What's your position on the mind-body problem?

[JimL]

So the majority of physicists are Materialists? Not to argue over statistics, I wouldn't know a thing about them. Just curious.

Well, I probably shouldn't have asserted that, but in my experience I don't recall a one that believes or argues for the supernatural. I'm sure there are some but I would be willing to bet they are in the great minority.

Not at all. That is to say, Idealists don't have any justification to say that human minds are the sole creators of reality. That we define it in some part and interact with some degree of free will, yes. In fact, I would have said that we only interact with it--not create it to any degree--except for the necessary conclusions after integrating the results of QM with an Idealistic philosophy.

Do you believe in an external reality, independent of observers, i.e. minds? If there were no observers, do you believe that the external reality would continue to exist and evolve in a naturalistic manner? Or are you arguing that the otherwise natural evolution of the external reality can be changed by observers?

[Volt]

Do you believe in an external reality, independent of observers, i.e. minds?

If we're only considering human minds, then yes. If all minds, then God poses a problem. He's a universal consciousness, encompassing all reality. Or in other words, all reality exists inside God's mind. As a result, his thoughts (which form our external reality) are necessarily defined as fundamentally different from ours in order to avoid an infinite regression.

If there were no observers, do you believe that the external reality would continue to exist and evolve in a naturalistic manner?

Assuming you're including God in "no observers", then no.

Or are you arguing that the otherwise natural evolution of the external reality can be changed by observers?

Yes. Scientific evidence provided by my interpretation of QM, philosophical evidence to prefer that interpretation being provided by Idealism.

[JimL]

If we're only considering human minds, then yes. If all minds, then God poses a problem. He's a universal consciousness, encompassing all reality. Or in other words, all reality exists inside God's mind. As a result, his thoughts (which form our external reality) are necessarily defined as fundamentally different from ours in order to avoid an infinite regression.

Well if God is a universal consciousness encompassing and governing all of the external reality, then we are a part of that external reality which he governs. So, how does our observations change the very external reality that we are a part of? Remember, we are not talking free will here, we're talking observation.

Assuming you're including God in "no observers", then no.

Right, so the universe is determined either by God or by its own nature, so how do human observations fit in as a cause?

Yes. Scientific evidence provided by my interpretation of QM, philosophical evidence to prefer that interpretation being provided by Idealism.

How so? It seems that you continue to argue 2 contradictory points of view. Observation does not reduce to Idealism or human free will which I take it is what you mean by Idealism.

[Volt]

Well if God is a universal consciousness encompassing and governing all of the external reality, then we are a part of that external reality which he governs. So, how does our observations change the very external reality that we are a part of? Remember, we are not talking free will here, we're talking observation.

By "change" you're referring to how we interact with reality. An easy example of direct, completely (or nearly completely) controllable reality is conscious movement of your body. An indirect example is anything you use your body to do that affects perception. Moving your head alters perception, for that matter. You see, hear, smell, and touch different things.

If there were no change or interaction with reality via perception (which is all we have access to), then it wouldn't follow that we can alter anything. It'd be like watching a movie.

Right, so the universe is determined either by God or by its own nature, so how do human observations fit in as a cause?

It's not wholly determined by God, else the wave function would already be turned into particles before we observed them. See a more fleshed out explanation of God's mind vs human mind interactions in this post, after the third quote.

TL;DR God only goes so far as to create potentiality and physical laws, including those that govern the operating of our minds. Potentiality is altered into physical reality as we perceive it, on, well, perception. Or in other words, observations fit into the cause by collapsing the wave function. Yes, you've already stated your own interpretation of QM's results, i.e. that the wave function doesn't actually collapse. But both interpretations are internally consistent and explain the scientific results, so to decide which is more likely to be true, we need to appeal outside of science. Queue philosophical debate and Idealism. If you want me to believe your interpretation of QM, then you'll need to convince me that Materialism or any version of Dualism are internally consistent and meaningful in their assertions. To my knowledge, both fail the test.

How so? It seems that you continue to argue 2 contradictory points of view.

When you say contradictory, are you referring to this:

It seems to me that you are trying to argue two contradicting points.

1. That the wave fuction collapses due to observation.
And
2. That the wave function is determined.

Or something new? If you are referring to the above, please explain why you find my earlier explanation insufficient?

Observation does not reduce to Idealism or human free will which I take it is what you mean by Idealism.

Free Will =/= Idealism, though it does entail from the premises of Idealism that there is a degree of free will afforded to the human mind.

For a fast and loose summary of Idealism, see this post.

Also, yes, I would argue that from observation, one can deduce the premises of Idealism. It is a reductionist philosophy, after all. Asserting anything beyond it would go into the realm of meaningless statements, as I've been discussing with Seer. For a quick and shoddy list of said deductions, see the end of this post.

[JimL]

By "change" you're referring to how we interact with reality.

No, by "change" i'm refering to our being the cause of the future by observing it. We interact with reality whether or not it is determined or subject to free will.

An easy example of direct, completely (or nearly completely) controllable reality is conscious movement of your body. An indirect example is anything you use your body to do that affects perception. Moving your head alters perception, for that matter. You see, hear, smell, and touch different things.

You seem to be assuming with the above statement that consciousness equates with free will. Consciousness of your actions need have nothing to do with whether or not you are the cause of those actions, i.e. with free will.

If there were no change or interaction with reality via perception (which is all we have access to), then it wouldn't follow that we can alter anything. It'd be like watching a movie.

No not quite, it would be more like being in the movie where your future observations and actions are pre-determined.

It's not wholly determined by God, else the wave function would already be turned into particles before we observed them. See a more fleshed out explanation of God's mind vs human mind interactions in this post, after the third quote.

Your assertion is that God is the cause of the wave function but that we are the cause of its collapse, and that we collapse it by merely observing it in some way. Observation itself has nothing to do with free will, so how are we the cause of collapse of the wave function by observation?

TL;DR God only goes so far as to create potentiality and physical laws, including those that govern the operating of our minds. Potentiality is altered into physical reality as we perceive it, on, well, perception. Or in other words, observations fit into the cause by collapsing the wave function. Yes, you've already stated your own interpretation of QM's results, i.e. that the wave function doesn't actually collapse. But both interpretations are internally consistent and explain the scientific results, so to decide which is more likely to be true, we need to appeal outside of science. Queue philosophical debate and Idealism. If you want me to believe your interpretation of QM, then you'll need to convince me that Materialism or any version of Dualism are internally consistent and meaningful in their assertions. To my knowledge, both fail the test.

To be honest, i'm not seeing any consistency in your own interpretation, i.e. with collapse of Gods wave function being due to our conscious observations even though our conscious observations would necessarily be included in the wave function. What is inconsistent with the many worlds interpretation of the wave function? It does away with the ridiculous idea of our conscious observation of the external reality being the cause of that external reality.

When you say contradictory, are you referring to this:



Or something new? If you are referring to the above, please explain why you find my earlier explanation insufficient?

