Originally posted by Leonhard
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Cogito ergo sum
Here in the Philosophy forum we will talk about all the "why" questions. We'll have conversations about the way in which philosophy and theology and religion interact with each other. Metaphysics, ontology, origins, truth? They're all fair game so jump right in and have some fun! But remember...play nice!
Forum Rules: Here
Here in the Philosophy forum we will talk about all the "why" questions. We'll have conversations about the way in which philosophy and theology and religion interact with each other. Metaphysics, ontology, origins, truth? They're all fair game so jump right in and have some fun! But remember...play nice!
Forum Rules: Here
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Are Thoughts Causal?
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Originally posted by Leonhard View PostNeurology doesn't have specific claims right now about the particular correlations between social constructions of thoughts and will, and whatever neural correlations there are. In these discussions you've been somewhat overplaying the state of sciences as they are right now.
But is the kind of radical reductive materialism that you're talking about even a viable alternative?I've given you some challenges of things to account of. Intentionality, aboutness, qualia,
Those are all good questions. First of all we could begin with reasoning according to best explanation.
Which of these views provide a better account of the reality that we experience.
And we can begin to exclude those views who fail to account for these realities.
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Originally posted by Tassman View PostThe state of the sciences as they are right now have nevertheless shown they are on the right track. ... Reductive materialism is the only viable alternative if you are to avoid mere subjective (so-called 'common-sense') arguments based upon apparent self-evident truths, which have very often been shown to be wrong. ... You have given no challenges at all. All you have given are speculative hypotheses with no means to determine whether or not they are factually true. ... How do you obtain the correct premise so as to begin with reasoning according to best explanation? ... How do you validly conclude what is the better account of the reality that you experience, given that your experiences are purely subjective? ... On what basis do you exclude those views that fail to account for these subjective realities. How do you know your subjective views are correct gut instinct?
I've asked you to begin to demonstrate an account of these subjective qualities: Thoughts, intention, aboutness. Come on, try it. Give an account of how an explanation that consists entirely of micromechanical motion becomes qualia? We've been asking you to do this for several pages now. For several years in fact! And all you've done is to allude to explanations that don't exist. It's not that the field of Neurology is on the path to finally give an account of qualia, they're not even on that road at all. No one is trying to explain intention. Or give an account of what it means for a thought to be 'about something'.
I detect a general theme in your objection which goes something like this "Reductive materialists know how to answer the questions they ask. How do you answer your questions, give me a method." and "Since reductive materialism has a well defined way to answer all its questions, everything else is nonsense and reductive materialism is to be preferred"
I'm trying here to be as fair to you as I can be because you almost never explain your viewpoint. You object to the use of inferences to best explanations, and yet you use the same logic yourself. You're doing that right here, you consider reductive materialism to be preferrable, on the basis of methodology. Now I'd gladly challenge you. Reductive materialism has no such methodology. Chemists use different methods than physicists, biologists use different methods than chemists, and so does history, geography, sociology, psychology, and so forth. There's no grand unified method of science within reductive materialism, there is only a grand story of how one field ultimately reduces to the other even if defacto such reductions or bridging laws don't exist, or are impossible to derive.
Reductive materialism is just one of many popular metaphysics of the world. Its popularity stems from a particular school of philosophy called Logical Positivism which became popular in Europe. Their goal was to do away with as much metaphysics as possible and focus solely on supposedly objective science. They defined that only knowledge gained by science or analysis was to be considered knowledge, and all other statements were to be considered nonsense. This was for a time a popular metaphysics, but unfortunately, they ran into unsolvable coherency issues, because no matter how they defined that approach logical positivism, in the end, fell to the exact same analysis and became nonsense by definition - as it was neither something amenable to scientific study or something you could derive from the analysis.
Further nails in the coffin of logical positivism were banged in by the post-structuralists who uncovered that completely objective science was an impossibility.
I propose no method for arriving at truth different than what people have always used. When it comes to metaphysics there are transcendental arguments where we infer what must be true, in order for us to be even able to make an argument or reason at all; there are inferences to the best explanation, where we compare different metaphysics and look for deficiencies in them (you've used this yourself several times); there are even concrete analytical arguments, beginning with trivially true premises and drawing conclusions from it. If you're unfamiliar with any of this, why not read some of the philosophy I've suggested to you for several years now.
Finally, you seem to object to "subjective realities"? I'm talking about what you experience. Yes, "pain" is a "subjective" experience. It's experienced by a subject. However, the existence of pain is an undeniable fact. We are more confident that pain exists, and is real than we are that quantum mechanics and general relativity is a better account of motion than Newtonian mechanics. Similarly, I point out experiences you undeniably have, such as the qualia of pain, or the fact that you've made thoughts about this page, or that you intend to make a witty response.
