What's your position on the mind-body problem?

[seer]

Descarte took a leap of faith in assuming that there is a demon who wants to trick us, a necessary assumption for his scenario. The only difference here is that where he's a pessimist, you're an optimist. Instead of a demon, it's God who controls the lightshow.

That said, the problem remains on two counts:

1. How can we trust the connection between mind/perception and reality? If it's indirect, then my previous points still hold true.

Well no, since we start with a trustworthy, honest Creator and said Creator created the us in such a fashion that the indirect information accurately corresponds to reality.

2. Pre-supposing a being that can mediate this indirect connection (God or demon, take your pick) just moves the problem of trust instead of solving it. Now we have to trust the being in question instead of the connection itself. Moreover, any reason you can have for trusting this being must be derived from experience itself. Another case of experience proving that we can trust experience.

But how do you escape the Matrix? How could you ever be sure that you are seeing past your own perceptions? Even if you have a direct connection with reality how does one know that that reality isn't simply a feature of the Matrix? Or that you are not being deceived into believing that you are directly experiencing reality?

[Volt]

Well no, since we start with a trustworthy, honest Creator and said Creator created the us in such a fashion that the indirect information accurately corresponds to reality.

Point. Unfortunately, we can only assert this with evidence from experience. Without it, God may as well be Descartes' demon. To trust perception, we have to trust this being, and the only way to do so is to trust perception...

But how do you escape the Matrix? How could you ever be sure that you are seeing past your own perceptions? Even if you have a direct connection with reality how does one know that that reality isn't simply a feature of the Matrix? Or that you are not being deceived into believing that you are directly experiencing reality?

Good question. In a nutshell: because the question is meaningless when asked within the premise(s) of Idealism.

Of course, that brings up the question: by what standard do I call a statement meaningless? Well, when it's pure conjecture, i.e. something that has no possible method of providing any kind of evidence for or agianst the statement. There is no way to relate it to reality, so it's just a string of words that have nothing to do with it. Literally pure fantasy. Also, whether the statement in question is logically consistent with what we already know isn't proof in itself.

For instance: Zeus. We can say that Greeks saw lightning fall from the sky and heard thunder, so they came up with the assertion: there's a giant standing on clouds above us, who forges lightning bolts (hence the thunder) and gets his jollies from throwing them at us. Is the assertion logically consistent with what they know (existence of thunder and lightning)? Yes. Is there any evidence whatsoever of the existence of a floating, giant bolt-thrower named Zeus? None. The only thing that makes this assertion meaningful to talk about now is because we have evidence of where lightning and thunder really come from. The assertion becomes meaningful, but only in the negative. In the time of the Greeks, the assertion was meaningless because there was no means to prove or disprove the assertion in any way, no way to connect it with reality.

That's why I find the assertion of an independent substrata (i.e. "physical matter") to all perception odd. There's no possible way to determine whether it exists or not; philosophers have created it as a logically consistent explanation for consistent perceptions, just like the Greeks created Zeus. Yet unlike the assertion for Zeus, there's never going to be any evidence in the negative because we can't look past perception like we can look past rain clouds.

Now, how do I know that my direct perceptions can be trusted, if they truly are direct? The answer: Reflexively.

For instance: the existence of your mind. "I think, therefore I am." It's an assertion in which stating it's opposite cannot be possible. In this case, because then you wouldn't exist. In the same way, perceptions can be trusted to exist as they truly are because they interact with your mind just like thoughts. You can no more doubt perception than you can your own thoughts, and therefore your own existence! Moreover, I have no need to prove that these direct perceptions (and therefore my mind) aren't an aspect of the Matrix because the question is meaningless--no evidence one way or another.

[seer]

Point. Unfortunately, we can only assert this with evidence from experience. Without it, God may as well be Descartes' demon. To trust perception, we have to trust this being, and the only way to do so is to trust perception...

Well yes there would have to be trust somewhere along the line. Even in your model. I personally don't see how we could do better than starting with the premise of an omnipotent, trustworthy Creator.

Now, how do I know that my direct perceptions can be trusted, if they truly are direct? The answer: Reflexively.

