Is libertarian free will coherent?

[Joel]

Perhaps the agent prefers X over Y. Perhaps the agent chooses according to some end. Perhaps the agent decides to give into his passions. Lots of possible reasons. Note, again that purpose--final cause--is not the same as efficient cause. Being uncaused (efficient cause) does not imply a lack of purpose/reasons for acting (that can have a connection to what's going on around the agent).

But what causes that preference?

I'm not saying that the preference is the efficient cause. I'm saying it's one of many possible final causes.

If you want to bring in Aristotelian metaphysics into this, like final and efficient causes, you will be undermining libertarian free will, because the Aristotelian principal is incompatible with LFW: (Whatever is changed is changed by another, or, in its more traditional formulation, Whatever is moved is moved by another.) If the soul is changed to cause one action vs. another, then it must be changed or moved by something else that is not itself, and that means it isn't free and must be caused.

I'm only pointing out that when you asked "why" the agent does X, that the question is ambiguous, and we have to be careful to distinguish purpose from efficient cause. That doesn't imply that I'm bringing in everything else that Aristotle ever said.

But if you want to discuss that point, you seem to be incorrect. After all, Aristotle argued that there exists an unmoved mover. Thus it doesn't violate his principle because it isn't moved. I'm proposing the same for the human faculty (will) that has some degree of capacity as an unmoved mover. To the extent that it is LFW, the will moves something else (the body, or a different part of the soul) without itself being moved.

The decision is the soul actualizing one of multiple possibilities. There is no decision apart from the act. The act is the actual thing, and it is caused by the soul.

But since it can't choose it's own thoughts or decisions it can't be free.

This is just you restating your conclusion.

This is you saying, "Thoughts can't be controlled, because thoughts can't be controlled."

No, this is me saying, "Thoughts can't be controlled." Period. Full stop.

You restating your assertion that "thoughts can't be controlled" does nothing to further the discussion.

You are just assuming that the thought about the particular is out of your control, (which is to assume your conclusion).

No, I'm showing you how the possibility of that is incoherent.

No, as you yourself just said, "No, this is me saying, "Thoughts can't be controlled." Period. Full stop."

It still faces the same exact problem, because "choosing to think through the content of the exact formula" is itself a thought that popped into your mind that you couldn't have chosen, no more than you can choose any thought you will ever have ahead of time. It's simply logically impossible.

On the contrary, I would not have taken the time to think through the content of the exact formula if I had not chosen to do so.
For you to just restate that it's impossible for me to choose to do so is just to repeat the assertion, and does nothing to further the discussion.

It's as illogical as something creating itself - it has to exist before it exists. To choose your thoughts is to think about it before you think about it.

I've already explained why that's not true. You can be thinking of a different-but-related thought when you make the decision.
And that in the case of deciding to continue thinking a thought, there is no logical problem with thinking the thought at time t1 when choosing to continue thinking it at t2.

LFW itself is incoherent logically, so you can't claim that a person going through a process of weighing different options is evidence for LFW because that is actual compatible with determinism, and LFW itself is incoherent - which is the one thing I asked you do show is coherent and you have not done.

This is you arguing, "My conclusion is true, so your argument to the contrary must be invalid."

You didn't think about continuing to think about X until that thought popped into your consciousness without your ability to choose or control it. So you're still stuck with the same problem.

You are confusing the thought "X" with the thought of "continuing to think about X".
The order is:
1) You think about X
2) You think about continuing to think about X.
3) You make the choice to do so rather than switch to do something else.
4) You think about X some more.

The fact that you were already thinking about X (1), and already thinking about "continuing to think about X" is irrelevant to whether step (4) was voluntary.
Also whether (1) and (2) were voluntary or involuntary is irrelevant to whether (4) was voluntary.

On the LFW view, thoughts cause actions,

I have repeatedly disagreed with such a claim. You clearly aren't following what I've been saying.

And again, there still is the point that even if you couldn't choose what to think, you could still choose actions. Choosing an action involves choosing among alternative ideas/thoughts about possible actions. Even if you didn't choose the set of alternatives that are in your head (you didn't choose that set of thoughts), you could still choose among those. You could choose one of those (involuntary) thoughts to act upon. The act could still be voluntary, even if the set of thoughts of possible alternatives was involuntarily in your head.

Still faces the same problem, since the choice of the action is still something that involuntarily popped into your head, since you cannot choose it before it does. Every single thought you have faces this problem.

1) You are still supposing that actions are thoughts. [...]
2) You are supposing here, without argument, that at act (of actualizing one of the thoughts) is involuntary, which is assuming your conclusion.

That is complete nonsense because I gave an argument for how it is logically impossible to choose your thoughts in my original post.

