Is libertarian free will coherent?

[Joel]

That makes no sense. There would be a state of affairs when the thing didn't exist

Not if there was no time when the thing didn't exist.

And the question here is about you claiming god doesn't change (which logically entails god does nothing)

No. God doing something only requires that there is an effect. It does not imply that the actor changes. As I said before, you seem to be confusing cause and effect.

Or if God created space-time, then the creation of it is not a change, because (necessarily) there was no time when time didn't exist.

That would entail god and spacetime eternally coexisted. Is that what you believe?

It depends on what you mean by "eternally coexist". Theologians by enternal existence mean self-existence, necessary being, pure actuality, etc. In that case no it would not entail that spacetime is eternally existent.

If on the other hand it is meant in a temporal sense that it exists at every times, then it is necessarily true that space-time is eternal in that sense. Time cannot exist without time existing. And it trivially follows that God and time both exist at every time. No theologian denies that.

A third possible meaning is to say they are ontologically simultaneous or equal. Which is not implied by what I said.

Producing something (even without the actor changing) is doing something.

And that requires the producer change, and change requires time.

First, you are merely repeating your disputed claim again.
And second, "without the actor changing" does the opposite of requiring the actor to change.

I do deny causality - as you understand it in the theistic/Aristotelian/common sense way you think it exists. But you have to deny brute facts in order to make your claim

Such as?

I don't know. I don't really have a problem with God having LFW.

That doesn't answer my question. Is god's will logically necessary in everything he wills, or could it have been otherwise (different)?

I said I don't know. I lean towards the "could have been otherwise", but I don't know the answer.

[Sparko]

You never answered my question earlier: did you raise your arm when I told you to in my post? Why or why not?

No.

Why not?

[Sparko]

It wouldn't necessarily. But if we don't remove people who pose threats to society and discourage others from doing it, more crime and misery will almost certainly ensue - which wouldn't necessarily lead to chaos - but could. Secondly, you are assuming that people will be aware that they have no LFW if they don't. That's a big assumption. And you're assuming that knowledge of there being no LFW necessarily leads one to act differently.

You are assuming that if we don't remove immoral people from society then more people will CHOOSE to be immoral. Wouldn't that require free will to choose that? Hmm?

That's another big assumption. Why don't you try to learn how to philosophize better?

Because I don't want to.

[TheWall]

Beep boop
If we are under determinism we are not capable of agency. Beep boop. Besides what would determine what we where to be determined to do under determinism? It would have to be something that is everywhere and all knowing. Beep boop. Unfourtanatly such a system is not what we live in. Rather we have the choice to do things and consequently objective good and evil are a fact.

Determinism can not exist as good and evil are existant. It can not exist as I can choose not to have cabbage where as in determinism I would have no option.

[Sparko]

Beep boop
If we are under determinism we are not capable of agency. Beep boop. Besides what would determine what we where to be determined to do under determinism? It would have to be something that is everywhere and all knowing. Beep boop. Unfourtanatly such a system is not what we live in. Rather we have the choice to do things and consequently objective good and evil are a fact.

Determinism can not exist as good and evil are existant. It can not exist as I can choose not to have cabbage where as in determinism I would have no option.

You WILL EAT YOUR CABBAGE!!!!

cabbage-013.jpg

[The Thinker]

Yes, so we are agreed on that. (And you can go back and address what I wrote in Post 860)

I don't know what you're referring to.

I didn't. I made it simpler. It is simpler and easier to follow, and manage with logical rules, to say:

P1) X causes Y
P2) P1 is uncaused.

Than to say

P2) "X causes Y" is uncaused.
or P2) X's causing of Y was uncaused.
or P2) X's wasn't caused to cause Y.

No, you made it more complex. The simplest way it could be is:

P1) X causes Y
P2) X is uncaused.

That's all you need.

You often make such statements (that your opponent has conceded things they haven't conceded). It's bizzarre.

