Are Thoughts Causal?

[Jim B.]

Here's an interview with neuroscientist and philosopher Raymond Tallis where he argues against neuroscientistic reductionism of the mind to the brain. It's about 50 minutes long but definitely worth it!

https://blogs.scientificamerican.com...needs-physics/

[Tassman]

It does not hinge on a soul.

What does not that

Emergentism and neutral monism are just two options that do not require souls.

How do you obtain evidence to support these metaphysical beliefs of yours. How do you test them? If you cannot then you have no argument. Just endless talk.

[Sparko]

But light isn't a thing in itself, heat isn't a thing in itself and sound isn't a thing in itself, so however you define them, they have no existence in and of themselves, but are products of matter. So, why should we assume that "what it feels like to be," consciousness, is a thing in itself apart from the physical nervous system/brain? At any rate, I think that what this argument always redounds to is the existence of a soul, a mind that has existence distinct from, and directs, or controls the physical body, and for that there is no evidence.

Light and heat are things. They are energy. Photons. They exist in and of themselves. Once a photon is emitted, it exists until absorbed by something. There are photons still flying around from the big bang itself. That is what the Cosmic Backround Radiation is.

[Jim B.]

What does not “hinge on a soul?” Your subjective, unevidenced belief that the “I” is not a part of the material world? Is that what does not “hinge on a soul?”

Possible theories explaining consciousness. Please define your understanding of the phrase 'material world.' Is it understood ontologically, as a domain of reality, or epistemically, as a kind of understanding? All of your beliefs are based upon an UNscientific metaphysical assumption, ie strong metaphysical naturalism.

How do you obtain evidence to support these metaphysical beliefs of yours. How do you test them? If you cannot then you have no argument. Just endless talk.

Again, your fundamental misunderstanding of the issues. I'm not the one peddling metaphysical beliefs. I'm arguing for LACK OF METAPHYSICAL BELIEF, or at least radical skepticism in the face of the prevailing metaphysical belief of the day, which is strong metaphysical naturalism. You are the one pushing the metaphysical belief. You are the one making the unwarranted metaphysical leap of faith. I'm merely calling into question the unwarrantedness of your leap and your supreme self-confidence.

[Tassman]

Possible theories explaining consciousness.

How do you obtain actual evidence to support these How do you test them? If you cannot then ALL you have is academic speculation.

Please define your understanding of the phrase 'material world.'

refers to the physical world wherein all our natural senses, including mental states and consciousness, are dependent upon the action of the living brain. We know that our consciousness is affected by external influences such as anesthesia, or alcohol or physical pain etc.

All of your beliefs are based upon strong metaphysical naturalism.

I'm arguing for LACK OF METAPHYSICAL BELIEF, or at least radical skepticism in the face of the prevailing metaphysical belief of the day, which is strong metaphysical naturalism.

There is good reason why metaphysical naturalism is the It produces evidence (via scientific methodology) that can be tested and make predictions. Your alternative arguments do not.

[Jim B.]

How do you obtain actual evidence to support these “possible theories explaining consciousness?” How do you test them? If you cannot then ALL you have is academic speculation.

You're confused again. They are mere speculations in answer to JimL's questions. They are completely EXTRANEOUS to my argument. But I can understand why you want to divert the conversation.

“Material world” refers to the physical world wherein all our natural senses, including mental states and consciousness, are dependent upon the action of the living brain. We know that our consciousness is affected by external influences such as anesthesia, or alcohol or physical pain etc.

Yes, the "Easy Problem" as I've been over innumerable times and which you've never grasped. But what do you mean by "physical"?

My beliefs are based upon empirical scientific methodology, which in turn is grounded in metaphysical naturalism. Conversely, without empirically based scientific methodology, you have no means to obtain evidence to support your tentative explanations for ‘consciousness’.

But methodological naturalism need not be grounded in metaphysical naturalism. If that were the case, then no true theist could consistently be or have ever been a true natural scientist, which is clearly absurd. You are premising your entire worldview upon strict metaphysical naturalism, which is a NON-scientific metaphysical assumption that is not required to be a working scientist.

Once again, my tentative explanations for consciousness are mere speculations and are extraneous to my actual argument which calls into question to your non-scientific metaphysical assumption of metaphysical naturalism.

There is good reason why metaphysical naturalism is the “prevailing belief of the day”. It produces evidence (via scientific methodology) that can be tested and make predictions. Your alternative arguments do not.

Metaphysical naturalism does not "produce" such evidence. Methodological naturalism produces such evidence. Working scientists have all sorts of varying metaphysical commitments without such variance impinging upon their methodological commitment to, or their productivity within, their discipline. Einstein arguably believed in some form of Spinozistic deity.

Here is a list of Christians in science and technology:

[Jim B.]

Having trouble posting a link to that page...

[Jim B.]

Here are the listings from Wikipedia for Christians in Science and Technology just for the 20th and 21st Centuries(not including those still living):

[Tassman]

Yes, the "Easy Problem"

There is only ONE problem being discussed here, i.e. the nature of consciousness, and this is being resolved by science.

But what do you mean by "physical"?

Once again, my tentative explanations for consciousness are mere speculations and are extraneous to my actual argument

"Extraneous!", these are the only arguments we've heard. So, what is

Metaphysical naturalism does not "produce" such evidence. Methodological naturalism produces such evidence.

https://infidels.org/library/modern/...aturalism.html

Here is a list of Christians in science and technology:

Really!https://www.pewforum.org/2009/11/05/...ts-and-belief/

[EvoUK]

There is only ONE problem being discussed here, i.e. the nature of consciousness, and this is being resolved by science.