Yes, your argument was at most an argument that thoughts are necessarily involuntary.
So I explained how choice is different from thoughts--is not itself a thought--and so your argument does not apply. So a choice could be voluntary even if thoughts were involuntary.
So I pointed out that your response is either
a) continuing to erroneously call a choice a thought, or
b) claiming without argument that choice (a thing different from thoughts) is involuntary.

You have responded yes, but none of your responses logically demonstrates that LFW is coherent.

Nor have I yet seen any reason to think your demand for a positive argument is reasonable. (Rather than simply showing why your arguments for self-refuting are unsound.)

[The Thinker]

I'm not saying that the preference is the efficient cause. I'm saying it's one of many possible final causes.

Then you aren't really saying much.

I'm only pointing out that when you asked "why" the agent does X, that the question is ambiguous, and we have to be careful to distinguish purpose from efficient cause. That doesn't imply that I'm bringing in everything else that Aristotle ever said.

If you are appealing to A-T metaphysics to explain causality, such as efficient, formal, material, and final causes, you have to be prepared to accept the basis of them, which is to a large extent the Aristotelian principle.

But if you want to discuss that point, you seem to be incorrect. After all, Aristotle argued that there exists an unmoved mover. Thus it doesn't violate his principle because it isn't moved. I'm proposing the same for the human faculty (will) that has some degree of capacity as an unmoved mover. To the extent that it is LFW, the will moves something else (the body, or a different part of the soul) without itself being moved.

People cannot be unmoved movers on A-T metaphysics - that only applies to god. All the arguments to try and show god is an unmoved mover do not apply to people because people do not have the same traits as god. God is pure actuality; doesn't move, human beings are not. So even if you propose that humans are unmoved movers, that would simply be incompatible with the Aristotelian principle.

This is just you restating your conclusion.

Which I have argued for and for which you have not provided any good reason to refute.

You restating your assertion that "thoughts can't be controlled" does nothing to further the discussion.

[...]

No, as you yourself just said, "No, this is me saying, "Thoughts can't be controlled." Period. Full stop."

Because I'm dealing with a person that is just claiming they can choose their next thought without logically showing it. I already explained why thoughts cannot be controlled in the original post, and several times in subsequent posts.

On the contrary, I would not have taken the time to think through the content of the exact formula if I had not chosen to do so.
For you to just restate that it's impossible for me to choose to do so is just to repeat the assertion, and does nothing to further the discussion.

Then logically explain how you can choose your next thought. You have not done so except to claim that you do when you make a choice.

I've already explained why that's not true. You can be thinking of a different-but-related thought when you make the decision.
And that in the case of deciding to continue thinking a thought, there is no logical problem with thinking the thought at time t1 when choosing to continue thinking it at t2.


This is you arguing, "My conclusion is true, so your argument to the contrary must be invalid."


You are confusing the thought "X" with the thought of "continuing to think about X".
The order is:
1) You think about X
2) You think about continuing to think about X.
3) You make the choice to do so rather than switch to do something else.
4) You think about X some more.

The fact that you were already thinking about X (1), and already thinking about "continuing to think about X" is irrelevant to whether step (4) was voluntary.
Also whether (1) and (2) were voluntary or involuntary is irrelevant to whether (4) was voluntary.

I'll take this as your logical explanation of LFW. I am not confusing the thought "X" with the thought of "continuing to think about X". I'm arguing that each and every thought that pops into your consciousness is not something that you could have chosen, because once again, you can't have a thought, about a thought, before you have the thought. Thinking about X is a thought that pops into your mind that you couldn't have thought about before you thought about it. And choosing to continue to think about X likewise is a thought that pops into your mind that you couldn't have thought about before you thought about it. So for your (3) the choice you make is as involuntary as (1)

I have repeatedly disagreed with such a claim. You clearly aren't following what I've been saying.

If thoughts are not the cause of actions, ever, then your all of your actions are controlled by unconscious processes, like the firing of neurons in your brain. Once you accept that, you must jettison LFW.

Yes, your argument was at most an argument that thoughts are necessarily involuntary.
So I explained how choice is different from thoughts--is not itself a thought--and so your argument does not apply. So a choice could be voluntary even if thoughts were involuntary.
So I pointed out that your response is either
a) continuing to erroneously call a choice a thought, or
b) claiming without argument that choice (a thing different from thoughts) is involuntary.

"Choice" is commonly defined as "an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities." Unless you want to argue that decisions are not consciously made with thoughts, which would refute LFW, then you have to concede this. And if choices are not due to thoughts, then what are they due to? I don't see how any of the above helps your view. Either:

(A) Choices are not the result of thoughts, in which case they are not free in any LFW sense given my (2); or
(B) Choices are the result of thoughts, in which case since thoughts are not freely chosen, neither would the choices.

Nor have I yet seen any reason to think your demand for a positive argument is reasonable. (Rather than simply showing why your arguments for self-refuting are unsound.)

You have not shown that. The person who thinks X is coherent bears the burden of proof to show it because that is making the positive claim. Do you concede right now that thoughts are necessarily involuntary?

