Determinism And Rationality.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

It's difficult to imagine how such a theory could rely on current physical concepts.

I completely agree that it's difficult! It was similarly difficult for 16th Century thinkers to imagine how the Earth might be in motion around the Sun. Now that is not to claim that we certainly WILL form a deterministic theory of consciousness; rather, I'm simply noting that the difficulty in imagining X based on our current understanding does not imply that X is impossible.

Interesting that a naturalist would place so much importance on such a 'concept.' So I guess it exerts causal power in a way and yet it is not physical. I assume that it is mind-dependent(?). I assume that there are many other concepts with causal power, such as justice, freedom, equality,...

I don't think I'd object to saying that "in a sense" these things have causal power. But then, I view causation as a temporal ordering relation rather than something which affects ontology, so I suspect that might still present differences in our points of view.

Yes, definitely! That would be an interesting thread. I'm certainly not a B-Theorist. I believe in an ontologically open universe. But we can restrict ourselves to cognition and consciousness on this thread for purposes of clarity ( although we never stick to the OP with these threads!).

Cool! I'll start another thread. I recently wrote an article for my blog responding to Ed Feser on Neo-Aristotelian views of Act and Potency in light of modern physics, so I'll use that as a starting point.

Right. I read where you wrote that you were a determinist even when you were a Christian. Is it fair to say that determinism is more foundational to your belief system than theism/atheism?

I'd say that's fair. I can imagine conditions under which I might assent to some sort of theism. I cannot imagine anything which would overturn my understanding of Time, however.

[seer]

So you do think that Determinism means that something is acting upon a person to restrict an otherwise free choice, then?

No, I think it means that you were pre-programmed by the non-rational forces of nature to think and act as you do. Forces that have no concept of reasoning.

It's really not. If it had been clear, I wouldn't be asking questions asking for clarification. I'm not trying to be obtuse, here-- I sincerely don't understand what you mean.

Perhaps you can tell me exactly what you don't understand: Libertarianism holds onto a concept of free will that requires the agent to be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances, interactionist dualists believe that some non-physical mind, will, or soul overrides physical causality.

Once again, you have offered no justification for asserting that rational cognition cannot arise from deterministic principles. The fact that a person's cognition, on Determinism, results from deterministic principles does not imply that it is not actually that person performing cognitive acts. You've offered no justification for thinking that a person's actions are suddenly not their actions given Determinism.

Yes and a dog is performing his cognitive acts. And? The question is - what programmed the dog, and you? And how do you know you were programmed correctly?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

No, I think it means that you were pre-programmed by the non-rational forces of nature to think and act as you do. Forces that have no concept of reasoning.

This still seems like you think that these underlying deterministic principles act upon entities, especially in light of your later comments in this post. Do you think that some act of programming occurs?

Perhaps you can tell me exactly what you don't understand: Libertarianism holds onto a concept of free will that requires the agent to be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances, interactionist dualists believe that some non-physical mind, will, or soul overrides physical causality.

As I mentioned before, I don't know what it means "to be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances."

Like I said, I think I understand some of the things which you DON'T mean by this. I don't think you mean this as a purely epistemic description and I don't think you mean this in a purely stochastic sense. However, that's not the same as understanding what this DOES mean.

In particular, I certainly don't understand what it means to "override physical causality." Is this meant to imply that some non-physical thing can suspend the laws of physics?

Yes and a dog is performing his cognitive acts. And? The question is - what programmed the dog, and you? And how do you know you were programmed correctly?

This is why I asked earlier if you think that something is performing an action on entities. I don't believe that any programming has occurred, in these cases, any more than a rock in mid-air is "programmed" to fall to the ground.

[seer]

This still seems like you think that these underlying deterministic principles act upon entities, especially in light of your later comments in this post. Do you think that some act of programming occurs?

Well yes, if determinism is true something caused us to think and act as we do. And as far as I can see that something was the non-reasoning forces of nature. What else is there?

As I mentioned before, I don't know what it means "to be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances."

Like I said, I think I understand some of the things which you DON'T mean by this. I don't think you mean this as a purely epistemic description and I don't think you mean this in a purely stochastic sense. However, that's not the same as understanding what this DOES mean.

It means that we are not locked in to physical cause and effect (which would be the case with determinism) - that a non-physical mind or will or soul can override physical causality. I'm not sure why that is so hard to understand.

In particular, I certainly don't understand what it means to "override physical causality." Is this meant to imply that some non-physical thing can suspend the laws of physics?

Right, can override or supervene on the physical. Like immaterial thoughts can supervene in the physical.

This is why I asked earlier if you think that something is performing an action on entities. I don't believe that any programming has occurred, in these cases, any more than a rock in mid-air is "programmed" to fall to the ground.

But at bottom this example is following the laws of nature. These laws dictate what will happen in this case as much as they dictate what you think, feel or do. We are the passive vessels carrying out what said laws pre-determined.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Well yes, if determinism is true something caused us to think and act as we do. And as far as I can see that something was the non-reasoning forces of nature. What else is there?

I think I've narrowed down a point of our miscommunication, now. I understand causation to be a descriptive notion, that is to say we describe patterns in reality through an ordering relation. Unless I am mistaken, you understand causation as a prescriptive notion, that is to say the power which affects a thing's ontology. Is that a fair statement?

