said is anything causing itself to come to be. Once something (like Alice) exists, then it can cause changes to itself. There is nothing impossible about you giving yourself a tatoo, but it's impossible for the tatoo itself to cause itself to exist.

We've already agreed that X is uncaused to do Y and you already agreed you cannot control that which is uncaused. Now your nonsense is X causes itself to do Y.

You are confusing "X" with "Whether X does Y". The former is uncaused (in the sense of prior cause). The latter is caused, by X. The former doesn't need to be controlled; the latter does. This is all contained in what I wrote.

You also complain that, "X doesn't "cause itself." But nowhere did I say X causes itself. Here too you seem to be confusing "X" with "Whether X does Y".

You're all over the place constantly contradicting yourself.

As I've said before, then all you need to do is point out some proposition that I am both affirming and denying. If I'm doing it "all over the place", you should have no problem pointing it out.

[Jim B.]

So if subconscious impulses are inclining us to say and do one thing rather than another, how can we know what we intend to say? I agree that unconscious material does have an influence over our thoughts and actions, but unless that influence is marginal over what we say, how can we say anything with even provisional confidence? Why would we pay any attention to what any of us has to say?

[Tassman]

So if subconscious impulses are inclining us to say and do one thing rather than another, how can we know what we intend to say? I agree that unconscious material does have an influence over our thoughts and actions,

but unless that influence is marginal over what we say, how can we say anything with even provisional confidence? Why would we pay any attention to what any of us has to say?

[shunyadragon]

And what you are writing is likewise motivated by subconscious memories and experiences of which you are largely unaware, so you cannot know what you are really intending to say. And if you cannot know what you're intending to say, no one else can either. It's a self-refuting argument.

I agree with Tassman to a certain extent. I believe the role of the subconscious mind has a role in our decision making process, but you need to be more specific in your argument concerning what this role is and how it influences our 'will.' I believe there are evolutionary subconscious instinctual controls on our behavior and decision making process to ensure a stable cooperative social units like the family and community.

I believe Libertarian Free Will is problematic, but that depends on how you define it, and what limits on our Free Will decisions are considered and allowed in the definition. I believe 'we have a Will but it was not necessarily free.' To me the most obvious subconscious controls on our behavior are cultural and religious conditioning that control most people's decision making process in that a 'sense of belonging' probably has an overwhelming influence over many of our choices in our lives. Those that break away from this cultural and religious subconscious controls in their decision making process often pay heavy price for doing so.

[The Thinker]

No, even robots cause themselves to do things. When it is said that nothing can cause itself, what is meant is nothing can cause itself to come to be. But nothing in what I've said is anything causing itself to come to be. Once something (like Alice) exists, then it can cause changes to itself. There is nothing impossible about you giving yourself a tatoo, but it's impossible for the tatoo itself to cause itself to exist.

This is ridiculous. Robots do not cause themselves to do things. They are made of mechanical parts, and those parts are all physically caused by physical forces. Everything you say after that is disanalogous.

You are confusing "X" with "Whether X does Y". The former is uncaused (in the sense of prior cause). The latter is caused, by X. The former doesn't need to be controlled; the latter does. This is all contained in what I wrote.

No!!!X is uncaused to do Y and hence has no control over it, hence it has no control over whether it does or doesn't do Y. You are just making up nonsense.

You also complain that, "X doesn't "cause itself." But nowhere did I say X causes itself. Here too you seem to be confusing "X" with "Whether X does Y".

You're confusing X being uncaused to do why with smuggling in some kind of control factor here. At no point does X have any control over whether it does Y or not. Hence no LFW. X causing Y is not in X's control, since X is uncaused to cause Y.

As I've said before, then all you need to do is point out some proposition that I am both affirming and denying. If I'm doing it "all over the place", you should have no problem pointing it out.

Sure. That's easy. You are both affirming and denying that X has control, by saying X has control to do Y but also acknowledging that X is uncaused to cause Y and that you cannot control something uncaused.

And so we go round and round in circles with you affirming and denying that which you claim LFW rests on. This is getting tiring.

And you seem to be claiming that causing something equals controlling it. But if that were true, being determined to cause something would be controlling it, which is clearly not the case.

[Joel]

This is your same old argument.
You say the relevant cause (X) is either caused or uncaused, and you also argue that in either case, the effect of X can't be controlled. But your argument assumes that there needs to exist a control prior to X, which ignores the possibility that X itself could be the exercising of control, thus requiring no prior control (nor prior cause for that matter)--no need for X to be controlled. It is sufficient for LFW if X controls which effect it causes.

X does Y.
Thus, Y is caused, by X.
Whether X does Y is controlled, by X.
Whether X does Y is caused, by X.
Thus, X causes itself to do Y. (Thus X doing Y is caused.)
The above statements of causes are not multiple causes, not a sequence of causes. There is only one, atomic, cause-and-control: X.
X is not in turn caused or controlled by any prior cause or controller. X is the relevant (and sufficient) causer and controller.
X is not the thing needing to be caused/controlled. Rather, the only thing needing to be controlled is "whether X does Y", which is not identical to X.

