B Theory Of Time...

[seer]

There is absolutely a direction of Time on the B-Theory! As Sparko noted, that Arrow of Time seems to be a function of entropy, with rising entropic states of a system being that which defines the progression from earlier-than to later-than. In a purely physical theory of mind, it would seem reasonable to think that the neurology underlying psychological states follows this same entropic pattern.

The B-theory of time is the name given to one of two positions regarding philosophy of time. B-theorists argue that the flow of time is an illusion, that the past, present, and future are equally real, and that time is tenseless. https://www.google.com/search?q=b-th...hrome&ie=UTF-8

If time is tenseless then there is no flow of time.

[Jim B.]

I think you're misunderstanding, Jim. Only one of the theories can be actually true. If B-theory, which posits that all of time is real, is true, then A-theory, which posits the idea that the future is open, can't also be true.
If one is true, then the other must needs be false. The future can not be both open and closed, thus the logical contradiction. That's the mistake that Sparko is making, trying to fit the one theory, an open future, into the other, a closed future.

You may be right. You probably are. I'm just playing devil's advocate here.

The future could be 'open' from our perspective, the A-perspective, and closed from the B-perspective. In the same way that if free will were true, then I freely choose chocolate at time t1. But later, at time t2, in retrospect, the fact that I freely chose chocolate is already fixed. It's absolutely determined. I can never change the fact that I chose chocolate at t1. So at t2, I am looking at my choice of chocolate at t1 as if from the B-perspective. Imagine that the entire history of the universe were looked at in retrospect, the way I am looking back at my choice of chocolate. Then the entire history of the universe would be a B-history. But that wouldn't rule out the possibility of 'openness' from within the series of events, just like there was openness at t1 but not at t2. In other words, it's the possibility of perspectival truths. It's like 'folk physics'; they're not the completely adequate physical story, but they are still 'true' given their frame of reference.

[JimL]

I'm a Compatibilist. I see nothing in this which would negate the idea of free-will, in general. It would stand in contraposition to Libertarian notions of free-will, but I'm not really convinced that these latter are cogent in the first place.

I'd be interested to know how you fit free will, or compatibilsm into B-theory. I don't see how that's possible with a closed future. Can you give an example?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

The B-theory of time is the name given to one of two positions regarding philosophy of time. B-theorists argue that the flow of time is an illusion, that the past, present, and future are equally real, and that time is tenseless. https://www.google.com/search?q=b-th...hrome&ie=UTF-8

If time is tenseless then there is no flow of time.

You are conflating "flow" and "directionality." The two are not the same concept. The set of all Natural numbers does not flow, in any sense. All of the Natural numbers are completely coextant in that set. And yet, there is a distinct directionality-- 1 is less than 2, which is less than 30, which is less than a Googol, which is less than Graham's Number, et cetera.

[Jim B.]

I'd be interested to know how you fit free will, or compatibilsm into B-theory. I don't see how that's possible with a closed future. Can you give an example?

I could think of an example: Imagine that you're driving down the road and you want to turn left to go to a shoe store to buy shoes. At the very moment that you intend to turn left, imagine that your steering wheel locks into position to the left so that you cannot do anything BUT turn left. So your car turns into the intended parking lot for you to buy shoes. Some compatibilists would say that this is a prime example of compatibilist freedom. You're doing what you wanted and intended to do, free of external constraints, even though you could not have done otherwise.

[seer]

I'd be interested to know how you fit free will, or compatibilsm into B-theory. I don't see how that's possible with a closed future. Can you give an example?

No, compatibilsm is determinism - free will is simply redefined.

[seer]

You're doing what you wanted and intended to do, free of external constraints, even though you could not have done otherwise.

That is key...

[Boxing Pythagoras]

I'd be interested to know how you fit free will, or compatibilsm into B-theory. I don't see how that's possible with a closed future. Can you give an example?

When I talk about "free-will," I mean that the choice which an agent makes is controlled by that agent, itself, and not by some other agency whose will supercedes. Even if all of a person's future actions can be perfectly predicted, that does not imply that those actions are any less due to that person's control. Similarly, even if all of a person's future actions are coextant with the present, that doesn't imply that those actions are any less due to that person's control.

Think of it symmetrically. The fact that a person's future actions exist and cannot be changed does not imply that they are any less the result of free-will than the fact that a person's past actions exist and cannot be changed would imply such a thing.

[Jim B.]

That is key...

Exactly, and that is the key sticking point between most compatibilists and incompatibilists.

[Jim B.]

Think of it symmetrically. The fact that a person's future actions exist and cannot be changed does not imply that they are any less the result of free-will than the fact that a person's past actions exist and cannot be changed would imply such a thing.