[Joel]

I'm not saying that the preference is the efficient cause. I'm saying it's one of many possible final causes.

Then you aren't really saying much.

Your claim was that if the agent was not moved by an external efficient cause, then the agent acts randomly/arbitrarily. I was pointing out that no, an agent could still be acting purposefully towards ends and acting orderly. So that argument of yours was a non sequitur.

If you are appealing to A-T metaphysics to explain causality, such as efficient, formal, material, and final causes, you have to be prepared to accept the basis of them, which is to a large extent the Aristotelian principle.

No, I'm just appealing to the semantics of the English language, that the question "why" in English is ambiguous, and can be asking for efficient cause or for purpose.
E.g., the question, "Why does the piston move outward on the first stroke?" could be answered either by
a) "Because the crankshaft pulls it out." or
b) "In order to draw in a the fuel-air mixture into the cylinder."

People cannot be unmoved movers on A-T metaphysics - that only applies to god.

I don't care. (for the purposes of this thread, anyway, because I'm not claiming to adhere strictly to Aristotle)

Which I have argued for and for which you have not provided any good reason to refute.

I have provided a counter-argument to each of your arguments. If you don't think they are 'good enough' then you can explain why they aren't.

Because I'm dealing with a person that is just claiming they can choose their next thought without logically showing it.

The thread isn't about showing that it's true, but refuting your claim that it's self-contradictory.

Then logically explain how you can choose your next thought. You have not done so except to claim that you do when you make a choice.

I have explained how while thinking one thought, I can choose whether to think a different-but-related thought, which refutes your argument. That is sufficient.

You are confusing the thought "X" with the thought of "continuing to think about X".
The order is:
1) You think about X
2) You think about continuing to think about X.
3) You make the choice to do so rather than switch to do something else.
4) You think about X some more.

The fact that you were already thinking about X (1), and already thinking about "continuing to think about X" is irrelevant to whether step (4) was voluntary.
Also whether (1) and (2) were voluntary or involuntary is irrelevant to whether (4) was voluntary.

I'll take this as your logical explanation of LFW. I am not confusing the thought "X" with the thought of "continuing to think about X". I'm arguing that each and every thought that pops into your consciousness is not something that you could have chosen, because once again, you can't have a thought, about a thought, before you have the thought. Thinking about X is a thought that pops into your mind that you couldn't have thought about before you thought about it. And choosing to continue to think about X likewise is a thought that pops into your mind that you couldn't have thought about before you thought about it. So for your (3) the choice you make is as involuntary as (1)

As I said, whether (1) and (2) were involuntary is irrelevant. But then your last sentence there doesn't follow. Or is at least a claim without justification. You are saying that (1) and (2) were involuntary, therefore (4) is also involuntary. But that doesn't follow. It is possible for (1) and (2) to be involuntary but (4) to be voluntary. I see nothing contradictory about that. And at the time of (3) both X and the thought of "continuing to think about X" are both in your mind. But that doesn't imply that (4) is involuntary. And let me rephrase (3) slightly to be "You make the choice about whether to to do so or to switch to do something else." Then at (3) you might have chosen to not do (4). There would be nothing contradictory about that either. So 1 through 3 do not imply 4 follows necessarily.

I have repeatedly disagreed with such a claim. You clearly aren't following what I've been saying.

If thoughts are not the cause of actions, ever, then your all of your actions are controlled by unconscious processes, like the firing of neurons in your brain. Once you accept that, you must jettison LFW.

You aren't following what I've been saying. Each idea about a possible alternative action is a thought. I'm saying that (in an LFW choice) none of them causes the action. You can think about each of them. You can consciously deliberate about them. And then you actualize one of them (without being caused to do so by any one of the thoughts or by anything external). But that lack of a further efficient cause does not rule out the possibility that you did it for a purpose, that you consciously deliberated.

"Choice" is commonly defined as "an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities." Unless you want to argue that decisions are not consciously made with thoughts, which would refute LFW, then you have to concede this. And if choices are not due to thoughts, then what are they due to?

Of course decisions are usually made while thinking thoughts of the alternatives, and one's goals, passions, etc., with conscious deliberation. But that does not imply that any one of those thoughts caused the action. And thoughts of alternatives and goals can supply you with a purpose for action, without having to cause the action. (Indeed you probably have a motive/purpose for each alternative while deliberating.)

Either:
(A) Choices are not the result of thoughts, in which case they are not free in any LFW sense given my (2); or

How so? If the soul effectively causes and carries out the action (that the thought was a mere idea of), then the soul was causally effective, and acted according to (not caused by) a desired end. In what other sense does the agent need to be causally effective?

The person who thinks X is coherent bears the burden of proof to show it because that is making the positive claim.

