Is "Why is there something rather than nothing?" a legitimate question?

[mattbballman31]

I was attempting to construct a set of premises directly from your previous post. If you think it to be in error, I'd gladly appreciate a corrected set so that I can better understand what you are attempting to state.

Okay. Let me put it this way.

Def1: Nothing is the concrete/abstract non-exemplification of concrete/abstract positive properties.
Def2: Concrete Exemplification is concrete, positive property possession.
Def3: Abstract exemplification is abstract, positive property possession.
Def4: Being is the abstract exemplification of abstract positive properties.
Def5: Existence is the concrete exemplification of abstract/concrete positive properties.
Def6: Abstract exemplification does not occur in time/space.
Def7: Concrete exemplification occurs in time/space.
Def8: Exemplified concrete positive properties are temporally/spatially located.
Def9: Exemplified abstract positive properties are not temporally/spatially located.
Def10: Concrete properties are temporally/spatially located.
Def11: Abstract properties are not temporally/spatially located.

According to Def1, 'nothing' can refer to a universal lack of positive properties. It's inaccurate to say that because all referents refer, and 'nothing' is a referent, therefore 'nothing' refers to a thing which does not exemplify any properties. This is to smuggle in idiomatically what I exclude from 'nothing': the very word 'nothing' has in it the words 'no' 'thing'. There is no thing 'anywhere', 'anytime'. It is not anything. The meaning of its not being anything is that nothing has entered the existential, exemplification relation instantiating a property, whether concretely or abstractly. It is utter lack of any 'thing', concrete or abstract: no 'thing' has been concretely or abstractly exemplified such that a property has been instantiated, and therefore possesses neither being nor existence.

You seem to be talking about the colloquial idiomatic usage of the word "nothing."  

I suppose so. And I suppose I should sharply makes this distinct from precise conceptual analysis. My point with eating was that if I say,

1. I had nothing for lunch today.

I am not saying I had something for lunch today and it was 'nothing'. The conceptual oasis is there only because 'nothing' in 1 functions grammatically as a pronoun. Perhaps I need to brush up on grammar, but 'nothing' doesn't seem to be a negation of a verb, is it? 'No' is the negation; 'thing' is the thing negated. And 'thing' isn't a verb, but a noun. Correct me if I'm wrong on that!

So, when a person says, "I had nothing to eat today," he is saying that he has not eaten today. He is not saying, "Today, I ate <i>that which is devoid of all properties</i>."

To say 'that which' implies a 'thing' of some sort designated by the 'that'. By definition, 'nothing' isn't a 'that' which is devoid of all properties (positive, to be exact); 'nothing' just is the 'non-exemplification of positive properties'. For the sake of semantic equivalence, perhaps 1 = I ate 'no' 'thing'. But perhaps my idiomatic example threw us off the scent. Though idiomatic usages, they're probably bad for philosophical precision. Would you agree that there's a semantic difference between the idiom 'nothing' and (for lack of a better word) the philosophical 'nothingness'? Perhaps the idiom can be saved from existential commitment, but salvation comes from within the context of the proposition. So, for example, 'I had nothing to eat today.' doesn't existentially commit me to a thing that I ate which was nothing. For I did not eat 'anything', which is semantically equivalent to 'I had nothing to eat'. But perhaps it's wrong to apply conceptual analysis of philosophical 'nothingness' to the aforementioned idiom. Such application runs into the awkward problem you've articulated above: saying I ate (I'll take out 'that which') the non-exemplification of positive properties. I think we can solve this by not confusing the idiom with the conceptual analysis in the philosophical sense.

For another example, if I were to say, "There is nothing north of the North Pole," I am not claiming that there exists a "nothingness" north of the North Pole. I am saying that "north of the North Pole" does not exist.

Agreed. To say the 'nothingness' exists is to miss the point. But I do agree with the being/existence distinction. Being has abstract existence; existence (opposed to being) is concrete. 'Nothingness' would be neither concrete nor abstract, neither have being nor existence (though the concept 'nothingness' can refer to this 'lack').

So, are you saying that the question, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" should be more clearly phrased, "Why does anything at all exist rather than everything not existing?"

Can the latter be phrased, "Why are there some things rather than all things?" 'Anything at all' meaning 'whatever contingently has happened, is happening to, and will happen, to exist; and 'everything' meaning 'all things'. If so, I think the questions have different content. Leibniz's refers to anything at all (as being or existing); the other question seems confined to concrete existence and contrasting contingently existing things with why all things (abstract and concrete?) don't attain to the austere level of concrete existence. Correct me if I've understood you there on 'existing' or 'exist'.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Okay. Let me put it this way.

