Originally posted by Jim B.
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Cogito ergo sum
Here in the Philosophy forum we will talk about all the "why" questions. We'll have conversations about the way in which philosophy and theology and religion interact with each other. Metaphysics, ontology, origins, truth? They're all fair game so jump right in and have some fun! But remember...play nice!
Forum Rules: Here
Here in the Philosophy forum we will talk about all the "why" questions. We'll have conversations about the way in which philosophy and theology and religion interact with each other. Metaphysics, ontology, origins, truth? They're all fair game so jump right in and have some fun! But remember...play nice!
Forum Rules: Here
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Are Thoughts Causal?
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Originally posted by Jim B. View PostThe burden is on YOU, the reductionist. I am arguing against reductionism. Jim L keeps asking me questions I am only speculating about. You are the one with the case to prove up.
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Originally posted by JimL View PostOkay, so what is the empirical evidence of immaterial consciousness?
Dallas Texas but I dont have a city in my head. The Cartesian creature that plays in my mind is clearly not physical. I cn have ideas of things that don;t exist and have never been seen,Last edited by metacrock; 04-06-2020, 01:02 PM.
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Originally posted by JimL View PostSo, would you say that the sub- or unconscious functions of the brain, lets say dreams, exist as immaterial things as well? And how would you define memories that are unconsciously stored in the brain?
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Originally posted by Tassman View PostBasically, your argument seems to be that consciousness being directly related to the physical activity of the brain is inconceivable because philosophy says it is. But naturalistic explanations for still-mysterious phenomena have frequently born fruit, especially in the future where research will undoubtedly uncover more information.
I remind you that nearly every philosophical argument and conclusion Aristotle made about physical science was wrong and misguided.
Your reductionism is a philosophical idea
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Originally posted by Tassman View PostYour position, namely that immaterialmaterial brain is incoherent. There is no nexus. Hence the burden of proof rests with you.
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Originally posted by Tassman View PostBasically, your argument seems to be that consciousness being directly related to the physical activity of the brain is inconceivable because philosophy says it is. But naturalistic explanations for still-mysterious phenomena have frequently born fruit, especially in the future where research will undoubtedly uncover more information. I remind you that nearly every philosophical argument and conclusion Aristotle made about physical science was wrong and misguided.
Physical ontology was a useful heuristic in the 17th century to describe, from a third-person perspective, the natural world devoid of conscious points of view. But the natural world includes first person points of view which physicalism with its third-person perspective is singularly ill-equipped to deal with. It is likely that a new paradigm is needed, somewhat like when the mechanical, action-at-a-distance, paradigm had to give way to a new understanding that included electromagnetism and fields as a fundamental entity.
The Aristotle analogy is not apt, as I have already pointed out, because he was making incorrect empirical claims. His metaphysical claims are still taken seriously. We are not having a debate about the content of physical science but, once again, a metaphysical and epistemological debate about the proper scope of physical science.
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Originally posted by Tassman View PostYour position, namely that immaterialmaterial brain is incoherent. There is no nexus. Hence the burden of proof rests with you.
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Excellent posts Jim B. devastating.
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Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
The Aristotle analogy is not apt, as I have already pointed out, because he was making incorrect empirical claims. His metaphysical claims are still taken seriously. We are not having a debate about the content of physical science but, once again, a metaphysical and epistemological debate about the proper scope of physical science.
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Originally posted by Jim B. View PostNo. Once again, my argument is that conscious experience is NOT reducible to physics or physical concepts. You are the one making the positive assertion. You are saying it IS reducible to physics. The burden is on you to prove that it is. I only have to show that you are wrong. You are asserting that "X is the case." I am saying "X is not the case." You are the prosecution. I am the defense.
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Again, you fundamentally misunderstand my point. I am not making an empirical claim. I am making a claim about the epistemic domain of physical science. I am not claiming that there is an immaterial component to the universe. There may or may not be. The point is that we do not know how to frame the question. It is fundamentally a framing problem, not an empirical problem. It's not a problem of needing to gather more facts, but in understanding what facts we need to gather.
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Originally posted by Tassman View PostThe reverse is true. It is you who is arguing that is material. Therefore, it is up to you to explain how a material entity such as the physical brain can connect with your hypothesized immaterial consciousness. Where is the nexus? Without one your argument is incoherent?
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Originally posted by Jim B. View PostAgain, you fundamentally misunderstand my point. I am not making an empirical claim. I am making a claim about the epistemic domain of physical science.
I am not claiming that there is an immaterial component to the universe. There may or may not be.
The point is that we do not know how to frame the question.
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Originally posted by Jim B. View PostBut not necessarily an immaterial substance, like a soul stuff. Just because something is not physical doesn't mean it's a non-physical substance.Substance dualism is only one possibility, as are various forms of idealism. Substance monism would mean that everything is one substance or stuff but presents under two aspects, physical and mental. No nexus is needed if everything is essentially one thing. If emergence is the case, then information is as likely a nexus as anything. But this is all speculation.
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