The problem with it, as I see it, is that you are assuming that the wave function collapses, and that therefore a mind is necessary in order to cause it to collapse. You are not really explaining what a wave function is from your perspective. You are also making the assumption that we as human beings are somehow not included in the wave function. Perhaps if you could explain to me how exactly you would define a wave function then I could perhaps explain to you why it doesn't collapse as a result of our observations.

Free Will =/= Idealism, though it does entail from the premises of Idealism that there is a degree of free will afforded to the human mind.

For a fast and loose summary of Idealism, see this post.

Also, yes, I would argue that from observation, one can deduce the premises of Idealism. It is a reductionist philosophy, after all.

Assertions are not explainations. Explain how observing the moon is an act of free will causation of its existence.

[Volt]

No, by "change" i'm refering to our being the cause of the future by observing it. We interact with reality whether or not it is determined or subject to free will.

You seem to be assuming with the above statement that consciousness equates with free will. Consciousness of your actions need have nothing to do with whether or not you are the cause of those actions, i.e. with free will.

True. However, there is a delineation between a passive observer and an active observer. You're assuming it's passive.

No not quite, it would be more like being in the movie where your future observations and actions are pre-determined.

Passive observation, in other words. I believe it's active. We can't distinguish which is the correct interpretation without going beyond scientific data, else there would be little debate between explanations of QM.

Your assertion is that God is the cause of the wave function but that we are the cause of its collapse, and that we collapse it by merely observing it in some way. Observation itself has nothing to do with free will, so how are we the cause of collapse of the wave function by observation?

How? You'e effectively asking how QM gets its results. We both have interpretations regarding it, as have already been discussed.

To be honest, i'm not seeing any consistency in your own interpretation, i.e. with collapse of Gods wave function being due to our conscious observations even though our conscious observations would necessarily be included in the wave function. What is inconsistent with the many worlds interpretation of the wave function? It does away with the ridiculous idea of our conscious observation of the external reality being the cause of that external reality.

You keep returning to scientific theories, particularly our differing interpretations of QM. But scientific theories, at best, can only offer moderate evidence in denial or affirmation of philosophical worldviews, by the very nature of scientific inquiry. I was specifically referring to Dualism vs Materialism vs Idealism, all of which are purely philosophical. To repeat:

It's a consistent interpretation of the results of QM, I'll agree [in reference to your interpretation of QM and the wave function]. QM in and of itself isn't any kind of hard evidence in favor of Monism vs Dualism. Largely what's been discussed so far--as I understand it--is how QM can be integrated into the model Idealism proposes. Recently the conversation has moved to Dualism vs Monism altogether.

...

Idealism is internally consistent, as is Dualism. If we wished to argue which should be believed, my line of attack would be how the concept of an independent, inert substance from the mind is a strictly meaningless assertion.

Or in other words, we're tangling up scientific and philosophical assertions.

Now, the different scientific theories that exist to explain the experimental results of QM are just that: theories. Some simpler than others, some more complex. Some have a greater stack of evidence in support of them, in whatever way. Regardless, deciding which theory is true ultimately drags in philosophy, and which philosophical worldview presupposed as true is the deciding factor.

That said, let's start from a purely philosophical angle and put scientific theories aside for a moment, so as not to muddy the waters: How do you know what "external reality" is, and how do you interact with it?

The problem with it, as I see it, is that you are assuming that the wave function collapses, and that therefore a mind is necessary in order to cause it to collapse. You are not really explaining what a wave function is from your perspective. You are also making the assumption that we as human beings are somehow not included in the wave function. Perhaps if you could explain to me how exactly you would define a wave function then I could perhaps explain to you why it doesn't collapse as a result of our observations.

It apparently collapses. I have no overwhelming reason(s) to doubt that. Also, as I stated before, I know little of physics. Very little, to the point that I don't really know what it is except from a layman's perspective, as "potentiality." Moreover, it's a moot point. If there were no debate as to whether the wave function collapses, we wouldn't be discussing it now.

I don't need nor desire an explanation of the wave function from your perspective, as I believe it's not resolving anything in the discussion. As I've already said, I'm simply not interested in debating scientific theory, especially about such a controversial subject as QM that has so many educated opponents arguing for this or that theory; philosophical debate, as stated, is the decisive factor. Something you haven't addressed as of yet.

Assertions are not explainations. Explain how observing the moon is an act of free will causation of its existence.

First, you're speaking in absolutes, as if we wholly create reality by looking at it. That is not my position, nor do I believe "free will" is an absolute, as if it's pure chance that we do whatever we do. Even the unconscious and conscious aspects of our minds have rules governing them.

Second, a syllogism is not merely a set unsupported assertions and includes all physical matter in its conclusions, including the moon. Please point out a discrepancy in the syllogism before dismissing it.





To repeat the question I'd like answered, in order to open the philosophical basis of interpreting QM and the wave function: How do you interact with "external reality," and how do you know with any certainty what it is, i.e. what its substance consists of?

[JimL]

True. However, there is a delineation between a passive observer and an active observer. You're assuming it's passive.

You'll have to explain the difference with regards to consciousness. I don't believe that activity has anything to do with the definition of consciousness itself. Consciousness is an awareness of the external reality not an act in itself. Although, as i understand you, that is what your interpretation of QM seems to entail, i.e that consciousness itself is an active cause of the external reality.

Passive observation, in other words. I believe it's active. We can't distinguish which is the correct interpretation without going beyond scientific data, else there would be little debate between explanations of QM.

I am not familiar with any science that says that consciousness actively causes, in the sense that it chooses, to collapse of the wave function. It merely says that the wave function seemingly collapses upon conscious observation.

How? You'e effectively asking how QM gets its results. We both have interpretations regarding it, as have already been discussed.

Yes, we both have interpretations, but you have yet to explain your interpretation logically. The Copenhagen interpretation has never been explained logically, it merely asserts that observation is the cause of collapse. The many worlds interpretation, though it may be wrong as well, no one knows for sure, at least gives a logical explanation as to what might actually going on.

You keep returning to scientific theories, particularly our differing interpretations of QM. But scientific theories, at best, can only offer moderate evidence in denial or affirmation of philosophical worldviews, by the very nature of scientific inquiry. I was specifically referring to Dualism vs Materialism vs Idealism, all of which are purely philosophical. To repeat:

Your idealism, or dualism is assuming that a consciousness distinct from the body actively collapses the wave function. When the double split experiment is done does the conscious soul/spirit of the experimenter make a choice as to where the particle will be, or does it just observe where it is? I see nothing active about conscious observation there, do you?

Or in other words, we're tangling up scientific and philosophical assertions.

Now, the different scientific theories that exist to explain the experimental results of QM are just that: theories. Some simpler than others, some more complex. Some have a greater stack of evidence in support of them, in whatever way. Regardless, deciding which theory is true ultimately drags in philosophy, and which philosophical worldview presupposed as true is the deciding factor.

