Is "Why is there something rather than nothing?" a legitimate question?

[JimL]

No, it wasn't. The only times I have used the phrase "at once" in this thread have been in response to others who brought it up. I've been consistently attempting to show that the phrase is misleading. I have consistently held that time on the B-Theory is composed of an ordered set of moments, that there are more than one of these moments, and that not all events occur in the same moment.

This is accurate.

Again, this is accurate. The reason I object to the phrase "at once" is that it becomes terribly easy to commit an equivocation fallacy based upon it. Seer has fallen prey to this, earlier in the thread, by claiming that if all of time exists "at once," then there can only be one moment of time.

As such, I intentionally avoid using phrases like "at once" or (even worse) "simultaneously" when talking about the ontology of moments of time. They only breed confusion, and they're certainly not necessary to the conversation.

But if time is static and all events in time do occur "at once" then in reality there really is only one moment, one moment called time, within the which the increments are bound together as a whole. I think its a problem of language that makes it confusing where the term "moments" usually refers to the flow of time whereas in the B-Theory of time "moments" refers to increments of a static time.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

But if time is static and all events in time do occur "at once" then in reality there really is only one moment, one moment called time

And just when I thought we were making progress, we've come back to the insistence that a multitude of different moments must in fact be a single moment.

No, it is not the case that on the B-Theory there is only one moment of time. There is a panoply of ordered moments which form a dimension of measure referred to as time.

I think its a problem of language that makes it confusing where the term "moments" usually refers to the flow of time whereas in the B-Theory of time "moments" refers to increments of a static time.

Whether on the A-Theory or the B-Theory, I've never previously seen it supposed that "moment" refers to either a flow or an increment of time. A "moment," on both theories, usually refers to a single, instantaneous, and indivisible element of time, in my experience, and this is how I've been utilizing the term.

[shunyadragon]

And just when I thought we were making progress, we've come back to the insistence that a multitude of different moments must in fact be a single moment.

No, it is not the case that on the B-Theory there is only one moment of time. There is a panoply of ordered moments which form a dimension of measure referred to as time.


Whether on the A-Theory or the B-Theory, I've never previously seen it supposed that "moment" refers to either a flow or an increment of time. A "moment," on both theories, usually refers to a single, instantaneous, and indivisible element of time, in my experience, and this is how I've been utilizing the term.

I consider the A-Theory and B-Theory of time are conceptual descriptions of time from the human perspective. I personally would not hang my hat on either as necessarily true. I believe A-Theory focuses on the present moment in the passage of time, and B-Theory focuses on the eternal 'no distinct past, present not future.'

Long involved dialogues on picking frog hairs on the meaning of, 'at once,' are trying and not meaningful.

There are Theological implications of the nature of time from different perspective, but I believe the reality of time, and if God exists God's relationship to time is indifferent to human speculation.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

I consider the A-Theory and B-Theory of time are conceptual descriptions of time from the human perspective.

Well, yeah. That's pretty much what is meant by the word "theory."

I personally would not hang my hat on either as necessarily true.

Neither would I! I'll argue that the evidence stands in the B-Theory's favor, but that's hardly a logical tautology.

I believe A-Theory focuses on the present moment in the passage of time, and B-Theory focuses on the eternal 'no distinct past, present not future.'

That's not really accurate. The A- and B-Theories present mutually exclusive understandings of time. In particular, it is the explicit claim of the B-Theory that there does exist a distinct past, present, and future.

There are Theological implications of the nature of time from different perspective, but I believe the reality of time, and if God exists God's relationship to time is indifferent to human speculation.

Well, again, yes. The reality of time is what it is independent of human understanding. I'm fairly certain we all agree, there.

[shunyadragon]

Well, yeah. That's pretty much what is meant by the word "theory."

Neither would I! I'll argue that the evidence stands in the B-Theory's favor, but that's hardly a logical tautology.

That's not really accurate. The A- and B-Theories present mutually exclusive understandings of time. In particular, it is the explicit claim of the B-Theory that there does exist a distinct past, present, and future.

Well, again, yes. The reality of time is what it is independent of human understanding. I'm fairly certain we all agree, there.

Thank you!!!!

[JimL]

And just when I thought we were making progress, we've come back to the insistence that a multitude of different moments must in fact be a single moment.

No, it is not the case that on the B-Theory there is only one moment of time. There is a panoply of ordered moments which form a dimension of measure referred to as time.