Did you or did you not conceded that we cannot be in control of our will because something would have to exist before it existed?

Ignoring that we just said that "uncaused X" is ambiguous and should be dropped,)

I didn't say anything like that, nor did I agree anything should be dropped. This is how to best represent it:

P1) X causes Y
P2) X is uncaused.

No, I defined free will as the agent controlling the change/effect that the agent causes. And I pointed out that several things follow from that definition, including:
- The agent was not necessarily compelled (by some prior cause) to cause the effect.
- The agent could have done otherwise.
- The agent did cause the change (thus is causally effective).

(And I pointed out that there is no logical need for control of the control, which is just a meaningless phrase. It is sufficient that the agent controls the change/effect that the agent causes.)

But that makes no sense. If X causes Y and X is uncaused, they X had no choice to cause Y. At no point does LFW come into play here. Even if we played the scenario again and X didn't cause Y, X would not have had any choice in the matter. And if you try to introduce another step here to try an claim the agent "controlled" the effect Y, like saying X -->X2 --> Y then X2 has the same problem X has: it is either caused or uncaused, and if it is caused it is not free, and if it is uncaused there can be no control over it. Thus the agent has no control in either scenario.

You would have wasted my time yet again with more nonsense wordplay.

That is, regarding the definition, I'm not starting with lack of a prior cause and deducing control or will from that. Rather the implication runs in the other direction.

???

I think the real disagreement we have is that I see no reason to think your premise (P3`) (that a prior cause is required for control) is true. Rather it seems the contrary must be true. I doubt any advocate of LFW would agree to your (P3').

I'm not saying that. I've been saying over and over ad nauseum that if a prior cause exists there is no control, and if a prior cause doesn't exist there is no control. Neither possibility (and there can only be 2) allow for LFW. That is why LFW is logically impossible. How many times do I have to say this?

[Joel]

No, you made it more complex. The simplest way it could be is:

P1) X causes Y
P2) X is uncaused.

That's all you need.

No, as I said, "X is uncaused," (e.g. "Alice is uncaused.") is too ambiguous. It is not explicit or rigourous enough, because you really mean "Alice causing Y is uncaused", not simply "Alice is uncaused."

Did you or did you not conceded that we cannot be in control of our will because something would have to exist before it existed?

I did not concede that.

If X causes Y and X is uncaused, they X had no choice to cause Y.

Your conclusion doesn't follow. (regardless of the ambiguity of "X is uncaused")

No, I defined free will as the agent controlling the change/effect that the agent causes. And I pointed out that several things follow from that definition, including:
- The agent was not necessarily compelled (by some prior cause) to cause the effect.
- The agent could have done otherwise.
- The agent did cause the change (thus is causally effective).

(And I pointed out that there is no logical need for control of the control, which is just a meaningless phrase. It is sufficient that the agent controls the change/effect that the agent causes.)

At no point does LFW come into play here.

What is lacking? More specifically, what is lacking from what advocates of LFW mean by LFW?
(I know what you think is lacking from your definition of LFW, which no advocate of LFW accepts, and thus is a straw man.)

That is, regarding the definition, I'm not starting with lack of a prior cause and deducing control or will from that. Rather the implication runs in the other direction.

???

What don't you understand about that? The direction of logical implication is:
- Alice controls the change/effect that Alice causes. Therefore Alice was not necessarily compelled (by some prior cause) to cause the effect.

I do not argue in the other direction:
- Alice was not necessarily compelled (by some prior cause) to cause the effect. Therefore Alice controls the change/effect that Alice causes.

You seemed to think my reasoning followed the latter, and were attacking that. I was pointing out your error.

I think the real disagreement we have is that I see no reason to think your premise (P3`) (that a prior cause is required for control) is true. Rather it seems the contrary must be true. I doubt any advocate of LFW would agree to your (P3').

[FONT=Verdana]
I'm not saying that. I've been saying over and over ad nauseum that if a prior cause exists there is no control, and if a prior cause doesn't exist there is no control.