No not really, the only theories that I am familiar with, though there are others i know, are the Copenhagen and the many worlds, and only the latter is logically explanatory. There is no logical explanation given for the former other than "thats what seems to be the case so just accept it".

That said, let's start from a purely philosophical angle and put scientific theories aside for a moment, so as not to muddy the waters: How do you know what "external reality" is, and how do you interact with it?

Thats a whole different question, and since you ask again at the end of this reply I'll try to answer there.

It apparently collapses. I have no overwhelming reason(s) to doubt that.

I would have to disagree, we do have plenty of reason to doubt that looking at the external reality is what causes the external reality.

Also, as I stated before, I know little of physics. Very little, to the point that I don't really know what it is except from a layman's perspective, as "potentiality." Moreover, it's a moot point. If there were no debate as to whether the wave function collapses, we wouldn't be discussing it now.

There really is no debate on the Copenhagen side of the issue. They give no explanation, other than thats what the experiment seems to reveal, take it or leave it.

To repeat the question I'd like answered, in order to open the philosophical basis of interpreting QM and the wave function: How do you interact with "external reality,"and how do you know with any certainty what it is, i.e. what its substance consists of?

Could you elaborate on what you are trying to get at with this question because i am not seeing the connection exactly.

[Volt]

You'll have to explain the difference with regards to consciousness. I don't believe that activity has anything to do with the definition of consciousness itself. Consciousness is an awareness of the external reality not an act in itself. Although, as i understand you, that is what your interpretation of QM seems to entail, i.e that consciousness itself is an active cause of the external reality.

It's a matter of whether the mind is in direct contact with reality, or indirect. If direct, then it's like thinking--being conscious of your thoughts is an active process. If indirect, then you're correct; it's just passive reception of a mental image through our senses.

I am not familiar with any science that says that consciousness actively causes, in the sense that it chooses, to collapse of the wave function. It merely says that the wave function seemingly collapses upon conscious observation.

Precisely! Science reports the results, but interpretation falls within the realm of philosophy. I haven't heard of any science that says "consciousness actively causes..." either. Berkelian Idealism, on the other hand...

Yes, we both have interpretations, but you have yet to explain your interpretation logically. The Copenhagen interpretation has never been explained logically, it merely asserts that observation is the cause of collapse. The many worlds interpretation, though it may be wrong as well, no one knows for sure, at least gives a logical explanation as to what might actually going on.

I would have to do a lot more research in order to even thoroughly understand the Copenhagen interpretation, much less defend it. My only point has been that its conclusion--that observation causes the collapse, or seems to--is supported by and can be integrated into the Idealistic philosophy.

Your idealism, or dualism is assuming that a consciousness distinct from the body actively collapses the wave function. When the double split experiment is done does the conscious soul/spirit of the experimenter make a choice as to where the particle will be, or does it just observe where it is? I see nothing active about conscious observation there, do you?

First, Idealism is an "immaterial" Monism, i.e. there isn't a human consciousness distinct from perception, including the body. In order for me to say that there is a consciousness independent of the body/brain, there would have to be positive evidence...otherwise it's just idle speculation.

Second, I'm not familiar with the "double split" experiment? Observation causes the particle to come into being from a wave; where the particle comes into being is not subject to the experimenter. I can explain the results in that the mind does not have complete control over all the circumstances of reality, just certain aspects (wave to particle). Regardless, the question can only be resolved by determining whether a mind can directly affect reality, since these results can be explained by either of our interpretations.

No not really, the only theories that I am familiar with, though there are others i know, are the Copenhagen and the many worlds, and only the latter is logically explanatory. There is no logical explanation given for the former other than "thats what seems to be the case so just accept it".

I wouldn't know.

I would have to disagree, we do have plenty of reason to doubt that looking at the external reality is what causes the external reality.

There really is no debate on the Copenhagen side of the issue. They give no explanation, other than thats what the experiment seems to reveal, take it or leave it.

That observation causes wave function collapse is only a conclusion from the integration of QM with Idealism. I suspect that to find it an even marginally sane assertion, you'd have to first find Idealism a feasible proposition. So I won't argue the point, except on philosophical grounds.

Could you elaborate on what you are trying to get at with this question because i am not seeing the connection exactly.

Certainly.

The premise is purely philosophical. We can differentiate the mind itself from perceptions, i.e. it's not just a set of perceptions. Then, three general camps to explain the role of perception: Dualism, Materialistic Monism or Idealistic Monism.

Idealistic Monism: The mind and what it observes (passively or actively, whichever) directly interacts with reality, i.e. perception is all there is to reality. Reality is also made up of one substance, the only substance we know to exist: *perceptions, which can be divided into different categories of sensation. An "external reality" in this case only means that some perceptions are held constant and/or forced to act within certain parameters to be interacted with by multiple minds.

*Note that I'm referring to "perception" as the gestalt of sensations. Judgment and interpretations of the human mind immediately and absolutely color every perception, however. Perception is quite subjective in every way; the best we can do is use symbols and static abstractions to pinpoint similarities of perception. Our shared reality. Again, this is all with the premise of Idealism.

Dualism: The mind and what it observes indirectly interacts with reality, i.e. there is something above/below/beneath perception, causing that perception. The smell, taste, color, size and weight of Newton's apple are all caused and held together by something underneath all those sensations that is "the real apple." There is perception, then the "real" reality, and some kind of link between the two that allows information to flow from one to the other.

Materialistic Monism: Same as Idealistic Monism, except that the single substance of reality is "physical" reality. At least by definition. In reality, every Materialist I've talked to in RL has made a distinction between mental images--our perceptions--and the physical reality. A sort of closet Dualism?

Now, this all connects with QM by affirming or denying our differing interpretations. If Dualism is true, then observation is most definitely passive, and I'm dead wrong. If Idealistic Monism is true, it makes perfect sense to say perceptions can be altered by our minds, i.e. observation changes reality. My question was to see which camp you're in.

[JimL]

Certainly.

The premise is purely philosophical. We can differentiate the mind itself from perceptions, i.e. it's not just a set of perceptions. Then, three general camps to explain the role of perception: Dualism, Materialistic Monism or Idealistic Monism.

Idealistic Monism: The mind and what it observes (passively or actively, whichever) directly interacts with reality, i.e. perception is all there is to reality. Reality is also made up of one substance, the only substance we know to exist: *perceptions, which can be divided into different categories of sensation. An "external reality" in this case only means that some perceptions are held constant and/or forced to act within certain parameters to be interacted with by multiple minds.

*Note that I'm referring to "perception" as the gestalt of sensations. Judgment and interpretations of the human mind immediately and absolutely color every perception, however. Perception is quite subjective in every way; the best we can do is use symbols and static abstractions to pinpoint similarities of perception. Our shared reality. Again, this is all with the premise of Idealism.

Dualism: The mind and what it observes indirectly interacts with reality, i.e. there is something above/below/beneath perception, causing that perception. The smell, taste, color, size and weight of Newton's apple are all caused and held together by something underneath all those sensations that is "the real apple." There is perception, then the "real" reality, and some kind of link between the two that allows information to flow from one to the other.

