Are Thoughts Causal?

[Jim B.]

Of course, its analogous. The Higgs boson or the simultaneous dual nature of light - or any of the many other applications of quantum mechanics defy the reasoning of metaphysical logic.

You miss my point. It's still a structural/ functional question, even if it is a metaphysical conundrum. It's a third-person conundrum. And whether the puzzle is epistemic or ontological may have to be decided philosophically.

https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02207-1

In short, science is well on the way to understanding the physical nature of consciousness and its origins in the material brain.

Did you actually read what I wrote? What you refer to has to do with what I was referring to as extrinsic, relational, causal, ie physical. It has to do with the functions associated with conscious experience. Yes, science is about investigating the PHYSICAL nature of consciousness and its ORIGINS (causal dispositions) in the material brain. Has nothing to do with what is ESSENTIAL to conscious experience, the intrinsic nature, how it feels, the first-person ontology. Science is about third-person ontology. I realize you are an epistemic totalitarian, or at least unitarian, but the world is clearly pluralistic; have you ever entertained the possibility that not all things are one thing? That the world is not as simple as all that?

[JimL]

You miss my point. It's still a structural/ functional question, even if it is a metaphysical conundrum. It's a third-person conundrum. And whether the puzzle is epistemic or ontological may have to be decided philosophically.





Did you actually read what I wrote? What you refer to has to do with what I was referring to as extrinsic, relational, causal, ie physical. It has to do with the functions associated with conscious experience. Yes, science is about investigating the PHYSICAL nature of consciousness and its ORIGINS (causal dispositions) in the material brain. Has nothing to do with what is ESSENTIAL to conscious experience, the intrinsic nature, how it feels, the first-person ontology. Science is about third-person ontology. I realize you are an epistemic totalitarian, or at least unitarian, but the world is clearly pluralistic; have you ever entertained the possibility that not all things are one thing? That the world is not as simple as all that?

But isn't it also possible that all things are one thing, that all things eminate from one and the same substance? That the world is as simple as all that?

[Tassman]

you assume is my position as being that 'consciousness must be more than the physical activity of the brain.'

If you believe that consciousness is no more than a consequence of the physical activity of the brain then we are in agreement.

I never claimed that an argument can be confirmed solely via logic and reason, but that in some cases logic and reason can be the decisive criterion.

The decisive criterion is determined by scientific testing of the model NOT by philosophical argument. The latter is unable to attain a verifiable true conclusion, decisive or otherwise.

Take the argument that thoughts have an immaterial aspect. This is a philosophical argument that turns decisively on logic and reason.

If thoughts had no immaterial aspect, if they were completely material, no two material brains could think the 'same' thought simultaneously. But this is clearly not the case. Also, there would be no aspect to thoughts that would be 'right' or 'wrong', 'justified' or 'unjustified', since these categories do not apply to material objects.

Metaphysical argument cannot resolve such hypothetical questions. Science is better equipped because it is able to investigate and understand the assemblage of organic algorithms shaped by natural selection over millions of years of evolution that have made us what we are in every respect.

[Tassman]

It's still a structural/ functional question, even if it is a metaphysical conundrum. It's a third-person conundrum.

It's not a metaphysical conundrum it's a scientific question yet to be fully resolved - although it is well on the way as previously linked.

science is about investigating the PHYSICAL nature of consciousness and its ORIGINS (causal dispositions) in the material brain. Has nothing to do with what is ESSENTIAL to conscious experience, the intrinsic nature, how it feels, the first-person ontology. Science is about third-person ontology.

have you ever entertained the possibility that not all things are one thing? That the world is not as simple as all that?

Conversely, have YOU ever entertained the possibility that all things are one thing? Namely a physical natural universe subject primarily to scientific investigation.

[Jim B.]

But isn't it also possible that all things are one thing, that all things eminate from one and the same substance? That the world is as simple as all that?

Yes, it's possible, as I've been saying, such as under neutral monism. That one thing might not be what we understand as 'physical'. It might first be helpful to try to understand what it is we mean by the word physical. In any event, regardless of what everything is, for us to believe what it is, we have to have reasons to believe that is what it is, and an actual argument or arguments. One cannot simply cite scientific evidence, because restricting oneself to that kind of evidence means you've already assumed an unargued metaphysical bias about reality, when that is the very point at issue.