It's not a positive claim. You've defined "coherent" as "not self-refuting". Thus it is a negative claim (about the non-existence of a proof of self-refutation).
I tend to think one should assume any proposition X to be possible unless proven impossible. (Caveat: that's not the same thing as assuming X to be true until proven false.)

Do you concede right now that thoughts are necessarily involuntary?

I've been arguing that they can sometimes be voluntary (to at least some nonzero degree). So no.
But then I also have been arguing that even if they were purely involuntary, it's still possible that you could have some freedom to choose among possible thoughts to actualize, since that is different from a thought about doing so, so is different from a thought.
But you knew this because you've been paying attention, right? I'm not sure why you'd even ask this question.

[Truthseeker]

The Thinker may have in mind a definition of "thought" such that it opens the door for him to say that our thoughts are not our will and mind. Whatever the definition is, I feel that I should challenge it.

[robrecht]

It seemed like you were saying that, but then it didn't when I got more info. Do you accept (1)(2) or (3) in my original post? For (3) quantum indeterminism, should it be true, could allow for this, but it still would not allow true free will because a compatibilist would recognize (1) and (2) or not true.

(1) We are in control of our will
- Partially, not always, not completely, and some people more than others.

(2) our mind is causally effective
- Partially, not always, not completely, and some more than others. I'm not sure if you are differentiating mind from brain, but just speaking of our brain it effectively controls our autonomic nervous system without any interaction with our consciousness. If you are speaking of 'mind' in the sense of our subconscious and conscious 'self', that we experience as self-consciousness, the subconscious may exert control over our conscious mind in ways that we are not frequently aware of, and many other factors, both biological and historical, affect our freedom to choose among various options.

(3) in the same situation we could have done otherwise
- Sure, depending upon the situation, we may have more or fewer options

Now, here are the questions I've asked of you that you have not yet responded to:

1. What was the additional info that changed your classification of my view from compatibilist to libertarian free will?

2. Do you have any real data for saying that most Christians believe in libertarian free will and affirm 1), 2) and 3) in an absolute sense ('not determined by anything') in a strict dichotomy with determinism?

Your initial definition of 'libertarian free will' included the 'incoherent belief that our will, mind, and consciousness is not determined by anything'. I think our will, mind, and consciousness are largely determined by many things, but they are not completely determined. I do think we have some capacity for freedom.

[The Thinker]

Oh boy this is getting long....

Your claim was that if the agent was not moved by an external efficient cause, then the agent acts randomly/arbitrarily. I was pointing out that no, an agent could still be acting purposefully towards ends and acting orderly. So that argument of yours was a non sequitur.

Your point is not backed up with any argument; it's just a claim and nothing more. How can an agent be acting towards an end if their thoughts are uncaused? If there is an end, then there is something that is causing it to do one thing rather than another. So my argument is not at all a non-sequitor. And perhaps it is best if you outline a chronological order of events of what happens when you think a freely willed decision is made that allows for a coherent example of LFW.

No, I'm just appealing to the semantics of the English language, that the question "why" in English is ambiguous, and can be asking for efficient cause or for purpose.
E.g., the question, "Why does the piston move outward on the first stroke?" could be answered either by
a) "Because the crankshaft pulls it out." or
b) "In order to draw in a the fuel-air mixture into the cylinder."

No, you were appealing to A-T metaphysics, which itself denies LFW. If you deny A-T metaphysics, just say so.

I don't care. (for the purposes of this thread, anyway, because I'm not claiming to adhere strictly to Aristotle)

Fine, but be careful when you borrow from A-T metaphysics in order to describe free will.

I have provided a counter-argument to each of your arguments. If you don't think they are 'good enough' then you can explain why they aren't.

And your counter-arguments amount to bare claims. They do not logically explain LFW.

The thread isn't about showing that it's true, but refuting your claim that it's self-contradictory.

Showing how it is logically possible is how you refute my claim that is isn't.

I have explained how while thinking one thought, I can choose whether to think a different-but-related thought, which refutes your argument. That is sufficient.

That doesn't refute my argument at all, because all you're doing is just claiming that you can choose whether to think a different-but-related thought. That is backed up by no logical argument whatsoever. The "different-but-related thought" faces the exact same problem as the original thought that you concede cannot be chosen. You simply aren't following the problem.

As I said, whether (1) and (2) were involuntary is irrelevant. But then your last sentence there doesn't follow. Or is at least a claim without justification. You are saying that (1) and (2) were involuntary, therefore (4) is also involuntary. But that doesn't follow. It is possible for (1) and (2) to be involuntary but (4) to be voluntary. I see nothing contradictory about that. And at the time of (3) both X and the thought of "continuing to think about X" are both in your mind. But that doesn't imply that (4) is involuntary. And let me rephrase (3) slightly to be "You make the choice about whether to to do so or to switch to do something else." Then at (3) you might have chosen to not do (4). There would be nothing contradictory about that either. So 1 through 3 do not imply 4 follows necessarily.