Well the fact is that both posititions are correct depending upon ones perspective of thought. You're correct that each moment of time is temporally finite with respect to itself, but with respect to the whole of time for which each single moment is but a part, each of those moments is as eternal as every other moment. As far as the eternal goes, moments have no real meaning, or as you say, they all exist "at once" from the eternal perspective. But the finite perspective of moments doesn't really matter, its an illusion, because each moment is as eternal and static as every other moment.

Whether on the A-Theory or the B-Theory, I've never previously seen it supposed that "moment" refers to either a flow or an increment of time. A "moment," on both theories, usually refers to a single, instantaneous, and indivisible element of time, in my experience, and this is how I've been utilizing the term.

Okay, not well stated, what I meant was that we usually think of moments as increments of, or, if you will, as single instantaneous and indivisible elements of, a flowing time, as opposed to increments of, or single, instantaneous and indivisible elements of, a static time. Its difficult to think of moments being distinct from other moments, when they all occur "at once" as they do in B theory when we are so used to thinking about moments in time according to our experience, or A theory.

[Jedidiah]

That all events in time exist "at once" was your definition BP, not mine. But I agree with that phrasing because time is static, no? If so, then in that case all events, or moments, exist whether one happens to be observing them or not, the observers may be located in a different "moments" of time and so not be able to observe other moments, but those other moments exist whether they can observe them or not, no?

I don't believe I said that all events exist in a single moment, but if I did then what I meant is that because time is static, all events exist "at once," thus the distances between moments in time is little different than the distances between events in space, in both instances, there is no flow, all of the increments of space, and all of the moments in time, exist "at once" even though they exist in different locations within their respective dimensions.

To say all events exist at once, is equivalent to saying all things exist at the same place. It is just nonsense. Time as a dimension allows various events to exist in the same universe just as we see varying material objects existing in the same universe. "At once," or "at the same time," are not really meaningful descriptions of time.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

...or as you say, they all exist "at once"

Once again, I do not say, "they all exist 'at once.'" I have repeatedly objected to saying, "they all exist 'at once.'" I have repeatedly said that the phrase "they all exist 'at once'" is misleading, and leads to confusion and an invitation for fallacies of equivocation. I have consistently avoided saying, "they all exist 'at once,'" when defining my position, and have only utilized that phrase when responding to another person who has asked about it.

The phrase which I have utilized is, "all moments of time are coextant."

Well the fact is that both posititions are correct depending upon ones perspective of thought. You're correct that each moment of time is temporally finite with respect to itself, but with respect to the whole of time for which each single moment is but a part, each of those moments is as eternal as every other moment. As far as the eternal goes, moments have no real meaning, or as you say, they all exist "at once" from the eternal perspective. But the finite perspective of moments doesn't really matter, its an illusion, because each moment is as eternal and static as every other moment.

I don't understand what you mean by "the finite perspective" and "the eternal perspective." The terms "finite" and "eternal" are only opposites if by "eternal" you are referring to infinite quantities of time. However, you also seem to be using "eternal" in its other context, to mean "without time." Since these two definitions of eternal are (annoyingly) diametric opposites, it's not at all clear what you mean in this paragraph.

Okay, not well stated, what I meant was that we usually think of moments as increments of, or, if you will, as single instantaneous and indivisible elements of, a flowing time, as opposed to increments of, or single, instantaneous and indivisible elements of, a static time. Its difficult to think of moments being distinct from other moments, when they [are all coextant as they are] in B theory when we are so used to thinking about moments in time according to our experience, or A theory.

I completely agree, here. The intuitive and common way of thinking about time is an assumption of the A-Theory, and as such, it can be quite difficult to conceptualize the B-Theory. However, the fact that it is difficult to conceptualize doesn't mean that it is reasonable to simply supplant the B-Theory's premises with those of the A-Theory and pretend that we are still discussing the same thing.

[Jedidiah]

. . . snip . . .The phrase which I have utilized is, "all moments of time are coextant." . . . snip . . .

In exactly the same way all physical objects are coextant.

[JimL]

Once again, I do not say, "they all exist 'at once.'" I have repeatedly objected to saying, "they all exist 'at once.'" I have repeatedly said that the phrase "they all exist 'at once'" is misleading, and leads to confusion and an invitation for fallacies of equivocation. I have consistently avoided saying, "they all exist 'at once,'" when defining my position, and have only utilized that phrase when responding to another person who has asked about it.

The phrase which I have utilized is, "all moments of time are coextant."

Okay, you don't say that all events exist at once, you say they are coextant which is just a different way of saying that they all exist at once. I understand that you disagree with that, but if time is static then no matter how you slice it, coextant moments all exist at once. One moment didn't begin to exist after, or before, another moment, if time is eternal then each moment in time is eternal, if time in its totality began to exist, then each moment began to exist at once. It is not as though those of us who disagree with you don't understand B-Theory, the difference we have is that time, being that it is static, i.e there is only one time, then defining it as being devided into distinct moments doesn't make sense, time like space if devided into distinct locations, but not distinct moments. I think that this would be a much less confusing way to define it. There are different locations in time that all exist "at once."