Materialistic Monism: Same as Idealistic Monism, except that the single substance of reality is "physical" reality. At least by definition. In reality, every Materialist I've talked to in RL has made a distinction between mental images--our perceptions--and the physical reality. A sort of closet Dualism?

I'm not a philosopher in the educated sense so I will have to question you as to some of the definitions you give above if you don't mind. In Idealistic monism "how are you defining perception when equating it with "all there is to reality". It seems as though you are saying that the mind itself from this perspective is all there is to reality, or in other words that there is no external reality. If this is correct then what is it that you mean by multiple minds?

Dualism I understand. To put it simply, the mind is distinct from, though somehow linked to, the external reality.

To answer your question now as to which of these views I take, it would be neither of the two above, as i understand them, since I believe in an external reality, which apparently is not the perspective of Idealistic monism, and I do not believe in immaterialist spirits as in the Dualistic perspective that somehow interact with an external material reality. So, I guess you can chalk me up as an materialistic monist.
I'm not sure who the materialists are that you've talked to, but they are not really materialists if they believe that mental images are some sort of immaterial existing things rather than abstract notions or information contained within the physical brain, a.k.a qualia.

Now, this all connects with QM by affirming or denying our differing interpretations. I Dualism is true, then observation is most definitely passive, and I'm dead wrong. If Idealistic monism is true, it makes perfect sense to say perceptions can be altered by our minds, i.e. observation changes reality. My question was to see which camp you're in.

I'm not sure why you would say that the Dualism perspective necessitates a passivity of observation as compared with Idealistic monism. Could you explain? With regards to Idealistic monism, it seems that all you are saying is that what we percieve is what we percieve, though you imply that it is somehow an active choice, but you fail to mention materialistic monism with regards to QM. How would you say it differs in this regard to Idealistic monism? Do you mean to say that they are exactly the same except that the one collapses a wave function of the mind, or relating to an internal reality, while the other collapses a wave function relating to an external reality?

[JimL]

Sorry I only read and answered only the bottom half of this quote due to time constraints so I will reply to this part now.

It's a matter of whether the mind is in direct contact with reality, or indirect. If direct, then it's like thinking--being conscious of your thoughts is an active process. If indirect, then you're correct; it's just passive reception of a mental image through our senses.

Why do you assert that there should be a difference between direct and indirect conscious contact with reality? I'm not sure how you see Idealistic monism as being any more direct, in terms of conscious contact, than materialistic monism. What we are conscious of in both instances is information within the mind whether it originates there or not.

Precisely! Science reports the results, but interpretation falls within the realm of philosophy. I haven't heard of any science that says "consciousness actively causes..." either. Berkelian Idealism, on the other hand...

But I don't believe that the interpretation of wave function collapse is in question, it only states that conscious observation collapses the wave function, but the experimentor, the observer, is not actively looking for a particular result so that the cause of collapse can not be the result of an "observational choice", or as you put it of an "active consciousness". The only question as to interpretation is whether or not there is a collapse at all. The Copenhagen interpretation suggests a collapse of the superposition upon observation, passive observation, while the many worlds interpretation suggest that no collapse takes place at all, we merely observe, passively observe, the determined nature of the wave function in our own particular universe, the other possibilities within the wave function are all equally real, equally determined, which would be observed in other universes, if there are observers there to observe them.

I would have to do a lot more research in order to even thoroughly understand the Copenhagen interpretation, much less defend it. My only point has been that its conclusion--that observation causes the collapse, or seems to--is supported by and can be integrated into the Idealistic philosophy.

It would seem so, but it would not afaics be any more of an active conscious cause due to observation than it is from the materialistic monism perspective.

First, Idealism is an "immaterial" Monism, i.e. there isn't a human consciousness distinct from perception, including the body. In order for me to say that there is a consciousness independent of the body/brain, there would have to be positive evidence...otherwise it's just idle speculation.

Second, I'm not familiar with the "double split" experiment? Observation causes the particle to come into being from a wave; where the particle comes into being is not subject to the experimenter. I can explain the results in that the mind does not have complete control over all the circumstances of reality, just certain aspects (wave to particle). Regardless, the question can only be resolved by determining whether a mind can directly affect reality, since these results can be explained by either of our interpretations.

I think the problem I'm having is in understanding where you are deriving the idea that the mind itself has a direct effect, in an actively causal sense, on reality outcomes. That doesn't jive in any way with the actual science. Observation seems to collapse the wave function, but it doesn't actively cause it.

I wouldn't know.

Fair enough. But that is one thing I do know about Copenhagen. There is no explanation given for the collapse of the wave function other than passive observation. The cause for this is not known which is the reason for the alternative many worlds interpretation of "no collapse."

That observation causes wave function collapse is only a conclusion from the integration of QM with Idealism. I suspect that to find it an even marginally sane assertion, you'd have to first find Idealism a feasible proposition. So I won't argue the point, except on philosophical grounds.

Perhaps if you could explain how Idealistic monism should in some respect be considered actively conscious in a sense that materialistic monism is not I could understand how you've come to the philosophical conclusion that observation is an active cause of collapse in the former but not in the latter.

[Volt]

I'm not a philosopher in the educated sense so I will have to question you as to some of the definitions you give above if you don't mind. In Idealistic monism "how are you defining perception when equating it with "all there is to reality".

Not at all; I'm no more educated myself, having majored in Biology and not philosophy. "External reality," for one, I suspect I've used in the past with a differing interpretation than others.

As for the definition of perception: all five sensations, contained within your mind.

It seems as though you are saying that the mind itself from this perspective is all there is to reality, or in other words that there is no external reality. If this is correct then what is it that you mean by multiple minds?

In a word, inference. If it walks, talks, and smells like me, it's likely got a mind like the one I know I have. Also, if reality is nothing more than a set of sensations, then there's two possiblities: all the sensations are produced by my mind (like my thoughts), or they're produced by another mind. Clearly not all reality is not subject to my will (like a lucid dream), so the more reasonable conclusion is that other mind(s) exist (and therefore Solipsism is false, i.e. the claim that only my mind exists and is the creator of reality). It or they [the other minds] would be the source of any sensations and/or thoughts my own didn't create, and their will acting on those things that keeps them out of my complete control. I always maintain some degree of influence on them simply by virtue of perceiving them--the evidence for that being that all human sensations are subjective to the person from moment to moment. Similar, perhaps, but everything from color to size is dependent on where and when you perceive it.

Dualism I understand. To put it simply, the mind is distinct from, though somehow linked to, the external reality.

To answer your question now as to which of these views I take, it would be neither of the two above, as i understand them, since I believe in an external reality, which apparently is not the perspective of Idealistic monism...

Idealism, at least when it's not Solipsism, merely concludes that there's an external reality of a different sort: that certain ideas are produced by other minds than your own, and can be shared.