For instance: the existence of your mind. "I think, therefore I am." It's an assertion in which stating it's opposite cannot be possible. In this case, because then you wouldn't exist. In the same way, perceptions can be trusted to exist as they truly are because they interact with your mind just like thoughts. You can no more doubt perception than you can your own thoughts, and therefore your own existence! Moreover, I have no need to prove that these direct perceptions (and therefore my mind) aren't an aspect of the Matrix because the question is meaningless--no evidence one way or another.

Well no, if there is no evidence one way or another then you can not know if the perceptions you take as real, actually are. That you are not subjected to deception. See Volt, I don't see how this line of reasoning makes anything better or more certain. I'm not saying you shouldn't trust your perceptions, but trust it is - apart from deductive or empirical justification.

[Volt]

Well yes there would have to be trust somewhere along the line. Even in your model. I personally don't see how we could do better than starting with the premise of an omnipotent, trustworthy Creator.

To be sure of our terms: I generally define "trust" as assuming to be true any assertion that isn't deductively proven, i.e. there's some degree of chance the assertion is wrong. Proof by logical inference and indirect experiential evidence falls in this category. For instance, anything in history is only proven by indirect evidence, or in other words, there's a chance it didn't actually happen. Likewise, logical inference will give you a consistent result, but only from premise(s) that are assumed to be true. There's a chance the premises are wrong, and therefore the conclusion.

The only way you can be absolutely sure that an assertion is true, and therefore can't possibly be wrong (if the logic is correct), is deduction. There's 0% chance that the conclusion is wrong, so no assumption necessary. No trust required. Reflexive knowledge is in this category, a matter of deduction.

That said: Knowledge of another mind or being separate from you isn't reflexive. Knowledge of your mind, thoughts and your perceptions (if they're direct) are. You can't logically assert that you don't exist, making "I think, therefore I exist" absolutely true. This isn't the case for the assertion that an independent being exists, because I can still assert "No God exists" without finding myself in a contradiction. So in my model, I would argue that the initial premises: existence of mind, thought and perception exactly as they are experienced--no "mirror images" of reality or Matrix beyond them--requires no trust (as I defined it).

The existence of God requires some amount of trust, unless you can deductively prove. Which I believe I can via Idealism, incidentally, but not with your model.

Well no, if there is no evidence one way or another then you can not know if the perceptions you take as real, actually are. That you are not subjected to deception. See Volt, I don't see how this line of reasoning makes anything better or more certain. I'm not saying you shouldn't trust your perceptions, but trust it is - apart from deductive or empirical justification.

"Trust" is just a cognitive process of the mind, acting on an assertion as if it were known to be absolutely true, when it's actually not. But I do know with absolute certainty that my mind, thoughts, and perceptions (if direct) are true, i.e. exactly as they are and nothing else.

To assert that there is something beyond those things, something "past the curtain" of perception without any reason of any kind--other than your assertions are logically consistent--is meaningless because we can't even conceive of what might be beyond perception. It's a possibility, certainly, but it has quite literally nothing to do with reality as we know it, because there's no way to relate it to reality. It's like trying to imagine a "square triangle;" it's outside the bounds of reality as we know it, and therefore inconceivable. It's also a logical contradiction, but that's beside the point.

[seer]

To be sure of our terms: I generally define "trust" as assuming to be true any assertion that isn't deductively proven, i.e. there's some degree of chance the assertion is wrong. Proof by logical inference and indirect experiential evidence falls in this category. For instance, anything in history is only proven by indirect evidence, or in other words, there's a chance it didn't actually happen. Likewise, logical inference will give you a consistent result, but only from premise(s) that are assumed to be true. There's a chance the premises are wrong, and therefore the conclusion.

The only way you can be absolutely sure that an assertion is true, and therefore can't possibly be wrong (if the logic is correct), is deduction. There's 0% chance that the conclusion is wrong, so no assumption necessary. No trust required. Reflexive knowledge is in this category, a matter of deduction.

That said: Knowledge of another mind or being separate from you isn't reflexive. Knowledge of your mind, thoughts and your perceptions (if they're direct) are. You can't logically assert that you don't exist, making "I think, therefore I exist" absolutely true. This isn't the case for the assertion that an independent being exists, because I can still assert "No God exists" without finding myself in a contradiction. So in my model, I would argue that the initial premises: existence of mind, thought and perception exactly as they are experienced--no "mirror images" of reality or Matrix beyond them--requires no trust (as I defined it).