How is the bolded part not what I said you said? It is also what you said in your (P3').

As for the two parts of what you are saying, there is no dispute over the former, and there is no reason to believe the latter. The dispute is over the latter (which is what I said). The latter seems obviously false to me.

[The Thinker]

No, as I said, "X is uncaused," (e.g. "Alice is uncaused.") is too ambiguous. It is not explicit or rigourous enough, because you really mean "Alice causing Y is uncaused", not simply "Alice is uncaused."

We already know what it means. If you need to call it your P1, then fine. It doesn't change anything fundamental at all.

I did not concede that.

You agreed that you can never resolve the causality paradox of the will but then asserted my view is a strawman.

Your conclusion doesn't follow. (regardless of the ambiguity of "X is uncaused")

It absolutely does. You've never shown otherwise.

What is lacking? More specifically, what is lacking from what advocates of LFW mean by LFW?
(I know what you think is lacking from your definition of LFW, which no advocate of LFW accepts, and thus is a straw man.)

There is no strawman on my part. Every LFW advocate thinks LFW requires:

(1) We are in control of our will
(2) Our mind is causally effective
(3) In the same situation we could have done otherwise

Take any one of these 3 things away and you have no LFW. And you seemed to already concede (1) is impossible.

What don't you understand about that? The direction of logical implication is:
- Alice controls the change/effect that Alice causes. Therefore Alice was not necessarily compelled (by some prior cause) to cause the effect.

I do not argue in the other direction:
- Alice was not necessarily compelled (by some prior cause) to cause the effect. Therefore Alice controls the change/effect that Alice causes.

You seemed to think my reasoning followed the latter, and were attacking that. I was pointing out your error.

I need to ask you some questions again that you have not answered. Do you agree that by definition you cannot have control over something uncaused? If you deny this, show me how you can have control over something uncaused without that becoming a cause?

How is the bolded part not what I said you said? It is also what you said in your (P3').

As for the two parts of what you are saying, there is no dispute over the former, and there is no reason to believe the latter. The dispute is over the latter (which is what I said). The latter seems obviously false to me.

You said that I said "that a prior cause is required for control" is true. I've been saying for months that that is not the case. I've been super clear on this thread: having a prior cause negates LFW and not having a prior cause negates LFW. What's so hard about that? You need to tell me how LFW can exist if either (1) there is a prior cause or (2) there isn't a prior cause, because those are your only two possible options. You need to show for example how someone can have control over something uncaused. You've just been asserting that this whole time. It's logically impossible.

When will you just admit you have no argument here and no possible way to win this debate? I'm getting tired of your lame attempts.

[Joel]

We already know what it means. If you need to call it your P1, then fine. It doesn't change anything fundamental at all.

Because that was your only objection to my post 860, that post of mine still stands unobjected to.

There is no strawman on my part. Every LFW advocate thinks LFW requires:

(1) We are in control of our will
(2) Our mind is causally effective
(3) In the same situation we could have done otherwise

Take any one of these 3 things away and you have no LFW. And you seemed to already concede (1) is impossible.

I don't think any advocate of LFW agrees to your (1) in the sense that you mean it. Do you have evidence for your claim that they all do?

I need to ask you some questions again that you have not answered. Do you agree that by definition you cannot have control over something uncaused? If you deny this, show me how you can have control over something uncaused without that becoming a cause?

Note that that is not the same as asking if you can have control over something without being caused to cause it. (You can.)

The only thing Alice need have control over is the effect that Alice causes. And that is control over something that (by definition) is caused. Alice need not control anything uncaused. She only needs control over what she causes.

You want me to give a simple yes or no answer to your question. The question is not relevant. But I'll give you an answer:
If the "something" in question is not Alice causing Y, then of course I can agree and answer "yes."
If the "something" in question is Alice causing Y, then we are talking about something Alice caused to be actual (by causing Y). In which case it's possible that Alice was in control (particularly if there is no prior cause, which would imply that it was caused to be actual by Alice alone).