...and I do not believe in immaterialist spirits as in the Dualistic perspective that somehow interact with an external material reality. So, I guess you can chalk me up as an materialistic monist.
I'm not sure who the materialists are that you've talked to, but they are not really materialists if they believe that mental images are some sort of immaterial existing things rather than abstract notions or information contained within the physical brain, a.k.a qualia.

Probably. That said, whether physical qualia or mental images, there's a common problem: bridging the gap of verification between either of those and "real" reality. So long as all we have access to is qualia, that problem stubbornly remains. Or at least, I have yet to hear of a solution. We could say that because it's all physical, it all obeys physical laws and therefore correlates just fine...but that presupposes the reliability of physical laws, which we can only verify via the one thing we have access to: qualia.

I'm not sure why you would say that the Dualism perspective necessitates a passivity of observation as compared with Idealistic monism. Could you explain?

If you make a practical distinction between the mind and the body/reality, then the mind is just along for the ride, so to speak. The body receives data (sensation) and transmits it to the mind, regardless of anything the mind does. Observation is just another word for passive data collection, in this case. When it does act, the only thing it can affect are thing confined to itself--thoughts--and the body, like a puppet master pulling strings.

If the mind is all that exists and the body is just part of, or ideas of the mind--like fingers and toes are part of the body--then the gain of information through the senses and control over the senses are one and the same thing. Or in other words, what sensation you receive depends on your perspective--where you're looking, what you're touching--and the mind is in direct control of that perspective. As mentioned earlier: " I always maintain some degree of influence on them [sensations] simply by virtue of perceiving them--the evidence for that being that all human sensations are subjective to the person from moment to moment. Similar, perhaps, but everything from color to size is dependent on where and when you perceive it." This could also apply to Dualism, except that there's supposed to be a completely independent material below/behind/within these sensations, which are not in any way subjective. Also, the "puppet strings" are in question, whether they reliably connect to reality in providing the puppeteer information and in commanding the puppet to move.

With regards to Idealistic monism, it seems that all you are saying is that what we percieve is what we percieve, though you imply that it is somehow an active choice, but you fail to mention materialistic monism with regards to QM. How would you say it differs in this regard to Idealistic monism? Do you mean to say that they are exactly the same except that the one collapses a wave function of the mind, or relating to an internal reality, while the other collapses a wave function relating to an external reality?

First, for a more verbose explanation of "what we perceive is what we perceive," see above. I hardly want to give an overly brief argument of, "this is exactly as it looks, so just accept it."

Second, Materialistic Monism vs Idealistic Monism. Well, the former results in absolute predetermination. That's one difference between the two. Another is the problem I mentioned earlier regarding qualia. Even if we classify everything in the mind as physical, there is generally the assumption that our perception--our senses--are converted in the brain to something else that isn't reality in and of itself. It's a representation, at best. I haven't met a Materialist yet who's asserted otherwise.

As for your application of the differences to the wave function...I think so? My understanding of the wave function itself is perhaps interfering with my ability to answer correctly. If you'd like me to try and clarify this point, feel free to ask. For now, this post is more than long enough for me.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~`

Sorry I only read and answered only the bottom half of this quote due to time constraints so I will reply to this part now.

Why do you assert that there should be a difference between direct and indirect conscious contact with reality? I'm not sure how you see Idealistic monism as being any more direct, in terms of conscious contact, than materialistic monism. What we are conscious of in both instances is information within the mind whether it originates there or not.

Correct! However, Materialism and Dualism go one step beyond that: they assert that there is a separate, wholly independent reality made of an unknown substance that this information must make a reliable representation of, without any access to that independent reality or even the slightest concept of what this unknown substance is. I find this assertion somewhat...unconvincing.

But I don't believe that the interpretation of wave function collapse is in question, it only states that conscious observation collapses the wave function, but the experimentor, the observer, is not actively looking for a particular result so that the cause of collapse can not be the result of an "observational choice", or as you put it of an "active consciousness". The only question as to interpretation is whether or not there is a collapse at all. The Copenhagen interpretation suggests a collapse of the superposition upon observation, passive observation, while the many worlds interpretation suggest that no collapse takes place at all, we merely observe, passively observe, the determined nature of the wave function in our own particular universe, the other possibilities within the wave function are all equally real, equally determined, which would be observed in other universes, if there are observers there to observe them.

Put that way, I don't hold to the Copenhagen interpretation. I believe Leonhard somewhere in this thread made a similar summary, and I likewise said I don't hold to the Copenhagen interpretation given his definition of it. That said, replace "passive" with "active" and you have my stance, so it is very similar.

Now, as for the bold: that the "observer is not actively looking for a particular result." I would argue that this doesn't necessarily mean his mind is a completely passive factor, given the nature of the human mind. Observation can only be analytically separated from interpretation. Practically speaking, even looking at someone or something, even the same thing, is a completely unique experience between people. For instance, one person may see a mother, another a wife, another a daughter, another a stranger, etc...and so on for any number of things. The experimenter may have "just observed," but unless he was brain-dead, there's an active consciousness. Now, if the mind is separated from reality by "puppet strings," then this activity has no bearing on the experiment because it can't affect it. But if the mind isn't separate...?

It would seem so, but it would not afaics be any more of an active conscious cause due to observation than it is from the materialistic monism perspective.

Agreed, which is why I wanted to steer the debate between Materialist Monism/Dualism and Idealism. Given that Materialism necessitates absolute predetermination via physical laws, I don't see how there can be any "active consciousness," even in terms of spontaneous thoughts.

I think the problem I'm having is in understanding where you are deriving the idea that the mind itself has a direct effect, in an actively causal sense, on reality outcomes. That doesn't jive in any way with the actual science. Observation seems to collapse the wave function, but it doesn't actively cause it.

You mean the data collected by science, or the interpretations? There's a critical difference. Also, I would agree, if only because science's own methods keep it from considering assertions like that.

Fair enough. But that is one thing I do know about Copenhagen. There is no explanation given for the collapse of the wave function other than passive observation. The cause for this is not known which is the reason for the alternative many worlds interpretation of "no collapse."

Understood. I would agree that it seems farfetched if you're a Dualist or Materialist, to say the least.

Perhaps if you could explain how Idealistic monism should in some respect be considered actively conscious in a sense that materialistic monism is not I could understand how you've come to the philosophical conclusion that observation is an active cause of collapse in the former but not in the latter.

I believe this is (by and large) explained by the rest of my responses above? There are a few things to be added, however:

All I need to prove is that the mind is a) directly in contact with reality, and b) that it can have an active effect on reality, i.e. manipulate it. If your mind and your mind alone is responsible for all the "physical" effects you have on reality, then that includes the apparent effect on the wave function. No need for a theory that says it doesn't actually collapse, by virtue of Occam's Razor. Moreover, (b) naturally follows from (a) given our experience, so all I really need to prove is (a)!