I completely agree, here. The intuitive and common way of thinking about time is an assumption of the A-Theory, and as such, it can be quite difficult to conceptualize the B-Theory. However, the fact that it is difficult to conceptualize doesn't mean that it is reasonable to simply supplant the B-Theory's premises with those of the A-Theory and pretend that we are still discussing the same thing.

Exactly, and that is what you do when you define B-theory time as being made up of distinct moments rather than as distinct locations. Time in the B-Theory is no different than space, there are different locations in space and in time, but there are not different moments, because moments are not understood to be coextant.

[JimL]

In exactly the same way all physical objects are coextant.

Right, exactly the same way, and being that time, according to B-theory, is one and static, just like space and objects in space are static, neither consists of divisible moments, they consist of divisible locations. If everything is coextant, all existing at once, whether in space or in time, then different moments make no sense.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Compatibilism is just another word for determinism since it denies libertarian free will.

Compatibilists are not necessarily Determinists. They simply see no conflict between Free Will and Determinism.

However, I am quite happy to admit that I am a Determinist. I simply also happen to be a Compatibilist.

Okay, you don't say that all events exist at once, you say they are coextant which is just a different way of saying that they all exist at once.

No, it's not just a different way of saying that they all exist at once. It's a more precise way of describing temporal ontology. Again, saying that "all moments exist at once" begs for equivocation fallacies like the one you will subsequently make in your post, here:

It is not as though those of us who disagree with you don't understand B-Theory, the difference we have is that time, being that it is static, i.e there is only one time, then defining it as being devided into distinct moments doesn't make sense...

If you are going to continue to insist that a panoply of ordered moments in a dimension of measure is actually just a single moment, then it is very clear that you really don't understand B-Theory. Once again, the fact that time is static on the B-Theory does not imply that there is therefore only a single moment of time.

time like space if devided into distinct locations, but not distinct moments. I think that this would be a much less confusing way to define it. There are different locations in time that all exist "at once."

This wouldn't be less confusing. This would be more confusing. This would cause people to think that time isn't really what we mean by time, but rather just another dimension of space, and that there is some super-time which actually governs the universe, but that this super-time is only composed of a single moment. This, of course, is not what the B-Theory states, and continuing to insist upon such a view is nothing but a Straw Man. You're trying to superimpose the A-Theory on top of the B-Theory, and that is completely unnecessary.

I understand that you disagree with that, but if time is static then no matter how you slice it, coextant moments all exist at once.

Coextant moments all exist at all moments of time, in exactly the same way that coextant positions in space exist at all positions in space. The South Pole exists in the North Pole. That does not imply that there is actually only a single position in space; and neither does the coextant nature of a panoply of moments imply that there is actually only a single moment in time.

Are you arguing that there is actually only a single position in space? If not, then why are you arguing that there is actually only a single moment in time?

One moment didn't begin to exist after, or before, another moment, if time is eternal then each moment in time is eternal

I mentioned this in my last post, but I neglected to phrase it as a question, so that may be why you didn't answer it: I do not understand what you mean by "eternal." The word "eternal" has two common definitions which are unfortunately complete opposites. On the one hand, "eternal" may refer to something existing for an infinite amount of time; on the other, "eternal" may refer to something existing without time.

Which do you mean? Or do you mean something else, entirely, by the word?

...if time in its totality began to exist, then each moment began to exist at once.

Here is a perfect example of why I object to the phrase "at once." Here, you are using it to mean, "events which occur in the same moment." This is very different than two distinct moments being coextant. Using the same phrase in two very different ways leads to confusion and equivocation, and this is why I will continue to object to the use of the phrase.

Exactly, and that is what you do when you define B-theory time as being made up of distinct moments rather than as distinct locations. Time in the B-Theory is no different than space

It is not true that time, on the B-Theory, is no different than space. Time has similar properties to space, on the B-Theory, but it also has some properties which are very different. For example, there seems to be a preferred direction in time, while spatial dimensions do not seem to have preferred directions.

The simple fact that time is treated as a dimension of measure, on the B-Theory, does not imply that it is therefore equivalent to a dimension of space.

[JimL]

Compatibilists are not necessarily Determinists. They simply see no conflict between Free Will and Determinism.

However, I am quite happy to admit that I am a Determinist. I simply also happen to be a Compatibilist.