Unless the future and past really are different from each other. If they really are different from each other, then the closedness of the past may have different implications for freedom than the closedness of the future. (My brain is starting to hurt!)

They could be different from each other and still somehow be tenselessly 'real', say in the "mind of God" (think Boethius). This distinction and yet simultaneous reality is what allowed him to posit that we are truly free in a libertarian, not compatibilist, sense, and that God timelessly knows what our free actions are. God is looking at the free process of the world as if in retrospect, without that looking affecting the internal process, just like my retrospective looking tomorrow at what i'm writing now doesn;t affect what I'm writing now..

[JimL]

When I talk about "free-will," I mean that the choice which an agent makes is controlled by that agent, itself, and not by some other agency whose will supercedes. Even if all of a person's future actions can be perfectly predicted, that does not imply that those actions are any less due to that person's control. Similarly, even if all of a person's future actions are coextant with the present, that doesn't imply that those actions are any less due to that person's control.

Think of it symmetrically. The fact that a person's future actions exist and cannot be changed does not imply that they are any less the result of free-will than the fact that a person's past actions exist and cannot be changed would imply such a thing.

But a closed future is analogous to the block universe, correct. Everything, including all choices have always existed along the static timeline. They aren't choices, they just are, right?

[seer]

You are conflating "flow" and "directionality." The two are not the same concept. The set of all Natural numbers does not flow, in any sense. All of the Natural numbers are completely coextant in that set. And yet, there is a distinct directionality-- 1 is less than 2, which is less than 30, which is less than a Googol, which is less than Graham's Number, et cetera.

In what sense is tenseless time directional? Why would it be directional?

[JimL]

You may be right. You probably are. I'm just playing devil's advocate here.

The future could be 'open' from our perspective, the A-perspective, and closed from the B-perspective.

But again, that is a logical contradiction. The logical fact is that only one of the two theoretical perspectives could be the reality. How coult the future be both closed from an outside perspective and open from an inside perspective?

In the same way that if free will were true, then I freely choose chocolate at time t1. But later, at time t2, in retrospect, the fact that I freely chose chocolate is already fixed.

The past would be closed from either perspective. But in B-theory, the future is the same as the past in that respect, it's not open to change. T2 would just be another point along the timeline, but not another time.

It's absolutely determined. I can never change the fact that I chose chocolate at t1. So at t2, I am looking at my choice of chocolate at t1 as if from the B-perspective. Imagine that the entire history of the universe were looked at in retrospect, the way I am looking back at my choice of chocolate. Then the entire history of the universe would be a B-history. But that wouldn't rule out the possibility of 'openness' from within the series of events, just like there was openness at t1 but not at t2. In other words, it's the possibility of perspectival truths. It's like 'folk physics'; they're not the completely adequate physical story, but they are still 'true' given their frame of reference.

That's kind of the point, imagine that the entire history of the universe existed, from beginning to end. That's B-theory. It's all there and always has been. You're existence and actions along that timeline has always been there. How can you be said to be the chooser of that which has always been?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

But a closed future is analogous to the block universe, correct. Everything, including all choices have always existed along the static timeline. They aren't choices, they just are, right?

Allow me an analogy. Computers are decision machines. They take input, apply some tests, and produce output. And yet, all of their decisions are entirely deterministic. Given input X, the computer's decision will always be Y. The reason it is referred to as a decision is that a different input paramater may produce a different result. The fact that the results are deterministic does not change the fact that a decision was made.

In exactly the same way, on the B-Theory, the fact that the results of a decision are deterministic does not imply that no decision was made. Given different input parameters, the system in question would have made different decisions.

In what sense is tenseless time directional? Why would it be directional?

I literally explained this just a few posts ago, so I will copy and paste my answer, here:

There is absolutely a direction of Time on the B-Theory! As Sparko noted, that Arrow of Time seems to be a function of entropy, with rising entropic states of a system being that which defines the progression from earlier-than to later-than. In a purely physical theory of mind, it would seem reasonable to think that the neurology underlying psychological states follows this same entropic pattern.

[JimL]

Allow me an analogy. Computers are decision machines. They take input, apply some tests, and produce output. And yet, all of their decisions are entirely deterministic. Given input X, the computer's decision will always be Y. The reason it is referred to as a decision is that a different input paramater may produce a different result. The fact that the results are deterministic does not change the fact that a decision was made.

In exactly the same way, on the B-Theory, the fact that the results of a decision are deterministic does not imply that no decision was made. Given different input parameters, the system in question would have made different decisions.

I don't think you understood my point. There can be no input within that which has always been, correct? X has always been X, and Y has always been Y. There are no decisions about that being made if each point along the time line, if each decision, each X and Y, has always been, correct, or no?