As for how I've come to the philosophical conclusion:

1. Your own mind must exist (Proof: Reflexive knowledge)
2. Your thoughts* must exist (Reflexive Knowledge)
3. Your thoughts must be controlled and/or affected by your mind, i.e. will (Reflexive knowledge)
4. Your thoughts are a product of your mind (#2-3)
5. Your thoughts are dependent on your mind for existence, being a product of it. (#4)
6. Perceptions directly interact with your mind, i.e. are "in" your mind just like thoughts (Reflexive knowledge?)
7. Certain perceptions (e.g. your body) can be directly affected by your will just like thoughts (Experience)
8. Perceptions have the same "substance" as thoughts (#3, 5, 6, 7)
9. Your mind can and does directly affects perceptions(#6-8)
10. "Reality" refers to and can only be known as a certain set of perceptions, i.e. experiences (Experience)
11. Your mind affects reality. (#9, 10)

* "Thoughts" being defined as everything that you can completely control by will: sensations of all kinds in a lucid dream or daydream in addition to symbolic logic in the form of language.

I've re-read that list of statements enough times to get a headache, so I'll post it. That said, I'm almost sure I overlooked something, since it really isn't a completely self-contained syllogism in the proper sense, let alone in symbolic logic.

Quoted from this post, because there is conversation with Seer below it that expands on some points/criticisms.

[JimL]

Not at all; I'm no more educated myself, having majored in Biology and not philosophy. "External reality," for one, I suspect I've used in the past with a differing interpretation than others.

As for the definition of perception: all five sensations, contained within your mind.

Okay, so basically your definition, or the definition, of Idealistic monism is that the only thing that actually exists is the mind itself.

In a word, inference. If it walks, talks, and smells like me, it's likely got a mind like the one I know I have. Also, if reality is nothing more than a set of sensations, then there's two possiblities: all the sensations are produced by my mind (like my thoughts), or they're produced by another mind. Clearly not all reality is not subject to my will (like a lucid dream), so the more reasonable conclusion is that other mind(s) exist (and therefore Solipsism is false, i.e. the claim that only my mind exists and is the creator of reality). It or they [the other minds] would be the source of any sensations and/or thoughts my own didn't create, and their will acting on those things that keeps them out of my complete control. I always maintain some degree of influence on them simply by virtue of perceiving them--the evidence for that being that all human sensations are subjective to the person from moment to moment. Similar, perhaps, but everything from color to size is dependent on where and when you perceive it.

Isn't a contradiction to assert that all that exists is the mind, i.e. that there is no external reality, and then turn around and assert the existence of other minds external to your own?

Idealism, at least when it's not Solipsism, merely concludes that there's an external reality of a different sort: that certain ideas are produced by other minds than your own, and can be shared.

See above.

Probably. That said, whether physical qualia or mental images, there's a common problem: bridging the gap of verification between either of those and "real" reality. So long as all we have access to is qualia, that problem stubbornly remains. Or at least, I have yet to hear of a solution. We could say that because it's all physical, it all obeys physical laws and therefore correlates just fine...but that presupposes the reliability of physical laws, which we can only verify via the one thing we have access to: qualia.

It is a problem, and I don't understand how the brain works exactly either. For instance when i look at the external reality what I am supposedly seeing is a model of that reality based on the neuronal activity inside my brain, but if that is so then why don't I see that same external reality when i close my eyes? My guess is that the information that produces the qualia, or model of the external reality inside my brain, doesn't stay put and needs to be constant as when ones eyes are open. But not being yet able to bridge the gap between the two I don't think is good reason to assume there is one. Idealistic monism seems to be no more than solipsism wherein all of reality is naught more than an illusion, a dream within a single mind.

If you make a practical distinction between the mind and the body/reality, then the mind is just along for the ride, so to speak. The body receives data (sensation) and transmits it to the mind, regardless of anything the mind does. Observation is just another word for passive data collection, in this case. When it does act, the only thing it can affect are thing confined to itself--thoughts--and the body, like a puppet master pulling strings.

I don't know, I think the mind would be active in either case. A spirit for instance would need to act upon the sense data transmitted to it from the physical brain no less so than would the physical brain need to act upon the data transmitted to it from the external reality. As for Idealistic monism on the other hand, we, it would seem to me, would be nothing more than the dream of an all encompassing mind and so be completely passive.

If the mind is all that exists and the body is just part of, or ideas of the mind--like fingers and toes are part of the body--then the gain of information through the senses and control over the senses are one and the same thing. Or in other words, what sensation you receive depends on your perspective--where you're looking, what you're touching--and the mind is in direct control of that perspective. As mentioned earlier: " I always maintain some degree of influence on them [sensations] simply by virtue of perceiving them--the evidence for that being that all human sensations are subjective to the person from moment to moment. Similar, perhaps, but everything from color to size is dependent on where and when you perceive it." This could also apply to Dualism, except that there's supposed to be a completely independent material below/behind/within these sensations, which are not in any way subjective. Also, the "puppet strings" are in question, whether they reliably connect to reality in providing the puppeteer information and in commanding the puppet to move.

But you wouldn't be looking or touching anything because nothing else would exist, including your mind because you would just be a thought within an all encompassing mind.

First, for a more verbose explanation of "what we perceive is what we perceive," see above. I hardly want to give an overly brief argument of, "this is exactly as it looks, so just accept it."

Second, Materialistic Monism vs Idealistic Monism. Well, the former results in absolute predetermination. That's one difference between the two.

It would seem to be so if our understanding of QM and the wave function is correct.

Another is the problem I mentioned earlier regarding qualia. Even if we classify everything in the mind as physical, there is generally the assumption that our perception--our senses--are converted in the brain to something else that isn't reality in and of itself. It's a representation, at best. I haven't met a Materialist yet who's asserted otherwise.

Sure, its a problem, but everything that we don't understand is a problem, until we understand it.

As for your application of the differences to the wave function...I think so? My understanding of the wave function itself is perhaps interfering with my ability to answer correctly. If you'd like me to try and clarify this point, feel free to ask. For now, this post is more than long enough for me.

On second thought, a wave function, in the case of Idealistic monism would require an external reality as well. In order for a particle or an object to be in a superposition of being both here and there it would need be a thing that is distinct from your own mind, no?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~`

Correct! However, Materialism and Dualism go one step beyond that: they assert that there is a separate, wholly independent reality made of an unknown substance that this information must make a reliable representation of, without any access to that independent reality or even the slightest concept of what this unknown substance is. I find this assertion somewhat...unconvincing.

Not sure what you mean by a wholly independent reality. Dualism certainly asserts that in the opposite direction, i.e. that the mind is a wholly independent reality of an unknown or immaterial substance, but materialism makes no such claim. Idealistic monism on the other hand claims that there is no reality other than the mind which is itself made of an unknown substance.

Put that way, I don't hold to the Copenhagen interpretation. I believe Leonhard somewhere in this thread made a similar summary, and I likewise said I don't hold to the Copenhagen interpretation given his definition of it. That said, replace "passive" with "active" and you have my stance, so it is very similar.