The problem you face is that the thought of "continuing to think about X" is itself something that popped into your mind that you could not have chosen beforehand, and you have offered no explanation of whether (3) is a thought or choice caused by (2). If it is then it is just as involuntary as (2) and (1), and if it isn't caused by (2) then what does? It either has a cause or not. If it has no cause then it is itself something that you could not have chosen beforehand.

You aren't following what I've been saying. Each idea about a possible alternative action is a thought. I'm saying that (in an LFW choice) none of them causes the action. You can think about each of them. You can consciously deliberate about them. And then you actualize one of them (without being caused to do so by any one of the thoughts or by anything external). But that lack of a further efficient cause does not rule out the possibility that you did it for a purpose, that you consciously deliberated.

You clearly aren't following what I've been saying. Saying "You can consciously deliberate about them" must result from a process whereby thoughts enter your consciousness without choosing them. Every single thought in the chain of thoughts faces the same problem as the initial thought - you can't have a thought, about a thought, before you have the thought. If the thought of ice cream pops into your head, and the thoughts about whether or not to get some pops into your head, those thoughts of deliberation are also thoughts you could not have thought about, before you thought about them. You can't think to yourself "I'm going to deliberate whether or not to get ice cream in 5 seconds" without already thinking about it. And when you come to the final conclusion of whether to get it or not, that itself is a thought that you could not have controlled because you can't choose whether or not to get ice cream, before you choose whether or not to get ice cream. Now I assume you think you can choose whether or not to get ice cream, before you choose whether or not to get ice cream. That's what you have not logically shown, you've just claimed it. Having the thought in your mind about whether or not to get ice cream prior to the choice being made does not in any way make the choice libertarian and fall under my (1)(2) or (3) or any of them.

Of course decisions are usually made while thinking thoughts of the alternatives, and one's goals, passions, etc., with conscious deliberation. But that does not imply that any one of those thoughts caused the action. And thoughts of alternatives and goals can supply you with a purpose for action, without having to cause the action. (Indeed you probably have a motive/purpose for each alternative while deliberating.)

All those those thoughts of the alternatives, and one's goals, passions, etc., with conscious deliberation, faces the problem of us not being able to choose them. And if you think your actions have no cause (or if they're caused by a soul that has no cause for causing the action) then you couldn't possibly have chosen them beforehand. They'd be something out of your control in which case that negates LFW.

How so? If the soul effectively causes and carries out the action (that the thought was a mere idea of), then the soul was causally effective, and acted according to (not caused by) a desired end. In what other sense does the agent need to be causally effective?

If our mind is not causally effective, and if our soul causes our mind, and/or our actions, and we are not consciously aware of what the soul will do, then this is no different from a device being put in you brain that allows me to remotely control your thoughts and actions. How can you even argue your thoughts/actions are free? You need to differentiate between the soul, the agent, the will, and the mind.

It's not a positive claim. You've defined "coherent" as "not self-refuting". Thus it is a negative claim (about the non-existence of a proof of self-refutation). I tend to think one should assume any proposition X to be possible unless proven impossible. (Caveat: that's not the same thing as assuming X to be true until proven false.)

Oh please, this is such a trivial semantic hissy fit. I'm defining coherent as "(of an argument, theory, or policy) logical and consistent." There.

I've been arguing that they can sometimes be voluntary (to at least some nonzero degree). So no.
But then I also have been arguing that even if they were purely involuntary, it's still possible that you could have some freedom to choose among possible thoughts to actualize, since that is different from a thought about doing so, so is different from a thought.
But you knew this because you've been paying attention, right? I'm not sure why you'd even ask this question.

You have no libertarian freedom because no one can choose their next thought before already involuntarily thinking about the thought. It is a logical impossibility, and that's why LFW isn't coherent and very few philosophers accept it.

[The Thinker]

(1) We are in control of our will
- Partially, not always, not completely, and some people more than others.

How can you choose what thoughts you have or will have? How is it possible?

(2) our mind is causally effective
- Partially, not always, not completely, and some more than others. I'm not sure if you are differentiating mind from brain, but just speaking of our brain it effectively controls our autonomic nervous system without any interaction with our consciousness. If you are speaking of 'mind' in the sense of our subconscious and conscious 'self', that we experience as self-consciousness, the subconscious may exert control over our conscious mind in ways that we are not frequently aware of, and many other factors, both biological and historical, affect our freedom to choose among various options.

I am differentiating. If our minds our controlled by something subconscious, how can you even be sure it is free? Would you be able to tell the difference between a free thought, and one that is the result of a device implanted into your brain without your knowledge that is remotely controlled by me?

(3) in the same situation we could have done otherwise
- Sure, depending upon the situation, we may have more or fewer options

This requires quantum indeterminism, but more importantly, it requires that your mind somehow be what decides otherwise, or else you're just a random bot.