It means that we are not locked in to physical cause and effect (which would be the case with determinism) - that a non-physical mind or will or soul can override physical causality. I'm not sure why that is so hard to understand.

Right, can override or supervene on the physical. Like immaterial thoughts can supervene in the physical.

It's difficult to understand because I'm unclear as to how a thing, physical or non-physical, could suspend or supervene upon the laws of physics. Certainly you don't think such suspensions are unlimited. So what is the mechanism by which such a thing could occur? What constrains it to only supervene on a rather small subset of physical laws? How is it even logically possible for such a supervention to occur?

[seer]

I think I've narrowed down a point of our miscommunication, now. I understand causation to be a descriptive notion, that is to say we describe patterns in reality through an ordering relation. Unless I am mistaken, you understand causation as a prescriptive notion, that is to say the power which affects a thing's ontology. Is that a fair statement?

Yes, I think I agree. To put it in my words, what we are, what we think, feel or believe is all pre-determined by the forces of nature. Forces that are not in themselves rational (i.e. reasoning).

It's difficult to understand because I'm unclear as to how a thing, physical or non-physical, could suspend or supervene upon the laws of physics. Certainly you don't think such suspensions are unlimited. So what is the mechanism by which such a thing could occur? What constrains it to only supervene on a rather small subset of physical laws? How is it even logically possible for such a supervention to occur?

I'm not sure of the mechanism that would be involved, but let me ask you - do you believe that immaterial thoughts can influence patterns or function in the physical brain? Or do you hold to epiphenomenalism?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Yes, I think I agree. To put it in my words, what we are, what we think, feel or believe is all pre-determined by the forces of nature. Forces that are not in themselves rational (i.e. reasoning).

Alright, in that case it seems that you and I may have been talking past each other this whole time. When I speak about deterministic principles I'm not talking about entities which exert ontological power over anything else. I'm talking about descriptions of patterns in extant reality.

I'm not sure of the mechanism that would be involved, but let me ask you - do you believe that immaterial thoughts can influence patterns or function in the physical brain? Or do you hold to epiphenomenalism?

I actually don't subscribe to either of these views. I'm more of an identity theorist. That is, I identify mental events with the physical processes which underlie them. On my view it is neither the case that mental events are immaterial nor that they are causally effete.

But, again, we have very different understandings of causation so that may be the source of some confusion, here.

[seer]

Alright, in that case it seems that you and I may have been talking past each other this whole time. When I speak about deterministic principles I'm not talking about entities which exert ontological power over anything else. I'm talking about descriptions of patterns in extant reality.

OK, so do you agree, that what we are, everything we think do or say is pre-determined by the forces of nature?

I actually don't subscribe to either of these views. I'm more of an identity theorist. That is, I identify mental events with the physical processes which underlie them. On my view it is neither the case that mental events are immaterial nor that they are causally effete.

Causally effete? Why do you make me look up words? But you do believe that all your thoughts are determined - correct?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

OK, so do you agree, that what we are, everything we think do or say is pre-determined by the forces of nature?

Causally effete? Why do you make me look up words? But you do believe that all your thoughts are determined - correct?

Sorry! I'm honestly not trying to be obscure with my vocab. These are just very specialized topics so I sometimes find the need to use specialized language.

That said, before I can agree that these things are "determined," I kinda need an acknowledgement that you recognize that you and I have been using the word in two completely different ways; and a clarification as to whether you are asking me if these are "determined" in my descriptive sense or "determined" in your prescriptive sense.

[seer]

Sorry! I'm honestly not trying to be obscure with my vocab. These are just very specialized topics so I sometimes find the need to use specialized language.

That said, before I can agree that these things are "determined," I kinda need an acknowledgement that you recognize that you and I have been using the word in two completely different ways; and a clarification as to whether you are asking me if these are "determined" in my descriptive sense or "determined" in your prescriptive sense.

I'm not sure how terms like prescriptive or descriptive even apply to my point. I mean either you believe that what we are, and everything we think do or say is pre-determined by the forces of nature, or you don't.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

I'm not sure how terms like prescriptive or descriptive even apply to my point. I mean either you believe that what we are, and everything we think do or say is pre-determined by the forces of nature, or you don't.

Again, we seem to mean two entirely different things when we say "determined." You mean ontologically determined, whereas I do not.

So let me try it like this: no, I don't believe that the forces of nature affect the ontological state of the things we think, do, or say. That is not what I mean when I refer to deterministic principles.

[seer]

Again, we seem to mean two entirely different things when we say "determined." You mean ontologically determined, whereas I do not.

So let me try it like this: no, I don't believe that the forces of nature affect the ontological state of the things we think, do, or say. That is not what I mean when I refer to deterministic principles.

So the forces of nature do not create the dog the way he is?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

So the forces of nature do not create the dog the way he is?

That is correct. I do not believe that the forces of nature bring the dog into reality. They do not perform any sort of actions, let alone creative actions.

[seer]

That is correct. I do not believe that the forces of nature bring the dog into reality. They do not perform any sort of actions, let alone creative actions.

Then what does create the dog?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Then what does create the dog?

Ontologically speaking? Nothing. The dog is a particular locality of a completely extant cosmos.