I'm not sure if you're both talking cross purposes here, but Jim B is referring to Chalmers 'Easy' and 'Hard' problems of consciousness. The difference I suppose would be the easy problems refer to the mechanisms of the brain that cause the function - which parts of the brain do what, etc. The hard problem according to Chalmers is that that subjective experience is distinct from this and cannot be explained so easily.

I'd point out that the idea that the hard problems cannot be solved eventually by explaining the easy problems isn't settled by cognitive neuroscientists, and there is significant disagreement in the field regarding this. Also, it basically amounts to a glorified god-of-the-gaps argument as is being presented here.

A quick summary can be found on the wiki here.

[Tassman]

I'm not sure if you're both talking cross purposes here, but Jim B is referring to Chalmers 'Easy' and 'Hard' problems of consciousness. The difference I suppose would be the easy problems refer to the mechanisms of the brain that cause the function - which parts of the brain do what, etc. The hard problem according to Chalmers is that that subjective experience is distinct from this and cannot be explained so easily.

I'd point out that the idea that the hard problems cannot be solved eventually by explaining the easy problems isn't settled by cognitive neuroscientists, and there is significant disagreement in the field regarding this. Also, it basically amounts to a glorified god-of-the-gaps argument as is being presented here.

A quick summary can be found on the wiki here.

argument. It's reminiscent of the Thomist

[EvoUK]

Could be worse - we could be having a TAG argument...

[Jim B.]

There is only ONE problem being discussed here, i.e. the nature of consciousness, and this is being resolved by science.

That is the point we are debating, remember? You have to establish that fact with actual reasons for believing it is so beyond your repeated stipulation that it is so.

What do you think I mean? The physical universe or material universe" as separate from a posited immaterial universe – as referred to by you in #237: “I am not claiming that there is an immaterial component to the universe. There may or may not be”.

I don't know what you think you mean, and I'm beginning to wonder if YOU do either. I think the word is just a dogmatic talismanically charged object for you that you might not have thought much about. I am using the word "physical" in the sense of "can be exhaustively understood in terms of structure and function."

"Extraneous!", these are the only arguments we've heard. So, what is your actual argument if not neutral monism, substance dualism or any of the other mind/body dualisms you’ve been positing – all of which are purely speculative?

Have you been reading my posts for the past month?! The actual arguments I've put up have been about why conscious experiences are NOT reducible to physical concepts. They are NOT ABOUT what consciousness is. No one knows for sure what consciousness is and if they say they do, they are charlatans trying to sell a cheap and easy dogma to the naive.

“The relationship between methodological and philosophical naturalism, while not one of logical entailment, is the only reasonable metaphysical conclusion given (1) the demonstrated success of methodological naturalism, combined with (2) the massive amount of knowledge gained by it, (3) the lack of a method or epistemology for knowing the supernatural, and (4) the subsequent lack of evidence for the supernatural. The above factors together provide solid grounding for philosophical naturalism, while supernaturalism remains little more than a logical possibility”.

https://infidels.org/library/modern/...aturalism.html

Again, this makes no sense in light of my last post. If being a working physical scientist is logically compatible with being a theist (a non-metaphysical naturalist), then it follows that the practice of physical science is logically compatible with the holding of metaphysical commitments OTHER THAN metaphysical naturalism.

“Everyone is Christian like me so I must be right”. Really!

Is that really the point you drew from my post?! UGH!!! Did I say EVERYONE is a Christian? All I was saying is that being a theist IS NOT LOGICALLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH BEING A PRACTICING SCIENTIST. Therefore, metaphysical naturalism is not a necessary condition for the practice of science.

Even so: “the percentage of scientists who are unaffiliated with any religion is much higher than among the general public. Nearly half of all scientists in the 2009 Pew Research Center poll (48%) say they have no religious affiliation (meaning they describe themselves as atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular), compared with only 17% of the public”.

https://www.pewforum.org/2009/11/05/...ts-and-belief/

See my point above.

[Jim B.]

argument. It's reminiscent of the Thomist

I've been wondering about that "AFAIC"; exactly how far does that "F" extend, not so much the caring but more the understanding? I've never heard you actually give your understanding, other than a very brief polemical caricature like the one above, of the HP. Could you give your rendition of what you understand the HP to be? Not a cut and paste but in your own words?

[Jim B.]

I'm not sure if you're both talking cross purposes here, but Jim B is referring to Chalmers 'Easy' and 'Hard' problems of consciousness. The difference I suppose would be the easy problems refer to the mechanisms of the brain that cause the function - which parts of the brain do what, etc. The hard problem according to Chalmers is that that subjective experience is distinct from this and cannot be explained so easily.

I'd point out that the idea that the hard problems cannot be solved eventually by explaining the easy problems isn't settled by cognitive neuroscientists, and there is significant disagreement in the field regarding this. Also, it basically amounts to a glorified god-of-the-gaps argument as is being presented here.

A quick summary can be found on the wiki here.

Why do you say it's a glorified god-of-the-gaps argument as it is presented here? A god-of-the-gaps argument relies on currently unknown empirical evidence. My argument is that empirical evidence is the wrong kind of evidence because conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical concepts without their essential qualitative nature being lost.