The existence of God requires some amount of trust, unless you can deductively prove. Which I believe I can via Idealism, incidentally, but not with your model.



"Trust" is just a cognitive process of the mind, acting on an assertion as if it were known to be absolutely true, when it's actually not. But I do know with absolute certainty that my mind, thoughts, and perceptions (if direct) are true, i.e. exactly as they are and nothing else.

To assert that there is something beyond those things, something "past the curtain" of perception without any reason of any kind--other than your assertions are logically consistent--is meaningless because we can't even conceive of what might be beyond perception. It's a possibility, certainly, but it has quite literally nothing to do with reality as we know it, because there's no way to relate it to reality. It's like trying to imagine a "square triangle;" it's outside the bounds of reality as we know it, and therefore inconceivable. It's also a logical contradiction, but that's beside the point.

Volt, I made a deductive argument for the trustworthiness of our perceptions starting with the first premise of a trustworthy, omnipotent God. Second, I would like to see a deductive syllogism for your position. In other words, can you deductively show that the life of your mind is actually creating or affecting reality?

[Leonhard]

In other words, can you deductively show that the life of your mind is actually creating or affecting reality?

You can only perform deductive logic validly on known premises, but deductive logic isn't the only thing available, so you're kinda limiting the situation a bit.

[seer]

You can only perform deductive logic validly on known premises, but deductive logic isn't the only thing available, so you're kinda limiting the situation a bit.

Good to see you back Leonhard! Just to catch up, Volt said:

That said: Knowledge of another mind or being separate from you isn't reflexive. Knowledge of your mind, thoughts and your perceptions (if they're direct) are. You can't logically assert that you don't exist, making "I think, therefore I exist" absolutely true. This isn't the case for the assertion that an independent being exists, because I can still assert "No God exists" without finding myself in a contradiction. So in my model, I would argue that the initial premises: existence of mind, thought and perception exactly as they are experienced--no "mirror images" of reality or Matrix beyond them--requires no trust (as I defined it).

Along with other claims. He seems to suggest that he can make an argument for his position that is certain. I would like to see that laid out deductively. And thanks for jumping in with Tass... He can be a handful...

[Leonhard]

Along with other claims. He seems to suggest that he can make a an argument for his position that is certain. I would like to see that laid out deductively. And thanks for jumping in with Tass... He can be a handful...

You can make arguments that are completely fireproof and certain, without it being from deductively valid premises, but I think that's for another discussion. I still say you need to read Aristotle.

[seer]

You can make arguments that are completely fireproof and certain, without it being from deductively valid premises, but I think that's for another discussion. I still say you need to read Aristotle.

Aristotle! More old white guys! But I would suggest that any fireproof or certain argument could be stated deductively. And wasn't Aristotle big on deductive arguments?

[Leonhard]

Aristotle! More old white guys!

I think he had a bit of a tan you'd find.

But I would suggest that any fireproof or certain argument could be stated deductively.

But how to do you get the premises? How do you uncover that its possible to do deductive arguments, if you didn't know it originally? First comes experience, and from experience we can abstract truths about the world. One of those discoveries was in fact logic itself. That's what this old white guy did.

And wasn't Aristotle big on deductive arguments?

He wasn't the first one to use them, I think we used them long before before knowing what we were doing, but he was the first one to describe them.

[seer]

But how to do you get the premises? How do you uncover that its possible to do deductive arguments, if you didn't know it originally? First comes experience, and from experience we can abstract truths about the world. One of those discoveries was in fact logic itself. That's what this old white guy did.

True, I still think that Volt should be able to make a deductive argument for his position if it is so certain. Volt believes that we don't perceive reality, but that we create reality via our thought process. I think tree - tree comes into being, and this is the only way that we can be certain of reality or be in touch with reality. I don't see how/why that brings certainty since there is no way to prove that the tree exists anywhere except in your thoughts.

[Leonhard]

True, I still think that Volt should be able to make a deductive argument for his position if it is so certain. Volt believes that we don't perceive reality, but that we create reality via our thought process. I think tree - tree comes into being, and this is the only way that we can be certain of reality or be in touch with reality. I don't see how/why that brings certainty since there is no way to prove that the tree exists anywhere except in your thoughts.

