B Theory Of Time...

[Boxing Pythagoras]

I don't think you understood my question. There can be no input within that which has always been, correct? X has always been X, and Y has always been Y. There are no decisions about that being made if each point along the time line, if each decision, each X and Y, has always been, correct, or no?

I'm understanding your question, but my response may not have been clear.

There is a distinction between the function which makes the decision and the input parameters for that decision. Yes, the input parameters are set which means that the output of the function is similarly set, on the B-Theory. However, the function itself could (epistemically speaking) take a range of input values. Regardless of whether or not the input can vary, the function still makes a decision based upon that input parameter.

[JimL]

I'm understanding your question, but my response may not have been clear.

There is a distinction between the function which makes the decision and the input parameters for that decision. Yes, the input parameters are set which means that the output of the function is similarly set, on the B-Theory. However, the function itself could (epistemically speaking) take a range of input values. Regardless of whether or not the input can vary, the function still makes a decision based upon that input parameter.

But if the latter were the case, then that wouldn't amount to B-theory. That's sounds more like A-theory.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

But if the latter were the case, then that wouldn't amount to B-theory. That's sounds more like A-theory.

Nope, it's B-Theory. All moments of time-- past, present, future-- are coextant. Let me try an oversimplified mathematical analogy. Let's say that we have the function f(x)=2x+1. Now, epistemically speaking, the input parameter for the function, x, could be any one of an infinite number of values. Whatever value we take for x, the function will select a unique output from an equally infinite range of possibilities. Now, if we know the value which we will put into the function, say x=2, then we can similarly know the output value of the function, f(2)=5. This does not preclude the fact that the function decided upon its output from an infinity of possibility based upon its input. Even if there was no actual possibility for x to be anything but 2, the function still decided upon an output based upon that input parameter.

[JimL]

Nope, it's B-Theory. All moments of time-- past, present, future-- are coextant. Let me try an oversimplified mathematical analogy. Let's say that we have the function f(x)=2x+1. Now, epistemically speaking, the input parameter for the function, x, could be any one of an infinite number of values. Whatever value we take for x, the function will select a unique output from an equally infinite range of possibilities. Now, if we know the value which we will put into the function, say x=2, then we can similarly know the output value of the function, f(2)=5. This does not preclude the fact that the function decided upon its output from an infinity of possibility based upon its input. Even if there was no actual possibility for x to be anything but 2, the function still decided upon an output based upon that input parameter.

So, you are saying that the future isn't closed even though every point along the time dimension is coextant and closed? You seem to be suggesting that my future self makes a free will choice even though that choice is coextant with a changeless, Block universe. And how could an outside observer know the future if there were many possible future outcomes which are dependent upon free willed choices?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

So, you are saying that the future isn't closed even though every point along the time dimension is coextant and closed?

No, I am saying that a decision is made even in the case that the outcome of that decision is based upon fixed parameters and is itself therefore fixed.

[JimL]

No, I am saying that a decision is made even in the case that the outcome of that decision is based upon fixed parameters and is itself therefore fixed.

So, you're saying the future is fixed no matter how you look at it?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

So, you're saying the future is fixed no matter how you look at it?

Yes, and that this is still compatible with decisions being made.

[JimL]

Yes, and that this is still compatible with decisions being made.

Not seeing it BP, that looks like a logical contradictiohn on its face.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Not seeing it BP, that looks like a logical contradictiohn on its face.

I welcome you to point out the logical contradiction, certainly. But let me try another angle.

Do you think that it is logically possible for a person to be given a free choice between two options and that the person will always, 100% of the time freely, choose one option over the other?

[seer]

Yes, and that this is still compatible with decisions being made.

You probably missed this: In what sense is tenseless time directional? Why would it be directional? What makes it directional?

[seer]

I welcome you to point out the logical contradiction, certainly. But let me try another angle.

Do you think that it is logically possible for a person to be given a free choice between two options and that the person will always, 100% of the time freely, choose one option over the other?

Would it be free, in any sense of the word, if by nature he was compelled to choose that particular option? A nature, BTW, he had no choice in receiving.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

You probably missed this: In what sense is tenseless time directional? Why would it be directional? What makes it directional?

I actually didn't miss it. This will be my third time now answering this question with the exact same words.

"There is absolutely a direction of Time on the B-Theory! As Sparko noted, that Arrow of Time seems to be a function of entropy, with rising entropic states of a system being that which defines the progression from earlier-than to later-than. In a purely physical theory of mind, it would seem reasonable to think that the neurology underlying psychological states follows this same entropic pattern."

Would it be free, in any sense of the word, if by nature he was compelled to choose that particular option? A nature, BTW, he had no choice in receiving.

What do you mean by "compelled?" For example, many theologians would say that God cannot choose to do evil due to his nature. Would you say that God therefore does not have the freedom to choose to do good?

[JimL]

I welcome you to point out the logical contradiction, certainly. But let me try another angle.

Forever fixed and compatible with free will is a logical contradiction on its face. If the fact that you had corn flakes for breakfast on may 21 2025, and that event is extant with your having eggs this morning, and with every other point in time, didn't evolve to that point in time, but always has been, Then how can you have actually freely made the choice to choose corn flakes in 2025? You can't be the agent of an act if the act has never not existed. The Block Universe doesn't evolve, time doesn't flow, it's all there, forever fixed. So, how can anyone within a changeless, fixed, Block Universe, be responsible for changing anything that's always been fixed?

Do you think that it is logically possible for a person to be given a free choice between two options and that the person will always, 100% of the time freely, choose one option over the other?

If they are free willed agents, sure. But B-theory is as if every thing exists before we actually experience it. Like Einstein said: "I know that it isn't the fault of the ax murderer that he is an ax murderer, but I wouldn't want to sit at tea with him."

[Sparko]

I think you probably mean that if the future is open, then B-theory is false



I undertstand that's what you were trying to do, but if the future is closed, as in B-theory, then I don't see any way in which the present you can effect change by freely choosing a differnt future. Perhaps there is a way, but I have yet to see one.

One way is if what is "fixed" is your free will action. Just like when you look into the past, your fixed actions in the past are due to your free will actions in the past.

Another way is if there are parallel universes that branch off for every decision. Then you would have infinite block universes that encompass all choices you could make.

[seer]

I actually didn't miss it. This will be my third time now answering this question with the exact same words.

"There is absolutely a direction of Time on the B-Theory! As Sparko noted, that Arrow of Time seems to be a function of entropy, with rising entropic states of a system being that which defines the progression from earlier-than to later-than. In a purely physical theory of mind, it would seem reasonable to think that the neurology underlying psychological states follows this same entropic pattern."

BP, so there is an arrow of time? Again how is that possible if time is tenseless? And how would entropy be possible if time is tenseless? What is actually becoming more disordered?

What do you mean by "compelled?" For example, many theologians would say that God cannot choose to do evil due to his nature. Would you say that God therefore does not have the freedom to choose to do good?

God chooses to do things like create, but I would not say He has freedom to not act according to his moral character. When one speaks of freedom we usually mean one has a genuine choice. I can choose to eat that extra piece cake or not. Both options are logically possible.