The only problem with that is that it is not active observation in the sense of choice. If your stance is that what is seen is an act of observational choice, of seeing what we want to see, then we are not the observers making that choice. Again, Idealistic monism seems naught other than solipsism wherein an all encompassing mind is the cause of what all the minds contained within it, i.e. us, observe.

Now, as for the bold: that the "observer is not actively looking for a particular result." I would argue that this doesn't necessarily mean his mind is a completely passive factor, given the nature of the human mind. Observation can only be analytically separated from interpretation. Practically speaking, even looking at someone or something, even the same thing, is a completely unique experience between people. For instance, one person may see a mother, another a wife, another a daughter, another a stranger, etc...and so on for any number of things. The experimenter may have "just observed," but unless he was brain-dead, there's an active consciousness. Now, if the mind is separated from reality by "puppet strings," then this activity has no bearing on the experiment because it can't affect it. But if the mind isn't separate...?

My argument is not that the act of observation itself is passive, but only that when we observe our observation itself isn't the cause of that which we see. That is not intuitive, nor does the science suggest it to be the case.

Agreed, which is why I wanted to steer the debate between Materialist Monism/Dualism and Idealism. Given that Materialism necessitates absolute predetermination via physical laws, I don't see how there can be any "active consciousness," even in terms of spontaneous thoughts.

I wouldn't define consciousness itself as active anyway.

You mean the data collected by science, or the interpretations? There's a critical difference. Also, I would agree, if only because science's own methods keep it from considering assertions like that.

No, the point is that the data just doesn't suggest that observation, in the active sense, is itself the cause of collapse. Science by its very definition does not seek certain outcomes which is why experiments are repeated and verified.

Understood. I would agree that it seems farfetched if you're a Dualist or Materialist, to say the least.

Well the idea that observation itself is the cause of the future is far fetched in any case, even in Idealistic monism. But in Idealistic monism, at least afaics, even if observation itself were the cause of your future, you wouldn't be the causal observer, so determinism would still be the case for you.

I believe this is (by and large) explained by the rest of my responses above? There are a few things to be added, however:

All I need to prove is that the mind is a) directly in contact with reality, and b) that it can have an active effect on reality, i.e. manipulate it. If your mind and your mind alone is responsible for all the "physical" effects you have on reality, then that includes the apparent effect on the wave function. No need for a theory that says it doesn't actually collapse, by virtue of Occam's Razor. Moreover, (b) naturally follows from (a) given our experience, so all I really need to prove is (a)!

Close your eyes. Is your mind directly in contact with reality now?

As for how I've come to the philosophical conclusion:

Quoted from this post, because there is conversation with Seer below it that expands on some points/criticisms.

I'll have to go back and read it. Thanks.

[Volt]

Okay, so basically your definition, or the definition, of Idealistic monism is that the only thing that actually exists is the mind itself.

That's only the premise. Or in other words, the only thing that we know absolutely, via reflexive knowledge, is the existence of our own mind and what it contains, i.e. thoughts and perceptions. Can't be doubted at all. Moreover, thoughts and perceptions are assumed to have the same "substance" by virtue of both being contained in a mind, and therefore able to be manipulated by it if there are no other mitigating factors.

Idealism moves from those absolute premises to deduce that a) other mind(s) exist(s), b) thoughts and perceptions are shared between these minds, forming an "external," or shared reality, and c) there is a set of rules (presumably implemented by another mind's will) that govern the form and possible permutations of our mind, thoughts and perceptions.

The existence of other human minds, like you and I, is by inference, not deduction. The existence of the "God-mind" that is responsible for the maintenance of shared reality is a necessary logical conclusion of similar experiences from moment to moment, i.e. an objective reality. I'm not sure if the latter qualifies as a deduction.

Isn't a contradiction to assert that all that exists is the mind, i.e. that there is no external reality, and then turn around and assert the existence of other minds external to your own?

Idealism doesn't assert that your mind and what exists inside it is all that exists, just what we absolutely know to exist. All else must simply be logically derived from that knowledge.

It is a problem, and I don't understand how the brain works exactly either. For instance when i look at the external reality what I am supposedly seeing is a model of that reality based on the neuronal activity inside my brain, but if that is so then why don't I see that same external reality when i close my eyes? My guess is that the information that produces the qualia, or model of the external reality inside my brain, doesn't stay put and needs to be constant as when ones eyes are open. But not being yet able to bridge the gap between the two I don't think is good reason to assume there is one. Idealistic monism seems to be no more than solipsism wherein all of reality is naught more than an illusion, a dream within a single mind.

I...beg your pardon? You're saying that because we have no way of verifying reality, that we should just blindly trust the model and ignore the existence of a gap?

Given the premise of Dualism and/or Materialism, I'm not arguing that there's no relationship between neuronal activity and whatever's "out there." (Inferred by the example of closing your eyes.) I'm just saying that the relationship is so suspect that we can't assume anything. Practically speaking, the existence of such doubt of every sensation you have leads to Solipsism--living as if everything is an illusion, because it may as well be. It's either that, or blind faith that everything is as it appears. On top of that, the blind faith is in something that's literally meaningless.* (See below, on the quote of a "wholly independent reality.")

I don't know, I think the mind would be active in either case. A spirit for instance would need to act upon the sense data transmitted to it from the physical brain no less so than would the physical brain need to act upon the data transmitted to it from the external reality. As for Idealistic monism on the other hand, we, it would seem to me, would be nothing more than the dream of an all encompassing mind and so be completely passive.

If our mind was nothing more than a dream, a collection of inert thoughts, then we wouldn't be have reflexive awareness. Cogito ergo sum, to put it succinctly.

But you wouldn't be looking or touching anything because nothing else would exist, including your mind because you would just be a thought within an all encompassing mind.

First, a mind =/= a thought. The former is animate, the latter is inanimate. This we know to be true via reflexive knowledge of our own minds and thoughts, and the ability to differentiate between them. Second, true, "nothing else would exist." Aside from all your perceptions of real life, and your own thoughts, desires, emotions...let me be clear. Idealism doesn't assert that the world is an "illusion." Everything we see, hear, feel, etc is quite real in the sense that it exists independently of us in some state. There's just nothing of that which doesn't exist as a product of a mind.

Sure, its a problem, but everything that we don't understand is a problem, until we understand it.

Point. However, in this case, the apparent problem inevitably leads to Solipsism. I for one will believe the other option until this one make a more convincing case.

On second thought, a wave function, in the case of Idealistic monism would require an external reality as well. In order for a particle or an object to be in a superposition of being both here and there it would need be a thing that is distinct from your own mind, no?

Yes, shared thoughts and/or sensations.

Not sure what you mean by a wholly independent reality. Dualism certainly asserts that in the opposite direction, i.e. that the mind is a wholly independent reality of an unknown or immaterial substance, but materialism makes no such claim. Idealistic monism on the other hand claims that there is no reality other than the mind which is itself made of an unknown substance.