Robots do not cause themselves to do things. They are made of mechanical parts, and those parts are all physically caused by physical forces.

I don't see how your second sentence proves the claim in your first sentence.
In the case of a robotic automoton (i.e. not remote controlled), the immediate cause of what it does is the automoton.

You are confusing "X" with "Whether X does Y". The former is uncaused (in the sense of prior cause). The latter is caused, by X. The former doesn't need to be controlled; the latter does. This is all contained in what I wrote.

No!!!X is uncaused to do Y

That's your assertion, not mine. (And it's too ambiguous--causes you to fail to make the distinction I'm pointing out.) Read it more carefully:

"'Whether X does Y' is caused, by X.
"Thus, X causes itself to do Y. (Thus X doing Y is caused.)
"X is not in turn caused or controlled by any prior cause"

And I said, right there:
"X" is uncaused (in the sense of prior cause). "Whether X does Y" is caused, by X.

At no point does X have any control over whether it does Y or not.

Read it again. Particularly: "'Whether X does Y' is controlled, by X."

As I've said before, [if I'm contradicting myself all over the place] then all you need to do is point out some proposition that I am both affirming and denying. If I'm doing it "all over the place", you should have no problem pointing it out.

Sure. That's easy. You are both affirming and denying that X has control, by saying X has control to do Y but also acknowledging that X is uncaused to cause Y and that you cannot control something uncaused.

The part I bolded there is incorrect. See above.

And you seem to be claiming that causing something equals controlling it.

Nope. I haven't said that anywhere. And have even explicitly denied that.

[shunyadragon]

No, even robots cause themselves to do things. When it is said that nothing can cause itself, what is meant is nothing can cause itself to come to be. But nothing in what I've said is anything causing itself to come to be. Once something (like Alice) exists, then it can cause changes to itself. There is nothing impossible about you giving yourself a tatoo, but it's impossible for the tatoo itself to cause itself to exist.

The science of Methodological Naturalism does not remotely claim that something or anything in our physical existence can cause itself. Science at present considers that the fundamental Natural Laws and the nature of our underlying physical existence are the determining 'uncaused cause' of everything physical that exists or has existed in the past. Methodological Naturalism cannot determine any cause beyond this, neither can the Theist assumption of God as the 'uncaused cause.' There is no substantial objective evidence nor logical argument that can go past the unknown without arguing from ignorance, When the uncaused cause is proposed from the Theist or scientific perspective the same problem would exist, both by definition may be described and defined as the 'uncaused cause' of everything in our physical existence. The questions as to; 'What caused Natural Laws,' and 'What caused God?' are equally problematic and cannot be answered to the satisfaction of either side of the argument. It is a draw without resolution. As shown here on Tweb the result is a 'perpetual motion' series of arguments that go no where.

My advice to Alice is 'don't eat the cookies.'

[hansgeorg]

Libertarian free will requires at least 3 things:

(1) We are in control of our will
(2) our mind is causally effective
(3) in the same situation we could have done otherwise

This view is popular among lay people but not among scientists and philosophers. Why is this? It's because libertarian free will is incoherent.

One simple question to ask the libertarian is: do our thoughts have causes? Yes or no?

If our thoughts have causes, what ever caused that can't be our will or our mind, because our thoughts are our will and mind.

You have forgotten about how I can by what I will now in some ways cause what I will tomorrow.

Some people have in some cases had wills directed on not wanting that candy, that bottle of alcohol or that wank next time they would according to their experience be likely to so want, if not forestalling it by will.

All our life stories, in succession, are what we are, in a way, and this means we can today will ourselves out of certain wills tomorrow.

On the Christian view, not quite so, since we need the grace of God for really good resolutions to be really efficient, but knowing that, a Christian can pray.

And if we can will ourselves today out of certain wills tomorrow, we can will ourselves into some too.

Note that the delay need not be exactly 24 hours, it could be shorter.

"If you look on the woman, you are not free not to desire her, but you are free not to look at her in the first place" - said by a Desert Father, an Egyptian monk about one disciple having visited the city.

[hansgeorg]

Make a positive argument showing LFW is coherent.

I think I just did.

[Sparko]

I think I just did.

Thinker can't answer you right now. The universe made him break the rules and now he is temporarily banned for two weeks.

[hansgeorg]

If you think consciousness has the ability to change the course of your atoms to go one way or the other, and that you could have done otherwise in the same situation, meaning, your consciousness itself is not determined by something, then you would believe in LFW.

This is why epiphenomenalists don't believe in LFW.

And why Christians usually do.

Yes, I believe my consciousness is rather determining than simply just being determined by atoms in my brain.

And so, of course, I have no problem thinking consciousness in purer, Divine or angelic, form has any problem directing atoms.

[hansgeorg]

The universe made him break the rules and now he is temporarily banned for two weeks.

Ah, I'll have to wait for an answer then.