Did you come this far from a discussion about the Copenhagen Interpretation? Granted in that interpretation objective reality really consists of the result of measurements, and what underlies those measurements is completely unknown. It makes it almost anti-realism, and is part of the reasons why I don't like it. The reason it enjoys widespread usage is that when you have to teach physics students what happens to a wavefunction after a measurement, it makes it so much easier "It collapses to a single eigen-value if discrete, or a dirac delta function if its continuous." Now that statement might not make too much sense, but its basically the selling point, because using this you get the right results.

However you also get the right results if you use Bohmian wave mechanics (if you can live with information traveling faster than light), or the global variable interpretation (if you can live with global variables existing), or if you use Everett's multiverse interpretation (which has some odd problems as well), or... the point is that there's a bunch of mutually exclusive interpretations of quantum mechanics, one of them [Copenhagen Interpretation] can be taken as supporting anti-realism. However that's some fairly weak evidence.

To be sure of our terms: I generally define "trust" as assuming to be true any assertion that isn't deductively proven, i.e. there's some degree of chance the assertion is wrong. Proof by logical inference and indirect experiential evidence falls in this category. For instance, anything in history is only proven by indirect evidence, or in other words, there's a chance it didn't actually happen. Likewise, logical inference will give you a consistent result, but only from premise(s) that are assumed to be true. There's a chance the premises are wrong, and therefore the conclusion.

Actually, there are premises which can't fail to be true.

[seer]

Did you come this far from a discussion about the Copenhagen Interpretation? Granted in that interpretation objective reality really consists of the result of measurements, and what underlies those measurements is completely unknown. It makes it almost anti-realism, and is part of the reasons why I don't like it. The reason it enjoys widespread usage is that when you have to teach physics students what happens to a wavefunction after a measurement, it makes it so much easier "It collapses to a single eigen-value if discrete, or a dirac delta function if its continuous." Now that statement might not make too much sense, but its basically the selling point, because using this you get the right results.

Yes I believe Volt is hanging his theory on the Copenhagen Interpretation. I believe Volt is an Idealist with is anti-realistic correct?

However you also get the right results if you use Bohmian wave mechanics (if you can live with information traveling faster than light), or the global variable interpretation (if you can live with global variables existing), or if you use Everett's multiverse interpretation (which has some odd problems as well), or... the point is that there's a bunch of mutually exclusive interpretations of quantum mechanics, one of them [Copenhagen Interpretation] can be taken as supporting anti-realism. However that's some fairly weak evidence.

Do any of them make sense?

Actually, there are premises which can't fail to be true.

In the context on Volt's claim?

[Leonhard]

Yes I believe Volt is hanging his theory on the Copenhagen Interpretation. I believe Volt is an Idealist with is anti-realistic correct?

Anti-realism, not 'anti-realistic', its a philosophical position, basically 'There is no spoon'. Some philosophers got tired of arguing about the metaphysical underpinnings of everything and decided that the weight and the piece of lead didn't exist, only the readout. That's the carricature of the position.

Do any of them make sense?

If its worth anything I think the Copenhagen Interpretation makes sense, its just that its lack of a stance on whether objective reality exists is bothersome among other issues. I prefer the thomistic interpretation.

In the context on Volt's claim?

That's actually what I want him to answer, since he seems to think that no premise can be known with certainty. This is a fairly untenable position for obvious reasons, it leads either to an infinite chain of justification or to circular logic.

[seer]

Anti-realism, not 'anti-realistic', its a philosophical position, basically 'There is no spoon'. Some philosophers got tired of arguing about the metaphysical underpinnings of everything and decided that the weight and the piece of lead didn't exist, only the readout. That's the carricature of the position.

I don't know, I just think we should take the spoon as real.

If its worth anything I think the Copenhagen Interpretation makes sense, its just that its lack of a stance on whether objective reality exists is bothersome among other issues. I prefer the thomistic interpretation.

What is the Thomistic interpretation, if you could put it in a nutshell?

That's actually what I want him to answer, since he seems to think that no premise can be known with certainty. This is a fairly untenable position for obvious reasons, it leads either to an infinite chain of justification or to circular logic.

He usually responds over night - my night.