Now, here are the questions I've asked of you that you have not yet responded to:

1. What was the additional info that changed your classification of my view from compatibilist to libertarian free will?

I can't recall the specifics, but it seems you were acknowledging a negation of my (1) and (2).

2. Do you have any real data for saying that most Christians believe in libertarian free will and affirm 1), 2) and 3) in an absolute sense ('not determined by anything') in a strict dichotomy with determinism?

I don't have any polls, but I don't think it is controversial to say this given how most people in general believe LFW is true and most interpretations of Christianity rely on LFW to make sense of judgement, hell, and the problem of evil.

Your initial definition of 'libertarian free will' included the 'incoherent belief that our will, mind, and consciousness is not determined by anything'. I think our will, mind, and consciousness are largely determined by many things, but they are not completely determined. I do think we have some capacity for freedom.

Actually, my initial post did not contain that quote.

[Truthseeker]

One way--perhaps the only way--to meet your demand is to assume LFW together with a set of premises. If 1) the set is sufficient to reach a conclusion and 2) the premises beside LFW all seem realistic and 3) a sound argument is made that ends in a conclusion that seems realistic, then perhaps we can say that LFW is not self-contradictory.

What is A-T metaphysics? Wikipedia was no help.

[robrecht]

How can you choose what thoughts you have or will have? How is it possible?

I don't, it just seems to me and, I think, most people, that we can sometimes choose to think about some things. For example I could have chosen to write my dissertation about Crossan's theory of the pre-Markan passion narrative, the the final text of the gospel of Mark, or the hypothetical Q-source, or the text of Philippians 2, and, depending on the choice I made at the time, that would determine to a large extent what I thought about for the next four years. That's just the common experience of many people. I don't think we can prove free-will or determinism but both seem to make sense of various phenomena.

I am differentiating. If our minds our controlled by something subconscious, how can you even be sure it is free? Would you be able to tell the difference between a free thought, and one that is the result of a device implanted into your brain without your knowledge that is remotely controlled by me?

Doubtful, but I am generally skeptical of black and white dichotomies. I see no reason why our minds cannot be both partly controlled by subconscious aspects of our being and partly subject to the conscious choices that we make. Why must it be only one or the other? And why must it be completely this one and not at all that one?

This requires quantum indeterminism, but more importantly, it requires that your mind somehow be what decides otherwise, or else you're just a random bot.

Again, why must it be either one or the other alone? Why not a combination of the two (and perhaps more) possibilities?

I can't recall the specifics, but it seems you were acknowledging a negation of my (1) and (2).

Well go back and read again and try to make sense of your opposing judgments if you can. Then we may be able to better define your terms and propositions.

I don't have any polls, but I don't think it is controversial to say this given how most people in general believe LFW is true and most interpretations of Christianity rely on LFW to make sense of judgement, hell, and the problem of evil.

I think it is actually controversial when you try and paint the opinion of others as incoherent. It seems to me that it is you who are trying to make it controversial. I've described how the variety of positions were available within the Jewish matrix out of which Christianity was born, and it seems to me various Christians still choose all three viewpoints, and thus there is nothing specifically Christian about either one of the two extremes or the view that combines elements of both.

Actually, my initial post did not contain that quote.

I merely made your statements a little more concise:

"Most Christians believe in libertarian free will. That is, they reject determinism, are incompatibilists, and believe that our will, mind, and consciousness is not determined by anything ... libertarian free will is incoherent."

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I think most Christians, and most non-Christians believe that our will is partially free and partially determined.

[The Thinker]

I don't, it just seems to me and, I think, most people, that we can sometimes choose to think about some things. For example I could have chosen to write my dissertation about Crossan's theory of the pre-Markan passion narrative, the the final text of the gospel of Mark, or the hypothetical Q-source, or the text of Philippians 2, and, depending on the choice I made at the time, that would determine to a large extent what I thought about for the next four years. That's just the common experience of many people. I don't think we can prove free-will or determinism but both seem to make sense of various phenomena.

That's the problem, it doesn't actually make sense. "It just seems to me" also led our ancestors to think the earth was flat.

Doubtful, but I am generally skeptical of black and white dichotomies. I see no reason why our minds cannot be both partly controlled by subconscious aspects of our being and partly subject to the conscious choices that we make. Why must it be only one or the other? And why must it be completely this one and not at all that one?

That's basically interactionism you've described. The problem is that even if we have an immaterial soul, it is impossible to choose your thoughts. Therefore we have no control of our will.

Again, why must it be either one or the other alone? Why not a combination of the two (and perhaps more) possibilities?

The view I'm arguing is that the ability for us to choose our thoughts or will - which is required for free will, is not possible, so even if I grant the two, it is not possible.

I think it is actually controversial when you try and paint the opinion of others as incoherent. It seems to me that it is you who are trying to make it controversial. I've described how the variety of positions were available within the Jewish matrix out of which Christianity was born, and it seems to me various Christians still choose all three viewpoints, and thus there is nothing specifically Christian about either one of the two extremes or the view that combines elements of both.