[Jim B.]

If you believe that consciousness is no more than a consequence of the physical activity of the brain then we are in agreement.

Yes, because you have no idea or curiosity about what I'm talking about.

The decisive criterion is determined by scientific testing of the model NOT by philosophical argument. The latter is unable to attain a verifiable true conclusion, decisive or otherwise.

I'll keep repeating this comment as many times as necessary (probably forever):
The comment you made immediately above is a philosophical argument, not a strict scientific claim; it cannot be verified scientifically; it depends decisively for its persuasiveness on logic and reason. Scientific knowledge has its limits: it depends for its operation on certain metaphysical assumptions. Self-evident phenomenal claims are not scientific. Value claims are not scientific. Logical positivism makes claims that fail to meet its own standards of verification.

It’s a philosophical argument that turns “decisively on logic and reason” but cannot be resolved by this without scientific input. Philosophy is useful but it is not, and cannot be, an end in and of itself.

Never said it was "an end in and of itself." I said some matters turn on logic and reason and must be resolved by philosophical conclusion. Please stop straw-manning what I write.

This is a question about the proper scope of scientific knowledge and physical concepts. It is essentially about epistemology. Can physical science exhaustively reduce first-person experiences to third-person concepts and categories without losing what is essential to the former? It is about inter-theoretic reduction between what are arguably distinct ontological categories. The matter turns on whether conscious experiences actually ARE a distinct ontological category. It is NOT a routine scientific instrumental matter for routine scientific investigation. To assume that it is is already to assume an unargued metaphysical bias, ie to beg the crucial question.

EVEN REDUCTIONISTS WHO AGREE WITH YOU AGREE THAT THIS IS WHAT THE ISSUE IS ABOUT. THEY AGREE IT'S NOT SIMPLY ABOUT GATHERING MORE DATA. IT'S ABOUT ONTOLOGY AND THE SCOPE OF KNOWLEDGE. IT'S NOT SIMPLY AN INSTRUMENTAL SCIENTIFIC ISSUE. PLEASE TRY TO LEARN SOMETHING ABOUT THIS ISSUE TO WHERE YOU CAN ACTUALLY UNDERSTAND WHAT I AM WRITING AND YOU CAN RESPOND COHERENTLY, OR LET'S MOVE ON.

This is the issue in a nutshell. I don't expect you to understand any of it. I'm sure it will all bounce off of your ideological armor like bb's off of a steel-plated wall.

Is there anyone out there who can understand anything of what I've written?! Otherwise, this is a waste of time and I'll jump off here.

[Jim B.]

It's not a metaphysical conundrum it's a scientific question yet to be fully resolved - although it is well on the way as previously linked.

You missed the word "if." Need to work on reading comprehension. Some things MAY be only resolvable philosophically.



What is essential to conscious experience is the first-person ontology, what it feels like. Science investigates third-person ontology. A different epistemic dimension. Sorry to burst your science-religion, but there are compelling reasons to think that science is not all-knowing.

Conversely, have YOU ever entertained the possibility that all things are one thing? Namely a physical natural universe subject primarily to scientific investigation.

I would venture to say more than you have the converse. The difference is I have actual reasons for doubting that everything is physical, not just circular reasoning. And I think everything might very well BE one thing, just not physical. How do you define the word 'physical'?

[JimL]

Yes, it's possible, as I've been saying, such as under neutral monism. That one thing might not be what we understand as 'physical'. It might first be helpful to try to understand what it is we mean by the word physical. In any event, regardless of what everything is, for us to believe what it is, we have to have reasons to believe that is what it is, and an actual argument or arguments. One cannot simply cite scientific evidence, because restricting oneself to that kind of evidence means you've already assumed an unargued metaphysical bias about reality, when that is the very point at issue.

But light isn't a thing in itself, heat isn't a thing in itself and sound isn't a thing in itself, so however you define them, they have no existence in and of themselves, but are products of matter. So, why should we assume that "what it feels like to be," consciousness, is a thing in itself apart from the physical nervous system/brain? At any rate, I think that what this argument always redounds to is the existence of a soul, a mind that has existence distinct from, and directs, or controls the physical body, and for that there is no evidence.