Def1: Nothing is the concrete/abstract non-exemplification of concrete/abstract positive properties.

This is what I am not understanding. In the first place, a verb requires a noun-- that is, a thing-- to make any sense. In this instance, the verb is a conjugation of "to be" while the noun is "Nothing." This is why it seems that you are trying to define "nothing" as a thing which is not a thing.

Similarly, the verb "to be" is a linking verb which ascribes some property or properties to a noun. In this instance, that property would be "the concrete/abstract non-exemplification of concrete/abstract positive properties." This seems clearly self-contradictory.

1. I had nothing for lunch today.

I am not saying I had something for lunch today and it was 'nothing'. The conceptual oasis is there only because 'nothing' in 1 functions grammatically as a pronoun. Perhaps I need to brush up on grammar, but 'nothing' doesn't seem to be a negation of a verb, is it? 'No' is the negation; 'thing' is the thing negated. And 'thing' isn't a verb, but a noun. Correct me if I'm wrong on that!

I would very much disagree, here. The word "nothing" in this case is absolutely negating the verb, and not any noun. When you state "I had nothing for lunch today," you are not saying that you did, indeed, have lunch, but that no thing was consumed. You are saying that you did not have lunch.

To say 'that which' implies a 'thing' of some sort designated by the 'that'. By definition, 'nothing' isn't a 'that' which is devoid of all properties (positive, to be exact); 'nothing' just is the 'non-exemplification of positive properties'.

The "non-exemplification of positive properties" in what? "Non-exemplification" is a fairly meaningless concept without a referent which is not exemplifying a certain property.

Would you agree that there's a semantic difference between the idiom 'nothing' and (for lack of a better word) the philosophical 'nothingness'?

Absolutely! This is why I argue that the philosophical concept of "nothingness" is self-defeating, while bearing no objection to the colloquial usage of the term.

Can the latter be phrased, "Why are there some things rather than all things?" 'Anything at all' meaning 'whatever contingently has happened, is happening to, and will happen, to exist; and 'everything' meaning 'all things'. If so, I think the questions have different content. Leibniz's refers to anything at all (as being or existing); the other question seems confined to concrete existence and contrasting contingently existing things with why all things (abstract and concrete?) don't attain to the austere level of concrete existence. Correct me if I've understood you there on 'existing' or 'exist'.

I would not limit "anything at all" to meaning only "contingent things." I meant "anything at all" to include, literally, any thing-- contingent or non-contingent. Certainly, non-contingent things are still things!

So, to clarify, "Why does anything (whether contingent or non-contingent) exist rather than everything which does exist not exist?"

[mattbballman31]

Thanks very much for your thought-provoking insights!

This is what I am not understanding. In the first place, a verb requires a noun-- that is, a thing-- to make any sense. In this instance, the verb is a conjugation of "to be" while the noun is "Nothing." This is why it seems that you are trying to define "nothing" as a thing which is not a thing.

More precisely, 'nothing' is an indefinite, singular pronoun of universal negation. In this case, we have a negative, singular, indefinite pronoun, thus having negative polarity. The 'no' in 'nothing' serves as what's called it's 'determiner': 'no' universally negates 'thing'. That the verb you mention is a conjugation of 'to be' doesn't help matters for me, because the universal negation (logical operator) can apply to it: 'not to be'. To this you say:

Similarly, the verb "to be" is a linking verb which ascribes some property or properties to a noun.

This applies when the verb is used existentially: a property(s) is/are expressed of such noun. Thus rendered we can get such an existential clause once 'to be' is linked with a 'noun' upon property possession or attribution. But such clauses or verbs can be modified by determiners of universal (or particular!) negation. For example, in 'There is a God', 'to be' is linked with God, since 'is' (the third personal singular of 'be': 'be' being the verb: 'to be' being the linking verb); but in 'There is not a God.', 'not' is the adverb expressing the relevant 'negation': in this case, the negation of God's existence. So, while the naked 'to be' is a verb that 'links' us to a noun via its properties, 'not to be' severs such a link by universally negating the noun. When semantically extended to 'nothing', 'no' universally negates 'thing', which refers to the 'not' entering into the relation of exemplification. If references must be fixed, I fix it, not between 'word and object', but 'word and concept'. The concept 'nothing' has meaning by understanding the concept as referring to the concept of non-exemplification of any positive properties had/possessed by a 'thing', denoted grammatically by a 'noun'.

And to this you say:

In this instance, that property would be "the concrete/abstract non-exemplification of concrete/abstract positive properties." This seems clearly self-contradictory.