That still says nothing about whether most Christians accept LFW. I fully acknowledge some don't, but they're a minority.

I merely made your statements a little more concise:

"Most Christians believe in libertarian free will. That is, they reject determinism, are incompatibilists, and believe that our will, mind, and consciousness is not determined by anything ... libertarian free will is incoherent."

.

I think most Christians, and most non-Christians believe that our will is partially free and partially determined.

That's not the issue. The issue is whether any part or any instance of our will is free at all vs. being fully determined and/or fully out of our conscious control.

[The Thinker]

One way--perhaps the only way--to meet your demand is to assume LFW together with a set of premises. If 1) the set is sufficient to reach a conclusion and 2) the premises beside LFW all seem realistic and 3) a sound argument is made that ends in a conclusion that seems realistic, then perhaps we can say that LFW is not self-contradictory.

What is A-T metaphysics? Wikipedia was no help.

A-T metaphysics means Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics. It's the metaphysics that the traditional Catholic Church has had since at least Aquinas.

[robrecht]

That's the problem, it doesn't actually make sense. "It just seems to me" also led our ancestors to think the earth was flat.

I choose not to believe that the earth is flat. It also does not seem to me that you've proven total determinism.

That's basically interactionism you've described. The problem is that even if we have an immaterial soul, it is impossible to choose your thoughts. Therefore we have no control of our will.

You don't think we have any control whatsoever over what we think about? If I decide to take a job in medical publishing, that choice will determine to some extent what I will think about during my work day. What career are you in? You had no control over the course of your life?

The view I'm arguing is that the ability for us to choose our thoughts or will - which is required for free will, is not possible, so even if I grant the two, it is not possible.

I know you are arguing for this position, and perhaps you are driven to believe this without any ability to consider other possibilities. I prefer to consider other possibilities. If you and I have no control over what we believe and study and think, then why do you bother to have this conversation with me? You really have no choice but to argue for your position?

That still says nothing about whether most Christians accept LFW. I fully acknowledge some don't, but they're a minority.

I don't think you've presented any evidence for this view. I think most accept some form of interactionism, as you are now describing my position. I notice that you deleted my invitation about trying to figure out what supposedly new information caused you to change your label of my view from compatibiiism to libertarian free will. "Well go back and read again and try to make sense of your opposing judgments if you can. Then we may be able to better define your terms and propositions." If we cannot be clear on what your definitions are, we will never be able to make an educated guess about whether or not a majority of any particular group hold this view.

That's not the issue. The issue is whether any part or any instance of our will is free at all vs. being fully determined and/or fully out of our conscious control.

It is certainly the issue when you say that you did not say something and I remind you of it. As I was saying, in my own limited experience, it seems to me most people, Christian and non-Christian alike, think that our will is partially determined and partially free. And most no longer believe that the earth is flat. What has led you to deny the common perception that we have at least some capacity for freedom and responsibility?

[The Thinker]

I choose not to believe that the earth is flat. It also does not seem to me that you've proven total determinism.

How do you choose your next thought or belief? Explain this coherently. Until you can, you cannot claim LFW is true.

You don't think we have any control whatsoever over what we think about? If I decide to take a job in medical publishing, that choice will determine to some extent what I will think about during my work day. What career are you in? You had no control over the course of your life?

We have to outline a few things here. Colloquially, and for practical purposes, we can talk about ourselves "choosing" career paths, or things like this. There is nothing wrong with that. But in actuality, your "choice" has a cause, and that cause was not something you have any conscious awareness or control over. So in actuality "we" don't technically choose anything. Our thoughts and actions are caused by physical antecedents of which we have no control over.

I know you are arguing for this position, and perhaps you are driven to believe this without any ability to consider other possibilities. I prefer to consider other possibilities. If you and I have no control over what we believe and study and think, then why do you bother to have this conversation with me? You really have no choice but to argue for your position?

This is one of the most common mistakes people make when dealing with determinism. Almost everyone of your beliefs started as a person telling you something (or you reading what they wrote) which caused you to change your beliefs. In trying to be the causal impetus that gets you to change your mind on this matter, or to at least educate you on the matter. Once you understand cause and effect, you'll see that this is the only thing that makes sense. Please don't conflate determinism with fatalism. It's the biggest mistake we can make on the issue. Perhaps this info graph might help:

I don't think you've presented any evidence for this view. I think most accept some form of interactionism, as you are now describing my position. I notice that you deleted my invitation about trying to figure out what supposedly new information caused you to change your label of my view from compatibiiism to libertarian free will. "Well go back and read again and try to make sense of your opposing judgments if you can. Then we may be able to better define your terms and propositions." If we cannot be clear on what your definitions are, we will never be able to make an educated guess about whether or not a majority of any particular group hold this view.