No, it's not just a different way of saying that they all exist at once. It's a more precise way of describing temporal ontology. Again, saying that "all moments exist at once" begs for equivocation fallacies like the one you will subsequently make in your post, here:

If you are going to continue to insist that a panoply of ordered moments in a dimension of measure is actually just a single moment, then it is very clear that you really don't understand B-Theory. Once again, the fact that time is static on the B-Theory does not imply that there is therefore only a single moment of time.

This wouldn't be less confusing. This would be more confusing. This would cause people to think that time isn't really what we mean by time, but rather just another dimension of space, and that there is some super-time which actually governs the universe, but that this super-time is only composed of a single moment. This, of course, is not what the B-Theory states, and continuing to insist upon such a view is nothing but a Straw Man. You're trying to superimpose the A-Theory on top of the B-Theory, and that is completely unnecessary.

Coextant moments all exist at all moments of time, in exactly the same way that coextant positions in space exist at all positions in space. The South Pole exists in the North Pole. That does not imply that there is actually only a single position in space; and neither does the coextant nature of a panoply of moments imply that there is actually only a single moment in time.

Are you arguing that there is actually only a single position in space? If not, then why are you arguing that there is actually only a single moment in time?

I mentioned this in my last post, but I neglected to phrase it as a question, so that may be why you didn't answer it: I do not understand what you mean by "eternal." The word "eternal" has two common definitions which are unfortunately complete opposites. On the one hand, "eternal" may refer to something existing for an infinite amount of time; on the other, "eternal" may refer to something existing without time.

Which do you mean? Or do you mean something else, entirely, by the word?

Here is a perfect example of why I object to the phrase "at once." Here, you are using it to mean, "events which occur in the same moment." This is very different than two distinct moments being coextant. Using the same phrase in two very different ways leads to confusion and equivocation, and this is why I will continue to object to the use of the phrase.

It is not true that time, on the B-Theory, is no different than space. Time has similar properties to space, on the B-Theory, but it also has some properties which are very different. For example, there seems to be a preferred direction in time, while spatial dimensions do not seem to have preferred directions.

The simple fact that time is treated as a dimension of measure, on the B-Theory, does not imply that it is therefore equivalent to a dimension of space.

The simple fact is that according to B-theory, the universe is static, a.k.a the block universe, and all pertaining to it, whether of space or of time, is static, and whether it is eternal or had a beginning, nothing of it ever changes. Now you can call divisions within that eternal and static block moments if you want, but if you were to look at a picture of such a universe hanging on the wall, you would say that the whole of it exists "at once."
Call the divisions within it moments if you want, but the fact is that moments refer to change, and in the B-Theory block universe, there is no such thing as change.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

The simple fact is that according to B-theory, the universe is static, a.k.a the block universe, and all pertaining to it, whether of space or of time, is static, and whether it is eternal or had a beginning, nothing of it ever changes. Now you can call divisions within that eternal and static block moments if you want, but if you were to look at a picture of such a universe hanging on the wall, you would say that the whole of it exists "at once."

Again, in order to claim that the whole universe occupies a single moment of time, you have to presume that there is some sort of super-time to which the whole universe is subject, but that this super-time only consists of a single moment. This is a completely unnecessary addition to the theory, and insisting upon it continues to be nothing but a Straw Man for you to knock down.

Call the divisions within it moments if you want, but the fact is that moments refer to change, and in the B-Theory block universe, there is no such thing as change.

It is not true that there is no such thing as change, on the B-Theory. "Change" refers to differences in a particular locality of space at different moments of time. This is just as applicable to the B-Theory as it is to the A-Theory.

[JimL]

I'm really not trying to be insulting or offensive, here. I'm honestly wondering: what is the point in sharing an opinion on the quality of a philosophical position, when you fully admit that the opinion is premature, ill-formed, and poorly constructed?

If I share my opinion on the quality of a thing, it is usually an attempt to be persuasive. For example, when I told my friend, "The hamburgers at Wendy's taste like garbage," I did so with the intention of swaying him away from purchasing a hamburger at Wendy's because I do not like the way that they taste, and I felt confident that my friend would not like the way that they taste, either. Now, if I had never eaten a Wendy's hamburger before-- or, perhaps, if I had very briefly smelled one without tasting it-- but I still told my friend that they probably taste like garbage, my opinion wouldn't really mean very much to him.

So, why share an opinion about something's quality which you know is made in ignorance?

Because I obviously wasn't trying to be persuasive, I was just sharing an opinion on the notion of compatibilism based I what I do know of determinism and free willl. That the two could be compatible seems ludicrous. Not a big deal.