It would be self-contradictory if the quotation was a 'positive' property'; the quotation is not the positive property of possessing said non-exemplification, it is the 'failing' of having the positive property of exemplification.

I would very much disagree, here. The word "nothing" in this case is absolutely negating the verb, and not any noun. When you state "I had nothing for lunch today," you are not saying that you did, indeed, have lunch, but that no thing was consumed. You are saying that you did not have lunch.

I meant to say that 'thing' is the noun; and in all the grammar that I've read 'nothing' is a pronoun. Agreed that the noun 'thing' negates the verb: 'having' being the verb. But in the same way that you say,

1. I had nothing for lunch today.

is semantically equivalent to

2. I did not have lunch.

I want to make

1a. Nothing exists.

to mean

2a. There does not exist anything.

The universal negation of 'not' qualifying 'thing', and the negation is universal if it negates 'anything'. If the universal negates 'anything', then we are left with 'nothing'.

The "non-exemplification of positive properties" in what? "Non-exemplification" is a fairly meaningless concept without a referent which is not exemplifying a certain property.

This is probably where our loggerheads are most apparent. 'In what?' presupposes the notion of negative properties. Non-exemplification can't be 'in' anything, since it's not a positive property; it's the 'not having' of a positive property. It's like I said before. If negative properties could be exemplified, then I could have property -P.

-P: I have the negative property of not being a prime number.

If 'in what?' applies here, the -P would actually 'inhere' in me somehow. But it makes more sense to say I 'fail' to have the positive property of being a prime number, instead of saying I 'have' the negative property of not being a prime number.

Absolutely! This is why I argue that the philosophical concept of "nothingness" is self-defeating, while bearing no objection to the colloquial usage of the term.

But I still think that there's some conceptual difference between 'nothing as a thing' and 'nothing', which refers/indicates (grammatically) lacks or absences. It's the former from which Parmenides' trap springs.

I would not limit "anything at all" to meaning only "contingent things." I meant "anything at all" to include, literally, any thing-- contingent or non-contingent. Certainly, non-contingent things are still things!

Oh, I know! Just clarifying.

So, to clarify, "Why does anything (whether contingent or non-contingent) exist rather than everything which does exist not exist?"

If X exists, X has instantiated positive properties that have entered into the exemplification-relation.
If X does not exist, X has 'failed' to instantiate any positive properties entering into the exemplification-relation.

This reiterates the main thesis: existence/non-existence involves entering or failing to enter into the exemplification-relation via the inherence of properties.

[JimL]

According to my crap knowledge of physics, there is no such thing as "nothing" scientifically speaking. What we call empty space is still full of fields and infinitesimal quantum particles popping in and out of existence (or is that arising from and going back into the background field? Depends on one's view of quantum mechanics?) Philosophically, I've been told that "Why is there something rather than nothing?" is a nonsense question because we cannot conceive of true nothingness and thus have no reference point from which to talk about it.

As I understand him, this is basically what Stephen Hawking means when he says that the universe creates itself without a God. He considers nothingness to be impossible and since there there is no such thing as a "beginning of time" therefore the universe must have an eternal past. I think Hawking killed my belief in a traditional Creator with this. All I'm left with as an alternative is the possibility of a God "eternal creating" the universe and providing a reason for it to exist rather than nothing at all. So, pretty much, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" is my last recourse at having anything like a reason to believe in God. I know the idea of a "First Cause" just pushes the question of "why?" back one layer, but I'm trying to tackle one issue at a time here.

I'm not sure true nothingness really is an oxymoron, though. I feel like I can, in fact, imagine nothingness. If I think of a finite particle or field, then I also have to think of the places beyond it's reach, the places where it does not exist. What's to stop me from adding "this field is not here" to every field I can think of until I've imagined a "place" in which there none of the fields in the universe are, in fact, located.

I liken it to the way in which we speak about fictional characters. To say that Batman does not exist doesn't mean that I am speaking gibberish when I talk about Batman. The word, "Batman" has a referent. There are certain qualities and attributes and ideas that we have agreed to associate with the word, "Batman." There is no Batman in the real world and yet the idea of Batman still exists.

One could reply that the referent for the word, "Batman" can never be as coherent as the referent, "Kevin Conroy" is because Conroy is a real person and Batman is a fictitious construct of literary devises and tropes designed to partially simulate a real person but that have no actual subject outside the mind of the speaker. However, there is enough of an agreed standardization of the character that we can refer, broadly, to the Batman and not just an arbitrary thing that each individual decides to subjectively call, "Batman" for themselves, right? It will never be as precise as the layers we refer to when we name a real person, but we can still at least know what we are talking about.