If most accept some form of interactionism and interactionism is incompatible with determinism (because it would violate physical law) then most Christians at least aren't determinists. Now I don't think it's controversial to believe most Christians accept LFW. Why is this such a big deal for you?

It is certainly the issue when you say that you did not say something and I remind you of it. As I was saying, in my own limited experience, it seems to me most people, Christian and non-Christian alike, think that our will is partially determined and partially free. And most no longer believe that the earth is flat. What has led you to deny the common perception that we have at least some capacity for freedom and responsibility?

What led me? Looking into the issue on logical and scientific grounds. There is no way one can rationally remain a believer in LFW when ones does that. LFW simply has no scientific or logical basis, and that's why only 13.7% of philosophers accept it.

[robrecht]

How do you choose your next thought or belief? Explain this coherently. Until you can, you cannot claim LFW is true.

I don't think I have claimed libertarian free will is true. I am still trying to get you to better define your terms.

We have to outline a few things here. Colloquially, and for practical purposes, we can talk about ourselves "choosing" career paths, or things like this. There is nothing wrong with that. But in actuality, your "choice" has a cause, and that cause was not something you have any conscious awareness or control over. So in actuality "we" don't technically choose anything. Our thoughts and actions are caused by physical antecedents of which we have no control over.

I don't think you have demonstrated this yet.

This is one of the most common mistakes people make when dealing with determinism. Almost everyone of your beliefs started as a person telling you something (or you reading what they wrote) which caused you to change your beliefs. In trying to be the causal impetus that gets you to change your mind on this matter, or to at least educate you on the matter. Once you understand cause and effect, you'll see that this is the only thing that makes sense. Please don't conflate determinism with fatalism. It's the biggest mistake we can make on the issue. Perhaps this info graph might help:

I agree that determinism and fatalism can certainly have different nuances in various contexts. Do you admit that there are also areas of overlap between determinism and fatalism?

If most accept some form of interactionism and interactionism is incompatible with determinism (because it would violate physical law) then most Christians at least aren't determinists. Now I don't think it's controversial to believe most Christians accept LFW. Why is this such a big deal for you?

I don't think you have yet given an account of all the physical laws that preclude our having any capacity for free will. It is not really that big of a deal for me, but it does seem to me that you are trying to paint Christians into a corner that feels much too cramped for me. Nor is it specifically Christian issue. Don't you find that many non-Christians also oppose total determinism without being opposed to the physical laws of science

What led me? Looking into the issue on logical and scientific grounds. There is no way one can rationally remain a believer in LFW when ones does that. LFW simply has no scientific or logical basis, and that's why only 13.7% of philosophers accept it.

I suspect there are perhaps some unnecessary philosophical presuppositions involved in your logical and scientific conclusions. It does not surprise me at all that few philosophers accept libertarian free will, as I think that I do too, but that still begs the question of how exactly and how well you define your terms. Are you saying that 96.3% of philosophers accept total determinism and believe that human beings have zero capacity for free will?

[The Thinker]

I don't think I have claimed libertarian free will is true. I am still trying to get you to better define your terms.

OK then. What terms do you want me to define?

I don't think you have demonstrated this yet.

I did. I made the argument in my initial thread post. What I made was a philosophical argument, the a priori argument. There are also an a posteriori argument.

I agree that determinism and fatalism can certainly have different nuances in various contexts. Do you admit that there are also areas of overlap between determinism and fatalism?

I honestly don't know. I'd need some possible examples.

I don't think you have yet given an account of all the physical laws that preclude our having any capacity for free will. It is not really that big of a deal for me, but it does seem to me that you are trying to paint Christians into a corner that feels much too cramped for me. Nor is it specifically Christian issue. Don't you find that many non-Christians also oppose total determinism without being opposed to the physical laws of science

You're right, I haven't. Here it is:



This equation describes everything in our everyday experience, including our bodies, brains, and everything that goes on in it. This leaves no possible room for a soul or immaterial mind to have a causal effect on any of the atoms in your brain or body. To claim otherwise would require you take up the burden of proof and disprove this equation.

And you're right, this is not a Christian issue. It's an issue that applies to everyone.

I suspect there are perhaps some unnecessary philosophical presuppositions involved in your logical and scientific conclusions. It does not surprise me at all that few philosophers accept libertarian free will, as I think that I do too, but that still begs the question of how exactly and how well you define your terms. Are you saying that 96.3% of philosophers accept total determinism and believe that human beings have zero capacity for free will?

I'm not saying that. I'm saying the vast majority of philosophers reject LFW because LFW is logically incoherent and scientifically unsupported, and philosophers are the ones who most closely think about these things. Once you critically examine LFW you will most likely see this too. Most philosophers are compatibilists, but the only point I want to raise in this thread is regarding LFW not CFW. So if you're a compatibilist, great, but that's off topic.