I've been super clear on this thread: ...not having a prior cause negates LFW. What's so hard about that?

I understand you just fine. I just see no reason to think it's true.

When will you just admit you have no argument here and no possible way to win this debate? I'm getting tired of your lame attempts.

I could say the same to you. But I don't, because it's bad form.

[The Thinker]

Because that was your only objection to my post 860, that post of mine still stands unobjected to.

It makes no difference, because they are just 2 different ways of saying the exact same thing: that X is uncaused to do Y. Therefore when you said in post 860:

The first meaning (which the LFW advocate affirms) is that P1 doesn't have a prior cause, such as when a first domino W knocks over the second domino X causing it to cause the third domino to fall over (Y).

You are still stuck with the fact that by definition you cannot control something uncaused. There's no way out of this logical dilemma.

I don't think any advocate of LFW agrees to your (1) in the sense that you mean it. Do you have evidence for your claim that they all do?

All do? No, I don't have a poll of every single LFW advocate and what they think. Sorry. I just know that if you remove (1) you negate LFW, because if you have no control over your will, it isn't free in any meaningful sense required for LFW. If you admit we have no control over our will, you admit we have no LFW. there is just no way to rescue LFW after admitting this. At best you will have CFW: compatibilistic free will. But we're not debating CFW, we're debating LFW.

Note that that is not the same as asking if you can have control over something without being caused to cause it. (You can.)

How? So you're uncaused to do X, how could you have not done X with any meaningful sense of control?

The only thing Alice need have control over is the effect that Alice causes. And that is control over something that (by definition) is caused. Alice need not control anything uncaused. She only needs control over what she causes.

You want me to give a simple yes or no answer to your question. The question is not relevant. But I'll give you an answer:
If the "something" in question is not Alice causing Y, then of course I can agree and answer "yes."
If the "something" in question is Alice causing Y, then we are talking about something Alice caused to be actual (by causing Y). In which case it's possible that Alice was in control (particularly if there is no prior cause, which would imply that it was caused to be actual by Alice alone).

The question is totally relevant to the discussion. In fact it is a central question.

I think you're conflating "Alice causes X" with "Alice has control over whether or not she causes X". They are completely different. Merely causing something is not the same as to have control over it. You need to logically justify where her control comes in and avoid the dilemma, because as soon as you claim she can do something to control it, I am going to ask you whether or not she was caused to do that thing that you claim gives her control over it, and you will face the dilemma once again.

I understand you just fine. I just see no reason to think it's true.

I don't think you understand me given all these back and forth misunderstandings. There is no way to get LFW, and I think ultimately what's going to happen is I will show that and you will try to claim that a compromised version of LFW is LFW; you will merely be calling some non-LFW thing LFW.

I could say the same to you. But I don't, because it's bad form.

But you have not even come close to refuting my argument, you have merely been splitting hairs and making word salads that seems to be ultimately a waste of my time since there is no logically possible way you can show LFW is true. Am I clear that you have admitted we cannot control our will?

[Sparko]

You never answered my question earlier: did you raise your arm when I told you to in my post? Why or why not?

No.

Why not?

[Joel]

All do? No, I don't have a poll of every single LFW advocate and what they think. Sorry. I just know that if you remove (1) you negate LFW, because if you have no control over your will, it isn't free in any meaningful sense required for LFW. If you admit we have no control over our will, you admit we have no LFW. there is just no way to rescue LFW after admitting this. At best you will have CFW: compatibilistic free will. But we're not debating CFW, we're debating LFW.

As I've repeatedly said, LFW doesn't need control of the will because the will is the control. And thus you are insisting on a control of control which is meaningless. So can you provide some examples of prominent advocates of LFW who require that and think that is meaningful? Because I seriously doubt any do.
(By the way, did claim that "Every LFW advocate" does. I was asking you to back up your claim.)

How? So you're uncaused to do X, how could you have not done X with any meaningful sense of control?