In the same way, I think I can conceive of nothingness even if I've never experienced it and even if I can only think of a limited number of fields to negate and "add up to" nothingness. And if I can conceive of nothing, then I'm also allowed to ask why there is something rather than nothing.

Am I making any sense?

If there were a such thing as nothing, then where in this nothing did the universe emerge from? Could another universe emerge from out of this same nothing, if so it would need emerge from out of a different place in this nothing than that of the first universe, and "different places" within nothing would mean that the nothing out of which universes emerge is actually a something.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Alright, it seems that we are more-or-less on the same page, now, regarding the definition and semantic implications of "nothing," so I'll just focus on this last part:

If X exists, X has instantiated positive properties that have entered into the exemplification-relation.
If X does not exist, X has 'failed' to instantiate any positive properties entering into the exemplification-relation.

This reiterates the main thesis: existence/non-existence involves entering or failing to enter into the exemplification-relation via the inherence of properties.

This describes to us the properties we find in existent things, but it doesn't answer the question of "why" anything exists rather than not existing.

[mattbballman31]

Alright, it seems that we are more-or-less on the same page, now, regarding the definition and semantic implications of "nothing," so I'll just focus on this last part:

This describes to us the properties we find in existent things, but it doesn't answer the question of "why" anything exists rather than not existing.

In terms of final or efficient causality? I'm assuming you don't accept these categories. I'm just trying to cash out the 'why' part.

By the way, I was following your discussion on the Double Slit Experiment. Kudos! I hadn't understood it until then. I'm thoroughly enjoying your blog too! Dr. William Lane Craig's writings have had a huge influence on me, so reading some of your objections were really interesting, though I disagreed with some of it. You far surpass me in mathematics, so some of it is hard to follow. But you definitely have the gift of teaching.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

In terms of final or efficient causality? I'm assuming you don't accept these categories. I'm just trying to cash out the 'why' part.

Causality doesn't really factor into it, regardless of whether one prefers Aristotelian views of causality or not. If everything did not exist, there would not exist anything which could act upon or cause anything else. Causality is only descriptive of existent things.

So, why does anything, at all, exist? Even if we were to agree with, say, Leibniz who argued that all existent things must trace back to a single, non-contingent existing thing, why does that thing exist rather than not existing? It's a curious-- and possibly unanswerable-- question.

By the way, I was following your discussion on the Double Slit Experiment. Kudos! I hadn't understood it until then. I'm thoroughly enjoying your blog too! Dr. William Lane Craig's writings have had a huge influence on me, so reading some of your objections were really interesting, though I disagreed with some of it. You far surpass me in mathematics, so some of it is hard to follow. But you definitely have the gift of teaching.

Thank you very much! I greatly appreciate it! And any time you find something unclear or objectionable (whether on these forums or on my blog), please feel free to comment about it. I absolutely love dialoguing about these things, and I try to be as honest and open about my positions as possible.

[Carrikature]

Thank you very much! I greatly appreciate it! And any time you find something unclear or objectionable (whether on these forums or on my blog), please feel free to comment about it. I absolutely love dialoguing about these things, and I try to be as honest and open about my positions as possible.

Would you prefer comments in PMs here or as comments on your blogs?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Would you prefer comments in PMs here or as comments on your blogs?

Whichever you feel more comfortable with. If there is a question about a specific blog post which you think would be useful to other readers of my blog, I certainly welcome them there, where they can benefit others.

[mattbballman31]

Causality doesn't really factor into it, regardless of whether one prefers Aristotelian views of causality or not. If everything did not exist, there would not exist anything which could act upon or cause anything else. Causality is only descriptive of existent things.

Okay. Let me write it out, so I can pinpoint certain parts:

X: Why is there something rather than nothing?

In my Christian worldview, there was never absolutely Nothing. So when I interpret X, I understand 'nothing' to mean 'physical' nothingness. So, when I answer X, causality becomes a factor, since I believe God caused the universe, or the Greater Cosmos, to exist. On the flip side, I'd say, if there was a point when there was absolutely nothing (no God, no Greater Cosmos), there would be nothing now. The 'Out of nothing, nothing comes' maxim seems self-evident to me. So to answer X, I'd say there's physically something, because a non-physical 'someone' brought it to be.

So, why does anything, at all, exist? Even if we were to agree with, say, Leibniz who argued that all existent things must trace back to a single, non-contingent existing thing, why does that thing exist rather than not existing? It's a curious-- and possibly unanswerable-- question.