The experience of those sensations are completely objective, and completely undeniably.
But it's those fundamental, mundane things, that are the hardest to account of in the world to account for the materialist. Most of them bite the bullet and try to deny them. And here I've offered you names you seem perpetually unfamiliar with because I think if you wanna make the case, then you should at least be aware of their arguments. That would be a much more fruitful discussion at least.
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Originally posted by Leonhard View Post
I've asked you to begin to demonstrate an account of these subjective qualities: Thoughts, intention, aboutness.
Secondly you ask yourself
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Originally posted by Tassman View PostAnd Ive asked you to explain your unevidenced speculations but all Ive got in response is a multi-paragraph monologue wherein you avoid addressing my questions altogether and resort to lecturing. Seemingly on the basis that the more words you use the more convincing your argument must be. Might I suggest that the reverse is true and that you would do well to sharpen Occam's razor.
I spent many words because I think there's a lot to deal with. I did not, however, avoid addressing your points.
- You claimed that reductive materialism is preferable - I pointed out areas where it has deficiencies.
- I tried to highlight it's history to show how it's more of an accident that it became popular than anything based on reason.
- Your arguments are based on arguing against any other method than natural science - yet you yourself use inferences to the best explanation, and other arguments common in metaphysics to justify this. I pointed out this contradiction, as I've done before.
- I pointed out that it's a naive view of the philosophy of science to assume that there's always a clear and unambiguous method of doing science.
- I argued that your position had coherency issues - as was demonstrated about logical positivism.
- I challenged you to give an account of qualia, aboutness or intentionality and argued that their existence, like the existence of pain, is objective.
All of those points are succient and specifically addresses your position.
You say we can begin demonstrating subjective qualities such as Thoughts, intention, aboutness by reasoning according to best explanation.
And the answer is that you haven't, because it is isn't possible to have any account of those things under reductive materialism.
Secondly you ask yourself Which of these views provide a better account of the reality that we experience. But you did not address my query as to how you can validly conclude what is the better account of the reality you experience, given that what you experience is purely subjective to you.
We're more certain that pain is real, than we are of Feynmann and Gell Mann' Quantum Electrodynamics being a better explanation of the motion of electrons than the Semi-Classical approximation of Shroedinger and Bohr.
Finally, you suggest that we can begin to exclude those views that fail to account for these realities. But you did not answer my question: on what basis do you exclude those views that fail to account for your personal subjective realities. How do you know your personal subjective views are correct?
It is up to you to argue why the premises can be disputed or to demonstrate why the arguments are fallacious. You haven't done any of that though.
On the other hand I haven't noticed any arguments from you, other than you assuming reductive materialism to be true, and then claiming victory.Last edited by Leonhard; 05-28-2020, 02:32 PM.
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Originally posted by Leonhard View PostOccam's razor has nothing to do with how long the response is;
I spent many words because I think there's a lot to deal with. I did not, however, avoid addressing your points.
[*]You claimed that reductive materialism is preferable - I pointed out areas where it has deficiencies.And the answer is that you haven't, because it is isn't possible to have any account of those things under reductive materialism.
You disambiguate here between subjective experiences, and the existence of a subjective experience, where you seemingly consider both "subjective". It's true they involve a subject. But are you ready to claim that the existence of pain is not an objective fact? That would be ridiculous!We're more certain that pain is real, than we are of Feynmann and Gell Mann' Quantum Electrodynamics being a better explanation of the motion of electrons than the Semi-Classical approximation of Shroedinger and Bohr.
I exclude them on the basis that there's a feature of reality, that I, and others, can perceive to be real, which isn't accounted for in that metaphysics. Ergo it is incomplete, it is lacking something, and a richer metaphysics is needed.That's about it. Calling it a "personal subjective view" is ridiculous. You can disagree with the arguments, but then you to deal with the arguments.
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Originally posted by seer View PostMany materialists do not believe that thoughts have a causal role in any sense, they are in effect epiphenomenal. To quote T.H. Huxley:
"Consciousness would appear to be related to the mechanism of the body simply as a collateral product of its working, and to be as completely without any power of modifying that working as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery..."
What he refereed to as "conscious automata."
In other words our thoughts have no real effect on behavior. This seems like a way to counter any form of dualism. But it seems to be that immaterial thoughts do play a causal role in behavior, this I believe is obvious in everyday experience.Many and painful are the researches sometimes necessary to be made, for settling points of [this] kind. Pertness and ignorance may ask a question in three lines, which it will cost learning and ingenuity thirty pages to answer. When this is done, the same question shall be triumphantly asked again the next year, as if nothing had ever been written upon the subject.
George Horne
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