The same way you can do X with control.
I'm really not seeing any kind of contradiction in this. What do you think I am both affirming and denying?

The question [Can you control something uncaused?] is totally relevant to the discussion. In fact it is a central question.

The reason it is not relevant is because LFW does not say there is control over anything uncaused. It need only claim Alice has control over what Alice causes.

I think you're conflating "Alice causes X" with "Alice has control over whether or not she causes X". They are completely different. Merely causing something is not the same as to have control over it.

I'm not confusing them. As I said before, the definition starts with control, and that implies causation. Not the other way around like you think I'm thinking. However, I do think that in LFW they are aspects of the same act. It's not a two-step thing where Alice first controls, and then Alice causes. They are simultaneous, they exist both in one step/act, and the only change is the effect.

It occurs to me that this may be our misunderstanding when you have asked me for a chronological ordering. In the essential thing there is no ordering. It's all simultaneous. It is a single act.

You need to logically justify where her control comes in and avoid the dilemma, because as soon as you claim she can do something to control it, I am going to ask you whether or not she was caused to do that thing that you claim gives her control over it, and you will face the dilemma once again.

Yes, in LFW she can do something to control it. The controlling it and the causing it are both in the same act. And that is not the same as doing something that "gives her control over it". There is no additional step of giving herself control.

[The Thinker]

As I've repeatedly said, LFW doesn't need control of the will because the will is the control. And thus you are insisting on a control of control which is meaningless. So can you provide some examples of prominent advocates of LFW who require that and think that is meaningful? Because I seriously doubt any do.
(By the way, did claim that "Every LFW advocate" does. I was asking you to back up your claim.)

That's just a word salad: "the will is the control" What the hell does that mean? LFW needs control of the will that's the whole point. If I had a device implanted in your brain that controlled your thoughts, you would clearly say that you had no free will in that case. If the "will is the control" and you have no control over your will, you have no LFW. This is the nonsense I have to deal with. As far as prominent LFW advocates, they just assert you have control of your will usually with no details. If pressed they might like you say some word salad that makes no sense. This is why barely 15% of professional philosophers accept LFW.

The same way you can do X with control.
I'm really not seeing any kind of contradiction in this. What do you think I am both affirming and denying?

That makes no sense since X is uncaused and you cannot by definition control something uncaused. You make no sense.

The reason it is not relevant is because LFW does not say there is control over anything uncaused. It need only claim Alice has control over what Alice causes.

Which you haven't shown either, nor can you without avoiding the dilemma. You will always face it no matter what you do because it is logically possible otherwise. And it is absolutely relevant. So you admit you cannot have control over anything uncaused? Correct?

I'm not confusing them. As I said before, the definition starts with control, and that implies causation. Not the other way around like you think I'm thinking. However, I do think that in LFW they are aspects of the same act. It's not a two-step thing where Alice first controls, and then Alice causes. They are simultaneous, they exist both in one step/act, and the only change is the effect.

But there is no control since X is uncaused to cause Y. So your whole answer is an incoherent word salad. Please stop wasting my time.

It occurs to me that this may be our misunderstanding when you have asked me for a chronological ordering. In the essential thing there is no ordering. It's all simultaneous. It is a single act.

It doesn't resolve anything. You're still stuck in the dilemma. There is no control if it is uncaused, or if it's caused, and it can only be one of the two. Please stop wasting my time. You've already conceded that something uncaused can't be controlled.

Yes, in LFW she can do something to control it. The controlling it and the causing it are both in the same act. And that is not the same as doing something that "gives her control over it". There is no additional step of giving herself control.

Is that simultaneous act caused by something, or is it uncaused?

[The Thinker]

Why not?

Because my brain didn't make me.

[Sparko]

Because my brain didn't make me.

Why not? So basically since you are your brain, as you keep saying, you are really saying that you didn't make you raise your arm. because otherwise you are not your brain if your brain made you not raise your arm. That would be dualism.