It's possibly unanswerable. I do think it possibly answerable as well. This is where I agree with Craig. He does a conceptual analysis of what properties a cause would have to have if it were the cause of all space, time, matter, energy (STME). I won't trot it all out here, but I'll get into more detail if asked. I'm assuming you're already familiar with this route, since you've read Craig pretty thoroughly. So, my assumption is that if X created time, X is timeless; if X created space, X is spaceless; if X created matter, X is immaterial; if X created matter out of no material, X is very powerful; if the effect (the universe, or Greater Cosmos) is finite, X is a personal agent of sorts. That last point needs unpacking. I believe that Craig narrows down the kinds of causes to two types: agential and event. But if the cause of STME is an event, STME should be past-eternal. For example, if the conditions for boiling water existed from all eternity, that event, those conditions, would have forever accompanied the consequent effect of water boiling. If we ever discovered a time during which the water wasn't boiling, that means the conditions would not have always been there. Event-causes can't cease to cause whatever is in their nature to cause. The boiling-conditions can't choose to not boil water, other things being equal. So, if the cause of the Greater Cosmos was an event-cause, the Greater Cosmos would have to be past-eternal. Of course, this route is closely linked to arguments against an actual infinite, and so on. Based on this, without going into all the minutia, I believe our other option is an agent, an agent that can choose to bring about a state of affairs with a reason as a formal cause of the choice, which explains the past-finitude of the universe or Greater Cosmos. So, either we have to prove that the Greater Cosmos is past-eternal, or that event-causes have the capacity to bring about finite effects, with regard to STME.

Lots of questions are left dangling, but perhaps you see where I'm going.

Thank you very much! I greatly appreciate it! And any time you find something unclear or objectionable (whether on these forums or on my blog), please feel free to comment about it. I absolutely love dialoguing about these things, and I try to be as honest and open about my positions as possible.

Oh, I will. And I appreciate the honesty. It's a breath of fresh air to talk to, not just an honest person who disagrees with the truth of my religion, but to a kindred spirit in philosophy itself. I can tell that you live up to the name: a lover of wisdom.

[JimL]

Causality doesn't really factor into it, regardless of whether one prefers Aristotelian views of causality or not. If everything did not exist, there would not exist anything which could act upon or cause anything else. Causality is only descriptive of existent things.

So, why does anything, at all, exist? Even if we were to agree with, say, Leibniz who argued that all existent things must trace back to a single, non-contingent existing thing, why does that thing exist rather than not existing? It's a curious-- and possibly unanswerable-- question.

And, causality being only an attribute of , or discriptive of, existing things, makes unnecessary the question of creation, i.e. of ex-nihilo creation. The answer then to the question of Leibniz, would be the same one given as an answer to the question of why does God exist rather than nothing. It is simply a brute fact that existence is. Something rather than nothing exists simply because it does.

[37818]

. . . It is simply a brute fact that existence is. Something rather than nothing exists simply because it does.

And this ". . . existence is" meaning what? Spacetime-matter? Or an uncaused existence?

[JimL]

And this ". . . existence is" meaning what? Spacetime-matter? Or an uncaused existence?

Well for me, the fact that the substance of the universe itself is the only existing thing that we have evidence of, then the the existence of that substance is the only brute fact with regards to existence.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Okay. Let me write it out, so I can pinpoint certain parts:

X: Why is there something rather than nothing?

In my Christian worldview, there was never absolutely Nothing. So when I interpret X, I understand 'nothing' to mean 'physical' nothingness.

I'll note that on my Naturalist worldview, there was never "absolutely Nothing," either. And I do understand that Christians generally think of the question as being, "Why is there something [physical] rather than nothing [physical]?" However, I was asking a very different question.

Let's say, for the sake of argument, that I were to agree that the whole of reality can be traced back to a single, eternal deity. Why does this deity exist rather than not exist? I argue that the theist has no better answer for this question than does the Naturalist who is attempting to answer why the physical cosmos exists rather than not. In both cases, we are left with something which just seems tautological: it exists because it exists.

Oh, I will. And I appreciate the honesty. It's a breath of fresh air to talk to, not just an honest person who disagrees with the truth of my religion, but to a kindred spirit in philosophy itself. I can tell that you live up to the name: a lover of wisdom.

Thank you! That means a lot to me!

[37818]

Well for me, the fact that the substance of the universe itself is the only existing thing that we have evidence of, then the the existence of that substance is the only brute fact with regards to existence.

Thank you for qualifying that.

Personally I see a difference between the existence we know as "spacetime and matter" from existence in which things do exist. Spacetime has existence, for example. But is not the existence proper. Existence and space are two different things in my view.