We know the substance of our thoughts and sensations; after all we think them and feel, hear, taste, smell and see them. The existence and contents of our minds aren't in question or ambiguity. The building blocks of the mind itself may be unknown, but that doesn't throw its existence into question It's what's "out there" that is, because we have no access to it and never will, something we can't possibly know or be aware of like the mind which I doubt the existence of.

As for the claims of Materialism. Remember the apple example? We perceive it as red, a certain size, weight, feel, smell, etc. Strip all those things away, all the sensations that we call an "apple," and tell me what's left. Try to describe it. That's our independent, external reality.

The only problem with that is that it is not active observation in the sense of choice. If your stance is that what is seen is an act of observational choice, of seeing what we want to see, then we are not the observers making that choice. Again, Idealistic monism seems naught other than solipsism wherein an all encompassing mind is the cause of what all the minds contained within it, i.e. us, observe.

Correct, assuming you're referring to ultimate causation, i.e. the "first mover," so to speak. However, simply because this all-encompassing mind is the original creator of the thoughts and sensations that we share doesn't mean that it retains absolute control over them.

My argument is not that the act of observation itself is passive, but only that when we observe our observation itself isn't the cause of that which we see. That is not intuitive, nor does the science suggest it to be the case.

Our observation doesn't in and of itself cause shared reality to spring into existence, no. Our minds apparently aren't that robust.

No, the point is that the data just doesn't suggest that observation, in the active sense, is itself the cause of collapse. Science by its very definition does not seek certain outcomes which is why experiments are repeated and verified.

Observation only apparently causes it. That's the data, anything more is interpretation.

As for the mind not actively causing anything: consider any kind of physical interaction. One object bumps into another; it effects it by energy transfer. Same sort of thing from an Idealistic premise. The mind coming into direct contact with sensations and alters them in some way.

Well the idea that observation itself is the cause of the future is far fetched in any case, even in Idealistic monism. But in Idealistic monism, at least afaics, even if observation itself were the cause of your future, you wouldn't be the causal observer, so determinism would still be the case for you.

Partly, yes. I never said that Idealism advocated absolute free will, much less complete causality via the human mind!

Close your eyes. Is your mind directly in contact with reality now?

Yes. Your point?

I'll have to go back and read it. Thanks.

I eagerly await criticism. No, seriously.

[JimL]

That's only the premise. Or in other words, the only thing that we know absolutely, via reflexive knowledge, is the existence of our own mind and what it contains, i.e. thoughts and perceptions. Can't be doubted at all. Moreover, thoughts and perceptions are assumed to have the same "substance" by virtue of both being contained in a mind, and therefore able to be manipulated by it if there are no other mitigating factors.

Idealism moves from those absolute premises to deduce that a) other mind(s) exist(s), b) thoughts and perceptions are shared between these minds, forming an "external," or shared reality, and c) there is a set of rules (presumably implemented by another mind's will) that govern the form and possible permutations of our mind, thoughts and perceptions.

The existence of other human minds, like you and I, is by inference, not deduction. The existence of the "God-mind" that is responsible for the maintenance of shared reality is a necessary logical conclusion of similar experiences from moment to moment, i.e. an objective reality. I'm not sure if the latter qualifies as a deduction.

First, to deduce that other minds exist, is to deduce that there is an external reality within which all minds exist. If that external reality is God, which I assume is what you are infering, then we as minds, are nothing more than thoughts produced by that external reality, i.e. God., and thoughts in and of themselves have no will beyond the will of the mind that produced them. One, that would mean we are nothing but a dream, and two, our actions would be determined by the dreamer. The only possible solution I can see for this problem, the problem of us being nothing but the determined dream of an all encompassing mind, is if the external reality, or that which in Idealistic monism might be called God, is not a mind at all, which brings us back to materialistic monism.

Idealism doesn't assert that your mind and what exists inside it is all that exists, just what we absolutely know to exist. All else must simply be logically derived from that knowledge.

But it does assert that all that does exist, exists inside of a mind, is the product of a mind, and does not exist external to a mind. Do I have that right?

I...beg your pardon? You're saying that because we have no way of verifying reality, that we should just blindly trust the model and ignore the existence of a gap?

Well of course. The model is all we have. That doesn't mean that we should ignore the fact that there is a gap in our knowledge as to how the one represents the other. If we can not trust that the model is representative of the reality then we might as well fold up our tents and go home, so to speak.

Given the premise of Dualism and/or Materialism, I'm not arguing that there's no relationship between neuronal activity and whatever's "out there." (Inferred by the example of closing your eyes.) I'm just saying that the relationship is so suspect that we can't assume anything. Practically speaking, the existence of such doubt of every sensation you have leads to Solipsism--living as if everything is an illusion, because it may as well be. It's either that, or blind faith that everything is as it appears. On top of that, the blind faith is in something that's literally meaningless.* (See below, on the quote of a "wholly independent reality.")

Well, we can assume anything when blind to the factual nature of things. But it is solipsism, which afaics is synonomous with Idealistic monism, which is a meaningless illusion. Materialistic monism may be meaningless as well, but at least it is not an illusion, at least we are not a dream, there is a reality to our existence there that exists independent of a mind.

If our mind was nothing more than a dream, a collection of inert thoughts, then we wouldn't be have reflexive awareness. Cogito ergo sum, to put it succinctly.

Yes, but if idealistic monism were true, then it wouldn't be we who are thinking, we would be being thought. Our thoughts would be as much of an illusion as we ourselves are. I think it a mistake though to define the physical brain as nothing more than a collection of inert thoughts.

First, a mind =/= a thought. The former is animate, the latter is inanimate. This we know to be true via reflexive knowledge of our own minds and thoughts, and the ability to differentiate between them. Second, true, "nothing else would exist." Aside from all your perceptions of real life, and your own thoughts, desires, emotions...let me be clear. Idealism doesn't assert that the world is an "illusion." Everything we see, hear, feel, etc is quite real in the sense that it exists independently of us in some state. There's just nothing of that which doesn't exist as a product of a mind.

If reality is a product of mind, then there can be only one mind that it is a product of, which means that if reality consists of many minds, then those minds too are the product of the one mind. The product of a mind is thought, and thought has no reality of its own and does nothing of its own.

Point. However, in this case, the apparent problem inevitably leads to Solipsism. I for one will believe the other option until this one make a more convincing case.

Personally, and sorry to keep repeating it, but Idealistic monism seems to be nothing more than solipsism from what i've so far gathered from your discription. Perhaps you could better explain to me how it isn't?

Yes, shared thoughts and/or sensations.

Yes, actually on third thought, the all encompassing mind would be an external reality with regards to the minds existing within it and so from their point of view, if we can call it that, the wave function would merely be describing the possibilities within the dream that they are a part of.

Sorry, just don't have time to finish replying. i'll get back to it as soon as i can. Thanks.

[seer]

Isn't a contradiction to assert that all that exists is the mind, i.e. that there is no external reality, and then turn around and assert the existence of other minds external to your own?

But it does assert that all that does exist, exists inside of a mind, is the product of a mind, and does not exist external to a mind. Do I have that right?

Good points James...