[Tassman]

what this argument always redounds to is the existence of a soul, a mind that has existence distinct from, and directs, or controls the physical body, and for that there is no evidence.

Indeed! Blind Freddy could see that this is where this is going.

[Tassman]

Some things MAY be only resolvable philosophically.

Nothing is resolved only

What is essential to conscious experience is the first-person ontology, what it feels like.

In short, mere subjective feelings unsupported by actual facts. Your argument is just based upon your subjective feeling

I would venture to say more than you have the converse. The difference is I have actual reasons for doubting that everything is physical

at all.

[Sparko]

Jim B., arguing with Tassman is fruitless. He doesn't have a grasp of the topic and he just keeps repeating himself till you get tired and go away. He then thinks he "won."

That's his SOP.

JimL is the little yapping "Me, too!" dog nipping at your ankles.

[Jim B.]

Indeed! Blind Freddy could see that this is where this is going.

It does not hinge on a soul. How many times do you have to be told the same thing? Are you being willfully dense, is your ideology constricting your critical faculties, or are you natively limited in that regard? Emergentism and neutral monism are just two options that do not require souls.

[Jim B.]

Nothing is resolved only by the logic and reasoning of philosophy. Conversely, one restricts oneself to scientific evidence because that’s the only kind of measurable evidence there is.

Again, I would suggest you familiarize yourself with some basic problems in physics, such as the nature of time. No one knows with absolute certainty that it can be resolved decisively by empirical means alone. To say that it can expresses nothing more than an irrational faith in science.

In short, mere subjective feelings unsupported by actual facts. Your argument is just based upon your subjective feeling that the “I” is somehow special and therefore must have a separate existence from the material world.

You're misreading "feelings" as "ungrounded or unwarranted subjective opinions." I'm referring to the fact that things feel a certain way to conscious subjects AT ALL, that there are qualia OF ANY KIND AT ALL. Do you start to see a glimmer of a difference? I'm not hopeful.

No, you don’t. What you have are unverifiable academic arguments grounded in feelings, NOT “actual reasons” at all.

The contingency argument I cited, which I doubt you even understood, is not an example of "feelings." The epistemic argument is another example of actual reasons, another argument I seriously doubt you understood. You may disagree with these arguments and reasons, but you cannot dispute that they are reasons and not mere feelings. What YOU HAVE are feelings. What you have is an honorific sense of awe and unquestioning quasi-religious respect for "science." Your 'argument' goes something like this: "Science has solved every problem it has been confronted with in the past. Every problem science has solved is a physical problem. Therefore, every problem must be physical. Therefore, consciousness must be physical in nature. Therefore science must be able to solve the consciousness problem."

And when I point out the problems with this logic, you keep repeating it in some form and saying that my critique is merely "academic" and carries no weight because it's not science and "science is the only true method for gaining verifiable knowledge..." It's self-confirming silliness, hermetically sealed against any kind of introspection or critique....

[Jim B.]

But light isn't a thing in itself, heat isn't a thing in itself and sound isn't a thing in itself, so however you define them, they have no existence in and of themselves, but are products of matter. So, why should we assume that "what it feels like to be," consciousness, is a thing in itself apart from the physical nervous system/brain? At any rate, I think that what this argument always redounds to is the existence of a soul, a mind that has existence distinct from, and directs, or controls the physical body, and for that there is no evidence.

It doesn't have to be a "soul" as I've said, although there may be non-physical particulars. First we have to define what 'physical' means. Is it ontological or epistemic? All the things you mention, even though they are all 'products of matter,' can nevertheless be reduced to 'physical' concepts like structure and function. Conscious experience does not seem to fit that pattern. Why is that so earth-shaking? Why should one pattern of reduction meant for one type of phenomenon, third-person phenomena, fit all of reality? It was invented by people in the 17th century for certain specific ends; why should we expect it to be all-knowing?

[Jim B.]

Here is physicist Carlo Rovelli discussing why physics needs philosophy and vice versa, as a possible antidote to scientism:


https://blogs.scientificamerican.com...needs-physics/